Academic literature on the topic 'Rape as a weapon of war'

This essay examines how rape of women and girls by male soldiers works as a martial weapon. Continuities with other torture and terrorism and with civilian rape are suggested. The inadequacy of past philosophical treatments of the enslavement of war captives is briefly discussed. Social strategies are suggested for responding and a concluding fantasy offered, not entirely social, of a strategy to change the meanings of rape to undermine its use as a martial weapon.

War is an extraordinary, shameful and bloody phenomenon. During the wars that were fought in different countries of the world, people faced sexual violence from their enemy. Unfortunately, this situation currently exists in Ukraine. During the war launched by Russia on February 24, 2022, civilians are killed by firearms, and thousands of public infrastructure facilities (schools, hospitals, kindergartens, social security services, shopping centers, churches, etc.), high-rise and private buildings are destroyed.In addition to firearms, Russian troops-aggressor also use rape as weapon. There are several explanations why sexual violence is a weapon, and they are presented in this article. Rape and violence perpetrated by aggressors during war are often aimed at terrorizing the population, destroying families, humiliating soldiers whose women and children are left behind, and, as the war in Ukraine has shown, abuse and humiliate even elderly men and women, destroy families and communities. In some countries, there were even ideas that rape will change the ethnic composition of the next generation. Crimes related to rape and other types of sexual violence are usually latent. Victims do not want to talk about it, do not want to testify for many reasons: re-traumatization, stigmatization, and publicity. But evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine is collected by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, so such crimes must be registered. Victims must have a very strong motivation to testify. In some countries, it is already possible to receive compensation for causing damage. This is a tool that, on the one hand, can stimulate testimony, registration of a sexual crime, and on the other hand, to receive material compensation that will improve the standard of living. Social workers, together with other specialists, must advocate for the possibility of receiving reparations for victims in Ukraine.The article contains an answer to why it is important to document the facts of violence and rape, and which mechanisms of assistance exist in the world for victims. The article highlights importance of the work of specialists, namely social workers, psychologists and lawyers, in providing assistance to victims.This article focuses on the work of social workers in the situation of sexual violence during the war, and points out that, in addition to working on improving the provision of assistance to victims, social workers should learn the experience gained in the war situation in Ukraine and the experience of other countries.

This paper analyzed the use of rape as a weapon in Democratic Republic of Congo conflict zone. Rape usually used by the arm group to weaken their enemy. This strategy did not only targeted to women but also men. Rape gave different effect toward women and men. The purpose of this paper is to explain how rape become the weapon of conflict and their effect to the victims, even men and woman. Feminist perspective used in this paper. In the end, the author found that women have a way to overcome the effect and impact of rape better than men do. Social structure, which placed men in the upper side of women, made the effect and impact on the men who experienced rape victim hard to release their suffering. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to show how women and men could manage their self as a victim in the conflict zone.

This paper seeks to better understand rape as a weapon in genocide and wars, the myriads contributing factors to creating ignorance to rape as a weapon in genocide, other forms of sexual violations, and circumstances that prevent women from witnessing rape acts of genocide violence. Drawing from the feminist perspectives of rape and women's sexual violence theorization, Derrida's accounts of truth and witness, and women as an improper mythic being-tainted witness, this paper shows that the current global gender inequality discrimination perpetuates the practice of rape as a weapon of genocide and wars as well as a repudiation for women's witnessing rape and sexual violations. As this situation of women rape survivors' desertions are not only happened in the Rwanda genocide and witnessing rapes for rape victims and survivors are equally challenging, this paper serves an alternative to support women's witnessing rapes and prevent rape the weapon of war to reoccur in the future. Further, Derrida's considerations on law should extend the notions of witnessing beyond the traditional European juridical tradition that excludes literature from legal exercise of witnessing as literature is regarded as mostly only fiction upbrings witnessing through literature as secret testimony is a useful interpretation on women's witnessing rape. Deciphering Derrida's description of witnessing through literature, this paper also recommends that women's writing literature can be an effective way for women to testify independently of the various gendered political disciplining gazes that hold them back from giving testimonies and then gain liberations.

