Academic literature on the topic 'Rajaji International Institute of Public Affairs and Administration'

A life of service to others ended on March 26, 2009, when professor emeritus George A. Warp of the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs of the University of Minnesota passed away at age 95. George was born on June 12, 1913, in Northfield, Ohio, and graduated from Bedford High School in Ohio. Prior to being associated with the University of Minnesota for the past 60 years, he graduated from Oberlin College, Case Western University, and Columbia University, earning degrees in political science, public administration, international administration, as well as law. George served briefly as a political science faculty member at the University of Minnesota, where he met and married his late wife, Lois, in 1940 before entering the U.S. Navy following the entry of the United States into World War II. His service in the Pacific theater led to his postwar appointment as a civilian advisor under General MacArthur in Japan from 1946–1948. Upon completion of that assignment, George returned to the University of Minnesota in 1948 as a professor of political science and served first as associate director and then director of the graduate program in public administration in the department's Public Administration Center until 1965 when the center became a self-standing unit of the College of Liberal Arts. He remained director through 1968 when the center was succeeded by the School of Public Affairs and recreated as the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs in 1978 as a collegiate unit named as a memorial honoring the late vice president and Minnesota's senator. George served as a professor and chair of graduate admissions until his retirement in 1982.

Allan Meltzer's career in economics has featured outstanding contributions in an astonishingly wide range of activities. As the basis of all of these, of course, lies his work in economic research. Perhaps most well known is Allan's long line of papers in monetary economics, many written together with Karl Brunner, which helped to establish the broad and widely accepted approach once known as monetarism. But several other areas have, at different times, attracted his main research efforts; among these are business-cycle analysis, financial intermediation, analytical political economy, and the history of economic thought. Recently, he has become deeply immersed in a major historical project — the writing of an extensive history of the Federal Reserve System and its monetary policymaking. A second type of outstanding accomplishment has been Allan Meltzer's work as a conference-series creator and organizer. In the 1970's, he and Karl Brunner founded the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, which has been unusually fruitful as an incubator of new ideas and talent. Together, Brunner and Meltzer also founded the Interlaken Seminar on Analysis and Ideology, which for many years brought together economists, political philosophers, and other social scientists. Allan was a major contributor to Brunner's organization of the Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy — still a creative force in European economics — and with colleagues he created and ran the Carnegie Mellon Conference on Political Economy from 1979 to 1990.As if all this were not enough for three or four normal beings, Allan and Karl created the Shadow Open Market Committee. At its inception this was a unique institution, but it has since served as a model for other groups designed to provide policy analysis for a wider public audience. In terms of that latter objective, Allan has been and continues to be one of the economists most frequently sought out and quoted in the national and international press. He maintains an amazingly fresh and extensive store of knowledge about economic and social affairs the world over, one that he shares generously with other scholars.Allan Meltzer has not spent much time in full-time governmental positions, but has served extensively as a consultant or advisor to the U.S. Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisors, as well as official agencies in several other nations, including most notably the Bank of Japan. Also he has for several years spent a good bit of time at the American Enterprise Institute. For over 40 years, however, his principal professional home has been the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at Carnegie Mellon University.From the foregoing account, it will be obvious that Allan Meltzer is equipped with an enormous supply of energy and enthusiasm, as well as analytical ability. A closely related characteristic, familiar to all those who are lucky enough to spend time with him, is an unfailing attitude of optimism and cheerfulness.My interview with Allan took place on May 14, 1997, in his office, with its pleasant corner location in the new wing of GSIA's building. We talked in the afternoon and continued somewhat longer than intended because there was so much of interest to discuss. Even after 16 years of having nearby offices and multiple conversations — on days when we both are in Pittsburgh — I found it instructive and enjoyable to learn more about Allan Meltzer's remarkable career. The interview was taped, transcribed, and edited lightly.

Over the last few years e-government in Slovenia has experienced very rapid development, with the latest EU surveys showing that Slovenia is among the most advanced member states in this field. However, the actual use of public e-services lags far behind the growing supply. This paper offers a comparative analysis of the current state of affairs in this field in Slovenia, focusing on the country’s administrative units. That analysis is based on the results of empirical research into the administrative units’ e-business, which was carried out in the first half of 2009 by the Institute for Public Administration Informatisation at the Faculty of Administration. The research looked at e-business in the most typical areas of the administrative units’ work, such as internal affairs, the environment and physical planning, agriculture etc., which most accurately reveal the current state of e-business in Slovenia’s public administration, particularly insofar as it relates to operations with citizens. The paper also examines the e-business of administrative units in their internal operations and in operations with other administrative bodies. The final part includes a comparison of the results of the empirical research with the latest results from the EU Capgemini Benchmark study (Capgemini, 2009), as well as a number of other international studies.

