Relevant bibliographies by topics / Rational irrationality

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Rational irrationality'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 6 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Rational irrationality"

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Mele, Alfred. "Rational irrationality." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 26 (2004): 31–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20042677.

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Brogan, Joseph V. "Rational Irrationality." Review of Politics 68, no. 3 (June 2006): 500–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670506210180.

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del Bueno, Dorothy J. "Rational Irrationality." JONA: The Journal of Nursing Administration 21, no. 1 (January 1991): 7???8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00005110-199101000-00003.

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Caplan, Bryan. "Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality." Kyklos 54, no. 1 (February 2001): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00138.

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Zaostrovtsev, A. P. "On Rational Irrationality." Journal of the New Economic Association 33, no. 1 (2017): 151–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2017-33-1-8.

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Billon, Alexandre. "Irrationality and Happiness." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11, no. 1 (June 7, 2017): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i1.108.

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There is a long tradition in philosophy of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only we were more rational, it is claimed, we would live happier lives. I argue that such optimism is misguided and that, paradoxically, people with desires, like us, cannot be both happy and rational. More precisely, if someone rational has desires he will not be fully happy, and if he has some desires that are rational and – in a yet-to-be-specified sense – demanding, he will be frankly unhappy. Call this claim Rational Pessimism. The argument for Rational Pessimism can be considered as a variation on a Schopenhauerian argument that bluntly claims that, because desires involve lack and suffering, desiring souls like us cannot be happy. I argue that, even if Schopenhauer’s argument escapes most attacks that have been targeted against it, it faces decisive empirical objections. I argue that Schopenhauer’s argument can, however, be rescued if it is assumed that we are rational.
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Şen, Zekai. "Rational Method Irrationality with Rectification." Turkish Journal of Water Science and Management 1, no. 1 (January 31, 2017): 6–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.31807/tjwsm.297140.

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Goetz, Melanie. "The irrationality of rational numbers." Journal - American Water Works Association 105, no. 7 (July 2013): 82–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5942/jawwa.2013.105.0096.

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Deutsch, Morton. "The Irrationality of Rational Deterrence." Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 32, no. 3 (March 1987): 218–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/026881.

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Fehr, Ernst, and Jean-Robert Tyran. "Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): 43–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196651.

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In their personal lives, many economists recognize that they are surrounded by individuals who are less than fully rational. In their professional lives, however, economists often use models that examine the interactions of fully rational agents. To reduce the cognitive dissonance of this situation, many economists believe that interactions in markets will correct or offset individually anomalous behaviors—although the reasons for this belief are often not clearly spelled out. This paper presents evidence indicating that “strategic complementarity” and “strategic substitutability” are important determinants of aggregate outcomes. Under strategic complementarity, a small amount of individual irrationality may lead to large deviations from the aggregate predictions of rational models; under strategic substitutability, a minority of rational agents may suffice to generate aggregate outcomes consistent with the predictions of rational models. Thus, the presence of strategic substitutability or complementarity seems to be a key condition in determining when a population that is heterogeneous with regard to rationality reaches either a “rational” or an “irrational” outcome.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Rational irrationality"

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Jonasson, Cecilia. "Klarsynthet : om den filosofiska innebörden av "det närvarande och verkliga" i Clara - or, On Nature's Connection to the Spirit World av F. W. J. Schelling." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-14839.

