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Čelutka, Simas. "PROTAGORO RELIATYVIZMAS: FRAGMENTŲ ANALIZĖ." Problemos 83 (January 1, 2013): 49–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2013.0.834.
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Darbe analizuojama Protagoro filosofijos visuma, ypatingą dėmesį kreipiant į garsųjį homo mensura fragmentą. Pastarąjį nagrinėjant pasitelkiami svarbūs filologiniai patikslinimai, kuriais remiantis daroma išvada, jog iš homo mensura fragmento negalima išvesti etinio ar politinio reliatyvizmo: iš jo logiškai plaukia tik perceptyvinis reliatyvizmas. Taip pat parodoma, jog protagoriškąjį perceptyvinį reliatyvizmą galima suvokti tiek objektyvistiškai, tiek subjektyvistiškai. Darbe mėginama argumentuoti, jog Protagoro mąstymui didelę įtaką turėjo Hėrakleito ir Parmenido filosofijos. Nurodoma, kuriose vietose Platonas ir Aristotelis netiksliai suprato svarbiausią Protagoro ištarą, sykiu reabilituojant homo mensura fragmentą nuo kaltinimų savęs paneigimu. Grindžiama mintis, jog Protagoras buvęs ne ateistas, o subjektyvus agnostikas.Protagorean Relativism: An Analysis of the FragmentsSimas Čelutka SummaryThe article provides an analysis of Protagorean philosophy, concentrating on his famous homo mensura fragment. The examination is supported by significant philological clarifications, which eventually lead to the conclusion that ethico-political relativism does not follow from homo mensura fragment: only perceptual relativism logically follows. The argument goes on to show that Protagorean perceptual relativism may be understood both objectively and subjectively. The Heraclitean and Parmenidean influences upon Protagoras’ thought are also indicated. It is consequently shown how Plato and Aristotle misunderstood the central thesis of Protagoras, at the same time retrieving the homo mensura fragment from charges of self-refutation. It is also argued that Protagoras should not be called an “atheist”, but only a “subjective agnostic”.
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Whall, Mary B., Karen Bell, and Stanley Lombardo. "Plato: Protagoras." Classical World 87, no. 6 (1994): 508. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4351570.
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Whall, Mary B., and C. C. W. Taylor. "Plato: Protagoras." Classical World 87, no. 6 (1994): 509. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4351572.
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Joyal, Mark. "Plato: Protagoras." Mouseion: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada 9, no. 3 (2009): 346–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mou.2009.0015.
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Piazza, Mario. "PLATO AND THE DICE: A REASSESSMENT OF THEAETETUS 154A–155D." Cambridge Classical Journal 58 (November 26, 2012): 231–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1750270512000085.
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This paper focuses on the pair of philosophical puzzles, in the first section of Plato's Theaetetus, concerning the comparison between cardinalities and sizes. My initial task is to analyse some difficulties and distractions which affect our understanding of the argumentation that Socrates puts forward on Protagoras' behalf. I then offer a revised interpretation that integrates the puzzles with the rest of the Protagorean/Heraclitean theory. The emerging discussion, far from being a bridging passage or detour, is a unit with its own specific identity. Its goal is to stretch the Protagorean/Heraclitean metaphysics of events to a new limit: the dematerialisation of change. Change may also be the simple effect of quantitative comparisons as such. At the same time, important traces of Plato's indirect move against Protagoras are detected: the conceivability itself of this Protagorean view descends from a common application of mathematics.
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Keeling, Evan. "Plato, Protagoras, and Predictions." Journal of the History of Philosophy 58, no. 4 (2020): 633–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2020.0070.
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BRANCACCI, ALDO. "LA “DOTTRINA RISERVATA” DI PROTAGORA (PLAT. THEAET. 152c7-E1)." Méthexis 24, no. 1 (March 30, 2011): 87–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000580.
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In modern studies it has been largely denied that the so-called “secret doctrine” (which would be more correct to call “private teaching”) of the Theaetetus can be traced back to Protagoras. However, reasons why this doctrine can not be his own, have never been explained. At the same time, an appropriate justification of the hypothesis that it would be considered a pure Platonic creation has never been offered, nor was explained why it would be attributed to followers of Protagoras, but not to Protagoras himself. This article examines the Platonic text in an analytical way, shows how Plato repeatedly attributes to the sophist of Abdera the content of this doctrine, and, based on fragments of Protagoras and other doctrines related to him by ancient sources, it is evident that nothing in Protagorean concepts comes into conflict with Theaetetus so-called “secret doctrine”, and how actually is completely coherent with it.
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Wolfsdorf, D. "The historical reader of Plato's Protagoras." Classical Quarterly 48, no. 1 (May 1998): 126–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/48.1.126.
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The popular question why Plato wrote dramatic dialogues, which is motivated by a just fascination and perplexity for contemporary scholars about the unique form of the Platonic texts, is confused and anachronistic; for it judges the Platonic texts qua philosophical texts in terms of post–Platonic texts not written in dramatic dialogic form. In comparison with these, the form of Platos early aporetic dialogues is highly unusual. Yet, in its contemporary milieu, the form of Platonic literature is relatively normal. Dramatic dialogue was the most popular form of Attic literature in the late fifth and fourth centuries. This explains why Plato wrote dramatic dialogues.
