To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Radical Evil.
Journal articles on the topic 'Radical Evil'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Radical Evil.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Heller, Agnes. "On Evils, Evil, Radical Evil and the Demonic." Critical Horizons 12, no. 1 (2011): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/crit.v12i1.15.
Full text
2
Muchnik, Pablo. "Radical Evil (radikal Böse)." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 6, no. 2 (2019): 101–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2018.v6n2.20.p101.
Full textAbstract:
By “evil,” Kant does not designate any set of particularly pernicious acts, but the type of volition that underlies and makes possible immorality in all its forms. The evil person, Kant believes, “makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law –whereas it is the latter that, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, should have been incorporated into the universal maxim of the power of choice as the sole incentive” (R 6:36). This inversion of the ethical order of priority does not entail the repudiation of “the moral law (…) in rebellious attitude (by revoking obedience to it)” (R 6:36), but its conditional respect. This fraudulent relation to morality is based on complex strategies of deception, self-deception, and rationalization. The “radical “nature of these tendencies has nothing to do with the intensity or magnitude of observable wrongdoing. Evil’s radicalism is a spatial metaphor intended to designate the locus of immorality (its “root”) in an agent’s “disposition (Gesinnung). What is most baffling the Kantian view is that evil so construed is perfectly compatible with good conduct. Indeed, under the conditions of civilization, Kant believes, it is impossible to distinguish a man of good conduct from a morally good man (RGV 6:30), for the dictates of self-love generally overlap with the prescriptions of duty. The persistence of war, poverty, oppression, and the infinity of vices which cast a dark shadow over the contemporary world speak of the prescience of the Kantian approach.
3
Formosa, Paul. "Is radical evil banal? Is banal evil radical?" Philosophy & Social Criticism 33, no. 6 (2007): 717–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453707080585.
Full text
4
Bozbuğa, Hande Nur. "Hannah Arendt’in Kötülük Algısının Din Felsefesinde Konumlandırılışı." TSBS Bildiriler Dergisi, no. 1 (August 21, 2021): 107–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.55709/tsbsbildirilerdergisi.1.7.
Full textAbstract:
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) is a 20th-century scholar. Her analyzes of the problem of evil are based on the suffering of the Jewish race in Germany during the World War II. Her thoughts on political issues, which were shaped by the influence of the period she lived, have prepared the ground for very efficient discussions in many fields. Some of her philosophical thoughts that she developed in the context of her studies on the political administration of the period she lived in, in a sense, have a feature that can bring essential expansions to the problems the problem of evil in the philosophy of religion. In this paper, the problem of evil and its source will be examined according to Arendt. In doing so, the concepts of radical evil and the banality of evil used by Arendt regarding the issue of evil and the aspects where such an understanding of evil differs from the classical theories of the problem of evil will be analyzed. In addition, the adequacy of the idea of radical evil caused by the totalitarian rule on the philosophy of religion will be questioned. In addition, the adequacy of the idea of radical evil caused by the totalitarian rule on the philosophy of religion will be questioned. Arendt used two fundamental concepts regarding the issue of evil: radical evil and the banality of evil. These two conceptualizations present two dimensions of her perception of evil: The first is about the agent, and the second is about the result. We can categorize the former within the scope of moral evil in the literature of the philosophy of religion since the evil he envisions is realized based on human will. As a matter of fact, the radical evil that Arendt advocated was carried out by many rulers under her command, especially Hitler. The second dimension has brought the concept of evil to a form that goes beyond its context and content. According to her, the evils in question were performed by their perpetrators as a normal and ordinary act. We can say that this perspective brought by Arendt to the problem of evil has changed the perception of evil in the classical sense.
5
BOUTLAS, GEORGE. "THE SHALLOW WATERS OF EVIL – ARENDT AND KANT." Arhe 21, no. 42 (2024): 111–32. https://doi.org/10.19090/arhe.2024.42.111-132.
Full textAbstract:
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) Hannah Arendt will introduce a concept of radical evil as an historical appearance of something “we actually have nothing to fall back on in order to understand, a phenomenon that confronts us with its overpowering reality and breaks down all standards we know”. Arendt will not insist on her initial conception of radical evil and in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem a Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), the radical evil will be replaced by the banality of evil. According to this last view “evil is a surface phenomenon, and instead of being radical, it is merely extreme”, is “thought defying,” and that is its “banality.” Only the good has depth and can be radical. Arendt contrasts this banality with her own former conception of radical evil as also with Kant’s conception of radical evil (the latter wrongly in our opinion). In this paper, we will try to show the conceptual closeness between the banality of evil in Arendt and radical evil in Kant, as well as the radicality of good in Arendt as equal to the acquisition of good character in Kant’s Religion. Henry Allison claims that “Kant, by ‘radical evil’, does not mean a particular, especially perverse, form of evil but rather the root or ground of the very possibility of all moral evil.” In Kant, radical evil is deflationed from political and religious empirical elements. The term seems to be an olive branch which Kant offers to the church and the doctrine of original sin which he deconstructs in Religion as meaningless in time while he accepts its limited value in reason (morally). Evil for Kant is something that simply exists in the radix of our choices, as a propensity, the same as good does. Kantian radical evil acquires the banal aspect of evil character. For Kant, Eichmann has an evil heart the same way a thief has it. That’s why it is the Arendtian banality of evil that comes closer to Kantian radical evil. On the other hand, good heart for Kant demands our struggle to acquire it. That’s why the radicality of good in Arendt seems to be on a par with the acquisition of good heart in Kant.