It is today common to argue that rape is a weapon, tool or instrument of warfare. One implication is that armed groups marshal body parts for tactical and strategic ends. In this article, I interrogate this discourse of embodied mobilization to explore how body weaponry has been made intelligible as a medium for sexual violence. First, I show that, despite wide rejection of essentialist models, the penis and penis substitutes continue to occupy a constitutive role in discussions of sexual violence in both political and academic fora, where they are often said to be like weapons, a tendency I term ‘weapon talk’. Second, I trace the image of the body weapon in key threads of feminist theorizing and commentary, to show how the penis has appeared as a ‘basic weapon of force’ in various permutations. Third, I explore the weaponization of the body as it appears in military thought and in the cultural circulation of ideas about the soldiering body in which sexual pleasure and violence are frequently conflated. Building on this foundation, I propose that these literatures collectively describe an uncanny weapon object, and I draw out the significance of this term for feminist security studies and martial empiricism. In short, the uncanny haunts accounts of sexual violence in the collision of sexuality and machinery in the image of a body weapon, in the unsettling designation of sexuality as itself both familiar and dangerous, and in the strange movement of violent bodies across the boundary between wartime and peacetime. A concluding discussion draws out implications and challenges for thinking about embodied violence, advocating renewed attention to the history of weaponization as a fallible and confounding process.

AbstractBy examining the experience of rape in Spain in the 1930s and 1940s, this article explains how the Spanish Civil War and Franco's dictatorship dramatically increased the likelihood of women becoming victims of sexual assault. Contrary to what historians often assume, this phenomenon was not the result of rape being deliberately used as a ‘weapon of war’ or as a blunt method of political repression against women. The upsurge in sexual violence was a by-product of structural transformations in the wartime and dictatorial contexts, and it was the direct consequence, rather than the instrument, of the violent imposition of a fascist-inspired regime. Using archival evidence from numerous Spanish archives, the article historicizes rape in a wider cultural, legal, and social context and reveals the essential albeit ambiguous political nature of both wartime and post-war rape. The experience of rape was mostly shaped not by repression but structural factors such as ruralization and social hierarchization, demographic upheavals, exacerbation of violent masculinity models, the proliferation of weapons, and the influence of fascist and national-Catholic ideologies. Rape became an expression of the nature of power and social and gender relations in Franco's regime.

Although rape and other forms of sexual violence have historically been present during wartime, it has recently become a strategic weapon of war in many settings. The term mass rape as a weapon of war is defined as a systematic pattern of rape perpetrated by fighters usually against civilian women and children at a rate much higher than the rate of rape prevailing during peacetime. This study will examine issues surrounding mass rape as a weapon of war including: emerging theories, effectiveness of current international law, public health consequences, and relevant indicators of likelihood of occurrence. Grave physical and mental health outcomes associated with mass rape highlight the need for intervention through policy and program planning. The proposed multi-dimensional prevention pathway addresses the ecological determinants of mass rape.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been used against civilian populations since the advent of armed conflict. However, recent scholarship within the last few decades proves that rape is not a byproduct of war or a result of transgressions by a few “bad apples,” rather, rape and sexual violence are used as strategic, systematic, and calculated tools of war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Rape has also been used as a means of preventing future generations of children of “undesirable” groups from being born. Rape and sexual violence are also used with the purpose of intimidating women and their communities, destroying the social fabric and cohesion of specific groups, and even as a final act of humiliation before killing the victim. In each conflict that is examined in this thesis, sexual violence is used against civilian populations for the specific purpose of genocide.

