Relevant bibliographies by topics / Pyrrhonisme

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Pyrrhonisme'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 10 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Pyrrhonisme"

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Lévy, Carlos. "Jules Vuillemin, le pyrrhonisme et Carnéade." Philosophia Scientae, no. 20-3 (November 8, 2016): 71–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1216.

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Charles, Sébastien. "Scepticisme et politique. Le cas Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville1." Tangence, no. 106 (August 11, 2015): 11–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1032598ar.

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Scepticisme et politique apparaissent comme des termes antinomiques, le scepticisme n’encourageant aucune position politique, et la politique se définissant par une action guidée par des idéaux plutôt que par l’irrésolution et la suspension du jugement. Dans ce contexte, le cas Brissot de Warville a tout du paradoxe, puisque ce dernier s’est tour à tour présenté comme un sceptique radical et comme un agitateur politique dévoué à la cause révolutionnaire. Cet article vise à comprendre les divers positionnements de Brissot, de son adoption d’un pyrrhonisme universel dans un manuscrit de jeunesse, qui se veut en rupture avec le pyrrhonisme raisonnable adopté généralement au xviiie siècle, à un engagement politique sans concession, qui semble remettre en cause ses convictions de jeunesse. Par-delà le cas Brissot, ce retournement spectaculaire permettra de montrer en quoi un pyrrhonisme extrême était tout bonnement intenable au siècle des Lumières, et comment les conditions sociohistoriques et politiques ont influencé une redéfinition du scepticisme en particulier, et de la philosophie en général, conduisant le philosophe à prendre peu à peu la posture de l’intellectuel engagé, et à rompre avec l’indifférence du scepticisme antique à l’égard de la chose politique.
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McKenna, Antony. "Pierre Bayle : le pyrrhonisme et la foi." Archives de Philosophie 81, no. 4 (2018): 729. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.814.0729.

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Corti, Lorenzo. "Jules Vuillemin et la morale du pyrrhonisme." Philosophia Scientae, no. 20-3 (November 8, 2016): 9–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1205.

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Pérouse, Marie. "Pascal trahi ? L’édition de 1670 et l’exemple du pyrrhonisme." Courrier du Centre international Blaise Pascal, no. 25 (December 4, 2003): 41–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/ccibp.529.

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PÉTUAUD-LÉTANG, LUCAS. "Doute et scepticisme. Examen d’une distinction hégélienne à Iéna." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 58, no. 4 (December 2019): 593–619. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217319000404.

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Dans cet article, nous nous demandons quelles sont les raisons de la distinction et de l’opposition établies par Hegel entre le doute et le scepticisme antique dans son essai de 1802 et dans quelle mesure ce point de vue est original. L’article montre que cette séparation se fonde sur l’attribution au sceptique d’une certitude de sa négation et que cette attribution se révèle à travers l’interprétation hégélienne du rapport entre Pyrrhonisme et Nouvelle Académie, d’une part, et d’autre part du Parménide de Platon.
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GONZÁLEZ FERNÁNDEZ, Martín. "Philosophia et medicina duæ sorores sunt. Divulgación del escepticismo en fuentes médicas del Medioevo / Philosophia et medicina duæ sorores sunt. Divulgation of Scepticism in the Medical Sources of the Middle Ages." Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 16 (October 1, 2009): 123. http://dx.doi.org/10.21071/refime.v16i.6183.

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At the beginning of the 17th century, a confluence between the sceptical tendency and the Latin Averroism is advised in the libertine movement of the classical age, so like Tommaso Campanella proclames. We try to explain in the present article why this was not possible in a previous time. Like the role played by the «Latin Galen» (we drop to analyze the translations of Niccolò da Reggio di Calabria during the first half of the 14th century), with its censure to the pyrrhonisme and the supposed, for him, contamination of the Hellenistic medical schools (empirical and methodical), in this process of delay.
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Bueno, Otávio. "Realism and Anti-Realism about Science." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5, no. 2 (April 22, 2015): 145–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-04031176.

