Academic literature on the topic 'Psychoanalytical Theory from D W Winnicott'

The evacuation of British children during World War II is read alongside the legend of the ‘Pied Piper’ after which the mass migration was officially named. While virtually every British account of World War II makes mention of the evacuation, most are silent on the question of its ominous title: ‘Operation Pied Piper’. This paper traces the legend's key theme – on influencing and being influenced – as it surfaces in the writing of one child analyst and one social worker charged with the responsibility of leading a family of five hostels for British youth. At a time when Hitler's deadly regime reached unprecedented heights across the Channel, the legend of the ‘Pied Piper’ becomes a highly suggestive metaphor for thinking about D. W. Winnicott and Clare Britton's writing on what authority could mean in the face of leadership gone terribly wrong. Quite another, profoundly intimate loss of leadership haunts their words as well: Sigmund Freud, in exile from Hitler's Europe and leader of the psychoanalytic movement, died in London just weeks after the first wave of Blitz evacuations. It is in this context that Winnicott and Britton articulated a theory of authority that could address the losses of history without at the same time demanding the loss of the mind.

In this paper, the author attempts to arrive at a comprehensive outline of Winnicott's developmental theory. This theory encompasses the infant's emergence from total dependence and subject/object merging to what the author refers to as relative independence and relative subject/object separation (in Winnicott's words, “separation that is a not a separation but a form of union” [1971a, p. 98]). This conceptualization is based mainly on an amalgam of Winnicott's two well-known papers, on transitional objects and phenomena (1953) and on the use of an object (1969). The author also refers to André Green's notions of the importance of the negative and of the “dead mother” in reference to Winnicott's work. To demonstrate the clinical implications of the paper, the author discusses in detail the case of Rosemary Dinnage, as described by both Winnicott and Green and as reported directly by herself.


 
 