The German Armed Forces were originally thought to be completely innocent of all war crimes associated with unethical Nazi racial policies. This has been proven not to be the case. History has adjusted itself to show that Wehrmacht forces were guilty of virtually every war crime except for the sexual violation foreign women. Due to the long-standing assumption that Nazi racial ideology prevented the intermingling of the “Aryan” race with the “unworthy” Eastern European races, this myth was rarely questioned. Given the lack of hard evidence proving that civilian women were raped by invading Wehrmacht troops, a firm conclusion is out of the question. However, with a concrete understanding of the Nazi attitude towards sexual relations, the components in the East that led to a breakdown in Wehrmacht discipline, and the resulting reaction of the Soviet Union in light of this brutality, one can surmise the type of violence women were forced to endure. Through the research conducted in this thesis, it is likely that the mass rape of Eastern European women did indeed occur. The silence that surrounds this issue is highly indicative of the cultural elements that prevent an open discussion of this topic. This thesis is meant to spark a discussion of the implications and reverberations of mass rape in a wartime setting.

Rape is a form of sexual violence punished by domestic and international law. When this violation is associated with the specific context of armed conflicts, the conceptualisation of rape and war becomes an inevitable form of violence against women. By adopting the lense of rape as a weapon of wartime, the thesis highlights the perspectives to understand and address the crime in the specific frameworks of armed conflicts. Firstly, it is considered how the surrounding socio-cultural-ethnic factors are involved in the normalisation of a discourse of rape, leading in certain cases to reach the extra-ordinary policies, up to the dimension of genocide, affecting victims as well as the society as a whole. Secondly, it is analysed the nature of the international judicial framework for armed conflicts, and in particular, it is questioned the provisions specific to women within the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their effectiveness from feminist legal perspective. Thirdly, it is regarded the achievements of the international criminal law, the recognition and the approach adopted during some cases of the ICTY and ICTR have provided a precedent in the prosecution of rape. Fourthly, it is underlined the importance of the transitional justice and the non-judicial measures, especially by the means of reparations and truth-seeking, ensuring the access to justice on a gender based approach.

Thesis (M.A.)--George Mason University, 2008.
Vita: p. 142. Thesis director: Debra Bergoffen. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed July 3, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-141). Also issued in print.

Magister Administrationis - MAdmin
The African continent has over the past 40 years witnessed a continued scourge of violent conflict and human rights abuses. These conflicts have significantly undermined the social, political, and economic prosperity of African citizens. Additionally, women and children are particularly affected by these conflicts. Women and children are regarded as ‘the most vulnerable’ as they often become the targets of sexual abuse by the enemy. The African Union (AU) is primarily responsible for the resolution of conflicts on the continent. It professes to be committed to the prevention of human rights abuses and the protection of African women (and children) during armed conflicts. It has thus developed an array of mechanisms, protocols, and instruments to address the exploitation and sexual abuse of women during conflict periods. These instruments include: The Constitutive Act of the AU (2000); The Solemn Declaration of Gender Equality in Africa (2003); the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa- ACHPRWA (2004); and the Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council. In this research project, I consider whether the narratives used in these AU documents sufficiently and explicitly address the use of rape as a strategic weapon during armed conflicts; or whether these narratives inadvertently contribute to a culture that perpetuates war-time rape. My analysis shows that these AU documents deal with war-time rape in very vague and euphemistic terms. Although gender discrimination, sexual violence, exploitation, discrimination, and harmful practices against women are condemned, the delegitimization of rape as a weapon of war is not specifically discussed. This allows for varying interpretations of AU protocols, including interpretations which may diminish the severity of strategic rape. This has lead me to propose that the narratives used in these AU protocols and related documents draw on patriarchy, perpetuate patriarchy, and thus inadvertently perpetuates a culture that perpetuates the use of rape as a weapon of war