In the movement of integration and development in Vietnam, universities are moving from centralized management to subsidized decentralization and strengthening the autonomy of universities to meet the goals of the innovation and integration phase. This paper would evaluate the international identity in Vietnam and at Vietnam National University, Hanoi (VNU) in the context of higher education autonomy. A number of policy factors affect international cooperation at the VNU; The role of scholarly exchanges for students, lecturers in the context of international integration; the impact of international affiliate programs to the internationalization of higher education at VNU. Keywords VNU, Vietnam, autonomy, internationalization, higher education References [1] N.V. Varghese, Michaela Martin, Governance reform in higher education: a study of institutional autonomy in Asian countries. Pg. 22. International institute for educational planning, 2014. [2] M. Kreysing, Autonomy, accountability, and organizational complexity in higher education: the Goettingen model of university reform, Journal of Educational Administration. 40(6) 2002) 552 Emerald Publishing Limited.[3] D. Anderson, R. Johnson, University Autonomy in Twenty Countries. Pg 20. Australia. Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 1998.[4] P. Koudelková, W. Strielkowski, D. Hejlova, Corruption and System Change in the Czech Republic: Firm-level Evidence, Law and Economics Review. 6(1) (2015) 2546.[5] J.V. Thomas, Ben Wikinson, Vietnamese Higher education: Crisis and Response, Memoradum Higher Education Task Force Nov 2008, USA, Harvard Kenedy School, ASH Institue, 2008. [6] Pham Thi Thanh Hai, Autonomy and Accountability of Higher Education In the process of innovation and international integration in Vietnam. Vietnam. Science Journal, VNU Human and Social Sciences University. 3(1b) (2017) 87-97.[7] I. Moses, Institutional Autonomy Revisited: Autonomy Justified and Accounted, Higher Education Policy. 20 (2007) 261-274. [8] J. Knight, Internationalization brings important benefits as well as risks, International Higher education. 46 (2007) 8-10. [9] Vietnam National Assembly, Laws on Education, Educational Publishing House, 2005.[10] Vietnam National Assembly, Laws on Higher Education, Educational Publishing House, 2012.[11] Bui Tu, Đại học Ngoại thương: Thực hiện thí điểm tự chủ là cơ hội lớn, Financial Times. (2007http://thoibaotaichinhvietnam.vn/pages/nhip-song-tai-chinh/2017-08-11/dai-hoc-ngoai-thuong-thuc-hien-thi-diem-tu-chu-la-co-hoi-lon-46550.aspx)/, [12] Prime Minister, University Charter, Decree 58/2010/QĐ-TTg, 2010.[13] Prime Minister, University Charter, Decree 70/2010/QĐ-TTg, 2014.[14] Vietnam Government, Resolution 77/NQ-CP. Piloting innovative mechanisms of action for public higher education institutions during 2014-2017 period, 2014. [15] Vietnam Government, Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010, Resolution No. 25/2006/NQ-CP, 2016.[16] Vietnam Government, Fundamentally and Comprehensively Innovation of Vietnam Higher Education, Resolution 14/2005/NQ-CP, 2005.[17] The Prime Minister, Approval of ‘scheme on using national budget to pay for training staffs conducting research on science and engineering working in foreign countries. Decision 322/2000/QĐ-TTg, 2000.[18] The Prime Minister, Approval of “scheme on training lecturers with PhD degree at universities and colleges in the period 2010-2020”, Decision 911/QĐ-TTg, 2010.[19] The Prime Minister, Approval of “scheme on using national budget to pay for training staffs in foreign countries in the period 2013-2020”, Decision 599/QĐ-TTg, 2013.

Currently, e-government is one of the important tools to improve the efficiency of state management and the quality of public services. E-government applications contribute to meeting the requirements of modern governance, such as publicity, transparency, accountability, timeliness of public administration and citizen participation. Therefore, e-government is being developed and applied by various countries in the world including Vietnam. Keywords: E-government, Digital Government, Open Government, Governance, State Governance. References: [1] ADB (2005), Governance: Sound Development Management Governance, tại https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32027/govpolicy.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[2] Sabri Boubaker, Duc Khuong Nguyen (editors), Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Emerging Markets Focus, World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd, 2014, tr. 377. Dẫn theo Nguyễn Văn Quân, Nguồn gốc và sự phát triển của quản trị tốt, trong cuốn “Quản trị tốt: Lý luận và thực tiễn”, Vũ Công Giao, Nguyễn Hoàng Anh, Đặng Minh Tuấn, Nguyễn Minh Tuấn (đồng chủ biên), NXB Chính trị Quốc gia, 2017.[3] Michiel Backus., “e-Governance and Developing Countries: Introduction and examples”, Research Report ; No. 3, April, 2001, Xem: https://bibalex.org/baifa/Attachment/Documents/119334.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[4] S. Bhatnagar, “e-government: from vision to implementation: a practical guide with case studies” New Delhi ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publications, 2004.[5] Vũ Công Giao, Nguyễn Hoàng Anh, Đặng Minh Tuấn, Nguyễn Minh Tuấn (đồng chủ biên) “Quản trị tốt: Lý luận và thực tiễn”, NXB Chính trị Quốc gia, 2017.[6] World Bank (2006), Making PRSP Inclusive, tại http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DISABILITY/Resources/280658-1172608138489/MakingPRSPInclusive.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[7] Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government - World Economic Forum (2011), The Future of Government Lessons Learned From Around The World, Xem: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/EU11/WEF_EU11_FutureofGovernment_Report.pdf –[8] Hanna, Nagy., Transforming Government and Building the Information Society: Challenges and Opportunities for the Developing World, Nagy Hanna & Peter T. Knight editors, Springer, NY, 2010.[9] Heeks, R., “iGovernment : Understanding e-Governance for Development”, Working Paper Series : Paper No. 11, Institute for Development Policy and Management, Xem: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN015484.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[10] Richard Heeks, “Most e-Government-for-Development Projects Fail How Can Risks be Reduced, 2003, Xem: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cafrad/unpan011226.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[11] J. Guida, and M. Crow “e-government and e-governance”, in Unwin, T. (ed.), ICT4D: International and Communication Technology for Development, Cambridge University Press 2009. Xem: https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/app/docs/e-gov_for_dev_countries-report.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[12] Bob Jessop, The State Past, Present, Future, Polity, 2016, tr.166-169, tại http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/re/k- rsc/hss/book/pdf/vol07_08.pdf[13] S. Joseph. Jr. Nye and D. John (2000), Governance in a globalizing world, Brookings Institution Press.[14] Joseph Stiglitz, “Globalization And The Economic Role Of The State In The New Millennium”, Journal Of Industrial and Corporate Change, 2003.[15] Báo Lao động, Xây dựng chính phủ điện tử, rào cản nào?, xem: https://laodong.vn/thoi-su/xay-dung-chinh-phu-dien-tu-rao-can-nao-631923.ldo, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[16] Phạm Tiến Luật, Những thách thức trong xây dựng chính phủ điện tử ở Việt Nam, Tạp chí Quản lý nhà nước, số 264 (1/2018).[17] D. Nute, “Net eases Government Purchasing Process”, The American City & County Journal, 117 (1), 2002; K.A. O’Connell, “Computerizing Government: The Next Generation”, The American City & County Journal, 118 (8), 2003.[18] OECD (2004), Principles of Corporate Governance, tại: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[19] United Nation (2002), World Public sector report Globalization and the State, tại: https://publicadministration.un.org/publications/content/PDFs/E-Library%20Archives/World%20Public%20Sector%20Report%20series/World%20Public%20Sector%20Report.2001.pdf , truy cập ngày 11/11/2018.[20] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, What is Good Governance?, tại: https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf ., truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.[21] UNDP (1997), Governance & Sustainable Human Development. A UNDP Policy Document. New York United Nations Development Programme, 1997.[22] Jim Macnamara, The Quadrivium of Online Public Consultation: Policy, Culture, Resources, Technology, Dẫn theo Nguyễn Đức Lam, Quản trị tốt: những chuẩn mực chung, tài liệu đã dẫn. Vũ Công Giao, Nguyễn Hoàng Anh, Đặng Minh Tuấn, Nguyễn Minh Tuấn (đồng chủ biên) “Quản trị tốt: Lý luận và thực tiễn”, NXB Chính trị Quốc gia, 2017.[23] United Nations : Department of economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and Development Management, “The Global e-Government Survey 2008”, xem: https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2008-Survey/unpan028607.pdf, truy cập ngày 18/12/2018.