6
Dutra, Delamar José Volpato. "Torture: banality of evil or radical evil?" Filosofia Unisinos 21, no. 3 (2020): 240–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.01.
Full textAbstract:
The text aims to explore legal and moral aspects of torture. Under the legal aspect the text compares three definitions of torture: UN definition, Brazilian definition, and Spanish definition. In this regard, neither the UN formulation nor the Brazilian formulation are ideal, because the Brazilian legal definition restricts the element of action by the part of the perpetrator of torture, and the UN convention restricts the effect on the victim, given that pain or suffering should be severe. The hypothesis is that a better proposal could be linked to the Spanish Penal Code, which in its art. 174 defines torture as the submission of someone “to conditions or procedures that, due to their nature, duration or other circumstances, involve physical or mental suffering, the suppression or decrease of their faculties of knowledge, discernment or decision, or that otherwise undermine their moral integrity”. Concerning the moral meaning of the repulse to torture it is intended to defend the paradigmatic character of the human right to not be tortured in at least two respects. The first aspect refers to its universalizing vocation in the full sense, since it can be extended to all sentient beings. In this regard, the prohibition of torture goes beyond the dominium of personality to advance in the direction of a domain of suffering not determined by the mask of personality. The second aspect is that the prohibition stands for an absolute right with no exceptions, precisely because of its deeper moral content.Keywords:radical evil, torture, perpetrator.
7
Morag, Raya. "Film Review: Radical Evil." Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 3 (2019): 176–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.3.1722.
Full text
8
Chaffee, Wilber A. "Radical Evil on Trial." Hispanic American Historical Review 80, no. 1 (2000): 217–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182168-80-1-217.
Full text
9
Birmingham, Peg. "Holes of Oblivion: The Banality of Radical Evil." Hypatia 18, no. 1 (2003): 80–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2003.tb00780.x.
Full textAbstract:
This essay offers a reflection on Arendt's notion of radical evil, arguing that her later understanding of the banality of evil is already at work in her earlier reflections on the nature of radical evil as banal, and furthermore, that Arendt's understanding of the “banality of radical evil” has its source in the very event that offers a possible remedy to it, namely, the event of natality. Kristeva's recent work (2001) on Arendt is important to this proposal insofar as her notion of “abjection” illuminates Arendt's claim that understanding the superfluousness of the modem human being is inseparable from grasping the emergence of radical evil. In the final part of the essay, I argue that Arendt's “politics of natality” emerges from out of these two inseparable moments of the event of natality, offering the only possible remedy to the threat of radical evil by modifying our relationship to temporality.
10
McMullin, Irene. "Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility." Kantian Review 18, no. 1 (2013): 49–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415412000283.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant's moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act – a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant's theory, since the act of attributing radical evil to one's freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance.
11
Goldberg, Zachary J. "Can Kant’s Theory of Radical Evil Be Saved?" Kantian Review 22, no. 3 (2017): 395–419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415417000140.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in order to evaluate whether his theory can be saved. Critics argue that Kant does not adequately distinguish between evil and mundane wrongdoing, making his use of the term ‘evil’ emotional hyperbole; by defining evil as the subordination of the moral law to self-love his analysis is seemingly overly simplistic and empirically false; and by focusing solely on the moral character of the perpetrator of evil, Kant’s theory apparently ignores the most salient aspect of evil – the suffering of victims. While I will not claim that Kant provides us with a fully adequate theory of evil, I respond to each of these criticisms and conclude that Kant’s theory can still provide significant insight into both the nature of evil and the moral psychology of perpetrators of evil.
12
Szyrwińska-Hörig, Anna. "Immanuel Kant’s idea of radical evil as a systematic and terminological problem." ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy 22, no. 2 (2023): 461–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2023.e95453.