 Home is where one starts from. As we grow older The world becomes stranger, the pattern more complicated Of dead and living. Not the intense moment Isolated, with no before and after, But a lifetime burning in every moment… (Eliot 204) Questions of just what home might mean emerged with unfortunate biting salience during the writing of this article with the vicious attack of a student knocked to the ground by the force of a broken bottle and then kicked mercilessly in the head. If not for the ministrations of a bystander, there would have been one less person on the planet. Such disruptive and distressing incidents shake up our world – not only for the person who experiences the original event but also for those who find themselves as witnesses. Using the given incident as an exemplar, the following paper explores the concept of home in the context of ruptures and breaks for people who inhabit a blended world of the digital and the physical. To focus investigations, the Winnicottian concept of the holding environment provides a novel way of understanding home as a seamless domain of continuity which, in this instance is the worldspace spans the physico-digital divide. Sitting writing a paper about ‘home’ and the manner in which the virtual and the physical worlds are blending, I glanced up and was shocked. It is very easy to sit within the warmth and comfort of academe, especially if you have a nice toasty office in the midst of winter and to postulate about what home might be. Theories and concepts, heater, pc and comfy chair support feelings of being at home, of feeling like you have a place in the world, that you have an academic home, you have a conceptual home and, …just wait a minute… back shortly… just answering an email… and a virtual home, in which you can interact and exist in wholly other ways. The other day, however, I abandoned writing the earlier paper with the disorienting experience of seeing a student at my door, a person who tumbled in amidst a mass of scrambled sentences, bandaged bleeding hands, and a bruised head-kicked face. An overseas student who should have been knocking on my door to tell me that ‘Hey, I’ve finished my exams’ instead arrived to ask for my advice: ‘Someone attacked me the other night and I don’t know what to do.’ Home, at least the home about which I wrote before the shock of meeting a traumatised student, was a concept and reality that had transformed markedly over the last quarter of the twentieth century. It was a concept that in its shifts revealed a parallel between the setting up of share housing and the emergence of virtual/physical world blending. Home, as I construed it was about the move, by people aged up to thirties, who were frequently moving from family homes towards blended environments in which share housing became specific non-related familial space (McNamara & Connell), a space/place replicated by social networking in the domain of the digital. There it was. Leaning on the work of theorists such as Miriam Meyerhoff in relation to communities of practice in a linguistic sense, to the earlier work of Lesley Milroy in relation to social networks, I was set to make an argument that the textual world of the internet and other digital domains was developing in a manner that replicated linguistic – specifically spoken – communities of practice based on speech patterns. Buoyed by the recent discovery of the more recent writing of Line Dubé, Anne Bourhis and Réal Jacob in relation to virtual communities of practice, I was certain that my propositions regarding textual practices had something to offer to the current edition of this journal. Further, my argument would proceed in such a way as to infer that the textual base played out in digital media was advancing into the domain of speech in the physical world to the extent that it was possible to determine who had an active digital life – especially in relation to domains on the net – merely by their vocabulary and their sentence construction. My proposition was that the digital domain had not only blended with the virtual in the manner that Dubé, Bourhis and Jacob suggested, but that textual communication was now a home base for the development of the English language for a broad section of the general populace in English speaking countries. The sudden jar of a physical world shock shook loose the comfortable home of text and theory and challenged what I wrote. What was home for the young student who stood before me? We had spoken of ‘home’ before, of making home in a new country, of how your housemates become your family to a certain extent, of how internet and mobile phones made it easier, how home was really with you wherever you went BUT, with the disaster that was an assault, some of that rhetoric resonated as hollow – rhetoric without substance, cold comfort, no comfort. In this situation, home is a concept tested. Perhaps only in such a context can the boundaries and meanings of home come to the fore. It is to that issue that I will address this version of the paper and for that purpose, I will advance the argument that although there may well be a modified version of home developing for a specific generation or cohort of people, that there remains a need for anchoring in the various domains of engagement. To that end, I will use the theory of psychoanalytic theorist D.W. Winnicott who constructed the concept of the holding environment (Winnicott ‘From Dependence;’ and Seinfeld). This article therefore takes its new springing point from hereon in and starts with a brief exploration of the holding environment by its originating author, reconstructs this as a contextually relevant concept, and then talks into some of the original propositions using the given incident for illustrative purposes. The holding environment as construed by D.W. Winnicott is, under optimal conditions, the first environment that an infant experiences, the warm and caring one provided by a primary caregiver who, for this article will be known as the m/other (“The Concept of the Healthy Individual” 27-28). Within this environment of literal and metaphoric holding, the infant knows nothing other than an all-encompassing domain which includes physical and psychological care, the anticipation and provision of needs, and a titrated introduction to the world of things and people (“From Dependence” 86). From the perspective of the infant and within this circle of holding, the world belongs to the infant and is composed largely of the m/other. Only when there is a break in the continuity of care does the infant notice/perceive a world that is anything other than seamless with her/his own existence. In Winnicott’s schema, if a holding environment operates in an optimal manner, it largely remains invisible (Winnicott, “From Dependence” 86; Winnicott, “The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship” 52; Ogden 200). This manner of experiencing the world changes with the developing person so that in adulthood, we experience a range of environments that attend to our various needs, if we are fortunate enough. For example, your office supports your work to a greater or lesser extent and perhaps your partner supports you in a psychological sense, and your personal trainer supports your physical training needs. Other instances of support and holding could include the glasses that support your sight and the car that supports your proclivity for drives in the country and a particular lifestyle. There are therefore, many things, people, institutions, and even phenomena such as birthday celebrations that support different aspects of who we are – our being – and different aspects of our activities – our doing. This mirrors theories developed within the context of sociolinguistics in which authors parallel what people are with social networks and what people do, with communities of practice (Moore 22). In the context of Winnicott and linguistic theory, without those supports, our lives would be different and for many of us, would be diminished. The supports I describe are those I construe as holding environments and I believe that by considering a holding environment as a form of ‘home’ that we can reveal a specific way of understanding not only what a home might be, but also the manner in which it operates when people perceive it to be under threat. In the context of the digital domain, there are many media such as email, chat rooms, twitter, real time chat in a range of venues and digital social networks and virtual worlds that support different aspects of our identities, of things that we want to do, of contacts we make and maintain, and of communication for fun and for business. My initial proposition included the concept that various language forms operate to support and construct our identities and that what digital media provided were various venues for the operation of differing but overlapping holding environments in a textual sense. What do these elements, or those like them mean in the situation in which the student found himself? What does it mean and why was it that despite some time in between, that his primary quest was to seek out a person in the physical domain rather than finding solace online when, as I understood, he spent a great deal of time in digital communication? I believe that although there is a blending of domains – the digital and analogue – that when a holding environment of either variety breaks, fractures or at least reveals cracks, that it is likely that a person will seek redress in both modes and in so doing, will reaffirm what is a vital element for the healthy existence of every person – the maintenance of a sense of home – be that on or offline. Despite the seeking for redress in the mode in which the break occurred, the parallel search for social sanction and acknowledgement in the alternative domain may be just as significant for a slightly different reason. When Winnicott writes about ruptures and breaks, it is about those impingements that destroy continuity (“The Fear of Breakdown” 93) – the break in going on being. In the current context in which a person or community inhabits both the online and offline realms, part of their continuity of being, their worldspace (Hardey 2) is the seamlessness between the domains. It is therefore necessary to bring the sense of rupture/failure that occurs in one domain, across into the other to maintain the meta- holding environment or home. Home is that space where ‘you speak my language,’ whether on or offline, the holding environment is one that adapts to you, that understands your speech/text and responds in a manner predictable and in your own genre under optimal conditions, home meets you where you are and, importantly, is a space and place that when it ruptures, mends in such a way as to your restore your faith in its capacity to perform as a holding environment (“Transitional Objects” 10-11). Winnicott writes that only with an environment that was not perfect, (only with an environment that failed occasionally in a minor way), is it possible for a person to sense that there was a holding environment at all. Further, rather than a person construing this failing as a marker of lack of dependability, that the small failure revealed the significance and value of its effective functioning for most of the time. Additionally, a minor break revealed that the holding environment/home held the potential to respond to some unanticipated and distressing break by supporting the person experiencing it. By operating in this manner, there is now an imaginal space of holding/home. In a sense, this mirrors what other authors such as Thomas Lindif and Milton Shatzer write about when they describe social presence in relation to the manner in which an online arena supports or is perceived to support activities such as communication between peers. One of the most noted and public manifestations of the phenomenon of a failed holding environment becoming mended and therefore stronger was that experienced in several places in relation to terrorist attacks such as that of 2001 in the USA. In relation to the attacks on the twin towers in New York, the people of that city experienced a shattering of the integrity of their holding environment/ their home. However, they also noted – as reported across a range of media (for example: Gamble 1.iii; Grider), a huge outpouring of compassion and caring by their fellow New Yorkers thereby experiencing a certain mending and elevating of the significance of their home city holding environment (Gamble 2.vi). In the context of the aforementioned student being attacked, the break also occurred in the physical domain. Although he sought some form of reassurance online could provide some solace. However, it would leave him with the experience that the physical environment was no longer homelike, that it had failed as a holding environment. That is, home in the physical realm was, for a time, failing to support him. To effect a mending in the physical domain, it was therefore important that he seek out solutions that equally involved the physical world of people – mirroring the break – the assault by a person. What occurred when he visited my office was that he received a physical world hearing and witness to his injuries and then with the aid of colleagues, he received further care, advice and support. One of the consequences of such an experience is that although the possibility of assault is now imaginable, because it has been experienced; there is also the knowledge that assistance is at hand – a situation that may not have been known or predicted before. In some manner therefore, with other imagined ghastly events, there is now an expectation of potential assistance. That imaginal knowing therefore now forms part of his holding environment in his physical world, that form of home that ensures ontological security as mentioned by McNamara and Connell (82). Outrage over incidents in Second Life and in other domains such as myspace predominantly play out in those arenas but, like the assault of the student, also get played out in other arenas, including mainstream media. For example, an attack on the virtual headquarters of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation on Second Life attracted attention in newspapers and other mainstream media (Hutcheon). It seems therefore that not only is it necessary to mend the breaks in a sense within the medium in which the original break occurred but also to reassert the blended domain of the digital and the analogue and the capacity of each to form part of the meta holding environment that exists in contemporary society. There is yet to develop a discourse that links the digital and the physical worlds as constituents of a worldspace (Hardey 2), that can be viewed as a meta- holding environment/home. However, even with the few examples proffered here, it seems apparent that by investigating breaks and ruptures in the lives of people who maintain a life world that spans the digital/physical divide that it might be possible to understand the apparent merging of the two. Further, it may lead to significant observations about the newly emerging worldspace as a holding environment /home in a novel way with leads for the assisting people across the divides that may otherwise have not been considered. The implications for maintaining the seamlessness and continuity of home/holding environment in the instance of natural or person-effected disasters in either domain is the demand for an appropriate response in both. Although this already occurs, it is in an ad hoc manner without a consideration of the significance of mending ruptures and re-enlivening both domains for a sense of ontological security of the worldspace – that is at its very heart, a sense of home. References Dubé, L., A. Bourhis, and R. Jacob. “Towards a Typology of Virtual Communities of Practice.” Interdisciplinary Journal of Information, Knowledge, and Management 1 (2006): 69-93. Eliot, T. S. “East Coker V.” Collected Poems 1909-26. London: Faber, 1974. 202-204. Gamble, Jennifer M. The Aesthetics of Mourning & the Anaesthetics of Trauma: Transformation through Memorial Space. Ph.D. thesis. The University of Sydney, 2006. Grider, Sylvia. “Spontaneous Shrines: A Modern Response to Tragedy and Disaster (Preliminary Observations Regarding the Spontaneous Shrines Following the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001)”. New Directions in Folklore 5 Oct. 2001: 1-10. 1 Dec. 2002 http://www.temple.edu/isllc/newfolk/shrines.html>. Hardey, Mariann. “Going Live: Converging Mobile Technology and the Sociability of the iGeneration.” M/C Journal 10.1 (2007). 2 July 2007 http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0703/09-hardey.php>. Hutcheon, Stephen. “Vandals ‘Bomb’ ABC Island.” Sydney Morning Herald 22 May 2007. 23 May. 2007 http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/vandals-bomb-abc-island/2007/05/22/1179601400256.html>. Lindlif, Thomas R., and Milton J. Shatzer. “Media Ethnography in Virtual Space: Strategies, Limits, and Possibilities.” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 42.2 (1998): 170(20). McNamara, Sophie, and John Connell. “Homeward Bound? Searching for Home in Inner Sydney’s Share Houses.” Australian Geographer 38.1 (2007): 71-91. Meyerhoff, Miriam. “Communities of Practice.” Handbook of Language Variation and Change. Eds. J.K. Chambers, Natalie Schilling-Estes and Peter Trudgill. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2002. 526-548. Milroy, J., and L. Milroy. “Linguistic Change, Social Network and Speaker Innovation.” Journal of Linguistics 21.2 (1985): 229-284. Moore, Emma. Learning Style and Identity: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of a Bolton High School. Unpublished PhD dissertation. Manchester, UK: University of Manchester (2003). Ogden, Thomas H. The Matrix of the Mind: Object Relations and the Psychoanalytic Dialogue. London: Maresfield Library, 1990. Seinfeld, Jeffrey. “Donald Winnicott and the Holding Relationship.” Interpreting and Holding: The Paternal and Maternal Functions of the Psychotherapist. Northvale, New Jersey & London: Jason Aronson, 1993. 101-121. Winnicott, Donald Woods. “The Concept of a Healthy Individual.” D.W. Winnicott: Home Is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst. Eds. Clare Winnicott, Ray Shepherd, and Madeleine Davis. New York: Penguin, 1975 (A talk given to the Royal Medico-Psychological Association, Psychotherapy and Social Psychiatry Section, 8 March 1967). 21-39. ———. “The Fear of Breakdown.” D. W. Winnicott: Psycho-Analytic Explorations. Eds. Clare Winnicott, Ray Shepherd and Madeleine Davis. Vol. 1. London: Karnac Books, 1989 (paper originally written c. 1963). 87-96. ———. “From Dependence towards Independence in the Development of the Individual.” The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment. London: Karnac Books, 2002 (Paper first presented in 1963). 83-92. ———. “The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship.” The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment. London: Karnac Books, 2002 (Paper first presented in 1960). 37-55. ———. “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena.” Playing and Reality. London: Brunner-Routledge, 1971/2001. 1-30. 
 
