Books: 'Rational irrationality'

1

Rational irrationality: The art of teaching composition. Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2002.

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2

The real is not the rational. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.

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3

Titze, Hans. Das Rationale und das Irrationale. Rheinfelden: Schäuble Verlag, 1993.

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4

Inkommensurabilität als Problem rationalen Argumentierens. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromann-Holzboog, 1992.

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5

Stanguennec, André. Etudes post-kantiennes: Le rationnel et l'irrationnel dans la pensée post-kantienne. Lausanne: Age d'homme, 1987.

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6

Stanguennec, André. Etudes post-kantiennes: Le rationnel et l'irrationnel dans la pensée post-kantienne. Lausanne: Age d'homme, 1987.

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7

Everyday irrationality: How pseudo-scientists, lunatics, and the rest of us systematically fail to think rationally. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2001.

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8

Kiesewetter, Benjamin. Explaining Structural Irrationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754282.003.0009.

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Chapter 9 provides the outline of a general explanation of structural rationality in terms of non-structural requirements of rationality, i.e. rational requirements to respond to reasons. The general idea is that internal incoherence is not by itself forbidden by rationality, but only indicates that at least one of the attitudes involved is insufficiently supported by available reasons. It is argued that a successful explanation of this kind amounts to a vindication of the normativity of rationality (9.1), can accommodate the close connection between irrationality and incoherence (9.2), and avoids the problems of structural requirements of rationality (9.3). After discussing two important problems for the suggested approach (9.4), the chapter provides a detailed explanation of three different types of structural irrationality: akrasia (9.5), doxastic akrasia (9.6), and modus ponens irrationality (9.7).

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9

1963-, McCarthy Stephen, and Kehl David 1965-, eds. Deductive irrationality: A common sense critique of economic rationalism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008.

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10

Henning, Tim. Parentheticalism and (Ir)rational Agency. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797036.003.0008.

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This chapter considers various cases of irrationality (such as akrasia, weakness in executive commitments, doxastic incontinence, etc.), all of which involve a break between an agent’s considered judgment and her effective mental states. It is shown that parentheticalism can solve puzzles that these phenomena typically raise. The discussion leads into a deeper grasp of the rationale behind parenthetical and non-parenthetical uses of verbs like “believe” and “want”: They are associated with aspects of rational agency that normally coincide but can come apart. In the latter cases, our willingness to use verbs like “believe” and “want” is conflicted in a way that confirms parentheticalism. Finally, I suggest that parentheticalism can help us understand the role of the agent in rational agency and solve the Missing Agent Problem.

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11

Kiesewetter, Benjamin. Conclusion. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754282.003.0011.

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This concludes my account of structural irrationality. I have argued, in Chapters 9 and 10, that structural irrationality claims such as (AI)–(MI) can be explained without recourse to structural requirements of rationality, by adherence to rational requirements to respond to available reasons alone. This enables us to respond to the problem that I described in ...

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12

Sullivan, Meghan. Neutrality, Sunk Costs, and Commitment. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812845.003.0009.

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This chapter applies the theory of temporal neutrality to past commitments. How do we distinguish irrational sunk cost reasoning from rationally permissible honoring of past plans? The chapter provides a parallel principle to Weak Forecasting called Weak Honoring that explains the difference. Roughly, given full information, it is permissible to choose any option you have not foresworn and will never regret over any option you have foresworn or will regret. The chapter considers alternative solutions to the sunk cost puzzle drawn from Nozick (rational irrationality), Bratman and Holton (commitment), Hurka and Kelly (structuralism), and Korsgaard (integrity). It raises objections for each of these alternative accounts.

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13

Kiesewetter, Benjamin. The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754282.001.0001.

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Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. Is there anything wrong with that? Should we be rational rather than irrational? This is the question that this book seeks to answer. Intuitively, the answer to this question is ‘yes’. Calling someone irrational amounts to a form of criticism. By doing so, we seem to imply that the person in question has made some kind of mistake, that her mental attitudes are in need of revision. Ordinary attributions of irrationality thus seem to presuppose that rationality is normative. This understanding is also implicit in many traditional approaches to rationality. In recent years, however, the normativity of rationality has come under attack. Many philosophers today accept the sceptical view that there may be no reason to be rational. This book defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content of rational standards or requirements, the preconditions of criticism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Over and above an extensive and careful assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, the book provides a detailed defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, a novel, evidence-relative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts.

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14

Cohen, Dov, Ivan Hernandez, Karl Gruschow, Andrzej Nowak, Michele J. Gelfand, and Wojciech Borkowski. Rationally Irrational? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190492908.003.0004.