Full textAbstract:
The paper investigates the systematic connection between Kantian concept of radical evil and radical indeterministic idea of freedom. According to the presented thesis the systematically relevant interpretation of the radical evil concept requires considering not only philosophical ideas Kant`s but also the historic background in which they were formulated. Particularly the specific situation of German philosophic terminology in the 17th and early 18th Century will be acknowledged as one of the most significant factors influencing the development of the radical evil concept. For the sake of methodological precision of the presented analysis, the differentiation between thick and thin concept of evil will be introduced.
13
Lolic, Marinko. "Is Kant’s conception of radical evil radical enough." Filozofija i drustvo 22, no. 4 (2011): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1104023l.
Full textAbstract:
Kant?s philosophical critical attitudes provoked strong reactions, not only philosophical, but the general public. Among those of his ideas, which have been provoking severe philosophical misunderstandings and controversy are: ?Which in theory is not worth, that has no use in practice?, ?The rights not to lie?, ?against the rights of citizens to revolt?, etc. After all, the most attention in the great public was provoked by his idea about radical evil. In this short reflection, we will try to point out the main points of this philosophical misunderstanding and to make a little more explicit the concept of radical evil.
14
Sudakov, Andrey K. "Fichte’s Ethics on Radical Evil." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 8 (2021): 153–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2021-8-153-164.
Full textAbstract:
Fichte constructs the general part of his early ethics as a philosophy of concrete freedom in the shape of a history of moral self-consciousness, and in the course of this construction he discovers something what he, in Kantian stile, may call a “radical evil in human nature”, that is, a force of “inertness to reflection and to activity in accordance with such reflection” inherent to human nature. Schelling and some contemporary authors recognize in Fichte’s doctrine of evil a symptom of his return to the ethical naturalism of the Enlightenment. An analysis of the dynamics of moral reflection in the I according to Fichte shows, however, that, exactly as the I itself is for Fichte essentially a duality, a subject-object, so is each particular position in the movement of the self-reflection of the I, on the one hand, conditioned by this spiritual inertness of human nature, but that same inertness is, on the other hand, a chain with which human freedom retains itself, and therefore actually inexistent as a restraining force for a free I, conscious of his own ethical vocation, so that its dwelling within the limits of the customary (in the invariability of consciousness) is the subject’s own fault as “non-use of freedom”. The spiritual inertness, as an empirical condition of possibility of a bad choice, is nevertheless in Fichte a spiritual force of a specific kind, active even there where ethical choice in the strict sense of the term is not (yet) at issue. Schelling’s reproof must therefore be acknowledged as invalid, exactly because the history of self-consciousness is, in Fichte’s ethics, not so much an exposition of a real sequence, as a transcendental reflection of grounds.
15
Auweele, Dennis Vanden. "Atheism, Radical Evil, and Kant." Philosophy and Theology 22, no. 1 (2010): 155–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtheol2010221/27.
Full text
16
Grimm, Stephen R. "Kant's Argument for Radical Evil." European Journal of Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2002): 160–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00154.
Full text
17
Mariano, Silke Ann Mariz. "The Banality of Radical Evil." International Journal of the Humanities: Annual Review 7, no. 1 (2009): 123–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/1447-9508/cgp/v07i01/42593.
Full text
18
Correia, Adriano. "Mal radical e vícios diabólicos em Kant." Educação e Filosofia 38 (December 6, 2024): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.14393/revedfil.v38a2024-74502.
Full textAbstract:
Kant insiste que não é possível uma corrupção radical da razão moral legisladora. Mesmo os piores malfeitores jamais extirpam de si o respeito pela lei moral. O mal moral é antes de tudo concebido como fragilidade, autoengano, desejo de felicidade. Não obstante, Kant considera a possibilidade de abrigarmos vícios diabólicos, principalmente em seus textos da década de 1890, sobre os quais mais nos determos nesse texto. Mesmo não admitindo uma vontade diabólica, que queira o mal pelo mal, Kant assume que podemos ter vícios diabólicos, como a alegria com o mal alheio, mobilizados por paixões e afetos. O objetivo desse texto é fazer uma exploração preliminar dessa articulação complexa entre um mal autointeressado traduzido na doutrina do mal radical e vícios diabólicos que apontam para males que ultrapassam a humanidade. Palavras-chave: Mal Radical; Vícios Diabólicos; Immanuel Kant. Radical evil and diabolical vices in Kant Abstract: Kant asserts that a radical corruption of legislative moral reason is not possible. Even the worst evildoers never eradicate respect for the moral law from themselves. Moral evil is understood primarily as weakness, self-deception, and desire for happiness. Nevertheless, Kant considers the possibility that we harbor diabolical vices, particularly in his texts from the 1890s, which we will focus on in this text. Even if he does not admit a diabolical will that wants evil for its own sake, Kant assumes that we can have diabolical vices, such as joy at the suffering of others, which are mobilized by passions and affections. The purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary exploration of this complex articulation between a self-interested evil manifested in the doctrine of radical evil and diabolical vices, which point to evils beyond humanity. Keywords: Radical Evil; Diabolical Vices; Immanuel Kant. Mal radical y vicios diabólicos en Kant Resumen: Kant insiste que no es posible una corrupción radical de la razón moral legisladora. Incluso los peores malhechores jamás erradican de ellos el respeto por la ley moral. El mal moral es antes de todo diseñado como fragilidad, autoengaño y deseo de felicidad. Sin embargo, Kant considera la posibilidad de albergarse vicios diabólicos, principalmente en sus textos de la década de 1890, sobre los cuales más nos centraremos en este texto. Aunque no admite una voluntad diabólica, que quiera el mal por el mal, Kant asume que podemos tener vicios diabólicos, como la alegría por el mal ajeno, movilizados por las pasiones y afectos. El objetivo de este texto es hacer una exploración preliminar de esa articulación compleja entre un mal auto interesado traducido en la doctrina del mal radical y los vicios diabólicos que apuntan para males que ultrapasan la humanidad. Palabras-clave: Mal Radical; Vicios Diabólicos; Immanuel Kant. Data de registro: 22/07/2024 Data de aceite: 28/08/2024
19
Burdman, Javier. "Between banality and radicality: Arendt and Kant on evil and responsibility." European Journal of Political Theory 18, no. 2 (2016): 174–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885116640725.
