Relevant bibliographies by topics / Public key certificate

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Public key certificate'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 9 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Public key certificate"

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Chien, Hung-Yu. "Dynamic Public Key Certificates with Forward Secrecy." Electronics 10, no. 16 (2021): 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics10162009.

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Conventionally, public key certificates bind one subject with one static public key so that the subject can facilitate the services of the public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, certificates need to be renewed (or revoked) for several practical reasons, including certificate expiration, private key breaches, condition changes, and possible risk reduction. The certificate renewal process is very costly, especially for those environments where online authorities are not available or the connection is not reliable. A dynamic public key certificate (DPKC) facilitates the dynamic changeover of the current public–private key pairs without renewing the certificate authority (CA). This paper extends the previous study in several aspects: (1) we formally define the DPKC; (2) we formally define the security properties; (3) we propose another implementation of the Krawczyk–Rabin chameleon-hash-based DPKC; (4) we propose two variants of DPKC, using the Ateniese–Medeiros key-exposure-free chameleon hash; (5) we detail two application scenarios.
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Ford, Warwick. "Advances in public-key certificate standards." ACM SIGSAC Review 13, no. 3 (1995): 9–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/219618.219714.

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Dirksen, Alexandra, David Klein, Robert Michael, Tilman Stehr, Konrad Rieck, and Martin Johns. "LogPicker: Strengthening Certificate Transparency Against Covert Adversaries." Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2021, no. 4 (2021): 184–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/popets-2021-0066.

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Abstract HTTPS is a cornerstone of privacy in the modern Web. The public key infrastructure underlying HTTPS, however, is a frequent target of attacks. In several cases, forged certificates have been issued by compromised Certificate Authorities (CA) and used to spy on users at large scale. While the concept of Certificate Transparency (CT) provides a means for detecting such forgeries, it builds on a distributed system of CT logs whose correctness is still insufficiently protected. By compromising a certificate authority and the corresponding log, a covert adversary can still issue rogue certificates unnoticed. We introduce LogPicker, a novel protocol for strengthening the public key infrastructure of HTTPS. LogPicker enables a pool of CT logs to collaborate, where a randomly selected log includes the certificate while the rest witness and testify the certificate issuance process. As a result, CT logs become capable of auditing the log in charge independently without the need for a trusted third party. This auditing forces an attacker to control each participating witness, which significantly raises the bar for issuing rogue certificates. LogPicker is efficient and designed to be deployed incrementally, allowing a smooth transition towards a more secure Web.
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Wazan, Ahmad Samer, Romain Laborde, David W. Chadwick, et al. "Trust Management for Public Key Infrastructures: Implementing the X.509 Trust Broker." Security and Communication Networks 2017 (2017): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/6907146.

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A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is considered one of the most important techniques used to propagate trust in authentication over the Internet. This technology is based on a trust model defined by the original X.509 (1988) standard and is composed of three entities: the certification authority (CA), the certificate holder (or subject), and the Relying Party (RP). The CA plays the role of a trusted third party between the certificate holder and the RP. In many use cases, this trust model has worked successfully. However, we argue that the application of this model on the Internet implies that web users need to depend on almost anyone in the world in order to use PKI technology. Thus, we believe that the current TLS system is not fit for purpose and must be revisited as a whole. In response, the latest draft edition of X.509 has proposed a new trust model by adding new entity called the Trust Broker (TB). In this paper, we present an implementation approach that a Trust Broker could follow in order to give RPs trust information about a CA by assessing the quality of its issued certificates. This is related to the quality of the CA’s policies and procedures and its commitment to them. Finally, we present our Trust Broker implementation that demonstrates how RPs can make informed decisions about certificate holders in the context of the global web, without requiring large processing resources themselves.
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Mahmoud, Mohamed M. E. A., Jelena Misic, Kemal Akkaya, and Xuemin Shen. "Investigating Public-Key Certificate Revocation in Smart Grid." IEEE Internet of Things Journal 2, no. 6 (2015): 490–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2015.2408597.