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Pyrrhonists provide a way of investigating the world in which conflicting views about a given topic are critically compared, assessed, and juxtaposed. Since Pyrrhonists are ultimately unable to decide between these views, they end up suspending judgment about the issues under examination. In this paper, I consider the question of whether Pyrrhonists can be realists or anti-realists about science, focusing, in particular, on contemporary philosophical discussions about it. Althoughprima faciethe answer seems to be negative, I argue that if realism and anti-realism are understood as philosophical stances rather than particular doctrines—that is, if they are conceptualized in terms of a mode of engagement, a style of reasoning, and some propositional attitudes—the apparent tension between Pyrrhonism, realism, and anti-realism vanishes. The result is a first step in the direction of bringing Pyrrhonism to bear on contemporary debates in the philosophy of science.
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Hankinson, R. J. "The Sceptical Inquirer." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 23, no. 1 (September 8, 2020): 74–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02301007.

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Abstract This article treats of whether scepticism, in particular Pyrrhonian scepticism, can be said to deploy a method of any kind. I begin by distinguishing various different notions of method, and their relations to the concept of expertise (section 1). I then (section 2) consider Sextus’s account, in the prologue to Outlines of Pyrrhonism, of the Pyrrhonist approach, and how it supposedly differs from those of other groups, sceptical and otherwise. In particular, I consider the central claim that the Pyrrhonist is a continuing investigator (section 3), who in spite of refusing to be satisfied with any answer (or none), none the less still achieves tranquillity, and whether this can avoid being presented as a method for so doing, and hence as compromising the purity of sceptical suspension of commitment (section 4). In doing so, I relate—and contrast—the Pyrrhonists’ account of their practice to the ‘Socratic Method’ (section 5), as well as to the argumentative practice of various Academics (section 6), and assess their claim in so doing to be offering a way of instruction (section 7). I conclude (section 8) that there is a consistent and interesting sense in which Pyrrhonian scepticism can be absolved of the charge that it incoherently, and crypto-dogmatically, presents itself as offering a method for achieving an intrinsically desirable goal.
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Wills, Bernard. "What kind of Sceptic was Pascal?" Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 36, no. 3-4 (September 2007): 571–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842980703600308.

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Antony McKenna has argued that Pascal has been misunderstood as a "Christian Pyrrhonist" when he is in fact an Academic sceptic. He holds Pascal's scepticism to be a negative dogmatism and Christian Pyrrhonism to be a contradiction in terms and thus useless as a category of intellectual history. This essay argues that McKenna's reading of Pascal is unsustainable and that his assault on the notion of Christian Pyrrhonism is based on a mistaken conception of what constitutes "true" Pyrrhonism. In fact, it argues that McKenna's Pyrrhonism is actually a form of Academicism and that Pascal himself understood the difference between these ancient schools more accurately.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Pyrrhonisme"

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Marchand, Stéphane. "Identité philosophique et évolution historique du pyrrhonisme ancien." Reims, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008REIML001.

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Les philosophes pyrrhoniens de l'Antiquité n'ont pas fait, au sens strict du mot, école : philosophes sans maîtres et sans doctrines, Timon, Enésidème et Sextus Empiricus apparaissent bien plutôt comme des philosophes isolés qui ont, chacun à leur manière, cherché à s'approprier la sagesse du maître paradoxal que fut Pyrrhon, et dont les positions évoluèrent au gré des débats marquant la période hellénistique et impériale. Faut-il pour autant abandonner l'idée d'une « tradition pyrrhonienne » ? Cette étude se propose de reconstituer cette tradition autour de trois thèmes – l'ontologie, le langage, l'action – sur lesquelles chaque pyrrhonien joue des variations subtiles. Une telle reconstitution est impossible sans défaire les réseaux de transmissions des textes qui constituent le corpus du pyrrhonisme, ainsi que les termes qui servirent à désigner cette tradition. Il apparaît alors que le concept de « scepticisme » n'est ni le plus légitime historiquement, ni le plus adéquat philosophiquement. Ce premier pas permet de fonder l'idée d'une tradition pyrrhonienne à partir de laquelle sont étudiées les différentes étapes du pyrrhonisme, du premier disciple de Pyrrhon, Timon, au scepticisme pyrrhonien de Sextus Empiricus, en passant par la figure centrale de la renaissance du pyrrhonisme, Enésidème, dont les positions relativistes sont étudiées à partir du texte de Photius et de la « théorie » des dix tropes. Malgré les évolutions importantes dans l'histoire du pyrrhonisme ancien, il est possible d'y déceler une intention éthique unique, qui place notre bonheur dans une vie sans croyance
Pyrrhonian philosophers of Antiquity did not belong to a school : Timo, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus were philosophers without masters or doctrine, and looked rather like isolated philosophers, claiming to be a follower of the wise Pyrrho as a paradoxical master and to adapt Pyrrho’s way of thinking to the different dialectic situations they met. Yet, should we abandon the idea of a « pyrrhonian tradition » ? This thesis aims at restoring this tradition by defining some shared views on three particular themes – ontology, language, action – on which each philosopher varied with great subtlety. But such a reconstruction would be impossible without revisiting the words and the concepts which made a name for this tradition. It seems that « skepticism » is not the best designation neither from an historic nor a philosophic point of view. This analysis allows us to call on a « pyrrhonian tradition », whose different stages are studied, from Timo, Pyrrho's first follower, to the pyrrhonian skepticism of Sextus Empiricus, including a detailed analysis of the relativism of Aenesidemus, on the basis of Photius' summary and the ten tropes strategy. Despite the evolutions of the history of ancient pyrrhonism, it is still possible to discover an exceptional ethic claim, according to which happiness is to live without beliefs
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Williamson, Sophie. "Diderot et le scepticisme : le problème des limites théoriques et pratiques de la philosophie." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/40044.