The UP Manila Health Policy Development Hub recognizes the invaluable contribution of the participants in theseries of roundtable discussions listed below: RTD: Beyond Hospital Beds: Equity,quality, and service1. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, UP Manila2. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, UP Manila3. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, UP Manila4. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, UP Manila HealthPolicy Development Hub; Director, Institute of HealthPolicy and Development Studies, University of thePhilippines Manila5. Irma L. Asuncion, MHA, CESO III, Director IV,Bureau of Local Health Systems Development,Department of Health6. Renely Pangilinan-Tungol, MD, CFP, MPM-HSD,Municipal Health Officer, San Fernando, Pampanga7. Salome F. Arinduque, MD, Galing-Pook AwardeeRepresentative, Municipal Health Officer, San Felipe,Zambales8. Carmelita C. Canila, MD, MPH, Faculty, College ofPublic Health, University of the Philippines Manila9. Lester M. Tan, MD, MPH, Division Chief, Bureau ofLocal Health System Development, Department ofHealth10. Anthony Rosendo G. Faraon, MD, Vice President,Zuellig Family Foundation (ZFF)11. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization12. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, MD, FPSO-HNS, AssociateDirector, Medical and Regulatory Affairs, AsianHospital and Medical Center13. Christian Edward L. Nuevo, Health Policy and SystemsResearch Fellow, Health Policy Development andPlanning Bureau, Department of Health14. Paolo Victor N. Medina, MD, Assistant Professor 4,College of Medicine, University of the PhilippinesManila15. Jose Rafael A. Marfori, MD, Special Assistant to theDirector, Philippine General Hospital16. Maria Teresa U. Bagaman, Committee Chair, PhilippineSociety for Quality, Inc.17. Maria Theresa G. Vera, MSc, MHA, CESO III, DirectorIV, Health Facility Development Bureau, Departmentof Health18. Ana Melissa F. Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean for Planning & Development, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila19. Fevi Rose C. Paro, Faculty, Department of Communityand Environmental Resource Planning, University ofthe Philippines Los Baños20. Maria Rosa C. Abad, MD, Medical Specialist III,Standard Development Division, Health Facilities andServices Regulation21. Yolanda R. Robles, RPh, PhD, Faculty, College ofPharmacy, University of the Philippines Manila22. Jaya P. Ebuen, RN, Development Manager Officer,CHDMM, Department of Health23. Josephine E. Cariaso, MA, RN, Assistant Professor,College of Nursing, University of the Philippines Manila24. Diana Van Daele, Programme Manager, CooperationSection, European Union25. Maria Paz de Sagun, Project Management Specialist,USAID26. Christopher Muñoz, Member, Yellow Warriors SocietyPhilippinesRTD: Health services and financingroles: Population based- andindividual-based1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the PhilippinesManila5. Mario C. Villaverde, Undersecretary, Health Policyand Development Systems and Development Team,Department of Health6. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan, MD, Former Secretary, Department of Health7. Marvin C. Galvez, MD, OIC Division Chief, BenefitsDevelopment and Research Department, PhilippineHealth Insurance Corporation8. Alvin B. Caballes, MD, MPE, MPP, Faculty, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila9. Carlos D. Da Silva, Executive Director, Association ofMunicipal Health Maintenance Organization of thePhilippines, Inc.10. Anthony Rosendo G. Faraon, MD, Vice President,Zuellig Family Foundation (ZFF) 11. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization12. Salome F. Arinduque, MD, Galing-Pook AwardeeRepresentative, Municipal Health Officer, San Felipe,Zambales13. Michael Ralph M. Abrigo, PhD, Research Fellow,Philippine Institute for Developmental Studies14. Oscar D. Tinio, MD, Committee Chair, Legislation,Philippine Medical Association15. Rogelio V. Dazo, Jr., MD, FPCOM, Legislation,Philippine Medical Association16. Ligaya V. Catadman, MM, Officer-in-charge, HealthPolicy Development and Planning Bureau, Department of Health17. Maria Fatima Garcia-Lorenzo, President, PhilippineAlliance of Patients Organization18. Tomasito P. Javate, Jr, Supervising Economic DevelopmentSpecialist, Health Nutrition and Population Division,National Economic and Development Authority19. Josefina Isidro-Lapena, MD, National Board ofDirector, Philippine Academy of Family Physicians20. Maria Eliza Ruiz-Aguila, MPhty, PhD, Dean, Collegeof Allied Medical Professions, University of thePhilippines Manila21. Ana Melissa F. Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean for Planning & Development, College ofMedicine, University of the Philippines Manila22. Maria Paz P. Corrales, MD, MHA, MPA, Director III,Department of Health-National Capital Region23. Karin Estepa Garcia, MD, Executive Secretary, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians24. Adeline A. Mesina, MD, Medical Specialist III,Philippine Health Insurance Corporation25. Glorey Ann P. Alde, RN, MPH, Research Fellow,Department of HealthRTD: Moving towards provincelevel integration throughUniversal Health Care Act1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the PhilippinesManila5. Mario C. Villaverde, Undersecretary of Health, HealthPolicy and Development Systems and DevelopmentTeam, Department of Health6. Ferdinand A. Pecson, Undersecretary and ExecutiveDirector, Public Private Partnership Center7. Rosanna M. Buccahan, MD, Provincial Health Officer,Bataan Provincial Office8. Lester M. Tan, MD, Division Chief, Bureau of LocalHealth System Development, Department of Health9. Ernesto O. Domingo, MD, FPCP, FPSF, FormerChancellor, University of the Philippines Manila10. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization11. Leslie Ann L. Luces, MD, Provincial Health Officer,Aklan12. Rene C. Catan, MD, Provincial Health Officer, Cebu13. Anthony Rosendo G. Faraon, MD, Vice President,Zuellig Family Foundation14. Jose Rafael A. Marfori, MD, Special Assistant to theDirector, Philippine General Hospital15. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, MD, FPSO-HNS, Consultant,Asian Hospital and Medical Center16. Ramon Paterno, MD, Member, Universal Health CareStudy Group, University of the Philippines Manila17. Mayor Eunice U. Babalcon, Mayor, Paranas, Samar18. Zorayda E. Leopando, MD, Former President,Philippine Academy of Family Physicians19. Madeleine de Rosas-Valera, MD, MScIH, SeniorTechnical Consultant, World Bank20. Arlene C. Sebastian, MD, Municipal Health Officer,Sta. Monica, Siargao Island, Mindanao21. Rizza Majella L. Herrera, MD, Acting Senior Manager,Accreditation Department, Philippine Health InsuranceCorporation22. Alvin B. Caballes, MD, MPE, MPP, Faculty, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila23. Pres. Policarpio B. Joves, MD, MPH, MOH, FPAFP,President, Philippine Academy of Family Physicians24. Leilanie A. Nicodemus, MD, Board of Director,Philippine Academy of Family Physicians25. Maria Paz P. Corrales, MD, MHA, MPA, Director III,National Capital Region Office, Department of Health26. Dir. Irma L. Asuncion, MD, MHA, CESO III, DirectorIV, Bureau of Local Health Systems Development,Department of Health27. Bernard B. Argamosa, MD, Mental Health Representative, National Center for Mental Health28. Flerida Chan, Chief, Poverty Reduction Section, JapanInternational Cooperation Agency29. Raul R. Alamis, Chief Health Program Officer, ServiceDelivery Network, Department of Health30. Mary Anne Milliscent B. Castro, Supervising HealthProgram Officer, Department of Health 31. Marikris Florenz N. Garcia, Project Manager, PublicPrivate Partnership Center32. Mary Grace G. Darunday, Supervising Budget andManagement Specialist, Budget and Management Bureaufor the Human Development Sector, Department ofBudget and Management33. Belinda Cater, Senior Budget and Management Specialist,Department of Budget and Management34. Sheryl N. Macalipay, LGU Officer IV, Bureau of LocalGovernment and Development, Department of Interiorand Local Government35. Kristel Faye M. Roderos, OTRP, Representative,College of Allied Medical Professions, University ofthe Philippines Manila36. Jeffrey I. Manalo, Director III, Policy Formulation,Project Evaluation and Monitoring Service, PublicPrivate Partnership Center37. Atty. Phebean Belle A. Ramos-Lacuna, Division Chief,Policy Formulation Division, Public Private PartnershipCenter38. Ricardo Benjamin D. Osorio, Planning Officer, PolicyFormulation, Project Evaluation and MonitoringService, Public Private Partnership Center39. Gladys Rabacal, Program Officer, Japan InternationalCooperation Agency40. Michael Angelo Baluyot, Nurse, Bataan Provincial Office41. Jonna Jane Javier Austria, Nurse, Bataan Provincial Office42. Heidee Buenaventura, MD, Associate Director, ZuelligFamily Foundation43. Dominique L. Monido, Policy Associate, Zuellig FamilyFoundation44. Rosa Nene De Lima-Estellana, RN, MD, Medical OfficerIII, Department of Interior and Local Government45. Ma Lourdes Sangalang-Yap, MD, FPCR, Medical OfficerIV, Department of Interior and Local Government46. Ana Melissa F. Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean for Planning & Development, College ofMedicine, University of the Philippines Manila47. Colleen T. Francisco, Representative, Department ofBudget and Management48. Kristine Galamgam, Representative, Department ofHealth49. Fides S. Basco, Officer-in-charge, Chief Budget andManagement Specialist, Development of Budget andManagementRTD: Health financing: Co-paymentsand Personnel1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the Philippines Manila5. Ernesto O. Domingo, MD, Professor Emeritus,University of the Philippines Manila6. Irma L. Asuncion, MHA, CESO III, Director IV,Bureau of Local Health Systems Development,Department of Health7. Lester M. Tan, MD, MPH, Division Chief, Bureau ofLocal Health System Development, Department ofHealth8. Marvin C. Galvez, MD, OIC Division Chief, BenefitsDevelopment and Research Department, PhilippineHealth Insurance Corporation9. Adeline A. Mesina, MD, Medical Specialist III, BenefitsDepartment and Research Department, PhilippineHealth Insurance Corporation10. Carlos D. Da Silva, Executive Director, Association ofHealth Maintenance Organization of the Philippines,Inc.11. Ma. Margarita Lat-Luna, MD, Deputy Director, FiscalServices, Philippine General Hospital12. Waldemar V. Galindo, MD, Chief of Clinics, Ospital ngMaynila13. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization14. Rogelio V. Dazo, Jr., MD, Member, Commission onLegislation, Philippine Medical Association15. Aileen R. Espina, MD, Board Member, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians16. Anthony R. Faraon, MD, Vice President, Zuellig FamilyFoundation17. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, Associate Director, Medical andRegulatory Affairs, Asian Hospital and Medical Center18. Jared Martin Clarianes, Technical Officer, Union of LocalAuthorities of the Philippines19. Leslie Ann L. Luces, MD, Provincial Health Officer,Aklan20. Rosa Nene De Lima-Estellana, MD, Medical OfficerIII, Department of the Interior and Local Government21. Ma. Lourdes Sangalang-Yap, MD, Medical Officer V,Department of the Interior and Local Government 22. Dominique L. Monido, Policy Associate, Zuellig FamilyFoundation23. Krisch Trine D. Ramos, MD, Medical Officer, PhilippineCharity Sweepstakes Office24. Larry R. Cedro, MD, Assistant General Manager, CharitySector, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office25. Margarita V. Hing, Officer in Charge, ManagementDivision, Financial Management Service Sector,Department of Health26. Dr. Carlo Irwin Panelo, Associate Professor, College ofMedicine, University of the Philippines Manila27. Dr. Angelita V. Larin, Faculty, College of Public Health,University of the Philippines Manila28. Dr. Abdel Jeffri A. Abdulla, Chair, RegionalizationProgram, University of the Philippines Manila29. Christopher S. Muñoz, Member, Philippine Alliance ofPatients Organization30. Gemma R. Macatangay, LGOO V, Department ofInterior and Local Government – Bureau of LocalGovernment Development31. Dr. Narisa Portia J. Sugay, Acting Vice President, QualityAssurance Group, Philippine Health InsuranceCorporation32. Maria Eliza R. Aguila, Dean, College of Allied MedicalProfessions, University of the Philippines Manila33. Angeli A. Comia, Manager, Zuellig Family Foundation34. Leo Alcantara, Union of Local Authorities of thePhilippines35. Dr. Zorayda E. Leopando, Former President, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians36. Dr. Emerito Jose Faraon, Faculty, College of PublicHealth, University of the Philippines Manila37. Dr. Carmelita C. Canila, Faculty, College of PublicHealth, University of the Philippines ManilaRTD: Moving towards third partyaccreditation for health facilities1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the PhilippinesManila5. Rizza Majella L. Herrera, MD, Acting SeniorManager, Accreditation Department, Philippine HealthInsurance Corporation6. Bernadette C. Hogar-Manlapat, MD, FPBA, FPSA,FPSQua, MMPA, President and Board of Trustee,Philippine Society for Quality in Healthcare, Inc.7. Waldemar V. Galindo, MD, Chief of Clinics, Ospital ngMaynila8. Amor. F. Lahoz, Division Chief, Promotion andDocumentation Division, Department of Trade andIndustry – Philippine Accreditation Bureau9. Jenebert P. Opinion, Development Specialist, Department of Trade and Industry – Philippine AccreditationBureau10. Maria Linda G. Buhat, President, Association ofNursing