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Sentesy, Mark. "Community with Nothing in Common?" Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2020): 155–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche2020107166.
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The Protagoras examines how community can occur between people who have nothing in common. Community, Protagoras holds, has no natural basis. Seeking the good is therefore not a theoretical project, but a matter of agreement. This position follows from his claim that “man is the measure of all things.” For Socrates community is based on a natural good, which is sought through theoretical inquiry. They disagree about what community is, and what its bases and goals are. But Plato illustrates the seriousness of Protagoras’s position through the repeated breakdown of their conversation. The dialogue leads us to question both speakers’ assumptions about community. Socrates must face the problem that not everything can be brought to language. Protagoras must recognize that there is a basis of community even in what cannot be shared. Community is grounded in an event that is both natural and not up to us, and cultural and articulate.
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Bazhenova, E. A. "On the Authenticity of Protagoras’ Myth and its Role in Plato’s Protagoras." Siberian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2019): 176–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2019-17-1-176-184.
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The article discusses the thesis according to which Protagoras’ myth in the dialogue of the same name by Plato originates in its core from the historical Protagoras. Although the author aligns with this thesis’ supporters, the analysis of the myth in the context of the dialogue as a whole, including dramatic features of the latter, allows her to presume that the myth is intended not so much to convey the views of the famous sophist as to contribute to the creation of the satirical image of his through which Plato ridicules Protagoras’ philosophical and pedagogical ambitions.
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Kołakowska, Katarzyna. "The Myth of Prometheus in Plato’s Protagoras." Roczniki Humanistyczne 66, no. 3 SELECTED PAPERS IN ENGLISH (October 23, 2019): 37–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rh.2018.66.3-3e.
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The Polish version of the article was published in “Roczniki Humanistyczne,” vol. 58–59 (2010–2011), issue 3
Protagoras is an exceptional dialogue of Plato as it uses two modes of expression: mythos and logos. Both are used by Protagoras in Great Speech, but the first one seems to be the most important. Protagoras chose the mythical mode of expression when he described to Socrates how he makes his pupils good citizens and politicians. The famous sophist told the story about two brothers: Prometheus and Epimetheus. It is easy to notice that Protagoras identifies with the clever Prometheus. However, the attentive reader can notice that Prometheus from Protagoras’ myth made a decision with fatal consequences. He entrusts his brother Epimetheus with a too responsible task. If Prometheus had been clever he should have predicted the dramatic consequences of his decision (see the etymology of his name). It might have been a conscious and intentional effort of Plato who wanted to ridicule Protagoras, the main opponent of Socrates. The resulting effect is so strong because Protagoras, who identifies with Prometheus, told the myth by himself in which Prometheus is in fact the less clever of the two brothers.
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Corradi, Michele. "Plato a Disciple of Protagoras? More on the Great Speech of the Protagoras." Peitho. Examina Antiqua, no. 1(4) (June 3, 2014): 141–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2013.1.7.
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The great speech of the Protagoras (320c–328d) still leaves many questions open. Particularly striking is the presence of doctrines that later on will be taken up and further developed by Plato in such dialogues as the Politicus, the Timaeus and the Laws. For this reason, many scholars tend to think that the words of Protagoras are just a product of Plato’s invention that bear no relation to Protagoras’ actual doctrines. Nevertheless, it is possible to propose a different interpretation. At the beginning of the Protagoras (313a–314b), Socrates develops the image of the sophist as the merchant of various μαθήματα: to sell his products, the sophist praises them all indiscriminately without knowing which of them are useful and which are harmful. But he who has the ability to make this distinction can still purchase the μαθήματα from Protagoras or anyone else. Through the dialectic, Plato is able to examine them without any danger in the Protagoras and then take them up and further develop in new ways in his later dialogues.
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Manuwald, Bernd. "Plato, Protagoras. Edited by Nicholas Denyer." Gnomon 82, no. 7 (2010): 586–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/0017-1417_2010_7_586.
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KAHN, CHARLES H. "PLATO AND SOCRATES IN THE PROTAGORAS." Méthexis 1, no. 1 (March 30, 1988): 33–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000005.
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Waterfield, Robin. "Plato: Protagoras. Edited by Nicholas Denyer." Heythrop Journal 52, no. 1 (December 8, 2010): 116–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00624_4.x.
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Javanmardi, Sana, and Saeed Binaaye Motlaq. "Two New Interpretation of Plato's Protagoras." International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences 24 (March 2014): 12–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.18052/www.scipress.com/ilshs.24.12.
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As we know, one of the most important ideas of Protagoras is Epistemic Relativism that this theory is attributed to him during the history of philosophy, without any dispute; But in the new era commentators such as Dr. Qavam Safari and Cornford by further and more precise reading the conversations between Protagoras and Theaetetus have concluded to this belief that Plato has interpreted the Protagoras’ rule of “Humanism“, by assimilating it with a course which he calls it “secret” and also the theory of Theaetetus “knowledge = perceiving”, in a way that it leads to perfect and very sophisticated relativism; and then in an ahistorical effort, Plato has imposed this relativism to the Protagoras’ mind. Whether this claim is proved or remained only as a claim, it should be discussed; so we have attempted to address this important issue in the present article.