 
 
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Introduction The first “Aquarius Festival” came together in Canberra, at the Australian National University, in the autumn of 1971 and was reprised in 1973 in the small rural town of Nimbin, in northern New South Wales. Both events reflected the Zeitgeist in what was, in some ways, an inchoate expression of the so-called “counterculture” (Roszak). Rather than attempting to analyse the counterculture as a discrete movement with a definable history, I enlist the theory of cultural memes to read the counter culture as a Dawkinsian cluster meme, with this paper offered as “testimonio”, a form of quasi-political memoir that views shifts in the culture through the lens of personal experience (Zimmerman, Yúdice). I track an evolving personal, “internal” topography and map its points of intersection with the radical social, political and cultural changes spawned by the “consciousness revolution” that was an integral part of the counterculture emerging in the 1970s. I focus particularly on the notion of “consciousness raising”, as a Dawkinsian memetic replicator, in the context of the idealistic notions of the much-heralded “New Age” of Aquarius, and propose that this meme has been a persistent feature of the evolution of the “meme cluster” known as the counterculture. Mimesis and the Counterculture Since evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins floated the notion of cultural memes as a template to account for the evolution of ideas within political cultures, a literature of commentary and criticism has emerged that debates the strengths and weaknesses of his proposed model and its application across a number of fields. I borrow the notion to trace the influence of a set of memes that clustered around the emergence of what writer Marilyn Ferguson called The Aquarian Conspiracy, in her 1980 book of that name. Ferguson’s text, subtitled Personal and Social Transformation in Our Time, was a controversial attempt to account for what was known as the “New Age” movement, with its late millennial focus on social and personal transformation. That focus leads me to approach the counterculture (a term first floated by Theodore Roszak) less as a definable historical movement and more as a cluster of aspirational tropes expressing a range of aspects or concerns, from the overt political activism through to experimental technologies for the transformation of consciousness, and all characterised by a critical interrogation of, and resistance to, conventional social norms (Ferguson’s “personal and social transformation”). With its more overtly “spiritual” focus, I read the “New Age” meme, then, as a sub-set of this “cluster meme”, the counterculture. In my reading, “New Age” and “counterculture” overlap, sharing persistent concerns and a broad enough tent to accommodate the serious—the combative political action of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), say, (see Elbaum)—to the light-hearted—the sport of frisbee for example (Stancil). The interrogation of conventional social and political norms inherited from previous generations was a prominent strategy across both movements. Rather than offering a sociological analysis or history of the ragbag counterculture, per se, my discussion here focuses in on the particular meme of “consciousness raising” within that broader set of cultural shifts, some of which were sustained in their own right, some dropping away, and many absorbed into the dominant mainstream culture. Dawkins use of the term “meme” was rooted in the Greek mimesis, to emphasise the replication of an idea by imitation, or copying. He likened the way ideas survive and change in human culture to the natural selection of genes in biological evolution. While the transmission of memes does not depend on a physical medium, such as the DNA of biology, they replicate with a greater or lesser degree of success by harnessing human social media in a kind of “infectivity”, it is argued, through “contagious” repetition among human populations. Dawkins proposed that just as biological organisms could be said to act as “hosts” for replicating genes, in the same way people and groups of people act as hosts for replicating memes. Even before Dawkins floated his term, French biologist Jacques Monod wrote that ideas have retained some of the properties of organisms. Like them, they tend to perpetuate their structure and to breed; they too can fuse, recombine, segregate their content; indeed they too can evolve, and in this evolution selection must surely play an important role. (165, emphasis mine) Ideas have power, in Monod’s analysis: “They interact with each other and with other mental forces in the same brain, in neighbouring brains, and thanks to global communication, in far distant, foreign brains” (Monod, cited in Gleick). Emblematic of the counterculture were various “New Age” phenomena such as psychedelic drugs, art and music, with the latter contributing the “Aquarius” meme, whose theme song came from the stage musical (and later, film) Hair, and particularly the lyric that runs: “This is the dawning of the Age of Aquarius”. The Australian Aquarius Festivals of 1971 and 1973 explicitly invoked this meme in the way identified by Monod and the “Aquarius” meme resonated even in Australia. Problematising “Aquarius” As for the astrological accuracy of the “Age of Aquarius meme”, professional astrologers argue about its dating, and the qualities that supposedly characterise it. When I consulted with two prominent workers in this field for the preparation of this article, I was astonished to find their respective dating of the putative Age of Aquarius were centuries apart! What memes were being “hosted” here? According to the lyrics: When the moon is in the seventh house And Jupiter aligns with Mars Then peace will guide the planets And love will steer the stars. (Hair) My astrologer informants assert that the moon is actually in the seventh house twice every year, and that Jupiter aligns with Mars every two years. Yet we are still waiting for the outbreak of peace promised according to these astrological conditions. I am also informed that there’s no “real” astrological underpinning for the aspirations of the song’s lyrics, for an astrological “Age” is not determined by any planet but by constellations rising, they tell me. Most important, contrary to the aspirations embodied in the lyrics, peace was not guiding the planets and love was not about to “steer the stars”. For Mars is not the planet of love, apparently, but of war and conflict and, empowered with the expansiveness of Jupiter, it was the forceful aggression of a militaristic mind-set that actually prevailed as the “New Age” supposedly dawned. For the hippified summer of love had taken a nosedive with the tragic events at the Altamont speedway, near San Francisco in 1969, when biker gangs, enlisted to provide security for a concert performance by The Rolling Stones allegedly provoked violence, marring the event and contributing to a dawning disillusionment (for a useful coverage of the event and its historical context see Dalton). There was a lot of far-fetched poetic licence involved in this dreaming, then, but memes, according to Nikos Salingaros, are “greatly simplified versions of patterns”. “The simpler they are, the faster they can proliferate”, he writes, and the most successful memes “come with a great psychological appeal” (243, 260; emphasis mine). What could be retrieved from this inchoate idealism? Harmony and understanding Sympathy and trust abounding No more falsehoods or derisions Golden living dreams of visions Mystic crystal revelation And the mind’s true liberation Aquarius, Aquarius. (Hair) In what follows I want to focus on this notion: “mind’s true liberation” by tracing the evolution of this project of “liberating” the mind, reflected in my personal journey. Nimbin and Aquarius I had attended the first Aquarius Festival, which came together in Canberra, at the Australian National University, in the autumn of 1971. I travelled there from Perth, overland, in a Ford Transit van, among a raggedy band of tie-dyed hippie actors, styled as The Campus Guerilla Theatre Troupe, re-joining our long-lost sisters and brothers as visionary pioneers of the New Age of Aquarius. Our visions were fueled with a suitcase full of potent Sumatran “buddha sticks” and, contrary to Biblical prophesies, we tended to see—not “through a glass darkly” but—in psychedelic, pop-, and op-art explosions of colour. We could see energy, man! Two years later, I found myself at the next Aquarius event in Nimbin, too, but by that time I inhabited a totally different mind-zone, albeit one characterised by the familiar, intense idealism. In the interim, I had been arrested in 1971 while “tripping out” in Sydney on potent “acid”, or LSD (Lysergic acid diethylamide); had tried out political engagement at the Pram Factory Theatre in Melbourne; had camped out in protest at the flooding of Lake Pedder in the Tasmanian wilderness; met a young guru, started meditating, and joined “the ashram”—part of the movement known as the Divine Light Mission, which originated in India and was carried to the “West” (including Australia) by an enthusiastic and evangelical following of drug-toking drop-outs who had been swarming through India intent on escaping the dominant culture of the military-industrial complex and the horrors of the Vietnam War. Thus, by the time of the 1973 event in Nimbin, while other festival participants were foraging for “gold top” magic mushrooms in farmers’ fields, we devotees had put aside such chemical interventions in conscious awareness to dig latrines (our “service” project for the event) and we invited everyone to join us for “satsang” in the yellow, canvas-covered, geodesic dome, to attend to the message of peace. The liberation meme had shifted through a mutation that involved lifestyle-changing choices that were less about alternative approaches to sustainable agriculture and more about engaging directly with “mind’s true liberation”. Raising Consciousness What comes into focus here is the meme of “consciousness raising”, which became the persistent project within which I lived and worked and had my being for many years. Triggered initially by the ingestion of those psychedelic substances that led to my shocking encounter with the police, the project was carried forward into the more disciplined environs of my guru’s ashrams. However, before my encounter with sustained spiritual practice I had tried to work the shift within the parameters of an ostensibly political framework. “Consciousness raising” was a form of political activism borrowed from the political sphere. Originally generated by Mao Zedong in China during the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the vested colonial interests that were choking Chinese nationalism in the 1940s, to our “distant, foreign brains” (Monod), as Western revolutionary romantics, Chairman Mao and his Little Red Book were taken up, in a kind of international counterculture solidarity with revolutionaries everywhere. It must be admitted, this solidarity was a fairly superficial gesture. Back in China it might be construed as part of a crude totalitarian campaign to inculcate Marxist-Leninist political ideas among the peasant classes (see Compestine for a fictionalised account of traumatic times; Han Suyin’s long-form autobiography—an early example of testimonio as personal and political history—offers an unapologetic account of a struggle not usually construed as sympathetically by Western commentators). But the meme (and the processes) of consciousness raising were picked up by feminists in the United States in the late 1960s and into the 1970s (Brownmiller 21) and it was in this form I encountered it as an actor with the politically engaged theatre troupe, The Australian Performing Group, at Carlton’s Pram Factory Theatre in late 1971. The Performance Group I performed as a core member of the Group in 1971-72. Decisions as to which direction the Group should take were to be made as a collective, and the group veered towards anarchy. Most of the women were getting together outside of the confines of the Pram Factory to raise their consciousness within the Carlton Women’s Liberation Cell Group. While happy that the sexual revolution was reducing women’s sexual inhibitions, some of the men at the Factory were grumbling into their beer, disturbed that intimate details of their private lives—and their sexual performance—might be disclosed