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Clarke, Dwaine. "Hybrid certificate closure-chain discovery public key system." International Journal of Computational Science and Engineering 9, no. 4 (2014): 312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijcse.2014.060714.

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Lu, Yang, and Jiguo Li. "Efficient Certificate-Based Signcryption Secure against Public Key Replacement Attacks and Insider Attacks." Scientific World Journal 2014 (2014): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/295419.

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Signcryption is a useful cryptographic primitive that achieves confidentiality and authentication in an efficient manner. As an extension of signcryption in certificate-based cryptography, certificate-based signcryption preserves the merits of certificate-based cryptography and signcryption simultaneously. In this paper, we present an improved security model of certificate-based signcryption that covers both public key replacement attack and insider security. We show that an existing certificate-based signcryption scheme is insecure in our model. We also propose a new certificate-based signcryption scheme that achieves security against both public key replacement attacks and insider attacks. We prove in the random oracle model that the proposed scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure and existentially unforgeable. Performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme outperforms all the previous certificate-based signcryption schemes in the literature.
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K.C, Amir, Harri Forsgren, Kaj Grahn, Timo Karvi, and Göran Pulkkis. "Security and Trust of Public Key Cryptography for HIP and HIP Multicast." International Journal of Dependable and Trustworthy Information Systems 2, no. 3 (2011): 17–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jdtis.2011070102.

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Host Identity Protocol (HIP) gives cryptographically verifiable identities to hosts. These identities are based on public key cryptography and consist of public and private keys. Public keys can be stored, together with corresponding IP addresses, in DNS servers. When entities are negotiating on a HIP connection, messages are signed with private keys and verified with public keys. Even if this system is quite secure, there is some vulnerability concerning the authenticity of public keys. The authors examine some possibilities to derive trust in public parameters. These are DNSSEC and public key certificates (PKI). Especially, the authors examine how to implement certificate handling and what is the time complexity of using and verifying certificates in the HIP Base Exchange. It turned out that certificates delayed the HIP Base Exchange only some milliseconds compared to the case where certificates are not used. In the latter part of our article the authors analyze four proposed HIP multicast models and how they could use certificates. There are differences in the models how many times the Base Exchange is performed and to what extent existing HIP specification standards must be modified.
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Balachandra and Prema K.V. "Certificate Path Verification in Hierarchical and Peer-to-Peer Public Key Infrastructures." Journal of Technology Management for Growing Economies 1, no. 1 (2010): 77–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.15415/jtmge.2010.11005.

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“Authentication of users in an automated business transaction is commonly realized by means of a Public Key Infrastructure(PKI). A PKI is a framework on which the security services are built. Each user or end entity is given a digitally signed data structure called digital certificate. In Hierarchical PKI, certificate path is unidirectional, so certificate path development and validation is simple and straight forward. Peer-to-Peer(also called Mesh PKI) architecture is one of the most popular PKI trust models that is widely used in automated business transactions, but certificate path verification is very complex since there are multiple paths between users and the certification path is bidirectional. In this paper, we demonstrate the advantage of certificate path verification in Hierarchical PKI based on forward path construction method over reverse path construction method with respect to the time requirement. We also propose a novel method to convert a peer-to-peer PKI to a Depth First Search(DFS) spanning tree to simplify the certificate path verification by avoiding multiple paths between users, since the DFS spanning tree equivalent of peer-to-peer PKI contains only one path between any two Certification Authorities.
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Tanwar, Sarvesh, and Anil Kumar. "A Proposed Scheme for Remedy of Man-In-The-Middle Attack on Certificate Authority." International Journal of Information Security and Privacy 11, no. 3 (2017): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijisp.2017070101.