This thesis set out to research why ISIS combatants use sexual violence when they target the Yazidi community in particular. The aims have been to provide an understanding of why ISIS target Yazidi women and girls with sexual violence and develop a better understanding of both groups and thus hopefully provide assistance that is contextually adapted to the needs of Yazidi women and girls who have been targeted by ISIS. This has been done through a case study, where ISIS has been the case and the Yazidi population has been the subunit of analysis. Materials that have been released by ISIS, as well as witness statements that have been made available as secondary sources have been analysed, by applying the three theories/conceptual frameworks evolution theory, feminist theory, and the strategic rape concept to this data. The results are that the three frameworks separately cannot provide an explanation for the phenomena. Evolution theory did not provide any explanations for ISIS’ behaviour at all, not even when combined with the other frameworks. However, feminist theory in combination with the strategic rape concept explains the behaviour of ISIS, to a certain extent. There is however, a gap today in wartime sexual violence conceptualizations that need to be filled with an overarching theory that includes elements of both feminist theory and the strategic rape concept. The reasons for ISIS’ use of sexual violence are multi-layered. Sexual violence is used as strategy of war for political and religious reasons, as well as, to an extent, because of misogyny. ISIS are aiming to assimilate the area of the caliphate, while at the same time violently targeting the Yazidi population, by using their interpretation of religion as a justification, and until they reach this target of homogeneity for the caliphate, they will continue using sexual violence as a strategy of war and for the appropriation of territory and justify it with religion.

For the last 22 years, systematic rapes and punitive violence against women in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were utilized as weapons of war and a control strategy. This quantitative study built upon the ecological model of impact of sexual assault on women's mental health to investigate the relationship between the health impacts and chronic pain and depression among women survivors of sexual rape in eastern DRC. The sample included 156 female rape survivors, between 18-80 years old, and raped between 2010 and 2014 while residing in the conflict area. The research questions focused on the association between fistulas, other sexual rape-related injuries, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), feelings of worthlessness, social rejection, support from family/friends, and chronic pain and depression among women victims of sexual rape in eastern DRC. Results from multinomial logistic regression and ordinal regression tests showed strong links between independent and dependent variables: Fistula was strongly linked with chronic illness over 6 months (p = 0.003), and with upset all the time (p = 0.033); PTSD was associated with chronic illness due to violent rapes (p = 0.004) and sadness (p = 0.000); feelings of worthlessness was related to prolonged illness over 6 months (p = 0.024) and feeling blue (p = 0.006); social rejection was linked to avoidance (p = 0.003); and support from family/friends was associated with prolonged illness over 6 months (p = 0.025) and lack of excitement (p = 0.011). The results of this study could assist health care providers in formulating response strategies for identifying public health priorities in conflict area, addressing health needs, and defining approaches for reducing war-related sexual violence, chronic pain, and depression among rape survivors.

Background: Wars are always accompanied by various forms of violence. Gender-based violence occupies a special place. Currently, for the first time since the Second World War, the civilian population of Ukraine is facing widespread sexual violence, including rape, by the occupying forces. This situation requires a sociological study of sexual violence that takes into account the Ukrainian experience. Purpose: To identify the goals, as well as general and specific features of sexual violence committed against women during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Methods: Analysis of the memoirs of a victim of gender-based violence during the war; analysis of interviews with experts on sexual violence; method of comparison. Results: The particularity of sexual violence during the Russian-Ukrainian war is the "era of social media", when the relevant information technologies can turn an act of sexual violence into a public event. The primary purpose of various types of sexual violence is to add new "weapons" to the arsenal of war that will help to win. Conclusion: The recent history of Ukraine related to the Russian-Ukrainian war contains a significant amount of empirical data for further research on gender-based sexual violence during wars. Only after the full liberation of the temporarily occupied territories, the scale of sexual crimes committed by the Russian army can be determined, and their goals, forms of manifestation, consequences for the physical and mental health of victims and, accordingly, social consequences can be fully investigated. Keywords: gender-based sexual violence, sexual violence against women, rape culture.

