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Journal articles on the topic 'Public good games'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 September 2021

Last updated: 29 July 2025

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1

Brañas-Garza, Pablo, and Maria Paz Espinosa. "Unraveling Public Good Games." Games 2, no. 4 (2011): 434–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g2040434.

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2

CORNES, RICHARD, and ROGER HARTLEY. "Aggregative Public Good Games." Journal of Public Economic Theory 9, no. 2 (2007): 201–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00304.x.

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3

Clemens, Christiane, and Thomas Riechmann. "Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games." Computational Economics 28, no. 4 (2006): 399–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9044-4.

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4

Veszteg, Róbert F., and Erita Narhetali. "Public‐good games and the Balinese." International Journal of Social Economics 37, no. 9 (2010): 660–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068291011062461.

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5

Nese, Annamaria, and Patrizia Sbriglia. "Social norms in repeated public good games." Research in Economics 63, no. 4 (2009): 266–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2009.09.006.

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6

Abele, Susanne, and Karl-Martin Ehrhart. "The timing effect in public good games." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41, no. 5 (2005): 470–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2004.09.004.

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7

Rothenhäusler, Dominik, Nikolaus Schweizer, and Nora Szech. "Guilt in voting and public good games." European Economic Review 101 (January 2018): 664–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.001.

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8

HAUERT, CHRISTOPH, SILVIA DE MONTE, JOSEF HOFBAUER, and KARL SIGMUND. "Replicator Dynamics for Optional Public Good Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 218, no. 2 (2002): 187–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2002.3067.

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9

Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. "Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (1997): 209–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.209.

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This paper describes a simple public goods game, implemented with playing cards in a classroom setup. Students choose whether to contribute to the provision of a public good in a situation where it is privately optimal not to contribute, but socially optimal to contribute fully. This exercise motivates discussion of altruism, strategies for private fund-raising, and the role of government in resolving the public good problem.

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10

Arifovic, Jasmina, and John Ledyard. "Scaling Up Learning Models in Public Good Games." Journal of Public Economic Theory 6, no. 2 (2004): 203–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00165.x.

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11

Battu, Balaraju, and Narayanan Srinivasan. "Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 5 (2020): 191567. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.191567.

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Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and presti

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12

Muñoz-García, Félix. "Competition for status acquisition in public good games." Oxford Economic Papers 63, no. 3 (2011): 549–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpr007.

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13

Hichri, W., and A. Kirman. "The emergence of coordination in public good games." European Physical Journal B 55, no. 2 (2007): 149–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2007-00032-8.

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14

Offerman, T., J. Sonnemans, and A. Schram. "Expectation formation in step‐level public good games." Economic Inquiry 39, no. 2 (2001): 250–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00064.x.

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15

Goeschl, Timo, and Johannes Lohse. "Cooperation in public good games. Calculated or confused?" European Economic Review 107 (August 2018): 185–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.007.

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16

Galbiati, Roberto, and Pietro Vertova. "Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games." Games and Economic Behavior 64, no. 1 (2008): 146–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004.

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17

Han, The Anh, Luís Moniz Pereira, and Tom Lenaerts. "Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?" Journal of The Royal Society Interface 12, no. 103 (2015): 20141203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.1203.

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When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of

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18

Morsky, Bryce, Marco Smolla, and Erol Akçay. "Evolution of contribution timing in public goods games." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 287, no. 1927 (2020): 20200735. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.0735.

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Life-history strategies are a crucial aspect of life, which are complicated in group-living species, where pay-offs additionally depend on others’ behaviours. Previous theoretical models of public goods games have generally focused on the amounts individuals contribute to the public good. Yet a much less-studied strategic aspect of public goods games, the timing of contributions, can also have dramatic consequences for individual and collective performance. Here, we develop two stage game theoretical models to explore how the timing of contributions evolves. In the first stage, individuals con

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19

Cornes, Richard, and Roger Hartley. "Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV." Journal of Public Economics 91, no. 9 (2007): 1684–707. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.07.007.