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This essay aims to explore the philosophical meaning of the expression ”present and real” in Clara – or, On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World by F. W. J. Schelling. Clara is unique among the works of Schelling since it is written as a discussion embedded in a symbolic and fictional context. One of the reasons for this is its aim to ground all scientific knowledge in that which is “present and real”. After having presented an overview of the life and philosophy of Schelling, as well as his relevance in contemporary philosophy, this essay is constituted by a thorough textual analysis of Clara. The analysis reveals how the text through descriptions of emotions, environments and a symbolic story highlights a certain “qualitative aspect” of the present and real.  As what is simultaneously ”the ideal in the real” and “the real in the ideal” this aspect escapes rational quantifying reason, revealing a foundational indivisible unity of life. An awareness of this intuitively known aspect of life can give rise to an immediate knowing, and felt as inspiration it can trigger the mind into the process of making what is immediately known into scientific “realized” knowledge. This way, an awareness of the pre-rational can lead to a permanent clairvoyance – a cognition in which that, which initially appears as irrational, can be made comprehensible. Interestingly, “the ideal in the real” coincides with the concept of “qualia”, the potential existence of which is lively debated within the field of consciousness studies today. Not much has been written about Clara so far, possibly partly because it concerns “the Spirit World” in its substantial sense. However, this essay hopes to show that Clara is phenomenologically, ontologically and epistemologically relevant and that it has a philosophical value of its own.
Denna uppsats syftar till att analysera den filosofiska innebörden av uttrycket ”närvarande och verkligt” i F. W. J Schellings verk Clara – or, On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World. Detta verk är unikt bland Schellings övriga verk då det är utformat som en diskussion satt i en symbolisk och fiktiv kontext, bland annat i syfte att förankra all vetenskaplig kunskap i det närvarande och verkliga. Efter en presentation av Schellings liv, filosofi och dagsaktualitet utgörs uppsatsen av en ingående textanalys som visar hur Schelling med hjälp av känslo- miljö- och händelseskildringar i Clara framhäver en särskild ”kvalitativ aspekt” av det närvarande och verkliga. Denna undflyr det rationella kvantifierande förnuftet och uppenbarar livets grundläggande odelbara enhet. Såsom det ideala i det reala sammanfaller denna aspekt med begreppet ”kvalia” vars existens livligt debatteras inom medvetandefilosofin idag. Clara visar dock att det ideala i det reala även är detsamma som det reala i det ideala och att en medvetandegörning om denna kvalitativt, omedelbart och intuitivt kända aspekt av livet kan ge upphov till ett omedelbart vetande och inspiration som kan realiseras vetenskapligt. I samverkan med förnuftet kan denna förrationella medvetenhet leda till en beständig klarsynthet inom vilket allt, även det som först förefaller irrationellt, kan göras begripligt.  Inte mycket har tidigare skrivits om Clara, möjligen delvis beroende på att den berör andevärlden i konkret bemärkelse, vilket kan verka vetenskapligt avskräckande. Denna uppsats hoppas dock visa på verkets fenomenologiska relevans och dess filosofiska egenvärde. [1]För mer info om kvaliadebatten se exempelvis: Edmond Wright (editor). The case for qualia. (Cambridge: MIT press, 2008)
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Bachman, Zachary. "Rational Capacities and the Practice of Blame: A Skeptical Argument." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2011-05-9548.

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This thesis investigates the relationship between our rational capacities and the norms that govern our practice of blame. The conclusion it reaches is rather shocking: it is impossible to satisfy the conditions of blameworthiness. The argument that reaches this conclusion is what I call an internal criticism. Unlike other skeptical arguments about moral responsibility, the one advanced in this thesis does not depend on any metaphysical theses external to the theory of blame. The thesis begins by looking at a position I call rational capacity compatibilism (RCC). My interest in RCC concerns the fact that it has done more than any other theory of responsibility to set out the relationship between our rational capacities and the practice of blame. I use the most well developed RCC view—that of R. Jay Wallace—as the backdrop for the skeptical argument that follows I next defend a recent argument advanced by Gideon Rosen according to which an agent cannot be blameworthy for a given act if akrasia does not occur somewhere in the act's etiology. This serves as the first major premise in my skeptical argument. Next, I turn to the second major premise of my argument, which is comprised of two controversial claims. The first is that akrasia results from a failure in one's rational capacities. The second is that an agent cannot be blameworthy for committing any act that results from a failure in his or her rational capacities. Together, these two claims produce the following premise: when an agent acts akratically she cannot be blameworthy for that act. Now, for any given act, either akrasia occurs in that act's etiology or it does not. If it does not, then the agent in question is not blameworthy (first premise); but if akrasia does occur in the act's etiology, then the agent in question is still not blameworthy (second premise). It follows that for any given act, the agent who performs that act cannot be blameworthy for so acting. I end with a brief discussion of what I call "the moral up-shot" of my skeptical argument: what does a world without blame look like? I suggest, contra the main party line (often associated with P.F. Strawson), that blame is not a requirement for significant and meaningful interpersonal relationships, nor is it a necessary component of morality.
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Chen, Jian-Hui, and 陳建輝. "The Study of the Concealed Irrationality in Rational Structure of Painting-The Theory of Painting by Jian-Hui Chen." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/uhemac.