Full textAbstract:
The paper reads Kant’s notion of radical evil as anticipating and clarifying problematic aspects of what Arendt called ‘the banality of evil’. By reconstructing Arendt’s varied analyses of this notion throughout her later writings, I show that the main theoretical challenge posed by it concerns the adjudication of responsibility for evil deeds that seem to lack recognisable evil intentions. In order to clarify this issue, I turn to a canonical text in which the relationship between evil and responsibility plays a central role: Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Relying on an interpretation of this writing by Arendt’s mentor Karl Jaspers published in 1935, in evident connection to National Socialism, I challenge Arendt’s own interpretation of Kant’s notion of radical evil, which, I argue, represents an antecedent, rather than a contrast, to ‘the banality of evil’. For Kant, radical evil consists in the destruction of the person’s sense of responsibility, thus producing a self-exculpatory mentality such as the one that characterised Eichmann during his trial.
20
Grigonis, Gintautas. "Politics and Terrorism of Immanuel Kant‘s Radical Evil." Politologija 104, no. 4 (2022): 62–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/polit.2021.104.3.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyzes Immanuel Kant’s concept of radical evil within the broader corpus of Kant’s practical works in order to ascertain whether suicidal terrorism can be interpreted using his philosophical framework. Said analysis establishes the dynamic between radical evil and other characteristics of Kantian human nature – unsocial-sociability and propensity towards humanity, whilst focusing on the political implications of said dynamic. When analyzed utilizing the established framework of politics of radical evil, suicidal terrorism reveals the extremities of human behavior as well as potential flaws of Kantian philosophy.
21
Jedan, Christoph. "Terrorisme, verantwoordelijkheid en het radicale kwaad: Kants Religionsschrift herlezen." NTT Journal for Theology and the Study of Religion 61, no. 1 (2007): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ntt2007.61.017.jeda.
Full textAbstract:
In recent debates, insufficient attention has been paid to the positive role religions can play in modern societies. Religions offer insights that remain important even in secular societies. Kant’s conception of radical evil is a paradigm of positive engagement with Christian dogmatics. This article argues that Kant cannot formulate his conception of radical evil without falling back on Christian interpretative resources. Kant attempts a combination of Pelagian and Augustinian views on evil and free will. In spite of tensions in Kant’s analysis of evil, it still offers important insights that can help us to better understand, and deal with, contemporary manifestations of evil, like modern terrorism.
22
Welsch, Martin. "Kant über den Selbstbetrug des Bösen." Kant-Studien 110, no. 1 (2019): 49–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kant-2019-0002.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract In Kantian philosophy, the evil heart is constituted as a system of self-degrading and self-deranging freedom by the coordination of two voluntary acts: the act of establishing radical evil and the act of a voluntary lie to oneself. The consequence is a kind of “madness of freedom”, which characterises the self-deception of evil. By discussing Kantian rhetoric as an elaborate art of writing, this structure will be explored via a new approach to reading ‘On Radical Evil in Human Nature’. The result is that it is the mere possibility of a lie to oneself originating in freedom that makes it impossible to cognise whether one’s heart is good or systematically evil.