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Morris, Michael. "Akrasia in the Protagoras and the Republic." Phronesis 51, no. 3 (2006): 195–229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852806778134072.
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AbstractAlthough it is a commonplace that the Protagoras and the Republic present diffent views of akrasia, the nature of the difference is not well understood. I argue that the logic of the famous argument in the Protagoras turns just on two crucial assumptions: that desiring is having evaluative beliefs (or that valuing is desiring), and that no one can have contradictory preferences at the same time; hedonism is not essential to the logic of the argument. And the logic of the argument for the division of the soul in the Republic requires the rejection of just the second of these assumptions, but not the evaluative conception of desire. I also maintain that Plato was aware, at the time of composition, of these features of the argumentation of his dialogues. Finally, I argue that there is reason to think that, even at the time of the Protagoras, Plato held the conception of the soul expressed in the Republic, and not anything like that expressed in the famous argument of the Protagoras. The Protagoras view, even without hedonism, is a poor expression of the thesis that virtue is knowledge.
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Matthen, Mohan. "Perception, Relativism, and Truth: Reflections on Plato's Theaetetus 152–160." Dialogue 24, no. 1 (1985): 33–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300045984.
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My purpose in this paper is to investigate the ontological structure of the theory that Plato ascribes to Protagoras in the Theaetetus (152–160). My interest is not just historical—what I wish to do is to explore the contemporary significance of Plato's Protagorean thesis, especially with regard to the theory of truth and the theory of perception. Even so, I shall attempt to say quite a lot about the text—I think that certain recent interpreters (especially M. F. Burnyeat [1982]) are on the wrong track with regard to Protagorean relativism, precisely due to their misjudging the relation of the Theaetetus doctrine to more recent philosophy.
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Nikitovic, Aleksandar. "Can virtue be taught?" Filozofija i drustvo 20, no. 3 (2009): 159–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid0903159n.
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The teachability of virtue is an issue on which were crossed swords during the struggle for supremacy between two basic principles of ancient Greek spirit - sophistry and ancient Greek ethics. Two great representatives of these opposite principles, Plato and Protagoras, confronted their arguments in Plato's dialog named after the great sophist. Paradoxically, during this philosophical struggle, Protagoras, who at the beginning supposed that virtue is teachable, later, on the contrary, states that virtue is not knowledge and this would make it least likely to be teachable. On the other hand Plato, who is trying to preserve the ancient Greek principle that virtue is innate, claims that virtue is knowledge. The solution of this great dispute between two principles of antiquity Plato sees in philosophical theoretization of ancient Greek mythical worldview.
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Politis, Vasilis. "What do the Arguments in the Protagoras Amount to?" Phronesis 57, no. 3 (2012): 209–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852812x640237.
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Abstract The main thesis of the paper is that, in the coda to the Protagoras (360e-end), Plato tells us why and with what justification he demands a definition of virtue: namely, in order to resolve a particular aporia. According to Plato’s assessment of the outcome of the arguments of the dialogue, the principal question, whether or not virtue can be taught, has, by the end of the dialogue, emerged as articulating an aporia, in that both protagonists, Socrates and Protagoras, have argued equally on both its sides. The first part of the paper provides an extensive analysis of the coda, with the aim of establishing the main thesis. The second part provides a comprehensive review of the arguments in the dialogue, with the aim of determining whether their outcome is what Plato says in the coda that it is. I undertake this review in three steps: on Plato’s conception of reasons (logoi); Socrates’ arguing on both sides; and Protagoras’ arguing on both sides.
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Volkova, Nadezhda. "Protagoras’ Homo mensura as the criterion of truth." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 2 (2019): 695–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-2-695-704.
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The article is about an interpretation of the concept of Measure in the famous thesis of Protagoras (TP) “Man is the Measure of all things” as a criterion of knowledge. The main purpose of this work is to show how the concept of “measure” was gradually transformed into the criterion of truth. The answer to this question can be found in the relevant passages of Plato’s “Theaetetus” and Sextus Empiricus’ “Adversus Mathematicos” and “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”. In the “Theaetetus” Plato represents “the secret doctrine” of Protagoras. According to Ugo Zilioli this doctrine is a robust version of relativism, encompassing different types of it: Relativism of Truth, Relativism of Being and Relativism of Knowledge. Among the other interpretations of the concept of Measure, Plato proposes the following substitution: “to be a Measure” means “to possess the criterion of knowledge”. This replacement allowed Plato to show the internal inconsistency of the TP. In the works of Sextus the concept of Measure in TP is unambiguously interpreted as the criterion of knowledge. For Plato the word criterion is still a philosophical neologism, but in the Hellenistic period it becomes an oft-used philosophical term.
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BALTUSSEN, HAN. "PLATO PROTAGORAS 340–48: COMMENTARY IN THE MAKING?" Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 47, Supplement_83_Part_1 (January 1, 2004): 21–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-5370.2004.tb02293.x.
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Anagnostou-Laoutides, Eva, and Andrew Payne. "Drinking and Discourse in Plato." Méthexis 33, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 57–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-03301003.