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碩士
國立臺灣師範大學
美術學系
102
This world is composed by rationality and irrationality. The structure of rationality is like checkerboard, neat and tidy, which shows succinctly and definitely in the form of art. However, this is not the real condition of life. Perfection does not exist in reality. There are defects in life, which cause the unbalance in our spirit and make the energy flows like vortex. In order to objectively reveal the vortex structure hidden in the works of art, this thesis not only quotes from principles or theories of art, but also Vijñānavāda, psychology, chaos theory, fractal geometry, etc. This structure is just like the expression of spirit, which especially shows obviously in the art of expressing subjective affections. This is just the advantage of eastern art, which might relate to eastern philosophy. Comparing to that of the west, eastern people emphasize more on spiritual needs than material ends. Material is visible and rational, but spirit is invisible, fluid, irrational and unpredictable. This is the flow in paintings which has been emphasized in eastern art, so-called “qi”, representing the spiritual conditions. The more irrational and instinctive the work is, the clearer the structure of vortex presents. Through this structure, the abstract energy of consciousness in deep is raised to the surface, destroying or overtaking the logic of rationality: the borders in paintings begin to dissolve, and there is no more complete figure. All elements in paintings are led by unconsciousness, based on the structure of spiral, which at last forms the order of vortex. The work has been integrated with body from the beginning of being created, and the spirit expands to the end like branches, which are similar to and also different from each other. The image in paintings is just like the tracks of spirit!
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Campbell, Peter G. "Rational and irrational agency." Thesis, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/8749.

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Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical states are allowed into the process. Believable is a functional concept, and for an agent to wield it requires that he possess beliefs or a theory he can justify about which states are goal-functional. Desirable is likewise a functional concept, and its exercise requires that agents possess justifiable beliefs or a theory about which goals are to be functional. When the desirability belief functions, it does so according to ideals of the theory. For example, it functions saliently where desires become intentions. So long as the normatives function in these ways the agent is rational. To so function is to satisfy the ideal for agency itself. Chapter 2 presents a fine-grained model of the fundamental terms and relations necessary for practical reasoning and agency. In this model, the functions of belief, desire and intention are described in naturalized terms. On the basis of this account of the terms of agency, a taxonomy of the possible failures of rationally controlled practicality is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive and detailed account of intention formation comprised of the functions of belief, desire and intention. Wherever one of those functions occurs in the process is a juncture at which rationality may be exercised, and therefore a point at which irrationality may occur. In chapter 5 I describe some of the main ways that dysfunctional states may disrupt agency, creating irrationality. The measures agents may take to ameliorate or otherwise control such failures are discussed and distinguished according to the ideal of agency. Finally, and in these terms, I address the problem of akrasia, in particular the views of Davidson and Mele, and show that the room they make for strict akratic action involves a significant compromise of the ideals of agency, and therefore is not as "strict" as they and others have claimed.
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Kleňha, Jan. "Racionální Iracionalita v USA." Master's thesis, 2017. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-357892.

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In this thesis, the theory of rational irrationality is used to explore the incentives behind seemingly irrational beliefs held by a large part of the contemporary American society towards anthropogenic climate change. Applying causal analysis, three questions are answered: "is it rationally irrational for people to be indifferent towards climate change?" "Are Americans inherently more likely than others to hold irrational beliefs about global issues such as climate change?" If so, "is this phenomenon rooted in certain values that constitute the American identity?" The author focuses on specific "American values" and uses statistics and recent empirical studies to find correlations and causality between those values and the exhibited behavior of individuals, while discussing its possible causes and implications. The study concludes that the root cause of irresponsibility of the American citizen towards climate change is a lack of social mechanisms rewarding individuals for holding epistemologically accurate beliefs. The author then proposes a set of general measures to be prioritized in order to improve social reward mechanisms in the American society. If implemented, those measures should be able to effectively enforce epistemic rationality in the U.S. political debate, which is desirable...
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Watson, Daniel James. "TRUE LIES: HOMERIC ??????? AS THE POSSIBILITY AND COMPLETION OF THE RATIONAL SOUL’S SELF-CONSTITUTION IN THE SIXTH ESSAY OF PROCLUS’ COMMENTARY ON THE REPUBLIC." 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10222/35459.

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Proclus is part of a long exegetical tradition that understands Plato and Homer to be in agreement. The Sixth Essay of his Commentary on Plato’s Republic particularly significant because it is the only extant ancient text that attempts to prove the concord of Plato and Homer philosophically. Yet, despite his uniquely reasoned approach, this endeavour suffers from charges of irrationalism. The necessity that drives him to seek this conciliation is thought to come from the pious attachment he has to Homer as an authority rather than the properly philosophical demands of his rational system. The aim of this thesis is to show that Proclus’ need to show Plato and Homer’s agreement is not an irrational adjunct to an otherwise rational outlook, but that it follows from the central doctrines of his philosophy. This will be accomplished through a detailed consideration of Proclus’ doctrine of the poetic ????????. In looking at how Proclus’ reading of Plato in the Sixth Essay is informed by his understanding of ????????, we will see how Homer becomes the means, both of taking the traditional criticisms of Plato’s apparent self-contradiction seriously and also of defending him against them. In looking in turn at how the soul actually experiences the ??????? of Homer’s inspired poetry, it shall become apparent that Homer does not just save the coherence of rational thought in this exterior way, but that his poetry operates as both the possibility and perfection of the rational soul’s various powers.
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Books on the topic "Rational irrationality"

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Rational irrationality: The art of teaching composition. Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2002.