Rape culture is a form of violence against women. One factor influencing the continuing predominance of this rape culture, in a range of global contexts, is the fact that societies in these contexts tolerate and, to an extent, normalize such sexual violence. This normalizing occurs ubiquitously, and not least through online technologies, such as with netizens. Yet, these netizens also influence conceptions of a just world. The belief in a just world appears to operate through the views of netizens toward victims of sexual abuse, as reflected in social media platforms. One example of this activism is the hashtag #HijaAko, which, as with many other hashtags, is being appropriated by netizens used to strengthen online anti-rape movements. These hashtags can be global and local, where many focus on the locality of #MeToo hashtags, largely owing to identification with place and space, and the cultural memory of such violence within respective physical communities. This study explores the rape culture landscape as reflected in online discourse, specifically on the Twitter platform. Drawing on Dalbert’s (2009) ‘Belief in the Just World’ hypothesis, and on work in critical technocultural discourse scholarship, in this paper, I argue that the localized #MeToo hashtag, #HijaAko, has provided and has constituted a techno weapon for victims of sexual violence such as rape, to retaliate against the existing predominant rape culture in the Philippines. The #MeToo hashtag, #HijaAko purports to create an online shared community that itself aims at the restoration of online justice that has seemingly failed to appear and succeed through other legitimate means, such as through the legal system. A general consensual confirmation by the netizens who have become active in this movement provides the victims with a sense of ‘virtual justice’ in several ways, and including the use of ‘receipts’ as weapons. Through a multimodal discourse analysis examining 340 tweets, I present data and its analysis, to reveal that Philippine society capitalizes on victim-blaming as the core advocates and perpetrators of the local rape culture.

In 2021, the military paratroopers celebrated 80 years of existence, since their establishment as a specialty, within the Romanian Aeronautics, later as a distinct weapon and generating, in turn, new military specialties, so necessary for an army that wants to be modern and performant. This specialty, established in the Romanian army at the beginning of the Second World War, was an attempt to respond and align with the needs and, why not, the modernity of the time. Passed through the fire of August 1944, disbanded immediately after the war and reborn from its own ashes in 1950, it managed, despite many hardships and sacrifices, some particularly painful, to impose itself as an elite weapon in the panoply of a modern Romanian army. Side by side with the military aviators, who always supported them with aircraft and aerodrome infrastructure, the paratroopers wrote history for Romania.

Abstract With the adoption of the international safety alert symbol, the safety profession has lost an important weapon in the war against injury. The symbol is not uniquely associated with safety, it does not have an optimum shape and it has no intrinsic pictorial to communicate danger to untrained people from every culture. The symbol represents a tragic “missed opportunity” for mobilizing personal vigilance.

"Halabja: It is an Iraqi city located in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, near the Iranian border, about 8-10 miles away, 150 miles away from Baghdad and located in the southeast of the city of Sulaymaniyah. It is one of the important cities that contains many mosques, shrines and shrines. In 1985, this city was subjected to the former regime's aerial bombardment, where more than 450 Kurdish villages were bombed, 300 citizens executed within one month, and internationally prohibited chemical weapons were used. The Iraqi regime’s violations of human rights continued to reach their climax in 1988, which was known as the Halabja events, which will be the subject of our research, the Halabja massacre, which took place at the end of the first Gulf War or what is known as the Iran-Iraq war from 16-17 March 1988, the killing of Kurdish civilians and the use of chemical weapons against them and the effects of a war The first Gulf and the breach of the international treaty through the use of chemical weapons that are banned internationally, as well as international reports on human rights violations in Halabja, which left about 5,000 martyrs, most of whom are residents of the region, and we will also clarify who is responsible for the events of Halabja, and the truth can be highlighted through documents and evidence The editorial in the Halabja case, where these documents included information about chemical weapons in handwriting and not in a printer to evade responsibility. The document talks about the production and accumulation of chemical agents by the former regime and the intention of the former regime to strike them when necessary, in addition to other documents that we will address through the research, There is also an appendix with the names of a number of companies involved in supplying the government at that time with unconventional weapons, including missile weapons and other weapons Chemical materials and advanced technology, and this is very clear in the violation of human rights by extremely barbaric repressive methods and means, and northern Iraq has become the scene of these crimes that have been circulated between international press agencies and television screens, articles, photos and documentaries expressing the horror of the calamity and the magnitude of the tragedy. Well-known international documents and documents and what Halabja has been exposed to are classified within the concept of genocide wars. This type of war is not attended by all international laws and segments only, but also the simplest rules of behavior and human and civilized interaction between people belonging to the human race. We will also show the issue of Halabja in the corridors of the Iraqi Parliament, which was during the session on 7/3/2011 of the second electoral cycle, the first legislative year, the second legislative term in the Iraqi Council of Representatives, held in Baghdad, by submitting a proposal to the Council of Representatives regarding the position of the House of Representatives regarding the crime of bombing Halabja with chemical weapons. In conclusion, I hope you will like this summary."