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Notre recherche porte sur la question du scepticisme diderotien et se divise en trois moments. Le premier consiste à présenter deux formes distinctes du scepticisme dans le corpus diderotien et le second à édifier chez Diderot un ethos et une figure idéale du philosophe sceptique. C’est à ce moment que nous tenterons de défendre notre thèse exégétique centrale ; soit l’unification de la pensée de Diderot par la mise en lumière de sa posture sceptique et par le repositionnement du matérialisme qu’on lui attribue traditionnellement. Nous chercherons finalement à présenter la transformation de la métaphysique traditionnelle en esthétique métaphysique pour mener à bien les objectifs du projet philosophique développé au deuxième moment. Notre recherche a pour visée générale l’établissement d’une attitude et d’une méthode propres à redonner goût à la vérité en réponse au problème de la « mort de la philosophie ».
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Peyronnet, Alain. "Actualité du pyrrhonisme : examen des interprétation et instrumentation de M. Conche à l'éclairage des positions de J.P. Dumont." Dijon, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999DIJOL031.

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A quelles conditions le pyrrhonisme peut-il contribuer de nos jours à un renouvellement du philosopher ? Suivant cette problématique, la thèse questionne l'intention et la portée de l'orientation inaugurée par le grec Pyrrhon d'Elis. Analysant deux versions majeures et opposées (J. P. Dumont/M. Conche), elle compare leurs positions et présente un examen des logiques respectives. Il apparaît que la cohérence interne de ces interprétations divergentes est sans défaut. En revanche, le conflit mis à jour entre ces deux options à propos du non dogmatisme inquiète. Par ailleurs, il ressort que l'attitude d'indifférence, appartenant en propre au pyrrhonien, a servi de caution à l'occident, évitant ainsi de penser l'épreuve de la condition humaine. Seule l'approche de M. Conche permet d'échapper tant au piège de l'aporie sceptique qu'à la reconduction de cette fuite. Aussi, ce travail privilégie-t-il la réappropriation, sur fond tragique, de cet auteur. Celle-ci promeut, pour notre époque, un accueil sans illusion ni limite de l'<< apparence >>. Relevant d'un nihilisme qui n'est qu'ontologique, le penseur contemporain de lui-même et de son temps peut alors affirmer d'autant plus fort ce qui reste: les valeurs et la vie.
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Neale, Matthew James. "Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism : doctrinal, linguistic and historical parallels and interactions between Madhyamaka Buddhism & Hellenic Pyrrhonism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:347ed882-f7ac-4098-908f-5bb391462a6c.