23
Schumacher, Lydia. "Kant’s Theory of Radical Evil and its Franciscan Forebears." Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 65, no. 2 (2023): 113–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2023-0022.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article argues that Kant’s famous theory of ‘radical evil’, according to which there is a natural propensity for evil as well as good in all human beings, has precedent in the medieval Franciscan intellectual tradition. In the early thirteenth century, members of this tradition, inspired by its founder Alexander of Hales, developed a novel account of free will, according to which the will is capable of choosing between equally legitimate options of good and evil. In affirming this, early Franciscans departed from the longstanding tradition of Augustine, for whom free will can only choose the good, since evil is merely a privation of the good that limits human freedom. By the same token, they anticipated the Kantian contention that freedom entails the ability to choose between good and evil maxims.
24
Schweitzer, Don. "The dialectic of understanding and explanation in answers to questions of theodicy." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 34, no. 2 (2005): 251–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842980503400206.
Full textAbstract:
This paper addresses the topic of how God can be known in relation to the radical evil of innocent human suffering. Beginning by distinguishing between understanding and explanation as two related but different types of knowledge, it argues that God's love and radical evil are to be understood, not explained. While logical explanations of how God's love and radical evil inevitably subvert one or both realities, understanding allows both to stand and be appreciated for what they are. The paper goes on to argue that explanation does have a necessary role in enabling participation in God's redemptive work of overcoming evil. Explanation enriches understanding but never replaces it. Related in this way, understanding and explanation can supplement each other in the task of illuminating the human condition and guiding human action.
25
Soares, Daniel, and Evanildo Costeski. "leitura weiliana de Dom Casmurro; A weilian reading by Dom Casmurro." Sofia 11, no. 2 (2022): e11238656. http://dx.doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.38656.
Full textAbstract:
Propõe-se investigar se o conceito weiliano de mal radical basta para compreender o comportamento moral de Bento Santiago descrito no romance Dom Casmurro. É necessário para tanto traçar em linhas gerais a análise feita por Eric Weil do mal radical kantiano, o que é proposto na primeira seção do artigo. Feito isso, o conceito kantiano é comparado com o mal radical conforme aparece na obra weiliana, o que marca a particularidade da versão encontrada no pensamento de Eric Weil da inspiração do mal radical kantiano; esse é o tema da segunda seção. Finalmente, o mal radical weiliano – entendido como violência passional – é aplicado ao agir de Bento Santiago para então analisar sua adequação e suficiência para a compreensão do comportamento do memorialista machadiano, o que é feito na terceira seção do artigo. Essa análise permite responder se o conceito basta para dar conta da violência moral do caso estudado. ABSTRACT The paper seeks to investigate whether the Weilian concept of radical evil is enough to understand the moral behavior of Bento Santiago described in the novel Dom Casmurro by Machado de Assis. It is necessary, therefore, to outline Eric Weil's analysis of the Kantian radical evil, which is proposed in the first section of this paper. The second section compares the Kantian concept with radical evil as it appears in Weil's work, which marks the particularity of the version found in Eric Weil's thought of the inspiration of Kantian radical evil. In the third section of the paper, Weil’s radical evil – understood as passionate violence – is applied to Bento Santiago’s actions and then analyzes its suitability and sufficiency for understanding the Machadian memorialist’s behavior. The conclusion of the paper aims to answer if the concept is enough to account for the moral violence of the case studied.
26
COTKIN, GEORGE. "ILLUMINATING EVIL: HANNAH ARENDT AND MORAL HISTORY." Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 3 (2007): 463–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244307001357.
Full textAbstract:
Hannah Arendt's well-known examinations of the problem of evil are not contradictory and they are central to her corpus. Evil can be banal in some cases (Adolf Eichmann) and radical (the phenomenon of totalitarianism) in others. But behind all expressions of evil, in Arendt's formulations, is the imperative that it be confronted by thinking subjects and thoroughly historicized. This led her away from a view of evil as radical to one of evil as banal. Arendt's ruminations on evil are illuminated, in part, by concerns that she shared with her fellow New York intellectuals about the withering effects of mass culture upon individual volition and understanding. In confronting the challenges of evil, Arendt functioned as a “moral historian,” suggesting profitable ways that historians might look at history from a moral perspective. Indeed, her work may be viewed as anticipating a “moral turn” currently afoot in the historical profession.
27
Burns, R. M. "The Origins of Human Evil." Scottish Journal of Theology 53, no. 3 (2000): 292–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930600051000.
Full textAbstract:
Enlightenment optimism concerning man's ‘natural goodness’ is out of fashion. The many instances of monstrous evil on a mass scale (Nazi extermination camps; Gulags; Cambodia; Kosovo, etc.), the widespread reporting of the activities of sadistic torturers and killers, the great increase in violent crime and drug addiction in the most affluent and welleducated societies, expose to ridicule Condorcet's prediction that 'the time will come when the sun will shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason … the human race, emancipated from its shackles [will] advance with a firm and sure step along the path of truth, virtue, and happiness. Yet there have been few recent philosophical or theological attempts to consider afresh the nature of human evil, and most of them still tend, if mutedly, to cling to the notion of mankind's essential moral goodness. Thus the hesitant conclusion of Ricoeur's reconsideration of human moral responsibility is that ‘however radical evil may be, it cannot be as primordial as goodness’, and that we should think of an ‘existential superimposition of radical evil on primordial good’.2 In 1963, Hannah Arendt declared that ‘evil is never “radical”, that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension … Only the good has depth and can be radical.‘ Instead she wrote of the ‘banality of evil’, generalising from the case of Eichmann.