Verification will be of critical importance to achieving and maintaining a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (ME WMD). Effective verification arrangements would serve a vital national security objective for each state in the region by reducing tensions, removing the motivation to proliferate, and mitigating the risk of a virtual nuclear arms race (or war). In view of the high levels of tension and mistrust within the zone, ensuring effective verification will be especially demanding. The paper examines specific elements of the future nuclear verification of the zone, including: Which states should be included? What prohibitions and obligations should apply in the zone and how would they be verified? How could elimination of nuclear weapons in the zone be achieved? On what basis would the zone treaty enter into force? The paper also examines a number of existing treaties and arrangements as well as the lessons learned from past verification cases which regional states can draw on in developing verification for a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In War-Algorithm Accountability (August 2016), we introduce a new concept—war algorithms—that elevates algorithmically-derived “choices” and “decisions” to a, and perhaps the, central concern regarding technical autonomy in war. We thereby aim to shed light on and recast the discussion regarding “autonomous weapon systems” (AWS). We define “war algorithm” as any algorithm that is expressed in computer code, that is effectuated through a constructed system, and that is capable of operating in relation to armed conflict. In introducing this concept, our foundational technological concern is the capability of a constructed system, without further human intervention, to help make and effectuate a “decision” or “choice” of a war algorithm. Distilled, the two core ingredients are an algorithm expressed in computer code and a suitably capable constructed system. Through that lens, we link international law and related accountability architectures to relevant technologies. We sketch a three-part (non-exhaustive) approach that highlights traditional and unconventional accountability avenues. We focus largely on international law because it is the only normative regime that purports—in key respects but with important caveats—to be both universal and uniform. In this way, international law is different from the myriad domestic legal systems, administrative rules, or industry codes that govern the development and use of technology in all other spheres. By not limiting our inquiry only to weapon systems, we take an expansive view, showing how the broad concept of war algorithms might be susceptible to regulation—and how those algorithms might already fit within the existing regulatory system established by international law.

The aim of the article. Establishment and development of the USSR rocket weapons for the period of the New Economic Policy and industrialization is one of the most interesting and poorly researched problem of the USSR military industry. The USSR first researches in the field of rocket weapons and ammunition creation, their features and results are poorly investigated by national historical science and just they are observed in the paper. Methodology. General principles of historism and objectivity are the theoretical-methodological base of this work. Author also use special historical methods: logic, systematic, chronological, actualisation and periodizing. Results. The paper is written by using the declassified documents for Official Use Only, by military technical documents, stored in the Russian National Library, little known memories of direct participants and some published researches. By considering these documents and materials it become clear that in the USSR before the Great Patriotic War a complex of problems on rocket weapon implementation were conditioned by objective and subjective reasons. The consequence of this was the adoption of some unfounded species of reactive weapons before the Great Patriotic War, who received an overestimated assessment and not justified all expectations and hopes assigned to them during the fighting. As a result, only by the end of the war these systems began to be used for their true purpose. Practical application. Practical significance of this work is as follows: facts shown in the article and conclusions drawn on them can be used for further research of USSR rocket weapon establishment and development in 20-40th years of XX century and also for Soviet history in general.

1. Macroeconomic Summary In December, headline inflation (13.1%) and the average of the core inflation measures (10.3%) continued to trend upward, posting higher rates than those estimated by the Central Bank's technical staff and surpassing the market average. Inflation expectations for all terms exceeded the 3.0% target. In that month, every major group in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) registered higher-than-estimated increases, and the diffusion indicators continued to show generalized price hikes. Accumulated exchange rate pressures on prices, indexation to high inflation rates, and several food supply shocks would explain, in part, the acceleration in inflation. All of this is in a context of significant surplus demand, a tight labor market, and inflation expectations at different terms that exceed the 3.0% target. Compared to the October edition of the Monetary Policy Report, the forecast path for headline and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items: EFR) increased (Graphs 1.1 and 1.2), reflecting heightened accumulated exchange rate pressures, price indexation to a higher inflation rate (CPI and the producer price index: PPI), and the rise in labor costs attributed to a larger-than-estimated adjustment in the minimum wage. Nevertheless, headline inflation is expected to begin to ease by early 2023, although from a higher level than had been estimated in October. This would be supported initially by the slowdown forecast for the food CPI due to a high base of comparison, the end anticipated for the shocks that have affected the prices of these products, and the estimated improvement in external and domestic supply in this sector. In turn, the deterioration in real household income because of high inflation and the end of the effects of pent-up demand, plus tighter external and domestic financial conditions would contribute to diluting surplus demand in 2023 and reducing inflation. By the end of 2023, both headline and core (EFR) inflation would reach 8.7% and would be 3.5% and 3.8%, respectively, by December 2024. These forecasts are subject to a great deal of uncertainty, especially concerning the future behavior of international financial conditions, the evolution of the exchange rate, the pace of adjustment in domestic demand, the extent of indexation of nominal contracts, and the decisions taken regarding the domestic price of fuel and electricity. In the third quarter, economic activity surprised again on the upside and the growth projection for 2022 rose to 8.0% (previously 7.9%). However, it declined to 0.2% for 2023 (previously 0.5%). With this, surplus demand continues to be significant and is still expected to weaken during the current year. Annual economic growth in the third quarter (7.1 % SCA)1 was higher than estimated in October (6.4 % SCA), given stronger domestic demand specifically because of higher-than-expected investment. Private consumption fell from the high level witnessed a quarter earlier and net exports registered a more negative contribution than anticipated. For the fourth quarter, economic activity indicators suggest that gross domestic product (GDP) would have remained high and at a level similar to that observed in the third quarter, with an annual variation of 4.1%. Domestic demand would have slowed in annual terms, although at levels that would have remained above those for output, mainly because of considerable private consumption. Investment would have declined slightly to a value like the average observed in 2019. The real trade deficit would have decreased due to a drop in imports that was more pronounced than the estimated decline in exports. On the forecast horizon, consumption is expected to decline from current elevated levels, partly because of tighter domestic financial conditions and a deterioration in real income due to high inflation. Investment would also weaken and return to levels below those seen before the pandemic. In real terms, the trade deficit would narrow due to a lower momentum projection for domestic demand and higher cumulative real depreciation. In sum, economic growth for all of 2022, 2023, and 2024 would stand at 8.0%, 0.2% and 1.0%, respectively (Graph 1.3). Surplus demand remains high (as measured by the output gap) and is expected to decline in 2023 and could turn negative in 2024 (Graph 1.4). Although the macroeconomic forecast includes a marked slowdown in the economy, an even greater adjustment in domestic absorption cannot be ruled out due to the cumulative effects of tighter external and domestic financial conditions, among other reasons. These estimates continue to be subject to a high degree of uncertainty, which is associated with factors such as global political tensions, changes in international interest rates and their effects on external demand, global risk aversion, the effects of the approved tax reform, the possible impact of reforms announced for this year (pension, health, and labor reforms, among others), and future measures regarding hydrocarbon production. In 2022, the current account deficit would have been high (6.3 % of GDP), but it would be corrected significantly in 2023 (to 3.9 % of GDP) given the expected slowdown in domestic demand. Despite favorable terms of trade, the high external imbalance that would occur during 2022 would be largely due to domestic demand growth, cost pressures associated with high freight rates, higher external debt service payments, and good performance in terms of the profits of foreign companies.2 By 2023, the adjustment in domestic demand would be reflected in a smaller current account deficit especially due to fewer imports, a global moderation in prices and cost pressures, and a reduction in profits