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20

Chan, Nathan W., Stephen Knowles, Ronald Peeters, and Leonard Wolk. "On generosity in public good and charitable dictator games." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 224 (August 2024): 624–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.027.

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21

Offerman, Theo, Arthur Schram, and Joep Sonnemans. "Quantal response models in step-level public good games." European Journal of Political Economy 14, no. 1 (1998): 89–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(97)00044-x.

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22

Teyssier, Sabrina. "Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games." Public Choice 151, no. 1-2 (2010): 91–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9735-1.

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23

Cartwright, Edward, and Abhijit Ramalingam. "Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities?" Economics Letters 179 (June 2019): 42–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.020.

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24

Yu, Sixie, Kai Zhou, Jeffrey Brantingham, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. "Computing Equilibria in Binary Networked Public Goods Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 02 (2020): 2310–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5609.

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Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions, and focus on the algorithmic aspects of such games. First, we show that checking the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. We then identify tractable instances based on restrictions of either utility functions or of the underlying graphical structure. In certain cases, we also show that we can efficiently compute a socially optimal N

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25

Balas, Tatyana, and Anna Tur. "Public Good Differential Game with Composite Distribution of Random Time Horizon." Contributions to Game Theory and Management 16 (2023): 7–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2023.01.

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Differential games with random duration are considered. In some cases, the probability density function of the terminal time can change depending on different conditions and we cannot use the standard distribution. The purpose of this work is studying of games with a composite distribution function for terminal time using the dynamic programming methods. The solutions of the cooperative and non-cooperative public good differential game with random duration are considered.

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26

Cartwright, Edward, Anna Stepanova, and Lian Xue. "Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games." Journal of Public Economic Theory 21, no. 5 (2019): 903–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12359.

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27

Sonnemans, Joep, Arthur Schram, and Theo Offerman. "Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart." Economics Letters 62, no. 1 (1999): 35–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00203-1.

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28

Ramalingam, Abhijit, Sara Godoy, Antonio J. Morales, and James M. Walker. "An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 129 (September 2016): 18–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.003.

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29

Cartwright, Edward. "A comment on framing effects in linear public good games." Journal of the Economic Science Association 2, no. 1 (2016): 73–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-016-0024-8.

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30

Butz, Britta, and Christine Harbring. "Donations as an incentive for cooperation in public good games." Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 85 (April 2020): 101510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.101510.

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31

Schlösser, Thomas, Sebastian Berger, and Detlef Fetchenhauer. "Justice Sensitivity and Cooperation Dynamics in Repeated Public Good Games." Social Justice Research 31, no. 1 (2017): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-017-0300-7.

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32

Sasaki, Tatsuya, and Satoshi Uchida. "Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games." Biology Letters 10, no. 1 (2014): 20130903. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2013.0903.

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Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems, such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process rarely succeeds, owing to a lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied here using threshold public good games, in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise it perishes. While punishment is a

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33

Decker, Torsten, Andreas Stiehler, and Martin Strobel. "A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games." Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 6 (2003): 751–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002703258795.

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34

Sanver, M. Remzi. "Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies." Review of Economic Design 9, no. 4 (2005): 307–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0133-y.

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35

McBride, Michael. "Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study." Economics of Governance 11, no. 1 (2009): 77–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-009-0069-8.

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36

Cox, Caleb, Oleg Korenok, Edward Millner, and Laura Razzolini. "Giving, taking, earned money, and cooperation in public good games." Economics Letters 171 (October 2018): 211–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.038.

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37

Cartwright, Edward, and Anna Stepanova. "The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games." Economics Letters 134 (September 2015): 29–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.032.

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38

Bruttel, Lisa, Gerald Eisenkopf, and Juri Nithammer. "Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders." Economics Letters 251 (May 2025): 112317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112317.