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PKI offers authentication via digital certificates, which are signed and provided by Certificate Authority (CA). A certificate can be signed by single CA or multiple CAs. A document signed by multiple CAs has less probability to be forged as compared to signed by a single CA. CA is a single point of failure, if CA issue forged certificate intentionally or maliciously the whole PKI system effected. Still PKI ensures a secure method for exchanging sensitive information over unsecured channels through the use of cryptographic public private key pair, issued by Certification Authority (CA) but even an honest CA can issue forged certificate. Now in India everything is digitalized to enable e-Governance. For that a unique identity, aadhar number issued by Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is most widely used. For avoiding fraudulent certificates, strong authentication and attacks on CAs, the authors proposed an algorithm that use multiple signature on certificate based on aadhar number offered by UIDAI for online entity authentication-verification before issuing the certificate. If any of the CA is compromised whether its database or key will not be able to issue certificate to any server as authentication fails and multiple signatures are required. Proposed concept is more secure than the existing in terms of authentication, security and time.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Public key certificate"

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Hagström, Åsa. "Understanding Certificate Revocation." Licentiate thesis, Linköping University, Linköping University, Department of Electrical Engineering, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-5477.

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<p>Correct certificate revocation practices are essential to each public-key infrastructure. While there exist a number of protocols to achieve revocation in PKI systems, there has been very little work on the theory behind it: Which different types of revocation can be identified? What is the intended effect of a specific revocation type to the knowledge base of each entity?</p><p>As a first step towards a methodology for the development of reliable models, we present a graph-based formalism for specification and reasoning about the distribution and revocation of public keys and certificates. The model is an abstract generalization of existing PKIs and distributed in nature; each entity can issue certificates for public keys that they have confidence in, and distribute or revoke these to and from other entities.</p><p>Each entity has its own public-key base and can derive new knowledge by combining this knowledge with certificates signed with known keys. Each statement that is deduced or quoted within the system derives its support from original knowledge formed outside the system. When such original knowledge is removed, all statements that depended upon it are removed as well. Cyclic support is avoided through the use of support sets.</p><p>We define different revocation reasons and show how they can be modelled as specific actions. Revocation by removal, by inactivation, and by negation are all included. By policy, negative statements are the strongest, and positive are the weakest. Collisions are avoided by removing the weaker statement and, when necessary, its support.</p><p>Graph transformation rules are the chosen formalism. Rules are either interactive changes that can be applied by entities, or automatically applied deductions that keep the system sound and complete after the application of an interactive rule.</p><p>We show that the proposed model is sound and complete with respect to our definition of a valid state.</p><br>Report code: LIU-TEK-LIC-2006:1
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Go, Hiu-wing, and 吳曉頴. "Forward security and certificate management in mobile AD Hoc networks." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2004. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B30331080.

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Ambers, Vanessa P. Kelly Amanda M. "Installation, configuration and operational testing of a PKI certificate server and its supporting services /." Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Jun%5FAmbers.pdf.

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Thesis (M.S. in Information Technology Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004.<br>Thesis advisor(s): J.D. Fulp, Dan C. Boger. Includes bibliographical references (p. 159-160). Also available online.
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MacMichael, John L. "A survey and security strength classification of PKI certificate revocation management implementations." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2003. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/03Dec%5FMacMichael.pdf.

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Kelly, Amanda M., and Vanessa P. Ambers. "Installation, configuration and operational testing of a PKI certificate server and its supporting services." Thesis, Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1615.

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited<br>Public key infrastructure (PKI) was created to provide the basic services of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation for sensitive information that may traverse public (un-trusted) networks. This thesis provides a brief description of the background and functional components of a PKI, and then "builds" a PKI to be used for research at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Deficiencies of this PKI with respect to DoD PKI policy are delineated. The thesis addresses details of software selection, installation, configuration and operation; using Netscape's Certificate Management System as its Certificate Authority application of choice. The functionality of this PKI was validated by testing all major certificate lifecycle events (creation, archival, revocation, validation, etc.) All but two of these tests were successful-key escrow and revocation checking-and thus these two remain to be addressed by further work to make the NPS PKI fully functional.<br>First Lieutenant, United States Air Force<br>Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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Nilsson, Christoffer. "Annulering av ogiltiga certifikat i Public-Key Infrastructures." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Avdelningen för för interaktion och systemdesign, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-3985.

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According to numerous sources, computer security can be explained as; how to address the three major aspects, namely Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Public-key infrastructure is a certificate based technology used to accomplish these aspects over a network. One major concern involving PKIs is the way they handle revocation of invalid certificates. The proposed solution will make revocation more secure; validation will be handled completely by the certificate authority, and revokes will be instant, without use of certificate revocation lists.<br>I enlighet med flertalet källor, kan datorsäkerhet beskrivas som; hur man adresserar de tre mest betydelsefulla aspekterna, nämligen Confidentiality (Tillit), Integrity (Integritet) och Availability (tillgänglighet). PKI är en certifikat baserad teknologi som används för att uppfylla dessa aspekter över ett nätverk. Ett huvudsakligt orosmoment rörande PKI är hur man skall hantera annullering av ogiltiga certifikat. Den föreslagna lösningen kommer att hantera annullering på ett mer säkert sätt; validering av certifikat hanteras uteslutandes av ”certifikat instansen” (the certificate authority), och annulleringar sker omedelbart, utan användning av ”annullerings listor” (certificate revocation lists).
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Macdonell, James Patrick. "MiniCA: A web-based certificate authority." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2007. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/3256.

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The MiniCA project is proposed and developed to address growing demand for inexpensive access to security features such as privacy, strong authentication, and digital signatures. These features are integral to public-key encryption technologies. The audience for whom the software project is intended includes, technical staff requiring certificates for use in SSL applications (i.e. a secure web-site) at California State University, San Bernardino.
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Hendershot, Travis S. "Towards Using Certificate-Based Authentication as a Defense Against Evil Twins in 802.11 Networks." BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/6115.

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Wireless clients are vulnerable to exploitation by evil twins due to flaws in the authentication process of 802.11 Wi-Fi networks. Current certificate-based wireless authentication protocols present a potential solution, but are limited in their ability to provide a secure and usable platform for certificate validation. Our work seeks to mitigate these limitations by exploring a client-side strategy for utilizing alternative trust models in wireless network authentication. We compile a taxonomy of various trust models for conducting certificate-based authentication of wireless networks and methodically evaluate each model according to desirable properties of security, usability, and deployability. We then build a platform for leveraging alternative certificate-based trust models in wireless networks, present a proof-of-concept using one of the most promising alternative validation models identified--a whitelisting and pinning hybrid--and examine its effectiveness at defending against evil twin attacks in 802.11 networks.
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Fredriksson, Bastian. "A Distributed Public Key Infrastructure for the Web Backed by a Blockchain." Thesis, KTH, Skolan för datavetenskap och kommunikation (CSC), 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-210912.

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The thesis investigates how a blockchain can be used to build a decentralised public key infrastructure for the web, by proposing a custom federation blockchain relying on honest majority. Our main contribution is the design of a Proof of Stake protocol based on a stake tree, which builds upon an idea called follow-the-satoshi used in previous papers. Digital identities are stored in an authenticated self-balancing tree maintained by blockchain nodes. Our back-of-the-envelope calculations, based on the size of the domain name system, show that the block size must be set to at least 5.2 MB, while each blockchain node with a one-month transaction history would need to store about 243 GB. Thin clients would have to synchronise about 13.6 MB of block headers per year, and download an additional 3.7 KB of proof data for every leaf certificate which is to be checked.<br>Uppsatsen undersöker hur en blockkedja kan användas för att bygga en decentraliserad publik nyckel-infrastruktur för webben. Vi ger ett designförslag på en blockkedja som drivs av en pålitlig grupp av noder, där en majoritet antas vara ärliga. Vårt huvudsakliga bidrag är utformningen av ett Proof of Stake-protokoll baserat på ett staketräd, vilket bygger på en idé som kallas follow-the-satoshi omnämnd i tidigare publikationer. Digitala identiteter sparas i ett autentiserat, självbalanserande träd som underhålls av noder anslutna till blockkedjenätverket. Våra preliminära beräkningar baserade på storleken av DNS-systemet visar att blockstorleken måste sättas till åtminstone 5.2 MB, medan varje nod med en månads transaktionshistorik måste spara ungefär 243 GB. Webbläsare och andra resurssnåla klienter måste synkronisera 13.6 MB data per år, och ladda ner ytterligare 3.7 KB för varje användarcertifikat som skall valideras.
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Goold, Jeremy C. "Improving Routing Security Using a Decentralized Public Key Distribution Algorithm." Diss., CLICK HERE for online access, 2005. http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/ETD/image/etd797.pdf.

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Books on the topic "Public key certificate"

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Komar, Brian. Windows Server 2008 PKI and certificate security. Microsoft Press, 2008.

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Komar, Brian. Windows Server 2008 PKI and certificate security. Microsoft Press, 2008.

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Martin, Keith M. Public-Key Management. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198788003.003.0011.

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This chapter builds on the previous one by considering additional key management issues that arise for management of public-key pairs. We identify why management of public keys presents special challenges and then consider different approaches to addressing these issues. We consider certification of public keys and examine the different stages in the lifecycle of a public-key certificate, paying particular attention to the creation and revocation of public-key certificates. In doing so, we investigate that it means to rely on a public-key certificate and what issues can arise with the deployment of public-key management infrastructures that are based on public-key certificates. We close by considering some alternative public-key management models that do not rely on public-key certificates.
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Windows Server 2008 PKI and Certificate Security (PRO-Other) (PRO-Other). Microsoft Press, 2008.

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Xisong, Lai, He Quande, and Ke xue ji shu zi liao zhong xin., eds. Gong kai jin yao ji chu jian she yu ping zheng guan li zhong xin: Public key infrastructure and certificate authority. Xing zheng yuan guo jia ke xue wei yuan hui ke xue ji shu zi liao zhong xin, 2003.

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Brands, Stefan. Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates. The MIT Press, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5931.001.0001.

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Brands, Stefan. Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy. MIT Press, 2000.

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Brands, Stefan. Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy. MIT Press, 2000.

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Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy. The MIT Press, 2000.

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Book chapters on the topic "Public key certificate"

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Buchmann, Johannes A., Evangelos Karatsiolis, and Alexander Wiesmaier. "Certificate Policies." In Introduction to Public Key Infrastructures. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40657-7_8.

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Galindo, David, Paz Morillo, and Carla Ràfols. "Breaking Yum and Lee Generic Constructions of Certificate-Less and Certificate-Based Encryption Schemes." In Public Key Infrastructure. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11774716_7.

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Muñoz, Jose L., Jordi Forné, Oscar Esparza, and Miguel Soriano. "CERVANTES – A Certificate Validation Test-Bed." In Public Key Infrastructure. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25980-0_3.

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Russell, Selwyn. "Recursive Certificate Structures for X.509 Systems." In Public Key Infrastructure. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25980-0_11.

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Wen, Wu, Takamichi Saito, and Fumio Mizoguchi. "Security of Public Key Certificate Based Authentication Protocols." In Public Key Cryptography. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-46588-1_14.

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Liu, Chuchang, Maris A. Ozols, Marie Henderson, and Tony Cant. "A State-Based Model for Certificate Management Systems." In Public Key Cryptography. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-46588-1_7.

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Elwailly, Farid F., Craig Gentry, and Zulfikar Ramzan. "QuasiModo: Efficient Certificate Validation and Revocation." In Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2004. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24632-9_27.

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Domingo-Ferrer, Josep. "On the Synergy Between Certificate Verification Trees and PayTree-like Micropayments." In Public Key Infrastructure. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25980-0_15.

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Lai, Junzuo, and Weidong Kou. "Self-Generated-Certificate Public Key Encryption Without Pairing." In Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2007. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71677-8_31.