28
Herrera Guevara, Asunción. "Break away from Rights, Radical Evil." Enrahonar. Quaderns de filosofia 40 (July 7, 2008): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.310.
Full text
29
Kohl, Markus. "Radical Evil As A Regulative Idea." Journal of the History of Philosophy 55, no. 4 (2017): 641–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2017.0069.
Full text
30
Boer, Roland. "Radical Evil, edited by Joan Copjec." Arc: The Journal of the School of Religious Studies 25 (May 1, 1997): 157–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.26443/arc.v25i.803.
Full text
31
Bernstein, Richard J. "Are Arendt's Reflections on Evil Still Relevant?" Review of Politics 70, no. 1 (2008): 64–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003467050800017x.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe relevance of Arendt's reflections on evil is analyzed in three respects. She warns that the appeal to absolutes (good or evil) destroys politics; her claim that radical evil involves making human beings as human beings superfluous is relevant to contemporary concerns with the vast refugee and stateless populations; and her idea of the banality of evil focuses our attention on the evil deeds that persons commit even when they do not have evil motives or intentions.
32
Pestana, Mark Stephen. "Radical Freedom, Radical Evil, and the Possibility of Eternal Damnation." Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 4 (1992): 500–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil19929442.
Full text
33
Rimai, Anthony. "Kant on Radical Evil: A Pragmatic Reading." Tattva Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2021): 63–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.12726/tjp.25.5.
Full textAbstract:
One of the primary concerns of Immanuel Kant in his major works on philosophy of religion is the doctrine of radical evil. He was greatly perplexed by the conundrums of this doctrine. Although Kant claimed it to be a universal trait, he failed to give a formal proof (evidence) supporting it. However, he asserted that the conducts of human beings are enough to demonstrate the nature of radical evil. The complexity of the doctrine is further fuelled by introducing the idea of the need of divine intervention for one to overcome such moral-religious predicament. Critical responses from both Christian and secular scholars reflect interesting take on his ethico-religious discourse. One of the prominent criticisms to Kant’s doctrine of radical evil is its relapse to religious absurdity reflecting the Christian doctrine of the ‘fall of mankind’ as narrated in the first book of the Bible. Consequently, the seriousness of the criticism not only affects the moral maxims but also the portrayal of its strong religious affinity, rendering the doctrine even more allusive and perplexing. The article intends to throw some light on the pragmatic perspective of the doctrine with special focus on the universality of the radical evil nature of human.
34
Fremstedal, Roe. "Original Sin and Radical Evil: Kierkegaard and Kant." Kantian Review 17, no. 2 (2012): 197–225. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415412000039.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractBy comparing the theories of evil found in Kant and Kierkegaard, this article aims to shed new light on Kierkegaard, as well as on the historical and conceptual relations between the two philosophers. The author shows that there is considerable overlap between Kant's doctrine of radical evil and Kierkegaard's views on guilt and sin and argues that Kierkegaard approved of the doctrine of radical evil. Although Kierkegaard's distinction between guilt and sin breaks radically with Kant, there are more Kantian elements in Kierkegaard than was shown by earlier scholarship. Finally, Kierkegaard provides an alternative solution to the problem of the universality of guilt, a problem much discussed in the literature on Kant.
35
Hładyłowicz, Joanna Gabriela. "To explain evil. Philosophical interpretation of Philip Zimbardo's Prison Experiment." Kultura i Wartości 31 (August 30, 2021): 151–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2021.31.151-172.
Full textAbstract:
The main problem of this paper is the issue of the evil and attempts at explaining this phenomenon. It is an analysis and reinterpretation of the Stanford Prison Experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo. The leading argumentation is composed of Hannah Arendt's thesis of the banality of evil and philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Paul Ricoeur. Facing the radical experiment's conclusions, questions about human free will, motives and responsibility was raised. Therefore, the main thesis of this paper is an objection against the radical postulate of social psychologists about a profound influence a situation has on our moral decisions. The conclusion leads us to assumption of the incomprehensible character of evil and a strong need to expand our ability of self-reliant thinking allowing us to make a morally right choices and to counteract evil.