and raked over by a bunch of radical feminists. As they began to demand equal rights to orgasm in the bedroom, the women started to seek equal access within the performance group, too. They requested rehearsal time to stage the first production by the Women’s Theatre Group, newly formed under the umbrella of the wider collective. As all of the acknowledged writers in the Group so far were men—some of whom had not kept pace in consciousness raising—scripts tended to be viewed as part of a patriarchal plot, so Betty Can Jump was an improvised piece, with the performance material developed entirely by the cast in workshop-style rehearsals, under the direction of Kerry Dwyer (see Blundell, Zuber-Skerritt 21, plus various contributors at www.pramfactory.com/memoirsfolder/). I was the only male in the collective included in the cast. Several women would have been more comfortable if no mere male were involved at all. My gendered attitudes would scarcely have withstood a critical interrogation but, as my partner was active in launching the Women’s Electoral Lobby, I was given the benefit of the doubt. Director Kerry Dwyer liked my physicalised approach to performance (we were both inspired by the “poor theatre” of Jerzy Grotowski and the earlier surrealistic theories of Antonin Artaud), and I was cast to play all the male parts, whatever they would be. Memorable material came up in improvisation, much of which made it into the performances, but my personal favorite didn’t make the cut. It was a sprawling movement piece where I was “born” out of a symbolic mass of writhing female bodies. It was an arduous process and, after much heaving and huffing, I emerged from the birth canal stammering “SSSS … SSSS … SSMMMO-THER”! The radical reversioning of culturally authorised roles for women has inevitably, if more slowly, led to a re-thinking of the culturally approved and reinforced models of masculinity, too, once widely accepted as entirely biologically ordained rather than culturally constructed. But the possibility of a queer re-versioning of gender would be recognised only slowly. Liberation Meanwhile, Dennis Altman was emerging as an early spokesman for gay, or homosexual, liberation and he was invited to address the collective. Altman’s stirring book, Homosexual: Oppression and Liberation, had recently been published, but none of us had read it. Radical or not, the Group had shown little evidence of sensitivity to gender-queer issues. My own sexuality was very much “oppressed” rather than liberated and I would have been loath to use “queer” to describe myself. The term “homosexual” was fraught with pejorative, quasi-medical associations and, in a collective so divided across strict and sometimes hostile gender boundaries, deviant affiliations got short shrift. Dennis was unsure of his reception before this bunch of apparent “heteros”. Sitting at the rear of the meeting, I admired his courage. It took more self-acceptance than I could muster to confront the Group on this issue at the time. Somewhere in the back of my mind, “homosexuality” was still something I was supposed to “get over”, so I failed to respond to Altman’s implicit invitation to come out and join the party. The others saw me in relationship with a woman and whatever doubts they might have carried about the nature of my sexuality were tactfully suspended. Looking back, I am struck by the number of simultaneous poses I was trying to maintain: as an actor; as a practitioner of an Artaudian “theatre of cruelty”; as a politically committed activist; and as a “hetero”-sexual. My identity was an assemblage of entities posing as “I”; it was as if I were performing a self. Little gay boys are encouraged from an early age to hide their real impulses, not only from others—in the very closest circle, the family; at school; among one’s peers—but from themselves, too. The coercive effects of shaming usually fix the denial into place in our psyches before we have any intellectual (or political) resources to consider other options. Growing up trying to please, I hid my feelings. In my experience, it could be downright dangerous to resist the subtle and gross coercions that applied around gender normativity. The psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott, of the British object-relations school, argues that when the environment does not support the developing personality and requires the person to sacrifice his or her own spontaneous needs to adapt to environmental demands, there is not even a resting-place for individual experience and the result is a failure in the primary narcissistic state to evolve an individual. The “individual” then develops as an extension of the shell rather than that of the core [...] What there is left of a core is hidden away and is difficult to find even in the most far-reaching analysis. The individual then exists by not being found. The true self is hidden, and what we have to deal with clinically is the complex false self whose function is to keep this true self hidden. (212) How to connect to that hidden core, then? “Mind’s true liberation...” Alienated from the performative version of selfhood, but still inspired by the promise of liberation, even in the “fuzzy” form for which my inchoate hunger yearned (sexual liberation? political liberation? mystical liberation?), I was left to seek out a more authentic basis for selfhood, one that didn’t send me spinning along the roller-coaster of psychedelic drugs, or lie to me with the nostrums of a toxic, most forms of which would deny me, as a sexual, moral and legal pariah, the comforts of those “anchorage points to the social matrix” identified by Soddy (cited in Mol 58). My spiritual inquiry was “counter” to these institutionalised models of religious culture. So, I began to read my way through a myriad of books on comparative religion. And to my surprise, rather than taking up with the religions of antique cultures, instead I encountered a very young guru, initially as presented in a simply drawn poster in the window of Melbourne’s only vegetarian restaurant (Shakahari, in Carlton). “Are you hungry and tired of reading recipe books?” asked the figure in the poster. I had little sense of where that hunger would lead me, but it seemed to promise a fulfilment in ways that the fractious politics of the APG offered little nourishment. So, while many of my peers in the cities chose to pursue direct political action, and others experimented with cooperative living in rural communes, I chose the communal lifestyle of the ashram. In these different forms, then, the conscious raising meme persisted when other challenges raised by the counterculture either faded or were absorbed in the mainstream. I finally came to realise that the intense disillusionment process I had been through (“dis-illusionment” as the stripping away of illusions) was the beginning of awakening, in effect a “spiritual initiation” into a new way of seeing myself and my “place” in the world. Buddhist teachers might encourage this very kind of stripping away of false notions as part of their teaching, so the aspiration towards the “true liberation” of the mind expressed in the Aquarian visioning might be—and in my case, actually has been and continues to be—fulfilled to a very real extent. Gurus and the entire turn towards Eastern mysticism were part of the New Age meme cluster prevailing during the early 1970s, but I was fortunate to connect with an enduring set of empirical practices that haven’t faded with the fashions of the counterculture. A good guitarist would never want to play in public without first tuning her instrument. In a similar way, it is now possible for me to tune my mind back to a deeper, more original source of being than the socially constructed sense of self, which had been so fraught with conflicts for me. I have discovered that before gender, and before sexuality, in fact, pulsing away behind the thicket of everyday associations, there is an original, unconditioned state of beingness, the awareness of which can be reclaimed through focused meditation practices, tested in a wide variety of “real world” settings. For quite a significant period of time I worked as an instructor in the method on behalf of my guru, or mentor, travelling through a dozen or so countries, and it was through this exposure that I was able to observe that the practices worked independently of culture and that “mind’s true liberation” was in many ways a de-programming of cultural indoctrinations (see Marsh, 2014, 2013, 2011 and 2007 for testimony of this process). In Japan, Zen roshi might challenge their students with the koan: “Show me your original face, before you were born!” While that might seem to be an absurd proposal, I am finding that there is a potential, if unexpected, liberation in following through such an inquiry. As “hokey” as the Aquarian meme-set might have been, it was a reflection of the idealistic hope that characterised the cluster of memes that aggregated within the counterculture, a yearning for healthier life choices than those offered by the toxicity of the military-industrial complex, the grossly exploitative effects of rampant Capitalism and a politics of cynicism and domination. The meme of the “true liberation” of the mind, then, promised by the heady lyrics of a 1970s hippie musical, has continued to bear fruit in ways that I could not have imagined. References Altman, Dennis. Homosexual Oppression and Liberation. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972. Blundell, Graeme. The Naked Truth: A Life in Parts. Sydney: Hachette, 2011. Brownmiller, Susan. In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution. New York: The Dial Press, 1999. Compestine, Ying Chang. Revolution Is Not a Dinner Party. New York: Square Fish, 2009. Dalton, David. “Altamont: End of the Sixties, Or Big Mix-Up in the Middle of Nowhere?” Gadfly Nov/Dec 1999. April 2014 ‹http://www.gadflyonline.com/archive/NovDec99/archive-altamont.html›. Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1976. Elbaum, Max. Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che. London and New York: Verso, 2002. Ferguson, Marilyn. The Aquarian Conspiracy. Los Angeles: Tarcher Putnam, 1980. Gleick, James. “What Defines a Meme?” Smithsonian Magazine 2011. April 2014 ‹http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/What-Defines-a Meme.html›. Hair, The American Tribal Love Rock Musical. Prod. Michael Butler. Book by Gerome Ragni and James Rado; Lyrics by Gerome Ragni and James Rado; Music by Galt MacDermot; Musical Director: Galt MacDermot. 1968. Han, Suyin. The Crippled Tree. 1965. Reprinted. Chicago: Academy Chicago P, 1985. ---. A Mortal Flower. 1966. Reprinted. Chicago: Academy Chicago P, 1985. ---. Birdless Summer. 1968. Reprinted. Chicago: Academy Chicago P, 1985. ---. The Morning Deluge: Mao TseTung and the Chinese Revolution 1893-1954. Boston: Little Brown, 1972. ---. My House Has Two Doors. New York: Putnam, 1980. Marsh, Victor. The Boy in the Yellow Dress. Melbourne: Clouds of Magellan Press, 2014. ---. “A Touch of Silk: A (Post)modern Faerie Tale.” Griffith Review 42: Once Upon a Time in Oz (Oct. 2013): 159-69. ---. “Bent Kid, Straight World: Life Writing and the Reconfiguration of ‘Queer’.” TEXT: Journal of Writing and Writing Courses 15.1 (April 2011). ‹http://www.textjournal.com.au/april11/marsh.htm›. ---. “The Boy in the Yellow Dress: Re-framing Subjectivity in Narrativisations of the Queer Self.“ Life Writing 4.2 (Oct. 2007): 263-286. Mol, Hans. Identity and the Sacred: A Sketch for a New Social-Scientific Theory of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. Monod, Jacques. Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970. Roszak, Theodore. The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition. New York: Doubleday, 1968. Salingaros, Nikos. Theory of Architecture. Solingen: Umbau-Verlag, 2006. Stancil, E.D., and M.D. Johnson. Frisbee: A Practitioner’s Manual and Definitive Treatise. New York: Workman, 1975 Winnicott, D.W. Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis: Collected Papers. 1958. London: Hogarth Press, 1975. Yúdice, George. “Testimonio and Postmodernism.” Latin American Perspectives 18.3 (1991): 15-31. Zimmerman, Marc. “Testimonio.” The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods. Eds. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman and Tim Futing Liao. London: Sage Publications, 2003. Zuber-Skerritt, Ortrun, ed. Australian Playwrights: David Williamson. Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 1988.