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There have been recent explosions of interest in two fields: Madhyamaka-Pyrrhonism parallels and Pyrrhonism itself, which seems to have been misunderstood and therefore neglected by the West for the same reasons and in the same ways that Madhyamaka traditionally has often been by the West and the East. Among these recent studies are several demonstrating that grounding in Madhyamaka, for example, reveals and illuminates the import and insights of Pyrrhonean arguments. Furthermore it has been suggested that of all European schools of philosophy Pyrrhonism is the one closest to Buddhism, and especially to Madhyamaka. Indeed Pyrrho is recorded to have studied with philosophers in Taxila, one of the first places where Madhyamaka later flourished, and the place where the founder of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, may have received hitherto concealed texts which became the foundation for his school. In this dissertation I explore just how similar these two philosophical projects were. I systematically treat all the arguments in the Pyrrhonist redactor Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against Dogmatists and compare them to the most similar arguments available in the Madhyamaka treatises and related texts. On this basis, I ask whether the Pyrrhonists and the Buddhists would satisfy each other’s self-identifying criteria, or what characteristics would disqualify either or both in the other’s eyes. I also ask what questions arise from the linguistic and historical evidence for interactions between the Pyrrhonist school and the Madhyamaka school, and how sure we can be of the answers. Did Pyrrho learn Buddhism in Taxila? Was Nāgārjuna a Pyrrhonist? Finally I bring the insights of the living commentarial tradition of Madhyamaka to bear on current scholarly controversies in the field of Sextan Pyrrhonism, and apply the subtleties of interpretation of the latter which have developed in recent scholarship to Madhyamaka and its various difficulties of interpretation, to scrutinize each school under the illumination of the other. With this hopefully illuminated view, I address for example whether Sextus was consistent, whether living Pyrrhonism implies apraxia, whether Pyrrhonism is philosophy at all, and whether Madhyamaka is actually nihilism.
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Sienkiewicz, Stefan Fareed Abbas. "Five modes of scepticism : an analysis of the Agrippan modes in Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2f49a75d-164c-4534-aa9e-9579d55be086.

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This thesis has as its focus five argumentative modes that lie at the heart of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. They are the modes of disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression, reciprocity and relativity. They are analysed, individually, in the first five chapters of the thesis (one mode per chapter) and, collectively, in the sixth. The first four chapters deal, respectively, with the modes of disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression and reciprocity. They distinguish between two versions of these modes: “dogmatic versions”, on the basis of which a dogmatic philosopher, who holds some theoretical beliefs, might reach a sceptical conclusion; and “sceptical versions”, on the basis of which a sceptical philosopher, who lacks all theoretical beliefs, might do so. It is argued that scholars such as Jonathan Barnes have offered reconstructions of these modes which are dogmatic in the sense just described, and alternative sceptical versions of the modes are presented. A stand-alone fifth chapter offers an analysis of a stand-alone mode - the mode of relativity. It argues that there are in fact three different modes of relativity at play in the Outlines, that only one of them is non-trivial, and that the non-trivial version is incompatible with the mode of disagreement. The sixth and final chapter offers an analysis of how the modes (excluding relativity) are meant to work in combination with one another. Four different combinations are presented and it is argued that all of them are underscored by a variety of theoretical assumptions, which a sceptic, who lacks all theoretical beliefs, cannot make. The ultimate conclusion of the thesis is that, though the sceptic can deploy the various modes individually (by means of exercising his particular sceptical ability), he is not able to systematise them into a net by means of which he might trap his dogmatic opponent. Unless specified otherwise, translations are based on Annas, J., and Barnes, J., Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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Waugh, Shane Gordon. "Betwixt a false reason and none at all: Pyrrhonian lessons on common sense and natural commitment." University of Sydney, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5445.

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Doctor of Philosophy
This dissertation argues that if we are to respect the common sense perspective then Pyrrhonian scepticism can be neither avoided nor defeated. While Pyrrhonian scepticism can be diagnosed it cannot be cured, at least, so long as we take a non-revisionary attitude towards common sense. The fundamental reason for this is that Pyrrhonian scepticism derives from the application of norms of inquiry that constitute part of the content of common sense in unusual but not fanciful or impossible situations. Implicit in this dissertation is a distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticisms, and for present purposes these two scepticisms can be distinguished on two criteria. First, unlike Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism is not global in its doubts. It is not global because it does not attempt to question our entitlement to entire domains of commitment, for instance commitments to anything beyond the content of our perceptions, all at once. Nor does Pyrrhonism attempt to deny the possibility of knowledge. Rather, Pyrrhonian scepticism questions our entitlement to one commitment at a time and is hence iterative rather than global. This leads to the second far more interesting criterion in that unlike its Cartesian cousin Pyrrhonian scepticism claims not to be revisionary of the common sense perspective. In fact Pyrrhonian scepticism represents itself as the common sense perspective under special conditions. On this reading Pyrrhonian scepticism is a form of common sense scepticism. The claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism is commonsensical calls for a clarification of in what exactly the common sense perspective consists, and its relationship to scepticism. Of particular interest in this regard is a position that has been called Common Sense Naturalism (CSN). CSN consists, in part, in three important claims. First, that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to common sense. Second, that because we are thus constrained, we have an entitlement to those commitments that constitute the content of common sense. Third, that the content of common sense is inherently anti-sceptical. These three claims jointly warrant Page 5 Page 6 the conclusion that appeals to commitments to which we are commonsensically entitled can feature prominently in refutations of scepticism. I argue that CSN is incorrect in that even if we have an entitlement to our common sense commitments we have an equally valid entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as Pyrrhonian scepticism can be derived from the common sense perspective itself. I also argue that CSN is correct but misleading in suggesting that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to the content of common sense. CSN is correct in that we are always forced to take ourselves to be entitled to some commonsensical commitments but overlooks the fact that the content of these commitments varies, becoming at times amenable to Pyrrhonian scepticism. In fact what we take to be commonsensical is sensitive to our mood at the time. This can be used to explain that feature of the phenomenology of scepticism according to which Pyrrhonian scepticism is a recurrent but not a constant problem. Presenting these arguments requires both that the nature of CSN be clarified (chapter 1), that the relationship between common sense and Pyrrhonian scepticism be established (Chapter 2). Finally, we must also provide an account of the content of common sense be given (Chapter 3) which provides warrant for continued inquisitive activities even after the emergence of Pyrrhonian scepticism from within common sense.
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Heidemann, Dietmar Hermann. "Der Begriff des Skeptizismus : seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung /." Berlin [u.a.] : de Gruyter, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016272095&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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O'Flaherty, E. "Relativism and criticism in seventeenth-century French thought." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.383845.

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Sachdev, Raman. "The Role of Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy: A Critique of Popkin's "Sceptical Crisis" and a Study of Descartes and Hume." Scholar Commons, 2019. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7920.

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The aim of this dissertation is to provide a critique of the idea that skepticism was the driving force in the development of early modern thought. Historian of philosophy Richard Popkin introduced this thesis in the 1950s and elaborated on it over the next five decades, and recent scholarship shows that it has become an increasingly accepted interpretation. I begin with a study of the relevant historical antecedents—the ancient skeptical traditions of which early modern thinkers were aware—Pyrrhonism and Academicism. Then I discuss the influence of skepticism on three pre-Cartesians: Francisco Sanches, Michel de Montaigne, and Pierre Charron. Basing my arguments on an informed understanding of both ancient Greek skepticism and some of the writings of these philosophers, I contend that it is inaccurate to predominantly characterize Sanches, Montaigne, and Charron as skeptics. To support his thesis about the singular influence of skepticism on early modern thought, Popkin says that René Descartes’ metaphysical philosophy was formed as a response to a skeptical threat and that Descartes ultimately conceded to the force of skepticism. He also argues that David Hume was a Pyrrhonist par excellence. I disagree with Popkin’s claims. I argue that Descartes was not as deeply affected by skepticism as Popkin suggests and that it is inaccurate to characterize Hume as a Pyrrhonist. By offering this critique, I hope to make clear to the readers two things: first, that Popkin’s thesis, though it is both enticing and generally accepted by many scholars, is questionable with regard to its plausibility; second, that the arguments I present in this dissertation reveal that further research into the role of skepticism in early modern philosophy is in order.
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Costa-Lopes, Viviane da. "O ceticismo em John Dewey : a busca da certeza /." Araraquara : [s.n.], 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/101544.

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Orientador: Marcus Vinicius da Cunha
Banca: Luiz Henrique de Araújo Dutra
Banca: Paula Ramos de Oliveira
Banca: Vera Teresa Valdemarin
Banca: Ana Raquel Lucato Cianflone
Resumo: O presente trabalho analisa as concepções filosóficas de John Dewey, tomando como principal referência o livro The quest for certainty: a study of the relation of knowledge and action, publicado em 1929, no qual o autor propõe utilizar o método das ciências experimentais no campo das ciências humanas, em especial para o exame dos juízos morais. Nesse livro, Dewey defende o rompimento da dicotomia entre teoria e prática e atribui caráter probabilístico aos conhecimentos advindos da investigação científica, tomando como exemplo a mecânica quântica. Os referenciais metodológicos empregados na análise do discurso deweyano advêm da nova retórica, teoria proposta por Chaïm Perelman e Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca em Tratado da argumentação. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar a proximidade entre Dewey e o ceticismo, tomando por base as concepções de Pirro de Élis sistematizadas por Enesidemo e Sexto Empírico, bem como desenvolvimentos recentes dessa filosofia. A intenção mais ampla do trabalho é contribuir para a discussão de teses que divergem em relação ao tema focalizado nesta pesquisa: de um lado, as que responsabilizam o ceticismo deweyano pelos males da educação contemporânea, e, de outro, as que atribuem a Dewey a origem de importantes progressos na pedagogia.
Abstract: The present study analyses the philosophical conceptions of John Dewey presented in the book The quest for certainty: a study of the relation of knowledge and action, published in 1929, in which the author proposes to use the method of experimental sciences in human sciences, specially to the examination of moral judgments. In this book, Dewey defends the disruption of the dichotomy between practical and theory and attributes a probabilistic character to the scientific inquiry knowledge, citing as an example the quantun mechanics. The methodology adopted to analyze deweyan discourse is the new rhetoric, based upon Treatise of argumentation by Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. The objective of the this work is to show to the proximity between Dewey and the skepticism, having as a basis the conceptions of Pyrrho from Élis systematized by Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus, as well as recent developments of this philosophy. The work also intends to contribute for the discussion of theses which diverge on the theme of this work: on the one hand, the ones that blame Dewey's skepticism for the harmfulness of contemporary education; and, on the other, those which attribute the origin of important progress in pedagogy to Dewey.
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Books on the topic "Pyrrhonisme"

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Crousaz, Jean-Pierre de. Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne. Paris: Fayard, 2003.

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autres, Negroni Barbara de, ed. Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne. Paris: Fayard, 2003.

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Maia Neto, José R. The Christianization of Pyrrhonism. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0231-5.

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Popkin, Richard Henry. The high road to Pyrrhonism. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1993.

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New essays on ancient Pyrrhonism. Leiden: Brill, 2011.

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Clayman, Dee L. Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into poetry. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.

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Clayman, Dee L. Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into poetry. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.

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Timon, of Phlius, ca. 320-ca. 230 B.C., ed. Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into poetry. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.

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Pyrrhonism in ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011.

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Machuca, Diego E., ed. Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0.

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Book chapters on the topic "Pyrrhonisme"

1

Grell, Chantal. "Le Vertige du Pyrrhonisme Hardouin Face à L’histoire." In The Return of Scepticism, 363–74. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0131-0_18.

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Brunschwig, Jacques. "Pyrrhonism." In A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, 465–85. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444305845.ch24.

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Pécharman, Martine. "Pascal sur le pyrrhonisme de Montaigne dans l’Entretien avec M. de Sacy : doute pyrrhonien ou doute académique ?" In International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, 213–43. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45424-5_10.

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Pritchard, Duncan. "Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism." In Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, 193–202. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0_10.

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Maia Neto, José R. "Before the Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Jansenism Faces Sceptical Fideism." In The Christianization of Pyrrhonism, 1–36. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0231-5_1.

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Maia Neto, José R. "Pascal’s Christianization of Pyrrhonism." In The Christianization of Pyrrhonism, 37–64. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0231-5_2.

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Maia Neto, José R. "Kierkegaard’s Christianization of Pyrrhonism." In The Christianization of Pyrrhonism, 65–89. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0231-5_3.

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Maia Neto, José R. "After the Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Shestov’s Irrationalism." In The Christianization of Pyrrhonism, 90–119. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0231-5_4.

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Maia Neto, José R. "Conclusion." In The Christianization of Pyrrhonism, 120–28. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0231-5_5.

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Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. "Der frühe Pyrrhonismus." In Die hellenistischen Philosophen, 13–27. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-03721-3_2.

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