Service Administrators of the Philippines, Inc.11. Bernardino A. Vicente, MD, FPPA, MHA, CESOIV, President, Philippine Tripartite Accreditation forHealth Facilities, Inc.12. Atty. Bu C. Castro, MD, Board Member, PhilippineHospital Association13. Cristina Lagao-Caalim, RN, MAN, MHA, ImmediatePast President and Board of Trustee, Philippine Societyfor Quality in Healthcare, Inc.14. Manuel E. Villegas Jr., MD, Vice Treasurer and Board ofTrustee, Philippine Society for Quality in Healthcare,Inc.15. Michelle A. Arban, Treasurer and Board of Trustee,Philippine Society for Quality in Healthcare, Inc.16. Joselito R. Chavez, MD, FPCP, FPCCP, FACCP,CESE, Deputy Executive Director, Medical Services,National Kidney and Transplant Institute17. Blesilda A. Gutierrez, CPA, MBA, Deputy ExecutiveDirector, Administrative Services, National Kidney andTransplant Institute18. Eulalia C. Magpusao, MD, Associate Director, Qualityand Patient Safety, St. Luke’s Medical Centre GlobalCity19. Clemencia D. Bondoc, MD, Auditor, Association ofMunicipal Health Officers of the Philippines20. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, MD, FPSO-HNS, AssociateDirector, Medical and Regulatory Affairs, Asian Hospitaland Medical Center21. Maria Fatima Garcia-Lorenzo, President, PhilippineAlliance of Patient Organizations22. Leilanie A. Nicodemus, MD, Board of Directors,Philippine Academy of Family Physicians23. Policarpio B. Joves Jr., MD, President, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians24. Kristel Faye Roderos, Faculty, College of Allied MedicalProfessions, University of the Philippines Manila25. Ana Melissa Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean, College of Medicine, University of thePhilippines Manila26. Christopher Malorre Calaquian, MD, Faculty, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila27. Emerito Jose C. Faraon, MD, Faculty, College ofPublic Health, University of the Philippines Manila 28. Carmelita Canila, Faculty, College of Public Health,University of the Philippines Manila29. Oscar D. Tinio, MD, Representative, Philippine MedicalAssociation30. Farrah Rocamora, Member, Philippine Society forQuality in Healthcare, IncRTD: RA 11036 (Mental Health Act):Addressing Mental Health Needs ofOverseas Filipino Workers1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, UPManila Health Policy Development Hub; College ofArts and Sciences, UP Manila3. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD, UPManila Health Policy Development Hub; College ofPublic Health, UP Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, UP ManilaHealth Policy Development Hub; College of Dentistry,UP Manila5. Frances Prescilla L. Cuevas, RN, MAN, Director,Essential Non-Communicable Diseases Division,Department of Health6. Maria Teresa D. De los Santos, Workers Education andMonitoring Division, Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration7. Andrelyn R. Gregorio, Policy Program and Development Office,Overseas Workers Welfare Administration8. Sally D. Bongalonta, MA, Institute of Family Life &Children Studies, Philippine Women’s University9. Consul Ferdinand P. Flores, Department of ForeignAffairs10. Jerome Alcantara, BLAS OPLE Policy Center andTraining Institute11. Andrea Luisa C. Anolin, Commission on FilipinoOverseas12. Bernard B. Argamosa, MD, DSBPP, National Centerfor Mental Health13. Agnes Joy L. Casino, MD, DSBPP, National Centerfor Mental Health14. Ryan Roberto E. Delos Reyes, Employment Promotionand Workers Welfare Division, Department of Laborand Employment15. Sheralee Bondad, Legal and International AffairsCluster, Department of Labor and Employment16. Rhodora A. Abano, Center for Migrant Advocacy17. Nina Evita Q. Guzman, Ugnayan at Tulong para saMaralitang Pamilya (UGAT) Foundation, Inc.18. Katrina S. Ching, Ugnayan at Tulong para sa MaralitangPamilya (UGAT) Foundation, Inc.RTD: (Bitter) Sweet Smile of Filipinos1. Dr. Hilton Y. Lam, Institute of Health Policy andDevelopment Studies, NIH2. Dr. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., College of Arts andSciences, UP Manila3. Dr. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, College of Public Health,UP Manila4. Dr. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, College of Dentistry,UP Manila5. Dr. Ma. Susan T. Yanga-Mabunga, Department ofHealth Policy & Administration, UP Manila6. Dr. Danilo L. Magtanong, College of Dentistry, UPManila7. Dr. Alvin Munoz Laxamana, Philippine DentalAssociation8. Dr. Fina Lopez, Philippine Pediatric Dental Society, Inc9. Dr. Artemio Licos, Jr.,Department of Health NationalAssociation of Dentists10. Dr. Maria Jona D. Godoy, Professional RegulationCommission11. Ms. Anna Liza De Leon, Philippine Health InsuranceCorporation12. Ms. Nicole Sigmuend, GIZ Fit for School13. Ms. Lita Orbillo, Disease Prevention and Control Bureau14. Mr. Raymond Oxcena Akap sa Bata Philippines15. Dr. Jessica Rebueno-Santos, Department of CommunityDentistry, UP Manila16. Ms. Maria Olivine M. Contreras, Bureau of LocalGovernment Supervision, DILG17. Ms. Janel Christine Mendoza, Philippine DentalStudents Association18. Mr. Eric Raymund Yu, UP College of DentistryStudent Council19. Dr. Joy Memorando, Philippine Pediatric Society20. Dr. Sharon Alvarez, Philippine Association of DentalColleges

Photograph by Gonzalo Echeverria (2010)Declaring War Soon after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration described its new grand strategy: the “Global War on Terror”. This underpinned the subsequent counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Media pundits quickly applied the Global War on Terror label to the Madrid, Bali and London bombings, to convey how Al Qaeda’s terrorism had gone transnational. Meanwhile, international relations scholars debated the extent to which September 11 had changed the international system (Brenner; Mann 303). American intellectuals adopted several variations of the Global War on Terror in what initially felt like a transitional period of US foreign policy (Burns). Walter Laqueur suggested Al Qaeda was engaged in a “cosmological” and perpetual war. Paul Berman likened Al Qaeda and militant Islam to the past ideological battles against communism and fascism (Heilbrunn 248). In a widely cited article, neoconservative thinker Norman Podhoretz suggested the United States faced “World War IV”, which had three interlocking drivers: Al Qaeda and trans-national terrorism; political Islam as the West’s existential enemy; and nuclear proliferation to ‘rogue’ countries and non-state actors (Friedman 3). Podhoretz’s tone reflected a revival of his earlier Cold War politics and critique of the New Left (Friedman 148-149; Halper and Clarke 56; Heilbrunn 210). These stances attracted widespread support. For instance, the United States Marine Corp recalibrated its mission to fight a