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Abstract The article argues that in the Symposium, but also the Phaedrus and the Protagoras, Plato instructs us on the correct way of engaging in discourse by adducing examples from the activities of drinking and singing (/performing poetry). By presenting Socrates as grappling with the use of wine, rhetoric and poetry, almost failing at times, but always able to recollect himself and identify the faults in his methods (as well as of others), Plato recognizes the difficulties of the process, while acknowledging Socrates’ extraordinary intellect.
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Younesie, Mostafa. "Plato’s Usage of phone in Protagoras." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 13, no. 1 (August 10, 2019): 181–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v13i1p181-190.
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Phone is a topic that is not so much explored and examined in Plato. Given eighteen times use of this word in Protagoras, this dialogue can be the suitable place to do a research about its meanings. Here the use of phone covers different subjects and facets of this word as an umbrella word so that in order to reach an ordered and meaningful understanding we place those aspects which are analogous in specific set and title
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Molinelli, Sebastiano. "How many ἀρεταί in Plato's Protagoras?" Journal of Ancient Philosophy 12, no. 2 (December 18, 2018): 192–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v12i2p192-204.
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A large debate around Plato’s Protagoras concerns the so-called ‘unity of virtue’, namely Socrates’ ultimate position on the relation between ἀρετή and the five concepts (justice, piety, prudence, wisdom, and courage) connected with it. In this article, I will draw on the language and ideas of the dialogue to question the semantic presupposition which all the scholars involved in the debate, whatever their views, have been sharing, namely that the five concepts can be considered as ἀρεταί, and not just as ‘good qualities’ (τὰ καλά), or ‘parts’ (μόρια), or ‘names’ (ὀνόματα) of ἀρετή, as Plato terms them.
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Deretic, Irina. "Do we need hermeneutics at all? Plato on the art of interpretation." Filozofija i drustvo 22, no. 2 (2011): 215–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1102215d.
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The main claim of this paper is to show how Plato?s views on hermeneutike techne are more relevant to the contemporary discussions on hermeneutics than it is commonly regarded. We will elucidate and critically discuss whether Plato?s understanding of the grounds, methods and merits of the hermeneutics in the Protagoras is adequate, consistent and still relevant. Also, we will attempt to find out which position in the contemporary discussion of hermeneutics is the closest to Plato?s own ideas and claims on the essence and meaning of the art of interpretation.
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Соловьёв, Роман Сергеевич. "On the Relative Chronology of the Dialogues “Euthyphron” and “Protagoras”." Theological Herald, no. 2(33) (June 15, 2019): 239–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.31802/2500-1450-2019-33-152-164.
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В статье рассматривается проблема датировки двух диалогов Платона: «Евтифрона» и «Протагора», которые традиционно относятся к числу ранних произведений автора. На основании анализа жанра, различия образа Сократа, особенностей трактовки понятия «благочестие», а также сопоставления с другими произведениями платоновского корпуса автор приходит к выводу, что исследуемые произведения не могли быть написаны одновременно, а именно: «Протагор» относится к ранним произведениям Платона, а «Евтифрон», вероятно, является поздним произведением платоновского корпуса. The article discusses the problem of dating the two dialogues of Plato: “Euthyphron” and “Protagoras”, which traditionally are among the earliest works of the author. Based on the analysis of the genre, the differences in the image of Socrates, the features of the interpretation of the concept of “piety”, as well as comparison with other works of the Platonic Corpus, the author concludes that the studied works could not be written at the same time, namely: “Protagoras” refers to the early works of Plato, and “Euthyphron” is probably a late work of the Platonic Corpus.
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Taylor, C. C. W. "NOMOS AND PHUSIS IN DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 2 (May 29, 2007): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070148.
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This essay explores the treatment of the relation between nature (phusis) and norm or convention (nomos) in Democritus and in certain Platonic dialogues. In his physical theory Democritus draws a sharp contrast between the real nature of things and their representation via human conventions, but in his political and ethical theory he maintains that moral conventions are grounded in the reality of human nature. Plato builds on that insight in the account of the nature of morality in the myth in the Protagoras. That provides material for a defense of morality against the attacks by Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the Republic, all of whom seek to use the nature-convention contrast to devalue morality.
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DAVIES, RICHARD. "The Measure of Pleasure: A Note on the Protagoras." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3, no. 3 (2017): 301–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.31.
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ABSTRACT:To explain the presence of the doctrine of hedonism in Plato's Protagoras (351b–8a), the hypothesis is advanced that the author may have been responding to a suggestion made by Eudoxus of Cnidus that pleasures can be measured in terms of size, number, and intensity. The peculiar ways that Socrates represents these dimensions may indicate that Plato did not fully grasp Eudoxus's suggestion or, conversely, that he saw at once that it was a dead end.
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Miller, Carolyn R. "The Polis as Rhetorical Community." Rhetorica 11, no. 3 (1993): 211–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rh.1993.11.3.211.
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Abstract: Although “community” has become an important critical concept in contemporary rhetoric, it is only implicit in ancient rhetorics. In the rhetorical thought of the sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, the polis stands as a presupposition that was both fundamental and troublesome. Various relationships between the faculty of speech and the social order are revealed in different tellings of the history of civilization by Protagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, as well as in more formal discussions of rhetoric and politics. These ancient disagreements about the nature of community can help us reformulate the current debate between liberalism and communitarianism. A rhetorical community as a site of contention can be both pluralist and normative.