36
Lagerlund, Henrik. "Willing Evil." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94, no. 2 (2020): 305–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2020312201.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, I present two virtually unknown sixteenth-century views of human freedom, that is, the views of Bartolomaeus de Usingen (1465–1532) and Jodocus Trutfetter (1460–1519) on the one hand and John Mair (1470–1550) on the other. Their views serve as a natural context and partial background to the more famous debate on human freedom between Martin Luther (1483–1556) and Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536) from 1524–1526. Usingen and Trutfetter were Luther’s philosophy teachers in Erfurt. In a passage from Book III of John Mair’s commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1530, he seems to defend a view of human freedom by which we can will evil for the sake of evil. Very few thinkers in the history of philosophy have defended such a view. The most famous medieval thinker to do so is William Ockham (1288–1347). To illustrate how radical this view is, I place him in the historical context of such thinkers as Plato, Augustine, Buridan, and Descartes.
37
Allison, Henry E. "Reflections on the Banality of (Radical) Evil." Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 18, no. 2 (1995): 141–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/gfpj199518217.
Full text
38
Atkinson, Camille. "Kant on Human Nature and Radical Evil." Philosophy and Theology 19, no. 1 (2007): 215–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtheol2007191/211.
Full text
39
Finlayson, Gordon. "Adorno: Modern Art, Metaphysics and Radical Evil." Modernism/modernity 10, no. 1 (2003): 71–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mod.2003.0010.
Full text
40
De Duve, Thierry. "Art in the Face of Radical Evil." October 125 (July 2008): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/octo.2008.125.1.3.
Full text
41
Barrios Andrade, Diego Fernando. "Arendt, Bernstein y santo Tomás: reflexiones sobre el mal banal." Espíritu 72, no. 166 (2023): 321–44. https://doi.org/10.63534/2938-3994.166.2023.321-344.barrios.
Full textAbstract:
Banal evil is a central notion in Arendt’s thought, not without contradictory interpretations. Bernstein states in an early article that Arendt took such a notion from Jaspers and, in doing so, leads her readers to fall into the misunderstanding of making banal evil and radical evil interchangeable. Banal evil is usually understood as evil derived from the inability to think. However, it also designates a deformed conscience. The incapacity to think influences the deformation of conscience, which is caused by passion and vice, as saint Thomas points out.
42
Mortensen, Jacob P. B. "Kants begreb om det radikale onde." Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift 75, no. 2 (2012): 103–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/dtt.v75i2.105564.
Full textAbstract:
The article is a reading of Book One in Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. The main focus is the concept of radical evil, which Kant posits as a philosophical analogue to the Christian concept of Original Sin. The article unfolds the relations between the concepts that Kant uses to establish the concept of radical evil. The main point is that Kant ends up contradicting his own conceptual defi nition because he ascribes evil to the concept of freedom, which is fundamentally good. The article thus follows a peripheral and marginalized trajectory within Kantian scholarship by proposing a Kant who is inconsistent and paradoxical. Even though this ‘contradictory Kant’ ends up not explaining what he sets out to explain, the article appreciates his work for his effort to fi nd a foothold in the question concerning the problem of evil.
43
Welsch, Martin. "Kant über das Satanisch-Böse." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 71, no. 3 (2023): 315–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0028.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract According to Kant, men cannot do evil for the sake of evil. A satanic act of resistance against the moral law is impossible, and therefore the idea of ultimate evil is called a “mere idea”. However, it isn’t impossible to realize the idea of satanic evil, as is widely thought: the idea of ultimate evil can be fully realized by the everyday evil of men, as if they were ultimately evil. Kant exposes this structure within his Doctrine of Right (1797) as an extension of his philosophy of radical evil, presented in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). This interpretation will be developed in a close reading of the crucial passage – where it is the revolutionizing people of France who are held responsible for having realized the idea of satanic evil.
44
Mariña, Jacqueline. "Radical Evil, Social Contracts and the Idea of the Church in Kant." Kantian Review 27, no. 1 (2022): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415421000704.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn this article I argue that Kant’s understanding of the universality of radical evil is best understood in the context of human sociality. Because we are inherently social beings, the nature of the human community we find ourselves in has a determinative influence on the sorts of persons we are, and the kinds of choices we can make. We always begin in evil. This does not vitiate responsibility, since through reflection we can become aware of our situation and envision ourselves as members of a different community, one with different expectations, making genuine virtue possible. This understanding of radical evil helps to make sense of Kant’s high regard for the church in Religion.
45
DePoe, John M. "Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Moral Skepticism." Philosophia Christi 24, no. 2 (2022): 257–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc202224222.
