Academic literature on the topic 'Provocation as a defence in English Law'

The term “cumulative provocation” is used to describe cases involving a prolonged period of maltreatment of a person at the hands of another, which culminates in the killing of the abuser by her victim. Since the early 1990s there has been a plethora of academic commentary on the criminal law’s response to such cases. More recently, the debate has been re-opened following the publication of the English Law Commission’s proposals on the partial defences to murder. This article examines doctrinal issues that arise in relation to claims of extenuation stemming from the circumstances of cumulative provocation. It is argued that, given the scope and limitations of the provocation defence, one should view the circumstances of cumulative provocation as likely to bring about the conditions of different legal excuses. Identifying the relevant legal defence would require one to reflect on the nature of the excusing condition or conditions stemming from the circumstances of each particular case. Although the paper draws largely upon the doctrines of provocation and diminished responsibility as they operate in English law, it is hoped that the analysis offered has relevance to all systems where similar defences are recognized (or proposed to be introduced), and can make a useful contribution to the continuing moral debate that the partial excuses to murder generate.

For over 300 years, criminal courts have regarded sexual infidelity as sufficiently grave provocation as to provide a warrant, indeed a ‘moral warrant’, for reducing murder to manslaughter. While the warrant has spilled over into diminished responsibility defences, wounding, grievous bodily harm and attempted murder cases, it is provocation cases that have provided the precedents enshrining a defendant's impassioned homicidal sexual infidelity tale as excusatory. Periodically, judges and law reformers attempt to reign in provocation defences, most recently in England and Wales where provocation has been replaced by a loss of control defence that, most controversially, specifically excludes sexual infidelity as a trigger for loss of control. This paper reflects on this reform and its reception, glossing Shakespeare's scathing critique of warrants for murder inTitus Andronicus.

Against the trend of roll-backs of pro-feminist initiatives by right-wing governments, feminist-led reforms to the law of murder deserve accolades as hard-fought feminist victories. For three decades, feminist analysts have critiqued the operation of provocation defences in intimate partner femicide cases. Their work has been rewarded with the implementation of reforms in several anglophone jurisdictions that have abolished or curtailed that defence. This article focuses on the revolutionary impact of the reform implemented in England and Wales. It argues for the continuing purchase for feminist legal scholars of a methodology championed by Carol Smart in her seminal 1989 text, Feminism and the Power of Law. She counselled feminist law scholars to read law as a site for contesting law’s truth about gendered relationships. This methodology has not only been critical in exposing the misogyny and injustice embedded in traditional provocation by infidelity defences; it also enables researchers to chart shifts in law’s discursive constitution of truth in the post-reform era.

The English law of self-defence has attracted significant attention following the controversial decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Martin. At the heart of the controversy is the determination of the reasonableness of a defendant's apprehension of the necessity to use a particular amount of force in self-defence. When comparing the defendant's apprehension and actions to those of a reasonable person in the same circumstances, what characteristics of the defendant must be attributable to the reasonable person in order for the test to be appropriate? This article argues that while the Court of Appeal's reluctance to allow a psychologically individualised standard of reasonableness may have been correct, the court should have reformulated the purely objective standard into a contextual objective standard. It is suggested that unless such reform is undertaken, the English law of self-defence will remain unduly constrained. Reform proposals by the Law Commission have made it clear that such reform is not on the horizon. As an alternative, the Law Commission proposed a reformulated defence of provocation. While this alternative is commendable, it does not remove the need to reform the objective standard of reasonableness in the law of self-defence.

This article compares, in the light of the House of Lords' decision in R v Smith (Morgan James), the English and Irish approaches to the objective test in provocation. Though the law on this point has developed in radically different directions as between England and Ireland, both jurisdictions demonstrate a profound dissatisfaction with the objective test in its traditional formulation combined with a reluctance to dispense with it altogether. It is suggested that Lord Hoffmann's approach in Morgan Smith, by drawing out the essentially normative function of the objective test, provides a useful way forward for the law on both sides of the Irish Sea.

Reformers in much of the common law world have recently turned their attentions to laws pertaining to murder and manslaughter; however, perceptions of the past maintain a hold. In England and Wales, the Coroners and Justice Act (2009) abandoned notions of provocation that developed in the seventeenth century, instead stipulating that “loss of control” would serve as the means of mitigating charges of murder to a lesser offence. If a person has reasonable grounds for losing control, of a sort that accords with contemporary norms and values, that loss of control can be adduced as a partial defense on a homicide charge. Concerns about blaming victims and gender bias have helped shape the shift away from provocation defenses. Whether a married woman's sexual infidelity might in some way serve as a partial defense that moderates her husband's killing of her from murder to something less serious has proven especially controversial. (The reverse, a wife killing an adulterous husband, receives far less attention, but then women kill their partners for any reason far less often.) Drafters of the 2009 act expressly abandoned the older notion that sexual infidelity constituted sufficient provocation to mitigate charges in a husband's killing of his wife. Angry, jealous men killing their spouses in revenge or a passionate rage might no longer cite infidelity as sufficient provocation to kill. Some people, including lawmakers and judges, expressed concerns about the change. One MP (and later attorney general) complained that “thousands of years of human experience and history should be jettisoned for a piece of political correctness.” He need not have worried: recently, the decision in R. v. Clinton (2012) reintroduced the substance of the defense in a new guise, seeing a wife's adultery not as provocation, but as a trigger for a husband's understandable “loss of control.” Among other factors, the Court of Appeal alluded to “experience over many generations” in treating a man's suspicion of his wife's sexual infidelity as reasonable grounds for mitigation.

