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Journal articles on the topic 'Pure player'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Carmona, Guilherme, and Konrad Podczeck. "Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games." Theoretical Economics 16, no. 3 (2021): 1055–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3967.

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In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite‐player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non‐atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilib

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2

Laan, Corine M., Judith Timmer, and Richard J. Boucherie. "Non-cooperative queueing games on a network of single server queues." Queueing Systems 97, no. 3-4 (2021): 279–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11134-020-09681-9.

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AbstractThis paper introduces non-cooperative games on a network of single server queues with fixed routes. A player has a set of routes available and has to decide which route(s) to use for its customers. Each player’s goal is to minimize the expected sojourn time of its customers. We consider two cases: a continuous strategy space, where each player is allowed to divide its customers over multiple routes, and a discrete strategy space, where each player selects a single route for all its customers. For the continuous strategy space, we show that a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists

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3

Jørgen Jacobsen, Hans. "On the Foundations of Nash Equilibrium." Economics and Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1996): 67–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100003722.

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The most important analytical tool in non-cooperative game theory is the concept of a Nash equilibrium, which is a collection of possibly mixed strategies, one for each player, with the property that each player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players. If we do not go into normative game theory, which concerns itself with the recommendation of strategies, and focus instead entirely on the positive theory of prediction, two alternative interpretations of the Nash equilibrium concept are predominantly available.In the more traditional one, a Nash equilibrium is a predic

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PHOENIX, SIMON J. D., and FAISAL SHAH KHAN. "THE ROLE OF CORRELATION IN QUANTUM AND CLASSICAL GAMES." Fluctuation and Noise Letters 12, no. 03 (2013): 1350011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219477513500119.

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We use the example of playing a 2-player game with entangled quantum objects to investigate the effect of quantum correlation. We find that for simple game scenarios it is classical correlation that is the central feature and that these simple quantum games are not sensitive to the quantum part of the correlation. In these games played with quantum objects it is possible to transform a game such as Prisoner's Dilemma into the game of Chicken. We show that this behavior, and the associated enhanced equilibrium payoff over playing the game with quantum objects in nonentangled states, is entirely

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CHATTERJEE, KRISHNENDU, and RUPAK MAJUMDAR. "DISCOUNTING AND AVERAGING IN GAMES ACROSS TIME SCALES." International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science 23, no. 03 (2012): 609–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129054112400308.

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We introduce two-level discounted and mean-payoff games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted or mean-payoff game and the lower level game is a (undiscounted) reachability game. Two-level games model hierarchical and sequential decision making under uncertainty across different time scales. For both discounted and mean-payoff two-level games, we show the existence of pure memoryless optimal strategies for both players and an ordered field property. We show that if there is only one player (Markov decision processes), then the

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6

Kaur, Hargeet, and Atul Kumar. "Nonlocality, entanglement, and randomness in different conflicting interest Bayesian games." quantum Information and Computation 20, no. 11&12 (2020): 901–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.26421/qic20.11-12-1.

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We analyse different Bayesian games where payoffs of players depend on the types of players involved in a two-player game. The dependence is assumed to commensurate with the CHSH game setting. For this, we consider two different types of each player (Alice and Bob) in the game, thus resulting in four different games clubbed together as one Bayesian game. Considering different combinations of common interest, and conflicting interest coordination and anti-coordination games, we find that quantum strategies are always preferred over classical strategies if the shared resource is a pure non-maxim

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7

Ackermann, Heiner, Heiko Röglin, and Berthold Vöcking. "Pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games." Theoretical Computer Science 410, no. 17 (2009): 1552–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.035.

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8

Duersch, Peter, Jörg Oechssler, and Burkhard C. Schipper. "Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games." International Journal of Game Theory 41, no. 3 (2011): 553–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0302-x.

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9

Kreps, Victoria. "On Maximal Vector Spaces of Finite Noncooperative Games." International Game Theory Review 19, no. 02 (2017): 1750003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500037.

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We consider finite noncooperative [Formula: see text] person games with fixed numbers [Formula: see text], [Formula: see text], of pure strategies of Player [Formula: see text]. We propose the following question: is it possible to extend the vector space of finite noncooperative [Formula: see text]-games in mixed strategies such that all games of a broader vector space of noncooperative [Formula: see text] person games on the product of unit [Formula: see text]-dimensional simplices have Nash equilibrium points? We get a necessary and sufficient condition for the negative answer. This conditio

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10

MCDANIEL, TANGA MORAE. "COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS." International Game Theory Review 13, no. 04 (2011): 461–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100309x.

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We use experiments to study coordination in games with incomplete information. In the games, one player knows the payoffs, while the other player knows the probability of payoffs forming a prisoner's dilemma or a stag-hunt. When payoffs form a stag-hunt there are two Pareto ranked pure strategy equilibria. We ask whether cheap talk aids coordination on the socially optimal equilibrium and whether the informed player can use cheap talk to engineer her preferred outcome. Consistent with previous literature, the benefit of cheap talk depends on the relationship between payoffs and risks, and in t

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11

Corriveau, Louis. "Game theory and the kula." Rationality and Society 24, no. 1 (2012): 106–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463111434700.

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The paper expounds a non-cooperative game that can be interpreted as a model of the system of kula that was described by Bronislaw Malinowski in his Argonauts of the Western Pacific. The game of kula is an infinite-horizon game with an arbitrary, but fixed, number n of players. It generates pure norms of direct reciprocity, pure norms of indirect reciprocity, and mixed norms whereby a player who deviates is punished both by the individual who has been harmed and by a third party.

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12

Gottlob, G., G. Greco, and F. Scarcello. "Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 24 (September 1, 2005): 357–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1683.

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We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a strong Nash equilibrium is SigmaP2-complete. We then study practically relevant restrictions that lower the complexity. In particular, we are interested in quantitative and qualitative restrictions of the way each player's payoff depends on moves of other players. We say that a game has small neighborhood if the utility function for each player depends only on

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13

Tan, Jin Jack, Jiun Cai Ong, Kin Keong Chan, Kam Hing How, and Jee Hou Ho. "Development of a Portable Automated Piano Player CantaPlayer." Applied Mechanics and Materials 284-287 (January 2013): 2037–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.284-287.2037.

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This paper describes the development of a low cost, compact and portable automated piano player CantaPlayer. The system accepts digital MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) files as input and develops pushing actions against piano keys which in turn produces sounds of notes. CantaPlayer uses Pure Data, an audio processing software to parse MIDI files and serve as user interfaces. The parsed information will be sent to Arduino, an open source microcontroller platform, via serial communication. The Arduino I/O pins will be triggered based on the information from Pure Data of which connect

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14

Ackermann, Heiner, and Alexander Skopalik. "Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games." Internet Mathematics 5, no. 4 (2008): 323–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15427951.2008.10129170.

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15

HAUSKEN, KJELL, and ROSS CRESSMAN. "FORMALIZATION OF MULTI-LEVEL GAMES." International Game Theory Review 06, no. 02 (2004): 195–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198904000150.

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The article presents multilevel game theory, as a generalization of conventional single-level game theory as it has developed since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). We define a multilevel game structure, multilevel games, payoffs and distribution rules, upward feasible strategies and the solution concept multilevel Nash equilibrium (MNE) in such games. A MNE must be, for each player, a best reply against itself with respect to alternative strategies that may have other players deviate as well, in contrast to the NE for conventional games where simultaneous deviations by more than one player

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16

Devlin, Stephen, and David Uminsky. "Identifying group contributions in NBA lineups with spectral analysis." Journal of Sports Analytics 6, no. 3 (2020): 215–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/jsa-200407.

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We address the question of how to quantify the contributions of groups of players to team success. Our approach is based on spectral analysis, a technique from algebraic signal processing, which has several appealing features. First, our analysis decomposes the team success signal into components that are naturally understood as the contributions of player groups of a given size: individuals, pairs, triples, fours, and full five-player lineups. Secondly, the decomposition is orthogonal so that contributions of a player group can be thought of as pure: Contributions attributed to a group of thr

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17

SALUKVADZE, MINDIA E., GURAM BELTADZE, and FRANCISCO CRIADO. "DYADIC THEORETICAL GAMES MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING FOR THE LEXICOGRAPHIC VECTOR PAYOFFS." International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making 08, no. 02 (2009): 193–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219622009003430.

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This article is about the full analysis of one concrete class of general non-cooperative lexicographic games and its computer programming. In such game, the payoffs of players are lexicographic vector payoffs — m scalar criteria vectors. At the same time, these criteria are strictly ranked on the set of the situations with lexicographic preference. In some such kind of game a Nash's equilibrium may not exist. In the given article the full analysis of one class of dyadic lexicographic games is worked out. Such kind of class is the non-cooperative lexicographic games, where each player has got t

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18

Frąckiewicz, Piotr. "On Correlated Equilibria in Marinatto–Weber Type Quantum Games." Applied Sciences 10, no. 24 (2020): 9003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app10249003.

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Players’ choices in quantum game schemes are often correlated by a quantum state. This enables players to obtain payoffs that may not be achievable when classical pure or mixed strategies are used. On the other hand, players’ choices can be correlated due to a classical probability distribution, and if no player benefits by a unilateral deviation from the vector of recommended strategies, the probability distribution is a correlated equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to investigate relation between correlated equilibria and Nash equilibria in the MW-type schemes for quantum games.

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19

JOOSTEN, REINOUD. "A NOTE ON REPEATED GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS." International Game Theory Review 07, no. 01 (2005): 107–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000430.

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A two-person general-sum repeated game with vanishing actions is an infinitely repeated game where the players face the following restrictions. Each action must be used by player k ∈ {1,2} at least once in every rk ∈ ℕ consecutive stages, otherwise the action vanishes for the remaining play. We assume that the players wish to maximize their limiting average rewards over the entire time-horizon. A strategy-pair is jointly convergent if for each action pair a number exists to which the relative frequency with which this action pair is chosen, converges with probability one. A pair of feasible re

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20

Pykacz, Jarosław, Paweł Bytner, and Piotr Frąckiewicz. "Example of a Finite Game with No Berge Equilibria at All." Games 10, no. 1 (2019): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010007.

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The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal-form finite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has Berge equilibrium neither in pure, nor in mixed strategies is given.

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Toumasatos, Evangelos, and Stein Ivar Steinshamn. "Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context." International Game Theory Review 20, no. 02 (2018): 1850001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198918500019.

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The partition function approach is applied to study coalition formation in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery in the presence of externalities. Atlantic mackerel is mainly exploited by the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Two games are considered. First, a four-player game where the UK is still a member of the EU. Second, a five-player game where the UK is no longer a member of the union. Each game is modeled in two stages. In the first stage, players form coalitions following a predefined set of rules. In the second stage, given the coa

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22

Iimura, Takuya, and Pierre von Mouche. "Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria." ESAIM: Proceedings and Surveys 71 (August 2021): 163–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/proc/202171163.

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We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f(d) as a function of distance d is constant or strictly decreasing. We show that this game admits a best-response potential. This result holds in particular for f(d) = wd with 0 < w ≤ 1. For this case special attention will be given to the structure of the equilibrium set and a conjecture about the increasingness of best-response correspondences will be made.

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23

Dawson, Mike. "Ocado will fahrerlose Lieferwagen." Lebensmittel Zeitung 73, no. 16 (2021): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.51202/0947-7527-2021-16-010-3.

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24

DUMRAUF, DOMINIC, and BURKHARD MONIEN. "COMPUTING NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR TWO-PLAYER RESTRICTED NETWORK CONGESTION GAMES IS $\mathcal{PLS}$-COMPLETE." Parallel Processing Letters 22, no. 04 (2012): 1250014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129626412500144.

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We determine the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in restricted network congestion games. Restricted network congestion games are network congestion games, where for each player there exits a set of edges which he is not allowed to use. Rosenthal's potential function guarantees the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. We show that computing a Nash equilibrium in a restricted network congestion game with two players is [Formula: see text]-complete, using a tight reduction from MAXCUT. The result holds for directed networks and for undirected networks.

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25

Rennack, Sebastian. "Makro setzt in Polen auf Online-Handel." Lebensmittel Zeitung 73, no. 27 (2021): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.51202/0947-7527-2021-27-008.

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26

OIKONOMOU, V. K., and J. JOST. "PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES." Advances in Complex Systems 21, no. 01 (2018): 1750009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219525917500096.

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We introduce a new solution concept, called periodicity, for selecting optimal strategies in strategic form games. This periodicity solution concept yields new insight into nontrivial games. In mixed strategy strategic form games, periodic solutions yield values for the utility function of each player that are equal to the Nash equilibrium ones. In contrast to the Nash strategies, here the payoffs of each player are robust against what the opponent plays. Sometimes, periodicity strategies yield higher utilities, and sometimes the Nash strategies do, but often the utilities of these two strateg

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Rennack, Sebastian. "Metro wächst in Russland mit E-Food." Lebensmittel Zeitung 73, no. 25 (2021): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.51202/0947-7527-2021-25-010-1.

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Der russische E-Food-Markt ist im Corona-Jahr explodiert. Etablierte Händler und neue Pure Player kämpfen um Marktanteile. Der Staat mischt als einer der Hauptakteure mit, aber auch Metro C+C ist mittendrin.

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28

HAN, YONG-JIAN, YONG-SHENG ZHANG, and GUANG-CAN GUO. "QUANTUM GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION." Fluctuation and Noise Letters 02, no. 04 (2002): L263—L271. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219477502000853.

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Quantum game is an interesting field and many scientists have done a lot of innovative work in it. We give a quantum model about incomplete information. In this model we find whether the pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists or not is strongly dependent on the entanglement of the initial state. We also find the player Bob can always find an initial state and a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium to get more payoff than classical game with some parameter.

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29

EHTAMO, HARRI, SIMO HELIÖVAARA, TIMO KORHONEN, and SIMO HOSTIKKA. "GAME THEORETIC BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR EVACUEES' EXIT SELECTION." Advances in Complex Systems 13, no. 01 (2010): 113–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021952591000244x.

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We present a model for evacuees' exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best-response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically by reacting optimally to other players' strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players' best-response functions defines a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. In the model, the players are the evacuees and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and show that the game has a NE with pure strategies. We also analyze different iterativ

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30

Joosten, Reinoud, and Llea Samuel. "On Finding Large Sets of Rewards in Two-Player ETP–ESP Games." International Game Theory Review 22, no. 02 (2020): 2040002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920400022.

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Games with endogenous transition probabilities and endogenous stage payoffs (or ETP–ESP games for short) are stochastic games in which both the transition probabilities and the payoffs at any stage are continuous functions of the relative frequencies of all past action combinations chosen. We present methods to compute large sets of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards in two-player ETP–ESP games with communicating states under the limiting average reward criterion. Such sets are useful in determining feasible rewards in a game, and instrumental in obtaining the set of (Nash) equilibrium r

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31

Ricci, Roberto Ghiselli. "A note on a Tarski type fixed-point theorem." International Journal of Game Theory 50, no. 3 (2021): 751–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00763-3.

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AbstractIn this paper we propose a basic fixed-point theorem for correspondences inspired by Tarski’s intersection point theorem. This result furnishes an efficient tool to prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for two player games with possibly discontinuous payoffs functions defined on compact real intervals.

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32

Setiawan, Abas. "Playing the SOS Game Using Feasible Greedy Strategy." CommIT (Communication and Information Technology) Journal 14, no. 1 (2020): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/commit.v14i1.6167.

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The research aims to make an intelligent agent that can compete against the human player. In this research, the feasible greedy strategy is proposed to make an intelligent agent by checking all possible solutions in the limited tree levels to find effective movement. Several matches are conducted to evaluate the performance of the feasible greedy agent. The board size for the evaluation consists of 33, 44, 55, 66, 77, and 88 squares. From the result, the feasible greedy agent never loses against the random agent and the pure greedy agent. In 3 3 squares match, the agent can compensate against

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33

Chai, Caichun, Hailong Zhu, and Zhangwei Feng. "Evolutionary Stable Strategies for Supply Chains: Selfishness, Fairness, and Altruism." Journal of Systems Science and Information 6, no. 6 (2018): 532–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.21078/jssi-2018-532-20.

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Abstract The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the short-term interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always dis

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34

Mariño, Julian R. H., Rubens O. Moraes, Claudio Toledo, and Levi H. S. Lelis. "Evolving Action Abstractions for Real-Time Planning in Extensive-Form Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 2330–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012330.

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A key challenge for planning systems in real-time multiagent domains is to search in large action spaces to decide an agent’s next action. Previous works showed that handcrafted action abstractions allow planning systems to focus their search on a subset of promising actions. In this paper we show that the problem of generating action abstractions can be cast as a problem of selecting a subset of pure strategies from a pool of options. We model the selection of a subset of pure strategies as a two-player game in which the strategy set of the players is the powerset of the pool of options— we c

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35

Carmona, Guilherme, and Konrad Podczeck. "Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games." Journal of Economic Theory 187 (May 2020): 105015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105015.

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Gutierrez, Julian, Paul Harrenstein, Giuseppe Perelli, and Michael Wooldridge. "Expressiveness and Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Boolean Games." ACM Transactions on Computational Logic 22, no. 2 (2021): 1–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3439900.

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We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent has a goal , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( ) . The goal captures agent ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of represent system behaviours that would satisfy . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables , and at each round in the game, player is at liberty to choose values fo

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37

Shen, Jiajun, and Dongqin Feng. "Stackelberg Interdependent Security Game in Distributed and Hierarchical Cyber-Physical Systems." Security and Communication Networks 2017 (2017): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/9017039.

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With the integration of physical plant and network, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly vulnerable due to their distributed and hierarchical framework. Stackelberg interdependent security game (SISG) is proposed for characterizing the interdependent security in CPSs, that is, the interactions between individual CPSs, which are selfish but nonmalicious with the payoff function being formulated from a cross-layer perspective. The pure-strategy equilibria for two-player symmetric SISG are firstly analyzed with the strategy gap between individual and social optimum being characterized,

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38

Xing, Yuan, and David B. Grant. "Developing a framework for measuring physical distribution service quality of multi‐channel and “pure player” internet retailers." International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 34, no. 4/5 (2006): 278–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09590550610660233.

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39

FLESCH, J., F. THUIJSMAN, and O. J. VRIEZE. "STATIONARY STRATEGIES IN ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAMES." International Game Theory Review 03, no. 04 (2001): 283–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198901000464.

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We deal with zero-sum stochastic games. We demonstrate the importance of stationary strategies by showing that stationary strategies are better (in terms of the rewards they guarantee for a player, against any strategy of his opponent) than (1) pure strategies (even history-dependent ones), (2) strategies which may use only a finite number of different mixed actions in any state, and (3) strategies with finite recall. Examples are given to clarify the issues.

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Bayraktar, Erhan, and Alexander Munk. "High-Roller Impact: A Large Generalized Game Model of Parimutuel Wagering." Market Microstructure and Liquidity 03, no. 01 (2017): 1750006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s238262661750006x.

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How do large-scale participants in parimutuel wagering events affect the house and ordinary bettors? A standard narrative suggests that they may temporarily benefit the former at the expense of the latter. To approach this problem, we begin by developing a model based on the theory of large generalized games. Constrained only by their budgets, a continuum of diffuse (ordinary) players and a single atomic (large-scale) player simultaneously wager to maximize their expected profits according to their individual beliefs. Our main theoretical result gives necessary and sufficient conditions for th

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41

Tixier, Florian. "Working in a developing communication space. Facebook and Twitter as journalistic tools for European information pure-player websites." Brazilian Journalism Research 10, no. 1 (2014): 162–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.25200/bjr.v10n1.2014.631.

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42

Peterson, J. M., and M. A. Simaan. "Probabilities of Pure Nash Equilibria in Matrix Games when the Payoff Entries of One Player Are Randomly Selected." Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 137, no. 2 (2008): 401–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10957-007-9333-7.

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43

Mondal, P., S. K. Neogy, A. Gupta, and D. Ghorui. "A Policy Improvement Algorithm for Solving a Mixture Class of Perfect Information and AR-AT Semi-Markov Games." International Game Theory Review 22, no. 02 (2020): 2040008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198920400083.

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Zero-sum two-person discounted semi-Markov games with finite state and action spaces are studied where a collection of states having Perfect Information (PI) property is mixed with another collection of states having Additive Reward–Additive Transition and Action Independent Transition Time (AR-AT-AITT) property. For such a PI/AR-AT-AITT mixture class of games, we prove the existence of an optimal pure stationary strategy for each player. We develop a policy improvement algorithm for solving discounted semi-Markov decision processes (one player version of semi-Markov games) and using it we obt

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Alfiyana, Lana, and Etisa Adi Murbawani. "PENGARUH PEMBERIAN AIR KELAPA TERHADAP KEBUGARAN ATLET SEPAK BOLA." Journal of Nutrition College 1, no. 1 (2012): 337–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/jnc.v1i1.515.