Full textAbstract:
One objection to skeptical theism is that it implies radical moral skepticism. Humans cannot make any moral judgments on this view because of their ignorance of the inaccessible divine knowledge that is called upon to explain the existence of apparently gratuitous evil. In answering this objection, I propose two important moves for skeptical theists. First, skeptical theists should be positive skeptical theists (the existence of God positively implies the appearance of gratuitous evil), rather than negative skeptical theists (the appearance of gratuitous evil is probabilistically inscrutable given theism). Second, the skeptical theist can affirm a model of divine transcendence whereby the unknown divine moral knowledge is continuous with human moral knowledge. These two moves, I contend, assist in saving skeptical theism from accusations of radical moral skepticism.
46
Zubets, Olga P. "Auschwitz: The Ruined Concept of Evil." Chelovek 33, no. 4 (2022): 77. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s023620070021629-8.
Full textAbstract:
Attempts to philosophically comprehend Auschwitz, which inevitably become acts of moral thinking, are faced with the impossibility of relying on the concept of evil and turn into criticism, through to its rejection. H. Arendt's concept of radical evil, which is fundamentally different in content from Kant's, captures the transformation of people into superfluous, which in the idea of the banality of evil is defined as lack of subjectness. Both radical nature and banality take the idea of evil outside the bounds of moral philosophy. But the peculiarity of thinking about Auschwitz also lies in the fact that it does not allow itself to use those “measurement instruments” that are destroyed or discredited by it. Such a discredited means is the dichotomy of good and evil, which lies at the heart of any, but especially Nazi morality: it is in it that the idea of evil and the appeal to it are present to the greatest extent, in contrast to the world of victims and witnesses. The view of Auschwitz and its assessment as evil by an ethical scientist looking from the outside, for whom evil is given as knowledge, is subjected to special criticism: the author refers to the criticism of the idea of knowledge of good and evil by Spinoza and Bonhoeffer. The remaining opportunity to preserve the concept of evil for those who think of Auschwitz as their own act is rejected on the basis of the conclusion that Auschwitz as the ultimate givennes of killing can only be opposed by the givenness of an act of non-murder that is not mediated by moral ideas and norms, primarily by the idea of combating evil
47
Borges, Maria. "Enlightenment and religion in Kant." SHS Web of Conferences 161 (2023): 01006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202316101006.
Full textAbstract:
How can we reconcile religion and Enlightenment in Kant? I begin by analyzing Kant’s conception of a rational religion and the key concepts of radical evil and ethical community. I refer to many instances of overcoming evil in Kant’s work. First, I show that in the Anthropology, the cultivation of society is one possibility, while in the Idea for a Universal History, the unsociable sociability plays a role to accomplish a moral end. In Religion, on the other hand, only an ethical community can defeat evil. Since evil has its source in social relations, only a society of virtue can counteract passions. Second, I ask whether we can reconcile religious faith with rational Enlightenment or if some concepts used in Religion, such as radical evil, are only a disguise for anti-Enlightenment conceptions. Finally, I ask if it is reasonable to argue that we should keep religion as an important social practice or if it always brings a higher risk of anti-Enlightenment outcomes such as fanaticism. I analyze the case of Brazil, where the Evangelical church helped to elect a right-wing president with a very conservative and anti-Enlightenment agenda.
48
Lederman, Shmuel. "The Radicalism of the Banality of Evil." New German Critique 46, no. 2 (2019): 197–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0094033x-7546248.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The article reexamines Hannah Arendt’s shift from “radical evil” in The Origins of Totalitarianism to “the banality of evil” in Eichmann in Jerusalem and subsequent writings. At the heart of this shift stands Arendt’s realization that she exaggerated the role of ideology in motivating ordinary people to become mass murderers. Instead, political conformity—namely, self-adjustment to the ruling political order simply because it is the ruling order—becomes Arendt’s main explanation for the participation of “ordinary people” in the Nazi mass murder. This shift in Arendt’s interpretation is truly radical, and its implications require further consideration and investigation.
49
I., Kant /. Roberto R. Aramayo. "Sobre el mal radical en la naturaleza humana , o de la morada interior del principio moralmente malo junto al bueno." Con-, no. 10 (December 18, 2019): 204–29. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3583171.
Full textAbstract:
Este artículo fue remitido en febrero de 1792 por Kant a su amigo Biester, director de la <em>Revista Mensual de Berlín, </em>donde fue publicado en el mes de abril. No correría la misma suerte otro trabajo que pretendía proseguir el discurso iniciado en este y que sería publicado como segunda parte de <em>La religión dentro de los limites de la mera razón </em>(1793), cuya primera sección es el artículo traducido aquí “Sobre el mal radical”. Tras no superar la censura berlinesa el segundo artículo, Kant se las ingenió para conseguir el <em>imprimatur</em> del libro, que fue expedido por la Facultad de Filosofía de Jena. Las notas de Kant van el un cuerpo mayor a las del traductor.
50
McBride, William L. "Radicalism as the Lucid Awareness of Radical Evil." Radical Philosophy Review 1, no. 1 (1998): 35–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev1998113.
Full text