AbstractIn October 2010, the UK Parliament brought into effect law that replaced the partial defence to murder of provocation with a new partial defence of “loss of control”, applicable to England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Although it retained some key features of its controversial predecessor, the new partial defence was in part designed better to address the gendered contexts within which a large number of homicides are committed. In examining the impact of the reforms, we will focus on long-held concerns about the treatment of sexual infidelity as a trigger for loss of control in murder cases. The article undertakes an analysis of English case law to evaluate the way in which sexual infidelity-related evidence has influenced perceptions of a homicide defendant's culpability, for the purposes of sentencing, both before and after the implementation of reform. The analysis reveals that, in sentencing offenders post reform, the higher courts have failed to follow the spirit of the reforms respecting the substantive law by effecting a corresponding change in sentencing practice.

AimsThe aim of the study was to identify any symptoms or features of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) or Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that may be associated with, or explain, abused women killing their abuser; and the extent to which such identified symptoms or features have been deemed, or are potentially relevant, to past and now reformed partial defences to murder in English law. Hence two sub-studies were completed.MethodThe first sub-study identified mental symptoms of BWS or PTSD apparent in battered women who kill their abuser; achieved by identifying relevant research papers, through applying a ‘rapid review’ approach to three databases: PubMed, PsychInfo and PsychArticles. The second sub-study identified by legal research reported Court of Appeal (CA) judgments on women appealing their conviction of the murder of their abusive partner. It then analysed the legal approach taken towards evidence of the effects of abuse upon these women before and after relevant statutory law reform (although no CA cases were identified post-reform).ResultThe first sub-study identified and reviewed six symptoms or features, within three quantitative and three qualitative studies, that appeared to be associated with, or described by, abused women killing their abuser. These included helplessness, symptoms associated with PTSD, plus fear, isolation, experience of escalation of violence and cycle of violence. From the CA cases the perpetrators of killings that occurred prior to 04.10.2010 (the date of law reform) were usually successful in having their conviction overturned based upon diminished responsibility; but not provocation, because of the requirement of ‘sudden loss of self control’. ‘Loss of control’, which replaced provocation, appears highly likely to be capable of reducing murder to manslaughter based upon symptoms of BWS, or PTSD. However, the amended defence of diminished responsibility is likely to exclude evidence of BWS, but allow evidence of PTSD, because of its requirement of the defendant suffering from ‘a recognised medical condition’.ConclusionThis study demonstrated particular symptoms or features of BWS or PTSD associated with abused women killing their abusers plus their very different relevance to two partial defences to murder, pre and post law reform.

After the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Lavallee, Canadian women who are victims of serious domestic abuse have been able to invoke an ‘enlarged’ conception of self-defence to exonerate some acts of killing abusers. While concern remains about Lavallee, this judgement broke important ground in insisting on a more sensitive account of the actual experience of abused women, and in giving recognition to the reasonable fears that such women have for their lives. However, other than self-defence, there is no criminal law defence or plea that has been effective as a (partial) excuse or justification for killings by abused women. In this paper, I will consider the potential for a plea of provocation to serve such a role. Provocation has acquired some standing in other jurisdictions as a defence for abused women who kill but it has not as yet been effectively used in Canada. I will look at the appropriateness of provocation as a plea in some abuser homicides. The paper will discuss some ways in which the plea of provocation could be enlarged in scope and in normative power; the paper will also examine some shortcomings of the current understanding of provocation to serve a defence for women who kill. Since homicides by women make up a small fraction of all homicides, even a reformed defence of provocation would be rarely used. But the more important question is whether a plea which has been available to men for several centuries should not also be (much more) available to women who kill, and whether closer attention to the situations and perspectives of women in abusive relationships yields good grounds for thinking some kill as excusable or reasonable responses to serious provocation. The underlying concern is an equality concern; that women have equal access to suitable defences for their putative breaches of the criminal law, and that standards of reasonableness operative in criminal case deliberation be as responsive to women’s experience and women’s values as they are to men’s.