long war against “World War IV-like” enemies. Yet these stances left the United States unprepared as the combat situations in Afghanistan and Iraq worsened (Ricks; Ferguson; Filkins). Neoconservative ideals for Iraq “regime change” to transform the Middle East failed to deal with other security problems such as Pakistan’s Musharraf regime (Dorrien 110; Halper and Clarke 210-211; Friedman 121, 223; Heilbrunn 252). The Manichean and open-ended framing became a self-fulfilling prophecy for insurgents, jihadists, and militias. The Bush Administration quietly abandoned the Global War on Terror in July 2005. Widespread support had given way to policymaker doubt. Why did so many intellectuals and strategists embrace the Global War on Terror as the best possible “grand strategy” perspective of a post-September 11 world? Why was there so little doubt of this worldview? This is a debate with roots as old as the Sceptics versus the Sophists. Explanations usually focus on the Bush Administration’s “Vulcans” war cabinet: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who later became Secretary of State (Mann xv-xvi). The “Vulcans” were named after the Roman god Vulcan because Rice’s hometown Birmingham, Alabama, had “a mammoth fifty-six foot statue . . . [in] homage to the city’s steel industry” (Mann x) and the name stuck. Alternatively, explanations focus on how neoconservative thinkers shaped the intellectual climate after September 11, in a receptive media climate. Biographers suggest that “neoconservatism had become an echo chamber” (Heilbrunn 242) with its own media outlets, pundits, and think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and Project for a New America. Neoconservatism briefly flourished in Washington DC until Iraq’s sectarian violence discredited the “Vulcans” and neoconservative strategists like Paul Wolfowitz (Friedman; Ferguson). The neoconservatives' combination of September 11’s aftermath with strongly argued historical analogies was initially convincing. They conferred with scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington and Victor Davis Hanson to construct classicist historical narratives and to explain cultural differences. However, the history of the decade after September 11 also contains mis-steps and mistakes which make it a series of contingent decisions (Ferguson; Bergen). One way to analyse these contingent decisions is to pose “what if?” counterfactuals, or feasible alternatives to historical events (Lebow). For instance, what if September 11 had been a chemical and biological weapons attack? (Mann 317). Appendix 1 includes a range of alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events which occurred. Collectively, these counterfactuals suggest the role of agency, chance, luck, and the juxtaposition of better and worse outcomes. They pose challenges to the classicist interpretation adopted soon after September 11 to justify “World War IV” (Podhoretz). A ‘Two-Track’ Process for ‘World War IV’ After the September 11 attacks, I think an overlapping two-track process occurred with the “Vulcans” cabinet, neoconservative advisers, and two “echo chambers”: neoconservative think-tanks and the post-September 11 media. Crucially, Bush’s “Vulcans” war cabinet succeeded in gaining civilian control of the United States war decision process. Although successful in initiating the 2003 Iraq War this civilian control created a deeper crisis in US civil-military relations (Stevenson; Morgan). The “Vulcans” relied on “politicised” intelligence such as a United Kingdom intelligence report on Iraq’s weapons development program. The report enabled “a climate of undifferentiated fear to arise” because its public version did not distinguish between chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (Halper and Clarke, 210). The cautious 2003 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) report on Iraq was only released in a strongly edited form. For instance, the US Department of Energy had expressed doubts about claims that Iraq had approached Niger for uranium, and was using aluminium tubes for biological and chemical weapons development. Meanwhile, the post-September 11 media had become a second “echo chamber” (Halper and Clarke 194-196) which amplified neoconservative arguments. Berman, Laqueur, Podhoretz and others who framed the intellectual climate were “risk entrepreneurs” (Mueller 41-43) that supported the “World War IV” vision. The media also engaged in aggressive “flak” campaigns (Herman and Chomsky 26-28; Mueller 39-42) designed to limit debate and to stress foreign policy stances and themes which supported the Bush Administration. When former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey’s claimed that Al Qaeda had close connections to Iraqi intelligence, this was promoted in several books, including Michael Ledeen’s War Against The Terror Masters, Stephen Hayes’ The Connection, and Laurie Mylroie’s Bush v. The Beltway; and in partisan media such as Fox News, NewsMax, and The Weekly Standard who each attacked the US State Department and the CIA (Dorrien 183; Hayes; Ledeen; Mylroie; Heilbrunn 237, 243-244; Mann 310). This was the media “echo chamber” at work. The group Accuracy in Media also campaigned successfully to ensure that US cable providers did not give Al Jazeera English access to US audiences (Barker). Cosmopolitan ideals seemed incompatible with what the “flak” groups desired. The two-track process converged on two now infamous speeches. US President Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech included a line from neoconservative David Frumm about North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an “Axis of Evil” (Dorrien 158; Halper and Clarke 139-140; Mann 242, 317-321). Powell’s presentation to the United Nations included now-debunked threat assessments. In fact, Powell had altered the speech’s original draft by I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, who was Cheney’s chief of staff (Dorrien 183-184). Powell claimed that Iraq had mobile biological weapons facilities, linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Mohamed El-Baradei, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Institute for Science and International Security all strongly doubted this claim, as did international observers (Dorrien 184; Halper and Clarke 212-213; Mann 353-354). Yet this information was suppressed: attacked by “flak” or given little visible media coverage. Powell’s agenda included trying to rebuild an international coalition and to head off weather changes that would affect military operations in the Middle East (Mann 351). Both speeches used politicised variants of “weapons of mass destruction”, taken from the counterterrorism literature (Stern; Laqueur). Bush’s speech created an inflated geopolitical threat