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Journal articles on the topic 'Proxy advisory firms'

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1

Duncan, Leah. "The Proxy Problem: Using Nonprofits to Solve Misaligned Incentives in the Proxy Voting Process." Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review, no. 9.2 (2020): 235. http://dx.doi.org/10.36639/mbelr.9.2.proxy.

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Proxy advisory firms and their influence on the proxy voting process have recently become the subject of great attention for the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) among other constituencies. A glance at recent proxy season recaps and reports, many of which devote space to discussing proxy advisory firm recommendations, reveal the significance of this influence on institutional voting. As Sagiv Edelman puts it, “proxy advisory firms exist at the nexus of some of the most high-profile corporate law discussions—most notably, the shareholder voting process, which has recently been the sub
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2

Subramanian, Shanmugasundaram. "Proxy advisory industry in India." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 2 (2016): 371–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i2clp5.

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Proxy advisory firms play a significant role in shareholder voting and in the formulation of corporate governance policy. This paper analyses the status of budding proxy advisory industry in India using a case study method. The paper first traces the history of the global proxy advisory industry and also reviews the literature. Then we study the Indian Proxy Advisory Industry, which was born when the market regulator SEBI came out with a regulation in 2010 on “mutual funds” shareholding resolution voting policy. Quickly, three proxy advisory firms came to the market with differing ownership st
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3

Subramanian, S. "Proxy advisory voting recommendations in India – an exploratory study." Journal of Indian Business Research 9, no. 4 (2017): 283–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jibr-10-2016-0111.

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Purpose This paper aims to explore the voting recommendations made by proxy advisory firms in India by descriptively analyzing the “Vote Against” recommendations made by two proxy advisory firms for shareholder resolutions for the listed Indian firms. It also empirically tests the relationship between proportion of “Vote Against” recommendations and the parameters which are proved to be influencing corporate governance practices of a firm. Design/methodology/approach Empirical analysis of proxy voting recommendations for a sample of 77 listed non-financial Indian firms across four financial ye
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4

KimSoonSuk. "Regulation and Utilization of Proxy Advisory Firms." Korean Journal of Securities Law 16, no. 2 (2015): 91–133. http://dx.doi.org/10.17785/kjsl.2015.16.2.91.

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5

Larcker, David F., Allan L. McCall, and Gaizka Ormazabal. "Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms." Journal of Law and Economics 58, no. 1 (2015): 173–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682910.

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6

Larcker, David F., Allan L. McCall, and Gaizka Ormazabal. "Proxy advisory firms and stock option repricing." Journal of Accounting and Economics 56, no. 2-3 (2013): 149–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.05.003.

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7

Habib, Ahsan, Md Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan, and Mostafa Monzur Hasan. "Firm life cycle and advisory directors." Australian Journal of Management 43, no. 4 (2017): 575–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0312896217731502.

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This article investigates whether the presence of advisory directors and monitoring directors varies across firm life cycle stages. We follow a parsimonious life cycle proxy based on the predicted behaviour of operating, investing and financing cash flows across the different life cycle stages that result from firm performance and the allocation of resources. Using an Australian sample, this study shows that compared to mature-stage firms, firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline stages have more advisory directors. With respect to the demand for monitoring directors, we find that comp
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8

Volonté, Christophe, and Simon Zaby. "Proxy advisors: a critical analysis." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 1 (2013): 857–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i1c10p3.

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The influence exerted by proxy advisors or proxy firms has become significantly more important over the last few years in pace with the increased activity of institutional investors. Recently, the adoption of a Swiss referendum has given fresh impetus to this development, concerning also international stockholders in the country. Spill-over effects to the regulations of neighbor countries are not unlikely. Given this context, it is essential that the role of proxy advisory services and the associated stakeholders be critically appraised. Substantial problems may arouse with regard to the metho
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9

Sorkin, John E., Abigail Pickering Bomba, Steven Epstein, et al. "SEC issues Staff Legal Bulletin after four-year comprehensive review of proxy system." Journal of Investment Compliance 16, no. 1 (2015): 63–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/joic-01-2015-0006.

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Purpose – To provide an overview of the guidance for proxy firms and investment advisers included in the Staff Legal Bulletin released this year by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) after its four-year comprehensive review of the proxy system. Design/methodology/approach – Discusses briefly the context in which the SEC’s review was conducted; the general themes of the guidance provided; the most notable aspects of the guidance; and the matters that were expected to be, but were not, addressed by the SEC. Findings – The guidance does not go as far in regulating proxy advisory firms a
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10

MALENKO, ANDREY, and NADYA MALENKO. "Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters." Journal of Finance 74, no. 5 (2019): 2441–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12779.