In the past 20 years the defence of provocation has shifted from the periphery of South African law to a fully developed defence available to those who kill when provoked. Not only is the defence available to the provoked, but it has been extended to those who kill when subjected to emotional stress. However, the defence is mirred in controversy and bad decisions. Not only has the precise nature of the defence not been clarified, but this lack of clarity has been exacerbated by confusing decisions of our courts. This confusion is partly a result of the development of the defence of incapacity, particularly its extension to cases involving provocation and mental stress, and partly a result of its application in practice. Three major problems have plagued the provocation defence. Firstly, the courts have confused the defence of sane automatism with that of non-pathological incapacity. Secondly, there has been an implied use of an objective test in determining criminal incapacity where the enquiry has clearly been a subjective one. Thirdly, it has been held that the problem may not so much be the subjective aspect of provocation, but rather its application. The real problem seems to lie in the theoretical confusion as to the precise meaning of lack of “selfcontrol”. Lastly, on occasion the courts have failed to distinguish lack of capacity from diminished responsibility. Thus, in order to gain clarity concerning this “grey” area of the law these problems have created, it is necessary for South African law to consult more authoritative sources to receive guidance for the problems identified. One of those sources that has been consulted is that of English law. English law, however, deals with the defence of provocation in a different manner. Raising a defence of provocation here does not result in an acquittal but rather in a reduction of the charge to manslaughter. However, the English law on provocation is also 7 plagued by various problems. Firstly, there is the issue of cumulative provocation. Generally, there is little difficulty in cases where there is no “immediate trigger”. Secondly, the fundamental flaw with the current test of the reasonable man is that the courts have had to swing between the two aims of taking a compassionate view of human frailty while endeavoring to maintain an objective standard of the reasonable man. Lastly, it can be said that the problem with the proportionality requirement is that it makes the provocation defence dependant upon the assessment of the accused’s conduct after he or she lost his or her selfcontrol rather than on his or her giving way to passion and losing control in the first place. It is clear that from the problems identified in both South African law and English law concerning the defence of provocation the courts in each jurisdiction will have to pay careful attentio n to the problems highlighted and apply the law in such a way so as to ensure clarity and legal certainty.

My thesis seeks to resolve key areas of debate regarding the nature of provocation as a defence in English Law, by reference to both historical and philosophical analysis. Academic commentators on the doctrine disagree on whether it should be seen as essentially an excusing condition alone, such as insanity, or should be understood as an excuse involving some element of "partial [moral] justification", such as duress. I seek to resolve this debate by considering at a deeper philosophical level the nature of anger and action in anger. I argue that English Law has historically operated with two equally plausible conceptions of anger, anger as righteous indignation and anger as a loss of self-control. The former was the conception drawn on in the development of the early modern law, and the latter is the conception drawn on in the development of the modern law. I go on to argue that controversy, referred to above, over the nature of provocation as a defence, can be only resolved by making clear the distinction between the two kinds of anger. Action in anger conceived as a loss of self-control bears more of a family resemblance to defences such as (temporary) insanity. Action in anger conceived as righteous indignation bears more of a family resemblance to defences such as duress. I argue that whichever conception of anger is in issue, however, action in anger can be open to moral criticism, because all kinds of action in anger are based on at least a judgment of moral wrongdoing, that may be subject of such criticism. I argue that the law may thus legitimately require at least some moral justification for action in anger before allowing a defence of provocation to be pleaded successfully.

The primary objective of this research is to make a critical analysis of the current methods of defences for preventing undue acquisitions of small to medium companies by large companies. Although these defences have been practised by the commercial community for a very long time, it is maintained that their effectiveness should still be questioned. The protection of the minority shareholders in a company is one of the reasons for using these defences but, in reality, either they are squeezed out or they themselves surrender to the acquiring company. Most of the published works tend to support the current defence tactics, but in this research an attempt has been made to demonstrate how these techniques have become rather ineffective and the means by which they may be strengthened. This research also demonstrates that from a societal standpoint the rationale behind acquisitions should be reviewed. As this process simply creates unemployment and most of the merged companies feel rather uncomfortable after acquisitions and mergers. The issue of the protection of the minority shareholders should be taken very seriously so that small shareholders may be encouraged to contribute to the capital formation process in small to medium size corporate entities. The protection of the minority shareholders should also be considered as a part of the concept of corporate social responsibility.