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Kambourakis, Georgios, Angelos Rouskas, and Dimitris Gritzalis. "Performance Evaluation of Certificate Based Authentication in Integrated Emerging 3G and Wi-Fi Networks." In Public Key Infrastructure. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25980-0_23.

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Conference papers on the topic "Public key certificate"

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Mahmoud, Mohamed M. E. A., Jelena Misic, and Xuemin Shen. "Efficient public-key certificate revocation schemes for smart grid." In 2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM 2013). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2013.6831167.

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Garba, Abba, Qinwen Hu, Zhong Chen, and Muhammad Rizwan Asghar. "BB-PKI: Blockchain-Based Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management." In 2020 IEEE 22nd International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications; IEEE 18th International Conference on Smart City; IEEE 6th International Conference on Data Science and Systems (HPCC/SmartCity/DSS). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hpcc-smartcity-dss50907.2020.00108.

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Tartan, Chloe, Craig Wright, Michaella Pettit, and Wei Zhang. "A Scalable Bitcoin-based Public Key Certificate Management System." In 18th International Conference on Security and Cryptography. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010556805480559.

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Hu, Chaoju, and Na Xu. "Application of XTR Public Key System in Certificate Authority System." In 2008 International Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/csse.2008.355.

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Aditia, Mayank K., Srikar Paida, Fahiem Altaf, and Soumyadev Maity. "Certificate-less Public Key Encryption For Secure e-Healthcare Systems." In 2019 IEEE Conference on Information and Communication Technology (CICT). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cict48419.2019.9066190.

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Sur, Chul, Chae Duk Jung, and Kyung Hyune Rhee. "Multi-receiver Certificate-Based Encryption and Application to Public Key Broadcast Encryption." In 2007 ECSIS Symposium on Bio-inspired, Learning, and Intelligent Systems for Security (BLISS 2007). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/bliss.2007.23.

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Yao, Xuanxia, Xiaoguang Han, and Xiaojiang Du. "A light-weight certificate-less public key cryptography scheme based on ECC." In 2014 23rd International Conference on Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icccn.2014.6911773.

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Choi, Pil Joo, Hyun Il Kim, and Dong Kyue Kim. "AMI authentication method based on hardware public key certificate using unique identifier." In 2015 International SoC Design Conference (ISOCC). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isocc.2015.7401727.

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Lee, Byoungcheon. "Unified Public Key Infrastructure Supporting Both Certificate-Based and ID-Based Cryptography." In 2010 International Conference on Availability, Reliability, and Security (ARES). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ares.2010.49.

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Bala, Dania Qara, Soumyadev Maity, and Sanjay Kumar Jena. "Mutual authentication for IoT smart environment using certificate-less public key cryptography." In 2017 Third International Conference on Sensing, Signal Processing and Security (ICSSS). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ssps.2017.8071559.

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Reports on the topic "Public key certificate"

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Santesson, S., R. Housley, S. Bajaj, and L. Rosenthol. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Image. RFC Editor, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc6170.

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Cooper, D., S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, and W. Polk. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. RFC Editor, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc5280.

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Housley, R., W. Polk, W. Ford, and D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. RFC Editor, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc3280.

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Linsenbardt, D., S. Pontius, and A. Sturgeon. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Warranty Certificate Extension. RFC Editor, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc4059.

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Adams, C., and S. Farrell. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols. RFC Editor, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc2510.

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Kent, S., D. Kong, K. Seo, and R. Watro. Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). RFC Editor, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc6484.

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Tuecke, S., V. Welch, D. Engert, L. Pearlman, and M. Thompson. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Proxy Certificate Profile. RFC Editor, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc3820.

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Adams, C., S. Farrell, T. Kause, and T. Mononen. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). RFC Editor, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc4210.

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Housley, R., W. Ford, W. Polk, and D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile. RFC Editor, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc2459.

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Blinov, M., and C. Adams. Alternative Certificate Formats for the Public-Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificate Management Protocols. RFC Editor, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc4212.

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