IntroductionIt has been nearly half a century since the appearance of Susan Sontag’s landmark essay “The Imagination of Disaster.” The critic wrote of the public fascination with science fiction disaster films, claiming that, on the one hand “from a psychological point of view, the imagination of disaster does not greatly differ from one period in history to another [but, on the other hand] from a political and moral point of view, it does” (224). Even if Sontag is right about aspects of the imagination of disaster not changing, the types, frequency, and magnitude of disasters and their representation in media and popular culture suggest that dynamic conditions prevail on both counts. Disaster has become a significantly urban phenomenon, and highly publicised “worst case” scenarios such as Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti earthquake highlight multiple demographic, cultural, and environmental contexts for visualising cataclysm. The 1950s and 60s science fiction films that Sontag wrote about were filled with marauding aliens and freaks of disabused science. Since then, their visual and dramatic effects have been much enlarged by all kinds of disaster scenarios. Partly imagined, these scenarios have real-life counterparts with threats from terrorism and the war on terror, pan-epidemics, and global climate change. Sontag’s essay—like most, if not all of the films she mentions—overlooked the aftermath; that is, the rebuilding, following extra-terrestrial invasion. It ignored what was likely to happen when the monsters were gone. In contrast, the psychological as well as the practical, social, and economic aspects of reconstruction are integral to disaster discourse today. Writing about how architecture might creatively contribute to post-conflict (including war) and disaster recovery, for instance, Boano elaborates the psychological background for rebuilding, where the material destruction of dwellings and cities “carries a powerful symbolic erosion of security, social wellbeing and place attachment” (38); these are depicted as attributes of selfhood and identity that must be restored. Similarly, Hutchison and Bleiker (385) adopt a view evident in disaster studies, that disaster-struck communities experience “trauma” and require inspired responses that facilitate “healing and reconciliation” as well as material aid such as food, housing, and renewed infrastructure. This paper revisits Sontag’s “The Imagination of Disaster,” fifty years on in view of the changing face of disasters and their representation in film media, including more recent films. The paper then considers disaster recovery and outlines the difficult path that “creative industries” like architecture and urban planning must tread when promising a vision of rebuilding that provides for such intangible outcomes as “healing and reconciliation.” We find that hopes for the seemingly positive psychologically- and socially-recuperative outcomes accompanying the prospect of rebuilding risk a variety of generalisation akin to wish-fulfilment that Sontag finds in disaster films. The Psychology of Science Fiction and Disaster FilmsIn “The Imagination of Disaster,” written at or close to the height of the Cold War, Sontag ruminates on what America’s interest in, if not preoccupation with, science fiction films tell us about ourselves. Their popularity cannot be explained in terms of their entertainment value alone; or if it can, then why audiences found (and still find) such films entertaining is something that itself needs explanation.Depicted in media like photography and film, utopian and dystopian thought have at least one thing in common. Their visions of either perfected or socially alienated worlds are commonly prompted by criticism of the social/political status quo and point to its reform. For Sontag, science fiction films portrayed both people’s worst nightmares concerning disaster and catastrophe (e.g. the end of the world; chaos; enslavement; mutation), as well as their facile victories over the kinds of moral, political, and social dissolution the films imaginatively depicted. Sontag does not explicitly attribute such “happy endings” to wish-fulfilling phantasy and ego-protection. (“Phantasy” is to be distinguished from fantasy. It is a psychoanalytic term for states of mind, often symbolic in form, resulting from infantile wish-fulfilment, desires and instincts.) She does, however, describe the kinds of fears, existential concerns (like annihilation), and crises of meaning they are designed (purpose built) to allay. The fears are a product of the time—the down and dark side of technology (e.g. depersonalisation; ambivalence towards science, scientists, and technology) and changes wrought in our working and personal lives by urbanisation. In short, then as now, science fictions films were both expressions of deep and genuine worries and of the pressing need to inventively set them to rest.When Sontag claims that “the imagination of disaster does not greatly differ” (224) from one period to another, this is because, psychologically speaking, neither the precipitating concerns and fears (death, loss of love, meaninglessness, etc.), nor the ways in which people’s minds endeavour to assuage them, substantively differ. What is different is the way they are depicted. This is unsurprisingly a function of the political, social, and moral situations and milieus that provide the context in which the imagination of disaster unfolds. In contemporary society, the extent to which the media informs and constructs the context in which the imagination operates is unprecedented.Sontag claims that there is little if any criticism of the real social and political conditions that bring about the fears the films depict (223). Instead, fantasy operates so as to displace and project the actual causes away from their all too human origins into outer space and onto aliens. In a sense, this is the core and raison d’etre for such films. By their very nature, science fiction films of the kind Sontag is discussing cannot concern themselves with genuine social or political criticism (even though the films are necessarily expressive of such criticism). Any serious questioning of the moral and political status quo—conditions that are responsible for the disasters befalling people—would hamper the operation of fantasy and its production of temporarily satisfying “solutions” to whatever catastrophe is being depicted.Sontag goes on to discuss various strategies science fiction employs to deal with such fears. For example, through positing a bifurcation between good and evil, and grossly oversimplifying the moral complexity of situations, it allows one to “give outlet to cruel or at least amoral feelings” (215) and to exercise feelings of superiority—moral and otherwise. Ambiguous feelings towards science and technology are repressed. Quick and psychologically satisfying fixes are sought for these by means of phantasy and the imaginative construction of invulnerable heroes. Much of what Sontag says can straightforwardly be applied to catastrophe in general. “Alongside the hopeful fantasy of moral simplification and international unity embodied in the science fiction films lurk the deepest anxieties about contemporary existence” (220). Sontag writes:In the films it is by means of images and sounds […] that one can participate in the fantasy of living through one’s own death and more, the death of cities, the destruction of humanity itself. Science fiction films are not about science. They are about disaster, which is one of the oldest subjects in art. In science fiction films disaster is rarely viewed intensively; it is always extensive. It is a matter of quality and ingenuity […] the science fiction film […] is concerned with the aesthetics of disaster […] and it is in the imagery of destruction that the core of a good science fiction film lies. (212–13)In science fiction films, disaster, though widespread, is viewed intensively as well as extensively. The disturbances constitutive of the disaster are moral and emotional as well as material. People are left without the mental or physical abilities they need to cope. Government is absent or useless. We find ourselves in what amounts to what Naomi Zack (“Philosophy and Disaster”; Ethics for Disaster) describes as a Hobbesian second state of nature—where government is inoperative and chaos (moral, social, political, personal) reigns. Science fiction’s way out is to imaginatively construct scenarios emotionally satisfying enough to temporarily assuage the distress (anomie or chaos) experienced in the film.There is, however, a tremendous difference in the way in which people who face catastrophic occurrences in their lives, as opposed to science fiction, address the problems. For one thing, they must be far closer to complex and quickly changing realities and uncertain truths than are the phantastic, temporarily gratifying, and morally unproblematic resolutions to the catastrophic scenarios that science fiction envisions. Genuine catastrophe, for example war, undermines and dismantles the structures—material structures to be sure but also those of justice, human kindness, and affectivity—that give us the wherewithal to function and that are shown to be inimical to catastrophe as such. Disaster dispenses with civilization while catastrophe displaces it.Special Effects and Changing StorylinesScience fiction and disaster film genres have been shaped by developments in visual simulation technologies providing opportunities for imaginatively mixing fact and fiction. Developments in filmmaking include computer or digital techniques for reproducing on the screen what can otherwise only be imagined as causal sequences of events and spectacles accompanying the wholesale destruction of buildings and cities—even entire planets. Indeed films are routinely promoted on the basis of how cinematographers and technicians have advanced the state of the art. The revival of 3-D movies with films such as Avatar (2009) and Prometheus (2012) is one of a number of developments augmenting the panoramas of 1950s classics featuring “melting tanks, flying bodies, crashing walls, awesome craters and fissures in the earth, plummeting spacecraft [and] colourful deadly rays” (Sontag 213). An emphasis on the scale of destruction and the wholesale obliteration of recognisable sites emblematic of “the city” (mega-structures like the industrial plant in Aliens (1986) and vast space ships like the “Death Star” in two Star Wars sequels) connect older films with new ones and impress the viewer with ever more extraordinary spectacle.Films that have been remade make for useful comparison. On the whole, these reinforce the continuation and predictability of some storylines (for instance, threats of extra-terrestrial invasion), but also the attenuation or disappearance of other narrative elements such as the monsters and anxieties released by mid-twentieth century atomic tests (Broderick). Remakes also highlight emerging themes requiring novel or updated critical frameworks. For example, environmental anxieties, largely absent in 1950s science fiction films (except for narratives involving colliding worlds or alien contacts) have appeared en masse in recent years, providing an updated view on the ethical issues posed by the fall of cities and communities (Taylor, “Urban”).In The Invasion of the Bodysnatchers and its remakes (1956, 1978, 1993), for example, the organic and vegetal nature of the aliens draws the viewer’s attention to an environment formed by combative species, allowing for threats of infestation, growth and decay of the self and individuality—a longstanding theme. In the most recent version, The Invasion (2007), special effects and directorial spirit render the orifice-seeking tendrils of the pod creatures threateningly vigorous and disturbing (Lim). More sanctimonious than physically invasive, the aliens in the 1951 version of The Day the Earth Stood Still are fed up with humankind’s fixation with atomic self-destruction, and threaten global obliteration on the earth (Cox). In the 2008 remake, the suave alien ambassador, Keanu Reeves, targets the environmental negligence of humanity.Science, including science as fiction, enters into disaster narratives in a variety of ways. Some are less obvious but provocative nonetheless; for example, movies dramatising the arrival of aliens such as War of the Worlds (1953 and 2005) or Alien (1979). These