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Bazhenova, Elena. "The Origins of Natural Law Thinking in the Ideas of Ancient Greek Sophists: Protagoras and Antiphon." Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS 14, no. 1 (March 14, 2019): 9–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.35427/2073-4522-2019-14-1-bazhenova.
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Protagoras and Antiphon are the first authors known to us who offered their views on the correlation between human nature, on the one hand, and the requirements of the law and positive morality, on the other. With Protagoras and Antiphon, the conventional character of law and morality, as well as the existence of a moral obligation to obey the law, became vital subjects of philosophical discussion. Protagoras, according to Plato’s testimony in the dialogues "Protagoras" and "Theaetetus", attempted to reconcile individual and public interests with the help of the concept of universal virtue, which all citizens of the polis should participate in. This attempt, however, is difficult to regard as successful, since, according to the logic of Protagoras, virtue is only a means for the survival of individuals and ensuring their security. While providing justification of the paramount importance and natural character of civic virtues, Protagoras at the same time allows for the possibility of following them only for appearance, as a cover for selfish motives.Antiphon views the contract between people as the sole and sufficient basis of law and morality. Approaching the problem from an individualistic point of view, Antiphon sharply contrasts nature and convention. Nevertheless, he considers the former rather in terms of benefits and harms of following it, and not as a source of objective moral prescriptions. According to this interpretation, nature and convention are two different worlds; one may chose which of them to follow, but it is impossible to reconcile them. Neither Protagoras, nor Antiphon offers any consistent concept of human nature, and that is why their ideas could not be characterized as natural law in the full sense of the word. Their views of nature do not yet contain fundamental standards, with which human law and conventional morality could be compared. The main weakness of both theories is their inability to give account of the social character of human nature. At the same time, the undoubted merit of Protagoras and Antiphon is the very statement of the question of the priority of nature or the convention, individual or public interests, as well as of the possibility of their harmonization. The ideas of two senior sophists played a decisive role in shaping the intellectual climate, in which, primarily in direct controversy with them, Plato and Aristotle produced much more elaborate concepts of human nature; and the natural law tradition emerged.
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Pascual-Martin, Angel. "Refiguring Odysseus’ Apologue in Plato’s Protagoras." Hypothekai 5 (September 2021): 43–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.32880/2587-7127-2021-5-5-43-63.
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The common 4th century B.C. view according to which Homer was regarded as a poet and a wise man, the leading and most honorable, to the point of being considered “the educator of Greece” (Pl. Resp. 606e-607a), is strongly supported by the Pla-tonic dialogues. The works of Plato are the main available source to get to know not only the great pedagogical esteem for Homer, but also the several educational traditions that used or relied on Homeric poetry in Classical Athens. We are certainly used to thinking of Socrates as standing out for contesting or blaming such customs and methods provided by rhapsodes, sophists and common people (Pl. Resp.; Ion; Hp. mi.). But conversely, he is also often depicted quoting, alluding to or remaking on Homeric passages when presenting his own views. Socrates even claims to feel a certain friendship or reverence for the poet and declares to be charmed by contemplating things through him, whom he con-siders to be amongst the few deserving to be called “philosophers” (Pl. Resp. 595b; 607c-d; Phdr. 278b-279b). The puzzling twofold nature of the Socratic attitude towards Homer, coupled with the fact that Plato would become a figure as honored as the poet was, led ancient literary criticism to focus on the Platonic use and sharing of material and techniques proper to Homeric poetry. Works like those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Maximus of Tyre, Longinus and above all Proclus, not only pointed out the philosopher’s debt to the poet, but even consid-ered him to be an admirer of the Homeric genius unlike anyone else, and whose emulation basically attempted to reach and out-perform the pedagogical power that the legendary poet had (Dion. Hal. Pomp. I, 13; Max. Tyr. Or. 26; [Longinus]; Subl. XIII, 2-3; Procl., In R. VI, 163.13-164.7; 202.7-205.23). With an analogous spirit, studies of contemporary Platonists suggest that the dialogues were shaped using the Homeric text, especially the Odyssey, as a template, and making Socrates ap-pear as going through equivalent experiences to those of Odys-seus’ “νόστος”. With respect to Protagoras, previous attempts focused on explicit references to books X and XI, placing the dispute with the sophist and the events at Callias’ house in the symbolic context of Odysseus’ encounter with Circe and the fol-lowing journey into the underworld. I attempt to bring that read-ing one step further, paying special attention to the narrated character and the dramatic context for the singing of those epi-sodes and the parallel ones in Protagoras. In first place, I consider the whole dialogue refiguring the epi-sode in the Odyssey that works as a dramatic frame for the sing-ing of Odysseus’ past adventures, the arrival at Phaeacia and the reception at Alcinous’ court. I regard Odysseus’ need to sing the Apologue as a call for hospitality to secure a safe passage home, working as a pattern for Socrates’ need of a tale at his own ap-pearance in Athens to fulfill and secure a philosophical education in the city. In second place, I take into consideration the metanar-rative dimension of such remaking. Since Socrates’ narration comes in response to a certain “Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης”, a “praiser of Homer” (Pl. Prt. 309b1), as Odysseus’ Apologue is to Demo-docus the “ἀοιδὸς”, I examine how the dialogue could evince a dispute for pedagogical primacy amongst the different narratives and uses of poetry in Athens, a dispute that the Platonic narrative would attempt to surpass precisely by imitating Homer.