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The real is not the rational. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.

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Titze, Hans. Das Rationale und das Irrationale. Rheinfelden: Schäuble Verlag, 1993.

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Inkommensurabilität als Problem rationalen Argumentierens. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromann-Holzboog, 1992.

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Stanguennec, André. Etudes post-kantiennes: Le rationnel et l'irrationnel dans la pensée post-kantienne. Lausanne: Age d'homme, 1987.

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Stanguennec, André. Etudes post-kantiennes: Le rationnel et l'irrationnel dans la pensée post-kantienne. Lausanne: Age d'homme, 1987.

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Everyday irrationality: How pseudo-scientists, lunatics, and the rest of us systematically fail to think rationally. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2001.

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Kiesewetter, Benjamin. Explaining Structural Irrationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754282.003.0009.

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Chapter 9 provides the outline of a general explanation of structural rationality in terms of non-structural requirements of rationality, i.e. rational requirements to respond to reasons. The general idea is that internal incoherence is not by itself forbidden by rationality, but only indicates that at least one of the attitudes involved is insufficiently supported by available reasons. It is argued that a successful explanation of this kind amounts to a vindication of the normativity of rationality (9.1), can accommodate the close connection between irrationality and incoherence (9.2), and avoids the problems of structural requirements of rationality (9.3). After discussing two important problems for the suggested approach (9.4), the chapter provides a detailed explanation of three different types of structural irrationality: akrasia (9.5), doxastic akrasia (9.6), and modus ponens irrationality (9.7).
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1963-, McCarthy Stephen, and Kehl David 1965-, eds. Deductive irrationality: A common sense critique of economic rationalism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008.

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Henning, Tim. Parentheticalism and (Ir)rational Agency. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0008.

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This chapter considers various cases of irrationality (such as akrasia, weakness in executive commitments, doxastic incontinence, etc.), all of which involve a break between an agent’s considered judgment and her effective mental states. It is shown that parentheticalism can solve puzzles that these phenomena typically raise. The discussion leads into a deeper grasp of the rationale behind parenthetical and non-parenthetical uses of verbs like “believe” and “want”: They are associated with aspects of rational agency that normally coincide but can come apart. In the latter cases, our willingness to use verbs like “believe” and “want” is conflicted in a way that confirms parentheticalism. Finally, I suggest that parentheticalism can help us understand the role of the agent in rational agency and solve the Missing Agent Problem.
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Book chapters on the topic "Rational irrationality"

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Mérő, László. "Rational Irrationality." In Moral Calculations, 191–207. New York, NY: Springer New York, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1654-4_12.

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Yen, Wei. "The Irrationality of Being Rational." In From the Great Wall to Wall Street, 105–17. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33008-2_6.

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Filip, Birsen. "The Rise of Mass Consumption: When Irrationality Is Considered Rational." In Palgrave Insights into Apocalypse Economics, 117–34. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61623-6_6.

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Bertolotti, Tommaso. "Irrationality as an Epistemic Immunization: Cognitive BubbleCognitive bubble Bubble cognitive s." In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 229–41. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17786-1_12.

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Nakaska, J. D. J. "Rational Choice Theory: Why Irrationality Makes More Sense for Comparative Politics." In Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences, 127–40. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230112612_8.

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Vélez Rodríguez, Luis A. "Controlling the Constitutionality of Criminal Law Against the Onslaught of Irrationality Criminal Policy." In Towards a Rational Legislative Evaluation in Criminal Law, 325–48. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32895-9_13.

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Krasser, Nikolaus. "Grundlagen: Rationalität und Irrationalität." In Kritisch-rationales Management, 12–34. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-12201-2_2.

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Hefendehl-Hebeker, Lisa. "Auf rationale Weise zur Irrationalität." In Vielfältige Zugänge zum Mathematikunterricht, 33–45. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24292-3_3.

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Schmidt, Johannes G. "Cholesterinscreening: Die Irrationalität von Grenzwerten und die Berücksichtigung des Gesamtrisikos für eine rationale Therapie." In Rationale Pharmakotherapie in der Allgemeinpraxis / Rational Pharmacotherapy in General Practice, 67–81. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76731-9_7.

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Palmon, Oded, and Itzhak Venezia. "A Rationale for Hiring Irrationally Overconfident Managers." In Encyclopedia of Finance, 803–12. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5360-4_69.

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Conference papers on the topic "Rational irrationality"

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"Rationally irrational or irrationally rational? Risk perceptions and their influence in the investment process." In 21st Annual European Real Estate Society Conference. ERES, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2014_247.

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