The study is based upon an analysis of the general principles of criminal liability in English law and Shari 'ah. It is hoped that it may provide a valid basis for discussion of the future development of criminal law. The relationship between law and society is an organic one and this relationship in Shari'ah is based on revelatory text of precepts, law, and admonitions. Shari'ah is an essential part of faith of every Muslim; a sound knowledge of its principles not only gives him a sense of inner fulfilment but enables him to order his life according to the dictates of his religion. On the other hand, in English law, religious beliefs and private morality might be viewed as not a matter for law. Religion is in that context generally conceived as a spiritual sphere of supra-human connotation distinct from law, which is basically a secular concern. Both the systems of law under consideration are different in their sources and nature. English law, being a positive law, finds its source in legislation and other recognised sources. Shari 'ah is a divine ordinance imposed upon people without having a freedom of choice and it has its roots in its primary sources, the Holy Qur'an, and the Sunnah. However, the revelatory nature of Shari'ah does not render it entirely inflexible and immutable. The finality of authoritative legal texts is confined only to a limited number of injunctions in the primary sources. The secondary sources provide flexibility to meet the changing requirements of society. A legal system should strike a fair balance between flexibility and inflexibility of legal rules. A very flexible system of law may lead to inconsistencies, illogicalities and at the same time may be subject to abuse by judges while a rigid system, which leaves no room for judicial discretion is likely to lead to injustice in certain cases. It is submitted that the very flexible nature of English law has left it full of inconsistencies and illogicalities, despite the appropriate use of judicial discretion. The research offers a general view of modern thinking about the theoretical foundations and methodology of Shari'ah Shari 'ah recognises a variety of sources and methods from which a rule of law might be derived. Part-I of the thesis discusses the evolving principles of Islamic jurisprudence from their rudimentary sources. The specific relationship between socio-religious reality and the production of theoretical legal discourse is illustrated in Part-11 and III while dealing with the problem of intoxication and private defence in society. It suggests that Shari'ah provides a framework in which the complex and sometimes competing needs of an individual and society can be fairly apportioned. The research will demonstrate that there is a well developed system of criminal law in Shari'ah that can be compared with the most developed and civilised criminal law of the contemporary world, for example, English criminal law. In order to compare the compatibility of both the legal systems, the approaches of both towards the problems of intoxication and self-defence have been taken as a parameter. Though Shari 'ah provisions seem to be predominantly prescriptive as compared to English criminal law, the comparison will show that it can provide practical solutions to problems faced by human society of any age. Shari 'ah being a revealed law is proactive in its nature. It takes action to cause changes and not only react to a change when it happens. This particular feature can be felt while dealing with the problem of intoxication. English criminal law, on the other hand, being a positive law bears the characteristics of a reactive law. It reacts to events or changes rather than acting first to cause change or prevent something. Another major difference between the two legal systems might be that English criminal law has passed through many evolutionary phases and reached at the present stage through the efforts of the political power and the state; whereas, Muslim states and governments throughout the centuries neither had a hand in the development of Islamic jurisprudence nor in the training and certification of jurists or jurisconsults whose task it was to formulate the law. History suggests that using the combined forces of religion, morality and law Shari'ah has effectively eradicated social evils and created a peaceful environment for human coexistence, where every one can enjoy his rights without a fear of infringement by the others. In cases of infringement of such rights, the offender shall be liable to severe punishments. The principles of criminal liability are on a par with the corresponding principles of the English criminal law. While protecting the rights of the victim of the crime, Shari'ah does not ignore the rights of the offender for fair trail, impartial justice and liability for punishment proportional to the offence committed by him. At the same time it recognises excuse and justification defences under appropriate circumstances, as it will be evident while comparing the defences of intoxication and self-defence with the same in English criminal law. The study reveals that there are similarities and differences between English law and Shari'ah when considering the issue of crime and criminal liability. However, this may be considered as normal phenomenon of comparing any two different legal systems. The differences can be attributed to their sources, origin, history and nature of the social values to be protected. Similarities can be ascribed to zeal for social justice and stability. The study of differences and similarities will provide an opportunity to illuminate our understanding of law and the process of its development. As both the systems have their own methodology to tackle legal issues, a different approach to the similar problem will provide a fresh insight leading to revitalised solutions. It will also be helpful to understand the methodology and the legal reasoning of both the systems leading towards a better understanding of law in general and at the same time providing efficient means for improvement.

This thesis aims to examine two issues related to the defence of self-defence in criminal law. Firstly, it is an investigation into the theory of excessive force in selfdefence. The essence of the theory is to have a person who excessively applies force in his defence to be convicted of manslaughter. The arguments in favour of the theory are compelling; however, in practice, the issue of excessive defence has always been a brain-teaser for judges. This thesis elaborates the controversies surrounding the application of the theory in the courts. The reason for its demise and arguments for its revival are discussed. Secondly, this work analyses the incorporation of the doctrine of the "battered woman syndrome" into the defence of self-defence. This doctrine has recently been introduced where, upon its acceptance by the court, an accused will be successful in pleading self-defence despite the fact that the traditional requirement of imminence has not been satisfied. There is discussion whether the doctrine has always been necessary for battered woman in claiming self-defence. This thesis focuses, in the main, on decided cases and, wherever necessary, a comparison is made of the two theories mentioned above in the law of self-defence in England, Australia and Canada.

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage
The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights