Academic literature on the topic 'Pyrrho of Elis'

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a temática das paixões no interior do Pirronismo antigo, especialmente nas figuras de Pirro e Sexto Empírico. Tal questão é controversa em um debate sobre o ceticismo antigo, em especial, porque essa corrente não pode dispor de uma teoria das paixões, dado que elas nada afirmam sobre o mundo. Entretanto, é possível falar que o cético manifesta sentimentos, ainda que de uma maneira não teórica? Para investigarmos essa nuance, passaremos pela vida de Pirro – conforme descrita por Diógenes Laércio – e pelo Esboços do Pirronismo de Sexto Empírico, em busca de uma reflexão acerca das paixões no interior do ceticismo pirrônico.PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Pirro. Sexto Empírico. Paixões. Ceticismo. Diógenes Laércio. ABSTRACTThe purpose of this paper is to examine the passions within the ancient Pyrrhonism, especially in the figures of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus. This question is controversial in a debate about ancient skepticism, especially because the skeptics cannot have a theory of passions, since they claim nothing about the world. However, is it possible to speak that the skeptic expresses feelings, albeit in a non-theoretical way? To examine this question, we will go through the life of Pyrrhus - as described by Diogenes Laertius – and we will examine the Outlines of Scepticism by Sextus Empiricus in search of a reflection on the passions within the Pyrrhonic skepticism.KEY-WORDS: Pyrrho. Sixth Empiricus. Passions. Skepticism. Diogenes Laertius.

AbstractIn 360/359 BC, Kotys, king of the Odrysian Thracians, was killed by two brothers of Ainos. Confusion, however, soon arose around their identity. The aim of this article is to reconstruct and analyze the various traditions that spread in Antiquity about their identification. Demosthenes was the first to call the murderers Python and Herakleides of Ainos. His version of the facts was later followed by Philodemos, Plutarchos, and Philostratos. Aristoteles, however, called them Πύρρων (or Πάρρων) and Herakleides of Ainos. Diokles of Magnesia, probably following the same tradition as Aristoteles, confused Pyrrhon of Ainos with Pyrrhon of Elis. Similarly, Demetrios of Magnesia confused Herakleides of Ainos with Herakleides Pontikos. Finally, the figures of Kotys, Herakleides, and Python were perhaps reused by the author of the spurious Letters of Chion of Herakleia and recontextualized as symbols of the conflict between philosophy and tyranny.

Background: Serum homocysteine (Hcy) level is considered to be an important biomarker for Alzheimer’s disease (AD); however, the status of Hcy in brain tissue, and the association between brain and serum levels of Hcy in AD patients remain unclear. Objective: We aimed to examine whether the changes of three thiols are consistent in serum of AD patients and the brain of APP/PS1 mice, and to verify the effectiveness of Hcy as a biomarker for early AD detection. Methods: The levels of Hcy, cysteine (Cys), and glutathione (GSH) in Aβ1–42-treated PC12 cells, the brain and hippocampus of APP/PS1 mouse, and the serum of AD patients were evaluated using ethyl (E)-3-(9-chloro-11-oxo-2,3,6,7-tetrahydro-1H,5H,11H-pyrano[2,3-f] pyrido [3,2,1 -ij] quinolin-10-yl)-2-cyanoacrylate (Probe 1) and ELISA assay or LC-MS. Results: Measurement by Probe 1 revealed a significant increase in Hcy level, and a decrease in Cys and GSH levels in Aβ1–42-treated PC12 cells and the serum of AD patients. The hippocampus and whole brain of APP/PS1 mice also showed a significant increase in Hcy level alongside the accumulation of age-related AD symptoms. The upregulation of Hcy and the downregulation of Cys and GSH were reversed in the Aβ1–42-treated PC12 cells and the brain of APP/PS1 mice when supplemented with VB6. Conclusion: Changes in Hcy, Cys, and GSH levels in the brain of APP/PS1 mice and Aβ1–42-treated PC12 cells were observed in situ with a new fluorescent probe, which were consistent with the abnormal changes in Hcy, Cys, and GSH levels in the serum of AD patients. VB6 supplementation was successful in ameliorating abnormal increases in Hcy levels.

An electrochemical enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) biosensor platform using electrochemically prepared ~11 nm thick carboxylic functionalized popypyrrole film has been developed for bio-analyte measurement in undiluted serum. Carboxyl polypyrrole (PPy-COOH) film using 3-carboxy-pyrrol monomer onto comb-shaped gold electrode microarray (Au) was prepared via cyclic voltammetry (CV). The prepared Au/PPy-COOH was then utilized for electrochemical ELISA platform development by immobilizing analyte-specific antibodies. Tumor necrosis factor-alpha (TNF-α) was selected as a model analyte and detected in undiluted serum. For enhanced performance, the use of a polymeric alkaline phosphatase tag was investigated for the electrochemical ELISA. The developed platform was characterized at each step of fabrication using CV, electrochemical impedance spectroscopy and atomic force microscopy. The bioelectrodes exhibited linearity for TNF-α in the 100 pg/mL–100 ng/mL range when measured in spiked serum, with limit of detection of 78 pg/mL. The sensor showed insignificant signal disturbance from serum proteins and other biologically important proteins. The developed platform was found to be fast and specific and can be applicable for testing and measuring various biologically important protein markers in real samples.

The demand for sensors capable of measuring low-abundant collagen in human fluids has highly increased in recent years. Indeed, collagen is expected to be a biomarker for chronic diseases and could monitor their progression. Here we show detection of highly diluted samples of collagen at picogram level thanks to an innovative pyro-electrohydrodynamic jet (p-jet) system. Through the intense electric fields generated by the pyroelectric effect in a ferroelectric crystal, the collagen solution was concentrated on a small area of a slide that was appropriately functionalized to bind proteins. The collagen molecules were labeled by an appropriate fluorophore to show how the number of tiny droplets influences the limit of detection of the technique. The results show that the p-jet is extremely promising for overcoming the current detection limits of collagen-based products in human fluids, performing 10 times better than the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and thus paving the way for the early diagnosis of related chronic diseases.

Cancer still remains a major public health concern around the world and the search for new potential antitumor molecules is essential for fighting the disease. This study evaluated the anticancer and immunomodulatory potential of the newly synthetized ellipticine derivate: sodium bromo-5,11-dimethyl-6H-pyrido[4,3-b]carbazole-7-sulfonate (Br-Ell-SO3Na). It was prepared by the chlorosulfonation of 9-bromoellipticine. The ellipticine-7-sulfonic acid itself is not soluble, but its saponification with sodium hydroxide afforded a water-soluble sodium salt. The cytotoxicity of Br-Ell-SO3Na was tested against cancerous (K562 cell line) and non-cancerous cells (Vero cell line and human peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMC)) using a Methylthiazoletetrazolium (MTT) assay. Cell cycle arrest was assessed by flow cytometry and the immunomodulatory activity was analyzed through an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). The results showed that the Br-Ell-SO3Na molecule has specific anticancer activity (IC50 = 35 µM) against the K562 cell line, once no cytotoxicity effect was verified against non-cancerous cells. Cell cycle analysis demonstrated that K562 cells treated with Br-Ell-SO3Na were arrested in the phase S. Moreover, the production of IL-6 increased and the expression of IL-8 was inhibited in the human PBMC treated with Br-Ell-SO3Na. The results demonstrated that Br-Ell-SO3Na is a promising anticancer molecule attested by its noteworthy activity against the K562 tumor cell line and immunomodulatory activity in human PBMC cells.

AbstractThis paper attempts a reconstruction of the views of Pyrrho of Elis. Many recent commentators, most notably Richard Bett, have made Pyrrho out to a metaphysical dogmatist who thinks the world is fundamentally indeterminate. Despite some criticisms of this view by Brennan and others, this metaphysical reading has continued to gain adherents. But there are serious textual and logical problems with these dogmatic interpretations. According to the evidence we have, a better view is that Pyrrho was an agnostic skeptic, i.e. one who refused to make assertions about the world outside of perceptual or intellectual appearances. But this does not mean that the traditional view of Pyrrho is correct either: the kind of skepticism Pyrrho endorsed is not Pyrrhonian, because it is grounded in the nature of our epistemic faculties rather than opposition between equally plausible theories, arguments, beliefs, or appearances. A secondary thesis of this paper is about methodology. Rather than focus on the most ambiguous and contentious passages in isolation, we should base our interpretation on the whole corpus, beginning with the easiest passages. Faulty interpretations of Pyrrho go wrong, I argue, partly by failing to follow this method.

Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystique
At the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness

Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystique.
At the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness.

The argument known in Antiquity as the Problem of the Criterion was introduced to Western thought by Pyrrho of Elis, who learned it in Central Asia and India from Early Buddhism. The problem revolutionized ancient European thought, such that from Pyrrho's time onward ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy was focused on the epistemological question, “Can we really know anything?” With the ascendancy of Christianity and its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic apologetics, the problem was sidelined and practically forgotten during the Middle Ages. When Pyrrhonism was reintroduced to Western Europe in the late Renaissance, the problem once again revolutionized Western thought and shifted the central focus of philosophy to epistemology. Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) is responsible for what may be called the problem's modern incarnation, known today as the “Problem of Induction.” This chapter analyzes the issues fundamental to understanding not only Hume but also Pyrrho, and in turn the Buddha.

Chapter Three charts the development of ancient Pyrrhonism, from its origins with Pyrrho of Elis through Timon of Phlius and Aenesidemus, concluding with the chronicling work of Sextus Empiricus. The chapter unpacks the conceptual apparatus of Pyrrhonism in some detail, including: scepticism as practice (agogê), its Fourfold way of observing appearances (phainomena), its observance (teresis) of the pre-theoretical understandings (prolepsis) of common life (ho bios ho koinos), its argumentative modes (tropoi, both Aenesidemus’ ten and Agrippa’s five tropes), its suspension of judgment (epochê), its practice of balancing oppositions (isosthenia), its non-assertive silence (aphasia) about what is hidden (ta adêla), its critiques of causality, its Apelletic method, its critical and inquiring openness (zetesis), its quasi-goal of tranquillity (ataraxia), and its anti-Platonic ideas about recollection. The chapter closes with a seven-point General Framework defining Pyrrhonian Scepticism.