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Background: The athlete’s fitness is one of the supporting factor for athlete’s performance. Consumption of carbohydrate-electrolyte beverage during training maintain hydration status and athlete’s performance. Coconut water is potential natural fluid that can be used as natural sport drink. Objective: The aim of this study was to verify the effect of additional sugar in coconut water on soccer athlete’s fitness Methode: An experimental study was done in randomized pretest - post test design with a control group. The subject were 18 soccer’s player aged 14-18 years at Persatuan Sepak Bola Kudu

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45

Sokota, Samuel, Caleb Ho, and Bryce Wiedenbeck. "Learning Deviation Payoffs in Simulation-Based Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 2173–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012173.

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We present a novel approach for identifying approximate role-symmetric Nash equilibria in large simulation-based games. Our method uses neural networks to learn a mapping from mixed-strategy profiles to deviation payoffs—the expected values of playing pure-strategy deviations from those profiles. This learning can generalize from data about a tiny fraction of a game’s outcomes, permitting tractable analysis of exponentially large normal-form games. We give a procedure for iteratively refining the learned model with new data produced by sampling in the neighborhood of each candidate Nash equili

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BEN-ASHER, YOSI, and EITAN FARCHI. "COMPACT REPRESENTATIONS OF SEARCH IN COMPLEX DOMAINS." International Game Theory Review 07, no. 01 (2005): 73–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000399.

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We introduce a new zero-sum matrix game for modeling search in structured domains. In this game, one player tries to find a "bug" while the other tries to hide it. Both players exploit the structure of the "search" domain. Intuitively, this search game is a mathematical generalization of the well known binary search. The generalization is from searching over totally ordered sets to searching over more complex search domains such as trees, partial orders and general set systems. As there must be one row for every search strategy, and there are exponentially many ways to search even in very simp

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47

BEN-ASHER, YOSI, and EITAN FARCHI. "COMPACT REPRESENTATIONS OF SEARCH IN COMPLEX DOMAINS." International Game Theory Review 07, no. 02 (2005): 171–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000478.

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We introduce a new zero-sum matrix game for modeling search in structured domains. In this game, one player tries to find a "bug" while the other tries to hide it. Both players exploit the structure of the "search" domain. Intuitively, this search game is a mathematical generalization of the well known binary search. The generalization is from searching over totally ordered sets to searching over more complex search domains such as trees, partial orders and general set systems. As there must be one row for every search strategy, and there are exponentially many ways to search even in very simp

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48

SEALE, DARRYL A., and JOHN E. BURNETT. "SOLVING LARGE GAMES WITH SIMULATED FICTITIOUS PLAY." International Game Theory Review 08, no. 03 (2006): 437–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001016.

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A computational procedure, Simulated Fictitious Play (SFP), is introduced to approximate equilibrium solutions for n-person, non-cooperative games with large strategy spaces. A variant of the iterative solution process fictitious play (FP), SFP is first demonstrated on several small n-person games with known solutions. In each case, SFP solutions are compared to those obtained through analytical methods. Sensitivity analyses are presented that examine the effects of iterations (repetitions of the stage game) and number of sample outcomes generated within each iteration on measures of convergen

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Wilder, Bryan, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. "Defending Elections against Malicious Spread of Misinformation." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 2213–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012213.

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The integrity of democratic elections depends on voters’ access to accurate information. However, modern media environments, which are dominated by social media, provide malicious actors with unprecedented ability to manipulate elections via misinformation, such as fake news. We study a zerosum game between an attacker, who attempts to subvert an election by propagating a fake new story or other misinformation over a set of advertising channels, and a defender who attempts to limit the attacker’s impact. Computing an equilibrium in this game is challenging as even the pure strategy sets of pla

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Ganzfried, Sam. "Algorithm for Computing Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Application to Continuous Blotto." Games 12, no. 2 (2021): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12020047.

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Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games—in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite—is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous action spaces, e.g., where actions refer to an amount of time, money, or other resource that is naturally modeled as being real-valued as opposed to integral. We present a new algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in continuous games. In addition to two-player zero-sum games, our algorith

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