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11

Balp, Gaia. "Regulating Proxy Advisors Through Transparency: Pros and Cons of the EU Approach." European Company and Financial Law Review 14, no. 1 (2017): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2017-0001.

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This article outlines potential pros and cons of a future European regulation of proxy advisory firms, as set forth in the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2007/36/EC. After summarizing criticisms concerning the proxy advisory industry, and findings regarding its de facto influence on investors’ voting conduct both in the US and in the European context, the article adverts to why the power of proxy advisors appears to be overestimated. Uncertainty on the status quo of the industry’s actual impact on key decisions in listed companies, as well as costs associated with a r
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12

Malenko, Nadya, and Yao Shen. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design." Review of Financial Studies 29, no. 12 (2016): 3394–427. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw070.

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13

염미경. "The Regulatory Approaches to the Proxy Advisory Firms and Issues Relating to It." kangwon Law Review 41, no. ll (2014): 687–720. http://dx.doi.org/10.18215/kwlr.2014.41..687.

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14

육태우. "Development of Proxy Advisory Firms and Comparative Legal Study concerning the Regulation on their Services in USA, Canada and Europe." kangwon Law Review 49, no. ll (2016): 527–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.18215/kwlr.2016.49..527.

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15

Cunningham, Lauren M. "Auditor Ratification: Can't Get No (Dis)Satisfaction." Accounting Horizons 31, no. 1 (2016): 159–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-51652.

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SYNOPSIS The auditor ratification vote provides shareholders with an opportunity to voice their opinions about the company's choice of auditor, but, historically, less than 2 percent of shareholders express dissent in their vote. Motivated by regulatory attention on the importance of shareholder involvement and the institutional power of proxy advisors on voting outcomes, I examine the proxy advisor's role in the auditor ratification vote. I find that proxy advisors have a statistically significant influence over shareholder voting outcomes when they recommend against auditor ratification, but
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16

Lambert, Damien. "Disciplinary power in corporate governance: A Foucauldian analysis of the emergence and development of proxy advisors." Accounting History 26, no. 3 (2021): 409–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1032373220986232.

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Prior research in corporate governance has extensively investigated the mechanisms through which a variety of actors (financial analysts, investment managers, shareholder activists) monitor and discipline corporate executives. However, one recently emerged actor has received little attention so far: the proxy advisory firm. Mobilising Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power, this study uses historical analysis to examine the role of proxy advisors in corporate governance. This article shows that proxy advisors actively contributed to developing and implementing disciplinary mechanisms. This i
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17

Jimenez, Laura, and Cristina Cruz. "The agency role of proxy advisors in family firms." Academy of Management Proceedings 2021, no. 1 (2021): 14401. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2021.14401abstract.

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18

Sauerwald, Steve, J. (Hans) van Oosterhout, Marc Van Essen, and Mike W. Peng. "Proxy Advisors and Shareholder Dissent: A Cross-Country Comparative Study." Journal of Management 44, no. 8 (2016): 3364–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206316675928.

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Proxy advisors are information intermediaries that enable shareholders to exercise their voting rights. While proxy advisors’ influence is documented in market-based corporate governance systems, we know little about the corporate governance role of proxy advice in relationship-based governance systems. Drawing on agency theory and the comparative corporate governance literature, we theorize that shareholders are sensitive to the costs and benefits of monitoring by considering internal monitoring capabilities. We also theorize that relative to market-based corporate governance systems, proxy a
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19

Belcredi, Massimo, Stefano Bozzi, Angela Ciavarella, and Valerio Novembre. "Institutional investors’ activism under concentrated ownership and the role of proxy advisors. Evidence from the Italian say-on-pay." Corporate Ownership and Control 14, no. 4 (2017): 41–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv14i4art4.

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Where corporate ownership is concentrated, the incentives for institutional shareholders to engage with firms in their portfolio are not clear a priori. Making use of a unique dataset of Say-on-Pay (SOP) votes in Italian listed firms, we provide evidence that specific classes of institutional investors do actively monitor investee firms under concentrated ownership, and that Proxy Advisors (PAs) perform an informational role: i) while general shareholder dissent on SOP is low, dissent by mutual and pension funds holding small equity positions (nonblockholders) is high; ii) nonblockholders’ dis
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20

Denis, Diane K., Torsten Jochem, and Anjana Rajamani. "Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation: The Peer Effects of Say on Pay." Review of Financial Studies 33, no. 7 (2019): 3130–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz104.