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Bailey, D. T. J. "Review: Epistemology After Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle and Democritus." Mind 115, no. 460 (October 1, 2006): 1151–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzl1151.
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Wilburn, Joshua. "Akrasia and the Rule of Appetite in Plato's Protagoras and Republic." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 8, no. 2 (November 10, 2014): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p57-91.
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According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the three-part soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute psychic ‘force’). I then offer an explanation of Plato’s lack of concern for akrasia by appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between the two dialogues.
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Jirsa, Jakub. "The Structure of Courage in the Laches, Meno and Protagoras." Elenchos 42, no. 1 (August 1, 2021): 143–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0010.
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Abstract The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato’s Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in the soul according to the same scheme: that there is a normatively neutral psychic state which is informed by the knowledge of good and evil. The knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which informs this normatively neutral psychic state is called practical wisdom (which Plato refers to as φρόνησις or sometimes σοφία). This interpretation seems to negate the claim that virtue is knowledge. I will show, however, that this is not a contradiction and that virtue is in fact knowledge, despite the complex moral psychology of courage. Finally, I will argue that the conception of courage in the Republic addresses some of the problems posed by the discussion of courage in the above-mentioned dialogues.
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BALANSARD, ANNE. "DES ARGUMENTS PROTAGORÉENS CONTRE LE CHANGEMENT. THÉÉTÉTE ET PHÉDON." Méthexis 24, no. 1 (March 30, 2011): 109–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000581.
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On the evidence of Plato’s Theaetetus and Phaedo the author claims that Protagoras argued against changement. The paper develops in four steps. First, the paradox of the dices is taken into account. Then four parallels to this argument are recovered in Socrates’ autobiography in Plato’ Phaedo. Third, the four parallels are identified with the wise causes of the antilogies. Finally, the author addresses the objection that both Theaetetus in the Theaetetus and Socrates in the Phaedo show serious wondering and dismiss such arguments as merely sophisms by focusing on how the notion of wondering is used in the Euthydemus.
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Schirren, Thomas. "Mi-Kyoung Lee: Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle and Democritus." Gnomon 81, no. 3 (2009): 193–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/0017-1417_2009_3_193.
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Brasi, Diego De. "N.DENYER(ed),Plato. Protagoras("Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics"), Cambridge University Press , Cambridge 2008." Elenchos 30, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 382–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2009-300211.
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CHAPPELL, TIMOTHY. "MI-KYOUNG LEE'S EPISTEMOLOGY AFTER PROTAGORAS: RESPONSES TO RELATIVISM IN PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND DEMOCRITUS." Philosophical Books 51, no. 2 (August 26, 2010): 117–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2010.00505.x.
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Boter, Gerard. "Plato Theaetetus 182e1-2: The Meaning of μενειν." Mnemosyne 62, no. 1 (2009): 30–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852508x252894.
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AbstractIn Pl. Tht. 182c1-183b5 Socrates deals with the implications of the Heraclitean doctrine of flux for the thesis (attributed to Protagoras) that knowledge is perception. After having illustrated that, according to the flux theory, the perceived object is subject to constant change (182d1-5), he deals with perception itself (182e1-2): μενειν ποτε εν αυτω τω οραν η ακουειν. It is generally believed that this phrase means that sight, for instance, does not remain within the domain of sight, but changes into another kind of perception. Thus the words εν αυτω τω οραν η ακουειν are taken as an obligatory constituent belonging to μενειν; the whole phrase is supposed to mean, 'Shall we say that it ever stays in the condition of seeing or hearing?' (Sedley). This contribution shows why this interpretation is untenable. As an alternative, it is argued that μενειν is used absolutely as 'remain as one was'; the phrase εν αυτω τω οραν η ακουειν serves to indicate that a perception, while constantly changing, does remain within its own domain; that is, sight is never stable, but it does remain within the domain of sight. The whole sentence means, 'Does it ever remain the same within sight or hearing itself?'
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Irrera, Elena. "Departing from Perfect Goodness? The tetragonōs and the hugiēs man in Plato’s Protagoras." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 13, no. 2 (December 5, 2019): 01–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v13i2p01-34.
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Simonides’ well known Ode to Scopas, which Plato introduces in the Protagoras, provides fertile ground for a discussion of two different forms of human goodness: on the one hand, the excellence embodied by the perfectly good man (τετράγωνος ἀνήρ); on the other hand, a less perfect form of goodness, which is the one embodied by the “healthy man” (ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ). This essay will critically address the shift from perfect to imperfect goodness and its underlying reasons. More specifically, I will argue that the distinctive goodness of the “healthy man” can be identified with a form of “minimal political decency”. As such, this can be praised only in comparison to a condition of lawlessness.
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WEILER, INGOMAR. "GAMES, CONTESTS, AND THE IDEA OF COMPETITIVE RIVALRY IN EARLY GREEK AND ROMAN CHILDHOOD." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 61, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 104–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/2041-5370.12073.
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Abstract This contribution discusses some topics concerning the physical activities of young children in ancient Greek society, especially games and contests. In Greek terminology and in general language use, these children are denoted as bréphos, paidíon or paidískē and paidískos. Paidíon is a term for a young child generally less than seven years and paīs for the age of seven up to fourteen years. Several Greek and Roman authors inform us about the games, contests, and the educational program for this age-category (i.e., before boys go to the gymnasium). The following texts discuss some examples of games and physical exercise in early childhood: Plato, Protagoras 325c–326c, Leges 794c–808c; Ps.-Plato, Axiochus 366–7; Aeschines, Kata Timarchou 9–12; Aristotle, Politika 1336a9–15 and 8.1338b40–1339a7; Horatius Flaccus, Ars Poetica 409–14; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 1.1.20; Plutarch, Lycurgus 14; Pausanias 5.16.2; Flavius Philostratos, Peri gymnastikes 25, 28 and Vitae sophistarum 1.21.
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Nill, Michael. "Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus and Lycos' Plato on Justice and Powe." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 7, no. 2 (1988): 134–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000323.
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Konrádová, Veronika. "God and Justice in Hesiod and Plato: Interpreting the Myth of Protagoras (Prot. 320d-322d) = Dios y Justicia en Hesíodo y Platón: Interpretando el Mito de Protágoras (Prot. 320d-322d)." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 3, no. 1 (June 7, 2019): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2019.4549.
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Resumen: El artículo examina la interconexión entre los principios fundamentales de la sociabilidad humana y el elemento de lo divino. Específicamente, se enfoca en la estrecha conexión entre las nociones de dios y justicia, establecidas en los trabajos de tradiciones pre-filosóficas y filosóficas, es decir Hesíodo y Platón. Se presta especial atención a los motivos, que pueden ser compartidos por Hesíodo y Platón en relación con los principios que subyacen en la vida social y política humana. La investigación comienza con una referencia a la imagen de Zeus como garantía de justicia, permitiendo una vida comunitaria plenamente humana y ordenada (Hes. Op. 213-285). Sobre esta base, se plantea la cuestión de hasta qué punto Platón se basa en esta imagen y en qué medida promueve la visión de Hesíodo en sus propios escritos. La respuesta se busca a través de un análisis detallado del mito de los orígenes de la cultura en el Protágoras (320d-322d). Entre otros ecos de Hesíodo, el pasaje contiene la imagen clave de Zeus que proporciona a la humanidad justicia y vergüenza, es decir, principios indispensables de la vida social en las ciudades. En cuanto al problema de autoría de toda la narración, presentada por Protágoras en un escenario dialógico, el artículo defiende la posición es platónica en sus puntos esenciales. Los argumentos a favor de esta orientación incluyen: 1) la detección de diferencias significativas en comparación con otras partes del tratamiento sofístico de la cuestión de los orígenes de la cultura (a este respecto, se examinará el fragmento del Sisyphus, B25 en particular); 2) resaltar elementos de la antropología y teología platónica presentes en el mito. Aquí, un punto de referencia importante son las Leyes de Platón, especialmente una larga exposición sobre las amenazas del ateísmo en el libro X (889a-906c), que rechaza el convencionalismo como un modelo explicativo de coexistencia política. Con un análisis textual detallado, el artículo pretende mostrar cómo Platón desarrolla y transforma la concepción de los principios de la sociabilidad humana, tanto en respuesta a sus predecesores como en contraste con la discusión contemporánea. La interpretación propuesta enfatiza el papel fundamental de Dios en la organización de los asuntos humanos, como una característica constante del tratamiento de este tema por parte de Platón, también reconocible en la estructura del mito de Protágoras.Palabras clave: Hesíodo, Platón, Protágoras, mito, origen, cultura, dios, justicia.Abstract: The paper examines the interconnection between fundamental principles of human socia-bility and the element of the divine. Specifically, it focusses on the close connection between the notions of god and justice, established in the works of pre-philosophical and philosophical tra-ditions, namely Hesiod and Plato. Special attention is paid to motives, which may be shared by Hesiod and Plato regarding principles underlying human social and political life. The examina-tion opens with a reference to Hesiod’s image of Zeus as a guarantee of justice, enabling a fully human and well-ordered communal life (Hes. Op. 213-285). On this basis, the question is raised to what degree Plato draws from this basic image and to what extent he prolongs Hesi-od’s vision in his own writings. The answer is sought in a detailed analysis of the myth of the origins of culture in Plato’s Protagoras (Prot. 320d-322d). Among other Hesiodic echoes, the passage contains Zeus’ key image providing humankind with justice and shame, i.e. indispen-sable principles of social life in the cities. Concerning the authorship problem of the whole nar-ration, presented by Protagoras in the dialogue’s dramatic setting, the paper defends the posi-tion that the story is Platonic in its essential points. Arguments in favour of this conviction in-clude: 1) detection of significant differences in comparison with other pieces of sophistic treat-ment of the issue of the origins of culture (in this respect, the Sisyphus fragment B25 will be ex-amined in particular), 2) highlighting elements of Platonic anthropology and theology present in the myth. Here, a significant reference point is Plato’s Laws, especially a long exposition on threats of atheism in Book 10 (889a-906c), refusing conventionalism as an explanatory model of political co-existence. With a thorough textual analysis, the paper aims to show how Plato develops and transforms the conception of underlying principles of human sociability, both in response to his predecessors and in confrontation with ongoing contemporary discussion. The proposed interpretation emphasises god’s fundamental role in the arrangement of human af-fairs, as a constant feature of Plato’s treatment of the issue, also recognisable in the structure of Protagoras’ myth.Keywords: Hesiod, Plato, Protagoras, myth, origin, culture, god, justice.