more subtle approaches can be personally confronting even without the mutation of victims into vegetables or zombies. Special effects technologies have made it possible to illustrate the course of catastrophic floods and earthquakes in considerable scientific and visual detail and to represent the interaction of natural disasters, the built environment, and people, from the scale of buildings, homes, and domestic lives to entire cities and urban populations.For instance, the blockbuster film The Day After Tomorrow (2004) runs 118 minutes, but has an uncertain fictional time frame of either a few weeks or 72 hours (if the film’s title is to taken literally). The movie shows the world as we know it being mostly destroyed. Tokyo is shattered by hailstones and Los Angeles is twisted by cyclones the likes of which Dorothy would never have seen. New York disappears beneath a mountainous tsunami. All of these events result from global climate change, though whether this is due to human (in) action or other causes is uncertain. Like their predecessors, the new wave of disaster movies like The Day After Tomorrow makes for questionable “art” (Annan). Nevertheless, their reception opens a window onto broader political and moral contexts for present anxieties. Some critics have condemned The Day After Tomorrow for its scientific inaccuracies—questioning the scale or pace of climate change. Others acknowledge errors while commending efforts to raise environmental awareness (Monbiot). Coincident with the film and criticisms in both the scientific and political arena is a new class of environmental heretic—the climate change denier. This is a shadowy character commonly associated with the presidency of George W. Bush and the oil lobby that uses minor inconsistencies of science to claim that climate change does not exist. One thing underlying both twisting facts for the purposes of making science fiction films and ignoring evidence of climate change is an infantile orientation towards the unknown. In this regard, recent films do what science fiction disaster films have always done. While freely mixing truths and half-truths for the purpose of heightened dramatic effect, they fulfil psychological tasks such as orchestrating nightmare scenarios and all too easy victories on the screen. Uncertainty regarding the precise cause, scale, or duration of cataclysmic natural phenomena is mirrored by suspension of disbelief in the viability of some human responses to portrayals of urban disaster. Science fiction, in other words, invites us to accept as possible the flight of Americans and their values to Mexico (The Day After Tomorrow), the voyage into earth’s molten core (The Core 2003), or the disposal of lava in LA’s drainage system (Volcano 1997). Reinforcing Sontag’s point, here too there is a lack of criticism of the real social and political conditions that bring about the fears depicted in the films (223). Moreover, much like news coverage, images in recent natural disaster films (like their predecessors) typically finish at the point where survivors are obliged to pick up the pieces and start all over again—the latter is not regarded as newsworthy. Allowing for developments in science fiction films and the disaster genre, Sontag’s observation remains accurate. The films are primarily concerned “with the aesthetics of destruction, with the peculiar beauties to be found in wreaking havoc, in making a mess” (213) rather than rebuilding. The Imagination of Disaster RecoverySontag’s essay contributes to an important critical perspective on science fiction film. Variations on her “psychological point of view” have been explored. (The two discourses—psychology and cinema—have parallel and in some cases intertwined histories). Moreover, in the intervening years, psychological or psychoanalytical terms and narratives have themselves become even more a part of popular culture. They feature in recent disaster films and disaster recovery discourse in the “real” world.Today, with greater frequency than in the 1950s and 60s films arguably, representations of alien invasion or catastrophic global warming serve to background conflict resolutions of a more quotidian and personal nature. Hence, viewers are led to suspect that Tom Cruise will be more likely to survive the rapacious monsters in the latest The War of the Worlds if he can become less narcissistic and a better father. Similarly, Dennis Quaid’s character will be much better prepared to serve a newly glaciated America for having rescued his son (and marriage) from the watery deep-freezer that New York City becomes in The Day After Tomorrow. In these films the domestic and familial comprise a domain of inter-personal and communal relations from which victims and heroes appear. Currents of thought from the broad literature of disaster studies and Western media also call upon this domain. The imagination of disaster recovery has come to partly resemble a set of problems organised around the needs of traumatised communities. These serve as an object of urban governance, planning, and design conceived in different ways, but largely envisioned as an organic unity that connects urban populations, their pasts, and settings in a meaningful, psychologically significant manner (Furedi; Hutchison and Bleiker; Boano). Terms like “place” or concepts like Boano’s “place-attachment" (38) feature in this discourse to describe this unity and its subjective dimensions. Consider one example. In August 2006, one year after Katrina, the highly respected Journal of Architectural Education dedicated a special issue to New Orleans and its reconstruction. Opening comments by editorialist Barbara Allen include claims presupposing enduring links between the New Orleans community conceived as an organic whole, its architectural heritage imagined as a mnemonic vehicle, and the city’s unique setting. Though largely unsupported (and arguably unsupportable) the following proposition would find agreement across a number of disaster studies and resonates in commonplace reasoning:The culture of New Orleans is unique. It is a mix of ancient heritage with layers and adaptations added by successive generations, resulting in a singularly beautiful cultural mosaic of elements. Hurricane Katrina destroyed buildings—though not in the city’s historic core—and displaced hundreds of thousands of people, but it cannot wipe out the memories and spirit of the citizens. (4) What is intriguing about the claim is an underlying intellectual project that subsumes psychological and sociological domains of reasoning within a distinctive experience of community, place, and memory. In other words, the common belief that memory is an intrinsic part of the human condition of shock and loss gives form to a theory of how urban communities experience disaster and how they might re-build—and justify rebuilding—themselves. This is problematic and invites anachronistic thinking. While communities are believed to be formed partly by memories of a place, “memory” is neither a collective faculty nor is it geographically bounded. Whose memories are included and which ones are not? Are these truly memories of one place or do they also draw on other real or imagined places? Moreover—and this is where additional circumspection is inspired by our reading of Sontag’s essay—does Allen’s editorial contribute to an aestheticised image of place, rather than criticism of the social and political conditions required for reconstruction to proceed with justice, compassionately and affectively? Allowing for civil liberties to enter the picture, Allen adds “it is necessary to enable every citizen to come back to this exceptional city if they so desire” (4). However, given that memories of places and desires for their recovery are not univocal, and often contain competing visions of what was and should be, it is not surprising they should result in competing expectations for reconstruction efforts. This has clearly proven the case for New Orleans (Vederber; Taylor, “Typologies”)ConclusionThe comparison of films invites an extension of Sontag’s analysis of the imagination of disaster to include the psychology, politics, and morality of rebuilding. Can a “psychological point of view” help us to understand not only the motives behind capturing so many scenes of destruction on screen and television, but also something of the creative impulses driving reconstruction? This invites a second question. How do some impulses, particularly those caricatured as the essence of an “enterprise culture” (Heap and Ross) associated with America’s “can-do” or others valorised as positive outcomes of catastrophe in The Upside of Down (Homer-Dixon), highlight or possibly obscure criticism of the conditions which made cities like New Orleans vulnerable in the first place? The broad outline of an answer to the second question begins to appear only when consideration of the ethics of disaster and rebuilding are taken on board. If “the upside” of “the down” wrought by Hurricane Katrina, for example, is rebuilding of any kind, at any price, and for any person, then the equation works (i.e., there is a silver lining for every cloud). If, however, the range of positives is broadened to include issues of social justice, then the figures require more complex arithmetic.ReferencesAllen, Barbara. “New Orleans and Katrina: One Year Later.” Journal of Architectural Education 60.1 (2006): 4.Annan, David. Catastrophe: The End of the Cinema? London: Lorrimer, 1975.Boano, Camillo. “‘Violent Space’: Production and Reproduction of Security and Vulnerabilities.” The Journal of Architecture 16 (2011): 37–55.Broderick, Mick, ed. Hibakusha Cinema: Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Nuclear Image in Japanese Film. London: Kegan Paul, 1996.Cox, David. “Get This, Aliens: We Just Don’t Care!” The Guardian 15 Dec. 2008 ‹http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/filmblog/2008/dec/15/the-day-the-earth-stood-still›. Furedi, Frank. “The Changing Meaning of Disaster.” Area 39.4 (2007): 482–89.Heap, Shaun H., and Angus Ross, eds. Understanding the Enterprise Culture: Themes in the Work of Mary Douglas. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity and the Renewal of Civilization. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2006.Hutchison, Emma, and Roland Bleiker. “Emotional Reconciliation: Reconstituting Identity and Community after Trauma.” European Journal of Social Theory 11 (2008): 385–403.Lim, Dennis. “Same Old Aliens, But New Neuroses.” New York Times 12 Aug. 2007: A17.Monbiot, George. “A Hard Rain's A-gonna Fall.” The Guardian 14 May 2004.Sontag, Susan. “The Imagination of Disaster” (1965). Against Interpretation and Other Essays. New York: Dell, 1979. 209–25.Taylor, William M. “Typologies of Katrina: Mnemotechnics in Post-Disaster New Orleans.” Interstices 13 (2012): 71–84.———. “Urban Disasters: Visualising the Fall of Cities and the Forming of Human Values.” Journal of Architecture 11.5 (2006): 603–12.Verderber, Stephen. “Five Years After – Three New Orleans Neighborhoods.” Journal of Architectural Education 64.1 (2010): 107–20.Zack, Naomi. Ethics for Disaster. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009.———. “Philosophy and Disaster.” Homeland Security Affairs 2, article 5 (April 2006): ‹http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.1.5›.FilmographyAlien. Dir. Ridley Scott. Brandywine Productions, 1979.Aliens. Dir. James Cameron. Brandywine Productions, 1986.Avatar. Dir. James Cameron. Lightstorm Entertainment et al., 2009.The Core. Dir. Jon Amiel. Paramount Pictures, 2003.The Day after Tomorrow. Dir. Roland Emmerich. 20th Century Fox, 2004.The Invasion of the Body Snatchers. Dir. Don Siegel. Allied Artists, 1956; also 1978 and 1993.The Invasion. Dirs. Oliver Hirschbiegel and Jame McTeigue. Village Roadshow et al, 2007.Prometheus. Dir. Ridley Scott. Scott Free and Brandywine Productions, 2012Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope. Dir. George Lucas. Lucasfilm, 1977.Star Wars Episode VI: Return of the Jedi. Dir. George Lucas. Lucasfilm, 1983.Volcano. Dir. Mick Jackson. 20th Century Fox, 1997.War of the Worlds. Dir. George Pal. Paramount, 1953; also Steven Spielberg. Paramount, 2005.Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to Oenone Rooksby and Joely-Kym Sobott for their assistance and advice when preparing this article. It was also made possible in part by a grant from the Australian Research Council.

Introdução - O aconselhamento é a estratégia escolhida pela Organização Mundial da Saúde para o combate à epidemia de aids por ser um método de ajuda, apoio e prevenção. Objetivo - Analisar as características das interações aconselhador-cliente no processo da revelação do diagnóstico positivo para HIV em dois Centros de Testagem e Aconselhamento em DST e Aids do Município de São Paulo, com base na versão dos clientes e tomando por referência suas repercussões sobre os procedimentos e resultados da atividade. Métodos - Como técnica de coleta para o levantamento de dados, foi utilizada a entrevista em momento posterior ao aconselhamento pós-teste. No total, foram realizadas 20 entrevistas, sendo 14 os sujeitos de pesquisa. Todos os entrevistados eram do sexo masculino. Os critérios escolhidos para inclusão no estudo foram: ter 18 anos ou mais; ter resultado positivo no teste anti-HIV; e ter participado do processo de revelação do diagnóstico de infecção pelo HIV nos serviços pesquisados. Para organizar os dados, a autora utilizou a técnica de análise de conteúdo por entrevista e por tema, construindo categorias analíticas segundo os objetivos do estudo. Os dados foram analisados e interpretados por meio da utilização de conceitos da teoria psicanalítica de D.W.Winnicott. Resultados - Com base nos relatos, considera-se que os profissionais seguem bem o protocolo do aconselhamento, atingindo seus objetivos de: a) lidar com os sentimentos provocados pelo diagnóstico positivo para o HIV; b) dar ao cliente a oportunidade de expressar seu sofrimento e angústia; c) sustentar as dificuldades de compartilhar a notícia com familiares e parceiros; e d) tirar dúvidas sobre prevenção de DST/HIV e sobre a terapia antiretroviral. Os contextos de aconselhamento investigados caracterizaram-se pelas interações de ajuda e suporte para a maioria dos entrevistados, funcionando como realidade compartilhada e dando sustentação para seus sentimentos e preocupações. Entretanto, alguns clientes sentiram falta de espaço para discussão e de mais tempo para abordarem questões pessoais, além daquelas relacionadas à sua nova condição de portadores do HIV. Conclusões - Na versão dos clientes, os aconselhadores os acolhem, informam e apóiam em suas necessidades. A análise revelou os processos psicológicos que operaram no momento do aconselhamento pós-teste entre o sujeito de pesquisa e o aconselhador. A escuta do cliente é a condição primordial para que o ambiente de compartilhamento se instale. O estudo fornece subsídios para melhorar a qualidade deste serviço prestado à população.<br>Introduction - Counseling is the strategy chosen by the World Health Organization against the aids epidemic since it is a method for help, support and prevention. Objective - To analyze the characteristics of counselor-subject interactions within the process of disclosing the positive diagnosis for HIV in two STD and Aids Counseling and Testing Centers in the city of São Paulo, according to the subjects’ version and based on their repercussions of the activity's procedures and results. Methods - The technique used to gather data was the interview, performed after the counseling moment when test result was communicated. In total, 20 interviews were carried with 14 research subjects. All interviewed were men. The criteria chosen to include a subject in the research were: greater than 18 years of age; positive for HIV; and having received the positive diagnosis for HIV at the researched CTC. In order to organize the data, the author used the technique of analysis of content by interview and by theme, elaborating analytical categories based on the study objectives. The data was interpreted using the concepts of the psychoanalytical theory of D. W. Winnicott. Results - Based on the subjects’ reports, it is considered that professionals follow the protocol for counseling, reaching its objectives, which are: a) dealing with feelings caused by the diagnosis; b) providing the opportunity to the subjects to express their suffering and anxiety; c) surpassing difficulties sharing the diagnosis with their family and partners; and d) clarifying questions about STD/HIV prevention and therapy. In the investigated counseling the interactions were characterized by the support and assistance for most of the subjects, acting as a shared reality and providing support to their feelings and concerns. However, some subjects felt the need for more time to discuss their feelings and personal issues, besides the ones related to their new HIV carrier condition. Conclusions - In the subjects’ version, the counselors welcome them, provide information and support for their needs. The study revealed the psychological processes occurred during the post-test counseling between the subject and the counselor. Listening to the subject is the primary condition to establish a sharing environment. The study provides data to improve the service currently available to the population.

Volume 4 (1952–1955) is introduced by the distinguished Canadian analyst, Dominique Scarfone. It contains texts of further BBC broadcasts and papers on Winnicott’s contribution to the psychoanalytic study of psychosis and the meaning of regression in analysis. There are letters to members of the British Society and reviews of contemporary books, including a review, with Masud Khan, of Ronald Fairbairn’s Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality. This volume contains the first published version of ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ and the whole case history Holding and Interpretation, first published posthumously in 1972 and then in 1986, but based on detailed case notes for a patient seen 1940–1941 and from 1953, and written between January and July 1955.

Volume 2, 1939–45, covers the years of World War II. It contains an introduction by the late senior child psychotherapist, Christopher Reeves. The volume includes letters to colleagues, including one to the British Medical Journal with Emanuel Miller and John Bowlby regarding the war and children; a report on war work; Winnicott’s first article on aggression; articles on delinquency and corporal punishment; his contribution to the Controversial Discussions of the British Psychoanalytical Society; texts of his early BBC broadcasts; and the very significant paper, ‘Primitive Emotional Development’, a continually relevant statement of his own evolving position in regard to psychoanalytic theory and practice.

How do people relate to the music they value? Listening is a central relation, but there are many others. As Charles Keil observed, people may find music, be invaded by music, use music, participate in music, and so on. This chapter explores a relation that may be called possessing music or owning music. Theodor W. Adorno and Simon Frith both emphasized such relations in the context of their very different accounts of mass-media music. A psychoanalytic approach, drawing on the ideas of Melanie Klein and D. W. Winnicott, clarifies the nature of these relations. A close reading of ethnographic interviews from the collection My Music shows some of the specific forms that such relations can take, which are different for every individual.

In this collection of points following the discussion of Congress papers by Winnicott and Greenacre on the parent-infant relationship, Winnicott states that he has learnt from the discussion, in particular from Greenacre’s discussion of aggression. He finds that there is a positive effect of understanding the whole infant-mother relationship as a real and rich experience. He refers to Balint on language, to the subject of predestination raised by Lagache, to Klein on envy, and to Martin James on the false self, quoting Hamlet’s line that Osric ‘did comply with his dug before he sucked it’. He argues finally that abnormalities in the mother-baby relationship can develop very early, noting that this demonstrates that the subject of infancy can be extremely fruitful for psychoanalytic discussion.

Winnicott’s contribution to a discussion of a case of obsessional neurosis given by Bertha Bornstein to the Amsterdam International Psychoanalytic Congress. In regard to the theory of obsessional neurosis, Winnicott formulates a concept of a split-off intellectual functioning as an essential feature of a thorough-going obsessional neurosis case. In this case, Winnicott believes it is possible to think that the mother of Frankie was interfered with, in her first relationship to this boy, by unconscious features derived from her relationship to her own brother and that the whole of the case could be described and understood around this detail.

In this review, written with Masud Khan, Winnicott judges it is possible to get something out of Fairbairn’s work on dreams by considering the relationship of his concept of introjection of the bad object to Freud’s work on repetition-compulsion. Fairbairn starts with an infant that is a whole human being, one experiencing the relation to the breast as a separate object, an object that he has experienced and about which he has complicated ideas. He says that the ‘libido is object-seeking,’ and considers introjection as a specific defence mechanism, not as a primary process or a kind of object-relationship. Fairbairn’s theory here has similarities with Melanie Klein’s theory. Winnicott says Fairbairn fails to note the differences between the needs of ‘whole’ infants (however young) experiencing object-relationships of an oral quality and those of infants at the theoretical start, who are emerging from a fused state characterised by primary identification with the mother.

Winnicott presents his personal view of the major importance of Kleinian thinking to psychoanalysis in this talk to the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society. He realised Klein’s contribution to his early training because he saw that babies, not just children of oedipal age, suffered and had emotional difficulties. Klein took Freudian analysis and three-person Oedipal work back to the earlier two-person stage of infant and mother. Winnicott affirms how much he valued and learned from all this while not agreeing with everything. He gives his criticism of her theories of paranoid-schizoid elements in the self and some aspects of the depressive position. He summarizes key aspects of her theory and sees her as a world leader in psychoanalysis.

In this unfinished paper, never given, Winnicott debates the sources of aggression from a psychoanalytic perspective. He advocates discarding the contributions of Freud on the Death Instinct and Klein on envy as laid out in her 1955 paper, and unlinking these concepts from their authors in order to asses their value free of loyalty or cliché.

Winnicott’s talk to the Progressive League gives a developmental psychoanalytic approach to masculinity and femininity; points out that males and females cross-identify with one another; considers prepuberty, puberty, and adolescent phases; considers the visibility of the penis as against the vagina; gives examples of how girls might fantasise about themselves and their bodies; distinguishes fantasising from true inner psychic reality (there in each of us); considers envy of the opposite sex; and finally details the real dangers of childbirth for women and the subsequent responsibility for newborn life.

This chapter consists of the introduction to Part II of Human Nature. In the Introduction to Part II, Winnicott states that he will explore early childhood, moving backwards into the human foetal stages, and then forward to latency and adolescence, all from the psychoanalytic (dynamic psychology) perspective. He will consider interpersonal relationships and their complications, the human being’s achievement of the personal unit of self and the capacity to experience concern, and the primitive tasks he considers essential for the human being: integration of self, a psycho-somatic modus vivendi, and the ability for contact with reality through the experience of illusion. In the chapter itself, Winnicott explores the work of psychoanalysis from Freud onwards and charts his views on the emotional features of infancy (2–5 years). He elaborates on the topic of the family, of the instincts (with reference to the fantasies for the growing child at each developmental stage), and of love relationships, with reference to the Oedipus complex in particular.

In this lecture to psychotherapy symposium at McLean Hospital, Belmont, Massachusetts, Winnicott discusses the treatment and understanding of the psychoses from a clinical psychoanalytical perspective, with an emphasis on a particular kind of regression in the clinical psychoanalytic setting, in which regression is not a matter of the standard defences deployed against recovery. Rather, regression may occur where a patient needs the analyst to provide a dependability originally lacking in early life and in which real needs have to be met for the first time for forward movement to resume in the patient’s development.

In this chapter, Winnicott describes the imaginative elaboration of the body and its functioning, which becomes organised by the growing self into fantasy. From this, the psyche is created with access to conscious and unconscious fantasy, leading on to the development of what we term the soul. He describes quiet and excited states for the child, all relating to his or her responses to instinctual activity and eventually to triangular relationships. He discusses Freud and the Oedipus complex; child, father, and mother relations; childhood and infantile sexuality; and reality, fantasy, and the unconscious for the child.

In this review, Winnicott judges this short work as valuable to child psychiatry for those who enjoy new ideas but who wish their theoretical contributions to relate to the Freudian basis of their work. The author, in Winnicott’s view, shows how Freud’s theory led to reconstructions of childhood and infancy, and of how work with children further enriched the theory derived from the analysis of neurotic adults. However, Winnicott believes that Glover’s dislike of Klein’s ideas colours his work and spoils this otherwise excellent booklet.