remitted abroad by companies with foreign direct investment (FDI) focused on the local market. Despite this anticipated correction in the external imbalance, its level as a percentage of GDP would remain high in the context of tight financial conditions. In the world's main economies, inflation forecasts and expectations point to a reduction by 2023, but at levels that still exceed their central banks' targets. The path anticipated for the Federal Reserve (Fed) interest rate increased and the forecast for global growth continues to be moderate. In the fourth quarter of 2022, logistics costs and international prices for some foods, oil and energy declined from elevated levels, bringing downward pressure to bear on global inflation. Meanwhile, the higher cost of financing, the loss of real income due to high levels of global inflation, and the persistence of the war in Ukraine, among other factors, have contributed to the reduction in global economic growth forecasts. In the United States, inflation turned out to be lower than estimated and the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduced the growth forecast for 2023. Nevertheless, the actual level of inflation in that country, its forecasts, and expectations exceed the target. Also, the labor market remains tight, and fiscal policy is still expansionary. In this environment, the Fed raised the expected path for policy interest rates and, with this, the market average estimates higher levels for 2023 than those forecast in October. In the region's emerging economies, country risk premia declined during the quarter and the currencies of those countries appreciated against the US dollar. Considering all the above, for the current year, the Central Bank's technical staff increased the path estimated for the Fed's interest rate, reduced the forecast for growth in the country's external demand, lowered the expected path of oil prices, and kept the country’s risk premium assumption high, but at somewhat lower levels than those anticipated in the previous Monetary Policy Report. Moreover, accumulated inflationary pressures originating from the behavior of the exchange rate would continue to be important. External financial conditions facing the economy have improved recently and could be associated with a more favorable international context for the Colombian economy. So far this year, there has been a reduction in long-term bond interest rates in the markets of developed countries and an increase in the prices of risky assets, such as stocks. This would be associated with a faster-than-expected reduction in inflation in the United States and Europe, which would allow for a less restrictive course for monetary policy in those regions. In this context, the risks of a global recession have been reduced and the global appetite for risk has increased. Consequently, the risk premium continues to decline, the Colombian peso has appreciated significantly, and TES interest rates have decreased. Should this trend consolidate, exchange rate inflationary pressures could be less than what was incorporated into the macroeconomic forecast. Uncertainty about external forecasts and their impact on the country remains high, given the unpredictable course of the war in Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, local uncertainty, and the extensive financing needs of the Colombian government and the economy. High inflation with forecasts and expectations above 3.0%, coupled with surplus demand and a tight labor market are compatible with a contractionary stance on monetary policy that is conducive to the macroeconomic adjustment needed to mitigate the risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations and to ensure that inflation converges to the target. Compared to the forecasts in the October edition of the Monetary Policy Report, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed level of output exceeding the productive capacity of the economy. In this context of surplus demand, headline and core inflation continued to trend upward and posted surprising increases. Observed and expected international interest rates increased, the country’s risk premia lessened (but remains at high levels), and accumulated exchange rate pressures are still significant. The technical staff's inflation forecast for 2023 increased and inflation expectations remain well above 3.0%. All in all, the risk of inflation expectations becoming unanchored persists, which would accentuate the generalized indexation process and push inflation even further away from the target. This macroeconomic context requires consolidating a contractionary monetary policy stance that aims to meet the inflation target within the forecast horizon and bring the economy's output to levels closer to its potential. 1.2 Monetary Policy Decision At its meetings in December 2022 and January 2023, Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR) agreed to continue the process of normalizing monetary policy. In December, the BDBR decided by a majority vote to increase the monetary policy interest rate by 100 basis points (bps) and in its January meeting by 75 bps, bringing it to 12.75% (Graph 1.5). 1/ Seasonally and calendar adjusted. 2/ In the current account aggregate, the pressures for a higher external deficit come from those companies with FDI that are focused on the domestic market. In contrast, profits in the mining and energy sectors are more than offset by the external revenue they generate through exports. Box 1 - Electricity Rates: Recent Developments and Indexation. Author: Édgar Caicedo García, Pablo Montealegre Moreno and Álex Fernando Pérez Libreros Box 2 - Indicators of Household Indebtedness. Author: Camilo Gómez y Juan Sebastián Mariño