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Botter, Barbara. "IS SOCRATES A REAL ENEMY OF AKRASIA?" Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 37, no. 119 (January 5, 2015): 329. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v37n119p329-350/2010.
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Recentemente, o tema da akrasia tornou-se um assunto favorito de discussão entre os estudiosos e contribuiu para introduzir a filosofia antiga no debate filosófico contemporâneo. O tema da akrasia foi uma preocupação dos filósofos ao longo da história da filosofia desde os tempos de Sócrates. A reflexão socrática sobre a ação humana é enigmática em seus detalhes, e Aristóteles, e provavelmente o Platão maduro, entraram em desacordo com Sócrates sobre alguns pontos importantes. Apesar disso, o objetivo do presente artigo é mostrar que Platão no Protágoras não representa Sócrates como o filósofo que recusa explicitamente a possibilidade da akrasia. Acho melhor supor que o que está em jogo nas palavras de Sócrates é apenas negar que quem comete uma injustiça a comete em plena consciência de estar agindo mal. Esta afirmação não parece pressupor a negação da akrasia, se com esta palavra indicamos o fenômeno bem conhecido de cometer uma ação moralmente não correta, embora o sujeito conheça a conduta moralmente excelente. Para justificar esta hipótese proponho examinarmos a possibilidade da presença no Protágoras de um segundo elemento cognitivo que age na presença imediata do objeto de desejo. É este o elemento responsável da conduta do agente nos casos de akrasia, embora o conhecimento moral permaneça presente no sujeito, mas não ativo no momento da ação.Abstract: Recently the topic of akrasia has become a favourite subject of discussion among the scholars and has contributed to reintroduce ancient philosophy into contemporary philosophical debate. Akrasia has been a persistent concern of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy since the time of Socrates. The Socratic insight into the way human action should be grasped is always puzzling in its details, and Aristotle, and probably the mature Plato, disagreed with it at some important points. In spite of this fact, our claim in this article is to show that Plato in the Protagoras does not represent Socrates as explicitly denying the possibility of something called akrasia. It is probably best to suppose that what is at stake in Socrates’ words is only denying that anyone can act as a result of his feelings, knowing that what he is doing is base. This argument does not seem presuppose the denying of akrasia, once we have become clear that with this word we intend a manifest phenomenon of our lived lives, like acting against what we know to be the best. To support our claim we will try to show the presence in Plato’s Protagoras of another cognitive element, which is involved when the particular object of desire appears. This is the element that in the cases of akrasia will determine what happens, although the moral knowledge is present and persisting.
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Taylor, C. C. W. "(N.) Denyer Plato, Protagoras. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, Pp. xiii + 207. £45. 9780521840446 (hbk). £17.99. 9780521549691 (pbk)." Journal of Hellenic Studies 130 (November 2010): 274–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0075426910000893.
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Ogar, Tom Eneji, and Edor J. Edor. "THE NOTHINGNESS OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM." Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal) 1, no. 3 (September 30, 2020): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.25273/she.v1i3.7553.
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This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the popularly held view that a fourth condition may be necessary for the Traditional Account of Knowledge otherwise known as JTB. Plato, it was who championed the traditional account of knowledge as justified Belief in response to the agitation of the skeptics notably Georgias and Protagoras. This tripartite account held sway until Edmund Gettier Challenged the position with his article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Since this challenge, scholars have tried to solve what has become known as the Gettier Problem by trying to fashion out a fourth condition to JTB. This work argues that the celebrated Gettier counter-examples in the challenge of the tripartite account is a "nothingness". The traditional account is rather fundamental in knowledge claim, hence any new vista in form of additional information on JTB should not invalidate it. The textual analysis was adopted as a method for this research.
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Dvorkin, Ilya. "Hermeneutics of Aristotle and Hermeneutics of Sophists in Terms of Dialogue Philosophy. Part 1." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 3 (December 15, 2020): 480–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2020-24-3-480-501.
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The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine of sophists, some elements of its dialogueism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogueism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already two and a half thousand years ago charted the paths for modern thought. The first part of the article analyzes the relationship between Aristotles hermeneutics and hermeneutics of sophists.
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Divenosa, Marisa G. "R. Bartlett, Plato, Protagoras and Meno; translated, with notes and interpretative essays, Ithaca-London 2004 (Cornell University Press, ix + 155 págs.)." Méthexis 18, no. 1 (March 30, 2005): 137–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000477.
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Divenosa, Marisa G. "M. K. Lee, Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus, Oxford 2005 (Clarendon Press, xi + 291 págs.)." Méthexis 19, no. 1 (March 30, 2006): 213–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000509.
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