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Abstract We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers’ compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely with their weak-vote peers in the executive labor market, and when those peers perform well. Reductions occur following peers’ disclosures of revised pay and are proportional to those needed to retain firms’ relative positions in their peer groups. We conclude that the spillover effects of shareho
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21

Krauss, Patrick, and Henning Zulch. "Non-Audit Services And Audit Quality: Blessing Or Curse?" Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 29, no. 2 (2013): 305. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v29i2.7640.

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This study investigates whether and how audit quality is associated with the provision of non-audit services by the statutory auditor. Using a sample of 1,008 firm observations of major German listed companies for the sample period 2004-2011, our study is one of the first to thoroughly analyze this issue empirically for the German audit market. Consistent with prior studies we choose discretionary working capital accruals as our proxy for audit quality. Our empirical results demonstrate that total non-audit fees in general and audit related fees in particular are negatively associated with aud
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22

Brannon, Ike, and Jared Whitley. "Corporate Governance Oversight and Proxy Advisory Firms." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3224511.

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23

Larcker, David F., Allan L. McCall, and Gaizka Ormazabal. "Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1811130.

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24

Dey, Aiyesha, Austin Starkweather, and Joshua T. White. "Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3871948.

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25

Sinha, Abhishek, and Suresh Kerani. "Shriram Transport Finance Corporation Ltd: Do Proxy Advisors Really Protect Non-promoters’ Interests?" South Asian Journal of Business and Management Cases, September 23, 2021, 227797792110401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/22779779211040172.

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Research Question: What is the role of Proxy Advisory Firms in protecting the interests of the non-promoter shareholders? Links to theory: This case study demonstrates how agency cost type 2 may lead to a conflict of interest between the promoters and the financial institutions. It also takes into consideration how the information asymmetry can be alleviated using proxy advisory services. Phenomenon studied: The case study explores the role of proxy advisory firms in influencing the votes of non-promoter shareholders at a general body meeting and its impact on the passage of resolution. Case C
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26

Eckstein, Asaf, and Sharon Hannes. "A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Advisory Firms." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3098008.

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27

Malenko, Andrey, and Nadya Malenko. "Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2757597.

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28

Malenko, Nadya, and Yao Shen. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526799.

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29

Ma, Shichao, and Yan Xiong. "Information Bias in the Proxy Advisory Market." Review of Corporate Finance Studies, May 4, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa005.

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Abstract We study an information sale problem in which a monopolist proxy advisor sells recommendations to a firm’s shareholders for corporate voting. We find that even an unconflicted proxy advisor skews its recommendations based on its clients’ beliefs or preferences. A novel bias-quantity relationship affects firm value. Under some parameters, shareholders’ biased beliefs or preferences can lead shareholders to make more information purchases, which enhances their collective decision-making. Thus, firm value may increase despite the negative effects of biased proxy voting recommendations. J
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30

"Audit Committees, Auditors and Corporate Governance: A Theoretical Bricolage for Epistemological Guidance Correlating with the Indian Context." International Journal of Recent Technology and Engineering 8, no. 2S7 (2019): 360–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.35940/ijrte.b1066.0782s719.

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The last two decades offer a pantheon of business failures, which drove modern corporate governance reforms, is demanding a strong assurance function, particularly from Auditors. This paper examines both qualitatively and quantitatively the ramifications of interfaces among the corporate triad members-Audit committee, External auditors and Internal Auditors. Focused on the backstage of corporate governance fiascos such as Carrilion, IL&FS and others, an attempt is made to understand through the Meta study their encumbrance. It is observed from this study is that ,while the plethora of refo
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31

Howley, Kevin. "Always Famous." M/C Journal 7, no. 5 (2004). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2452.

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Introduction A snapshot, not unlike countless photographs likely to be found in any number of family albums, shows two figures sitting on a park bench: an elderly and amiable looking man grins beneath the rim of a golf cap; a young boy of twelve smiles wide for the camera — a rather banal scene, captured on film. And yet, this seemingly innocent and unexceptional photograph was the site of a remarkable and wide ranging discourse — encompassing American conservatism, celebrity politics, and the end of the Cold War — as the image circulated around the globe during the weeklong state funeral of R
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32

Ellis, Katie M., Mike Kent, and Kathryn Locke. "Video on Demand for People with Disability: Traversing Terrestrial Borders." M/C Journal 19, no. 5 (2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.1158.

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IntroductionWithin Australia, the approach taken to the ways in which disabled people access television is heavily influenced by legislation and activism from abroad. This is increasingly the case as television moves to online modes of distribution where physical and legislative boundaries are more fluid. While early investigations of the intersections between television and the concept of abroad focused on the impacts of representation and national reputation (Boddy), the introduction of new media technologies saw a shifting focus towards the impact and introduction of new media technologies.
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