whilst Powell relied on flawed intelligence and scientific visuals to communicate a non-existent threat (Vogel). However, they had the intended effect on decision makers. US Under-Secretary of Defense, the neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, later revealed to Vanity Fair that “weapons of mass destruction” was selected as an issue that all potential stakeholders could agree on (Wilkie 69). Perhaps the only remaining outlet was satire: Armando Iannucci’s 2009 film In The Loop parodied the diplomatic politics surrounding Powell’s speech and the civil-military tensions on the Iraq War’s eve. In the short term the two track process worked in heading off doubt. The “Vulcans” blocked important information on pre-war Iraq intelligence from reaching the media and the general public (Prados). Alternatively, they ignored area specialists and other experts, such as when Coalition Provisional Authority’s L. Paul Bremer ignored the US State Department’s fifteen volume ‘Future of Iraq’ project (Ferguson). Public “flak” and “risk entrepreneurs” mobilised a range of motivations from grief and revenge to historical memory and identity politics. This combination of private and public processes meant that although doubts were expressed, they could be contained through the dual echo chambers of neoconservative policymaking and the post-September 11 media. These factors enabled the “Vulcans” to proceed with their “regime change” plans despite strong public opposition from anti-war protestors. Expressing DoubtsMany experts and institutions expressed doubt about specific claims the Bush Administration made to support the 2003 Iraq War. This doubt came from three different and sometimes overlapping groups. Subject matter experts such as the IAEA’s Mohamed El-Baradei and weapons development scientists countered the UK intelligence report and Powell’s UN speech. However, they did not get the media coverage warranted due to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics. Others could challenge misleading historical analogies between insurgent Iraq and Nazi Germany, and yet not change the broader outcomes (Benjamin). Independent journalists one group who gained new information during the 1990-91 Gulf War: some entered Iraq from Kuwait and documented a more humanitarian side of the war to journalists embedded with US military units (Uyarra). Finally, there were dissenters from bureaucratic and institutional processes. In some cases, all three overlapped. In their separate analyses of the post-September 11 debate on intelligence “failure”, Zegart and Jervis point to a range of analytic misperceptions and institutional problems. However, the intelligence community is separated from policymakers such as the “Vulcans”. Compartmentalisation due to the “need to know” principle also means that doubting analysts can be blocked from releasing information. Andrew Wilkie discovered this when he resigned from Australia’s Office for National Assessments (ONA) as a transnational issues analyst. Wilkie questioned the pre-war assessments in Powell’s United Nations speech that were used to justify the 2003 Iraq War. Wilkie was then attacked publicly by Australian Prime Minister John Howard. This overshadowed a more important fact: both Howard and Wilkie knew that due to Australian legislation, Wilkie could not publicly comment on ONA intelligence, despite the invitation to do so. This barrier also prevented other intelligence analysts from responding to the “Vulcans”, and to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics in the media and neoconservative think-tanks. Many analysts knew that the excerpts released from the 2003 NIE on Iraq was highly edited (Prados). For example, Australian agencies such as the ONA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Defence knew this (Wilkie 98). However, analysts are trained not to interfere with policymakers, even when there are significant civil-military irregularities. Military officials who spoke out about pre-war planning against the “Vulcans” and their neoconservative supporters were silenced (Ricks; Ferguson). Greenlight Capital’s hedge fund manager David Einhorn illustrates in a different context what might happen if analysts did comment. Einhorn gave a speech to the Ira Sohn Conference on 15 May 2002 debunking the management of Allied Capital. Einhorn’s “short-selling” led to retaliation from Allied Capital, a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and growing evidence of potential fraud. If analysts adopted Einhorn’s tactics—combining rigorous analysis with targeted, public denunciation that is widely reported—then this may have short-circuited the “flak” and “echo chamber” effects prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The intelligence community usually tries to pre-empt such outcomes via contestation exercises and similar processes. This was the goal of the 2003 NIE on Iraq, despite the fact that the US Department of Energy which had the expertise was overruled by other agencies who expressed opinions not necessarily based on rigorous scientific and technical analysis (Prados; Vogel). In counterterrorism circles, similar disinformation arose about Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons research after its sarin gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system on 20 March 1995 (Leitenberg). Disinformation also arose regarding nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors in the 1990s (Stern). Interestingly, several of the “Vulcans” and neoconservatives had been involved in an earlier controversial contestation exercise: Team B in 1976. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assembled three Team B groups in order to evaluate and forecast Soviet military capabilities. One group headed by historian Richard Pipes gave highly “alarmist” forecasts and then attacked a CIA NIE about the Soviets (Dorrien 50-56; Mueller 81). The neoconservatives adopted these same tactics to reframe the 2003 NIE from its position of caution, expressed by several intelligence agencies and experts, to belief that Iraq possessed a current, covert program to develop weapons of mass destruction (Prados). Alternatively, information may be leaked to the media to express doubt. “Non-attributable” background interviews to establishment journalists like Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward achieved this. Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange has recently achieved notoriety due to US diplomatic cables from the SIPRNet network released from 28 November 2010 onwards. Supporters have favourably compared Assange to Daniel Ellsberg, the RAND researcher who leaked the Pentagon Papers (Ellsberg; Ehrlich and Goldsmith). Whilst Elsberg succeeded because a network of US national papers continued to print excerpts from the Pentagon Papers despite lawsuit threats, Assange relied in part on favourable coverage from the UK’s Guardian newspaper. However, suspected sources such as US Army soldier Bradley Manning are not protected whilst media outlets are relatively free to publish their scoops (Walt, ‘Woodward’). Assange’s publication of SIPRNet’s diplomatic cables will also likely mean greater restrictions on diplomatic and military intelligence (Walt, ‘Don’t Write’). Beyond ‘Doubt’ Iraq’s worsening security discredited many of the factors that had given the neoconservatives credibility. The post-September 11 media became increasingly more critical of the US military in Iraq (Ferguson) and cautious about the “echo chamber” of think-tanks and media outlets. Internet sites for Al Jazeera English, Al-Arabiya and other networks have enabled people to bypass “flak” and directly access these different viewpoints. Most damagingly, the non-discovery of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction discredited both the 2003 NIE on Iraq and Colin Powell’s United Nations presentation (Wilkie 104). Likewise, “risk entrepreneurs” who foresaw “World War IV” in 2002 and 2003 have now distanced themselves from these apocalyptic forecasts due to a series of mis-steps and mistakes by the Bush Administration and Al Qaeda’s over-calculation (Bergen). The emergence of sites such as Wikileaks, and networks like Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya, are a response to the politics of the past decade. They attempt to short-circuit past “echo chambers” through providing access to different sources and leaked data. The Global War on Terror framed the Bush Administration’s response to September 11 as a war (Kirk; Mueller 59). Whilst this prematurely closed off other possibilities, it has also unleashed a series of dynamics which have undermined the neoconservative agenda. The “classicist” history and historical analogies constructed to justify the “World War IV” scenario are just one of several potential frameworks. “Flak” organisations and media “echo chambers” are now challenged by well-financed and strategic alternatives such as Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya. Doubt is one defence against “risk entrepreneurs” who seek to promote a particular idea: doubt guards against uncritical adoption. Perhaps the enduring lesson of the post-September 11 debates, though, is that doubt alone is not enough. What is needed are individuals and institutions that understand the strategies which the neoconservatives and others have used, and who also have the soft power skills during crises to influence critical decision-makers to choose alternatives. Appendix 1: Counterfactuals Richard Ned Lebow uses “what if?” counterfactuals to examine alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events that occurred. The following counterfactuals suggest that the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror could have evolved very differently . . . or not occurred at all. Fact: The 2003 Iraq War and 2001 Afghanistan counterinsurgency shaped the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 grand strategy. Counterfactual #1: Al Gore decisively wins the 2000 U.S. election. Bush v. Gore never occurs. After the September 11 attacks, Gore focuses on international alliance-building and gains widespread diplomatic support rather than a neoconservative agenda. He authorises Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and works closely with the Musharraf regime in Pakistan to target Al Qaeda’s muhajideen. He ‘contains’ Saddam Hussein’s Iraq through measurement and signature, technical intelligence, and more stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Minimal Rewrite: United 93 crashes in Washington DC, killing senior members of the Gore Administration. Fact: U.S. Special Operations Forces failed to kill Osama bin Laden in late November and early December 2001 at Tora Bora. Counterfactual #2: U.S. Special Operations Forces kill Osama bin Laden in early December 2001 during skirmishes at Tora Bora. Ayman al-Zawahiri is critically wounded, captured, and imprisoned. The rest of Al Qaeda is scattered. Minimal Rewrite: Osama bin Laden’s death turns him into a self-mythologised hero for decades. Fact: The UK Blair Government supplied a 50-page intelligence dossier on Iraq’s weapons development program which the Bush Administration used to support its pre-war planning. Counterfactual #3: Rogue intelligence analysts debunk the UK Blair Government’s claims through a series of ‘targeted’ leaks to establishment news sources. Minimal Rewrite: The 50-page intelligence dossier is later discovered to be correct about Iraq’s weapons development program. Fact: The Bush Administration used the 2003 National Intelligence Estimate to “build its case” for “regime change” in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Counterfactual #4: A joint investigation by The New York Times and The Washington Post rebuts U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United National Security Council, delivered on 5 February 2003. Minimal Rewrite: The Central Intelligence Agency’s whitepaper “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (October 2002) more accurately reflects the 2003 NIE’s cautious assessments. Fact: The Bush Administration relied on Ahmed Chalabi for its postwar estimates about Iraq’s reconstruction. Counterfactual #5: The Bush Administration ignores Chalabi’s advice and relies instead on the U.S. State Department’s 15 volume report “The Future of Iraq”. Minimal Rewrite: The Coalition Provisional Authority appoints Ahmed Chalabi to head an interim Iraqi government. Fact: L. Paul Bremer signed orders to disband Iraq’s Army and to De-Ba’athify Iraq’s new government. Counterfactual #6: Bremer keeps Iraq’s Army intact and uses it to impose security in Baghdad to prevent looting and to thwart insurgents. Rather than a De-Ba’athification policy, Bremer uses former Baath Party members to gather situational intelligence. Minimal Rewrite: Iraq’s Army refuses to disband and the De-Ba’athification policy uncovers several conspiracies to undermine the Coalition Provisional Authority. AcknowledgmentsThanks to Stephen McGrail for advice on science and technology analysis.References Barker, Greg. “War of Ideas”. PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2007. ‹http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/newswar/video1.html› Benjamin, Daniel. “Condi’s Phony History.” Slate 29 Aug. 2003. ‹http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/pagenum/all/›. Bergen, Peter L. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al Qaeda. New York: The Free Press, 2011. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. 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