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39

Reuben, Ernesto, and Arno Riedl. "Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations." Games and Economic Behavior 77, no. 1 (2013): 122–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.001.

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40

Tomassini, Marco, and Alberto Antonioni. "Computational Behavioral Models for Public Goods Games on Social Networks." Games 10, no. 3 (2019): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030035.

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Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are a useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride. Usually, social agents interact to play a public good game through network structures. Here, we use social network structures and computational agent rules inspired by recent experimental work in order to develop models of agent behavior playing public goods games. The results of our numerical simulations based on a couple of simple models show that agents behave in a manner qualitatively similar to what

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41

Khadjavi, Menusch, and Andreas Lange. "Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games." Experimental Economics 18, no. 3 (2014): 432–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9411-2.

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42

Liang, Yuxin. "Analysis of Immersion and Flow in Cozy Games --Take Journey and Gris as Examples." Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media 39, no. 1 (2024): 126–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/39/20240690.

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Flow and immersion are essential criteria for evaluating a game's design quality. In recent years, with the development of society, the design and thinking of games have changed in line with the trend of The Times. People are increasingly seeking ways to release pressure from work and life pressure. Besides battle games creating excitement, cozy games have received more attention from the public. This thesis analyzes the relevant literature to summarize the internal relationship between flow, immersion, and cozy game design and takes the two cozy games, Gris and Journey, as examples. The visua

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43

Kassens-Noor, Eva, Joshua Vertalka, and Mark Wilson. "Good games, bad host? Using big data to measure public attention and imagery of the Olympic Games." Cities 90 (July 2019): 229–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.02.009.

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44

Özpolat, Koray, Juanita Rilling, Nezih Altay, and Eric Chavez. "Engaging donors in smart compassion: USAID CIDI’s Greatest Good Donation Calculator." Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management 5, no. 1 (2015): 95–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jhlscm-11-2013-0041.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to introduce a game-like decision tool – “Greatest Good Donations Calculator (GGDC)”, which has been collaboratively developed by scholars from the University of Rhode Island and the USAID Center for International Disaster Information. Design/methodology/approach – The study is grounded in two streams of research – human learning through games and systems dynamics literature. The problem of “unsolicited in-kind donations” is discussed followed by the development of the GGDC. Findings – The GGDC is a game-like decision tool that informs users on some of th

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45

Rockenbach, Bettina, and Irenaeus Wolff. "The Dose Does it: Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games." Review of Behavioral Economics 6, no. 1 (2019): 19–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.00000084.

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46

Cartwright, Edward, and Denise Lovett. "Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games." Games 5, no. 4 (2014): 234–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g5040234.

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47

Bernasconi, Michele, Luca Corazzini, and Anna Marenzi. "‘Expressive’ obligations in public good games: Crowding-in and crowding-out effects." Research in Economics 67, no. 1 (2013): 13–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2012.09.004.

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48

Smith, Alexander. "Contribution heterogeneity and the dynamics of contributions in repeated public good games." Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 58 (October 2015): 149–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.08.005.

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49

Dorrough, Angela, Andreas Glöckner, and Borah Lee. "Race for Power in Public Good Games with Unequal, Unstable Punishment Power." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 30, no. 2 (2016): 582–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1976.

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50

Rauch, Joseph, Jane Kondev, and Alvaro Sanchez. "Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 14, no. 127 (2017): 20160967. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2016.0967.

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Microbial populations often rely on the cooperative production of extracellular ‘public goods’ molecules. The cooperative nature of public good production may lead to minimum viable population sizes, below which populations collapse. In addition, ‘cooperator’ public goods producing individuals face evolutionary competition from non-producing mutants, or ‘freeloaders’. Thus, public goods cooperators should be resilient not only to the invasion of freeloaders, but also to ecological perturbations that may push their populations below a sustainable threshold. Through a mathematical analysis of th

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