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A commitment to honor is a commitment to irrationality—at least in the short-run—because it involves defending one’s honor, regardless of stakes or cost. Yet, circumstances giving rise to honor cultures—lawless environments, portable (easy-to-steal) wealth—create milieus where people must appear tough to deter predators. Thus, what seems irrational in the short-run may be rational in the long-run. This chapter describes three agent-based models exploring when an honor stance is advantageous and examining population dynamics of strategies in the environment. Models track empirical observations well. Further, models highlight: how prosocial reciprocity (not just vengeance) is crucial for honor to thrive; how positive and negative reciprocity become correlated over time in honor cultures; the rise of a strategy opposite to honor and how honor and its opposite exist symbiotically; how evolution cannot be outsmarted but can be “outdumbed”; cycling of strategies’ popularity; and Child × Environment interactions producing drift.

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15

Wedgwood, Ralph. The Value of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802693.001.0001.

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Rationality is a central concept for epistemology, ethics, and the study of practical reason. But what sort of concept is it? It is argued here that—contrary to objections that have recently been raised—rationality is a normative concept. In general, normative concepts cannot be explained in terms of the concepts expressed by ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’. Instead, normative concepts are best understood in terms of values. Thus, for a mental state or a process of reasoning to be rational is for it to be in a certain way good. Specifically, rationality is a virtue, while irrationality is a vice. What rationality requires of you at a time is whatever is necessary for your thinking at that time to be as rational as possible; this makes ‘rationally required’ equivalent to a kind of ‘ought’. Moreover, rationality is an “internalist” normative concept: what it is rational for you to think at a time depends purely on what is in your mind at that time. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal—namely, getting things right in your thinking, or thinking correctly. The connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; and the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This account of the concept of rationality indicates how we should set about giving a substantive theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational.

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16

Beller, Steven. 4. The culture of irrationalism. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198724834.003.0004.

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Why has antisemitism been defined as ‘irrational’ hostility to Jews? This cultural approach was a reaction against the rationalist claim that all human experience and endeavour could be reduced to rational, calculable objects and relations. ‘The culture of irrationalism’ looks at the strong link between German cultural ‘irrationalism’, Romanticism, and antisemitism, and how influential people in the arts contributed to this. Even irrational thinkers who opposed antisemitism, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, also contributed in some way to the antisemitic thrust of German irrationalist culture. Jews, as allies of rationalist modernity, became the targets of many of those in Central and Eastern Europe who suffered from the dislocations of economic modernization.

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17

Dr, David Daniel, Lynn Steven J, and Ellis Albert 1913-2007, eds. Rational and irrational beliefs: Research, theory, and clinical practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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18

Kiesewetter, Benjamin. The Myth of Structural Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754282.003.0006.

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While Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that structural requirements of rationality cannot be normative, Chapter 6 argues for the stronger conclusion that there are no such requirements to begin with. The argument is that both narrow- and wide-scope interpretations of structural requirements face problems independently of whether these requirements are understood as being normative. Starting with the narrow-scope interpretation, the chapter discusses the problem that it licenses bootstrapping of rational requirements (6.1), that it entails inconsistent requirements (6.2), and that it entails requirements that undermine each other in a counterintuitive way (6.3). Turning to the wide-scope interpretation, the chapter discusses the charge that wide-scope requirements cannot capture an important asymmetry involved in structural irrationality (6.4–6.5), and that they are incapable of guiding our responses (6.6). It is argued that all of these objections pose serious problems for the respective accounts. This supports the conclusion that there are no structural requirements of rationality (6.7).

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19

Muñoz, José Romano. Neither Irrationalism nor Rationalism but Critical Philosophy (1928). Translated by Carlos Alberto Sánchez. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190601294.003.0004.

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José Romano Muñoz defends Antonio Caso’s “intuitionism” against Samuel Ramos’s criticisms, which Ramos had published in the same journal (Ulysses) the previous year. In his dismissal, Ramos argues that Caso’s intuitionism is merely a form of irrationalism that has no place in philosophy as a rational practice. In Caso’s defense, Muñoz proposes that intuition has epistemological value, that it alone can penetrate the reality of things that are hidden by concepts and obscured by perception, and that Caso’s philosophy shows us how this is so. This article is both a defense of philosophy as traditionally conceived—as rational and critical—and an attempt to broaden its scope to include invention, intuition, and instinct. A true critical philosophy cannot rely merely on reason as its source, but must involve and depend on intuition and the non-rational clarity that this brings.

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20

Rose, David C. Why Culture Matters Most. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199330720.001.0001.

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A society’s culture can lock in beliefs and practices that inevitably produce persistent poverty and tyranny. But a society’s culture can also provide a foundation for maximizing general prosperity and freedom to produce mass flourishing. This book explains why culture—not genes, geography, institutions, or policies—is therefore what ultimately explains the differential success of societies. In short, when certain kinds of moral beliefs are culturally transmitted, a society can overcome the most fundamental obstacle to societal success: rational self-interest undermining the common good. General prosperity requires large-group cooperation, and the most effective large-group cooperation requires having a high-trust society. This book explains why the larger a society is, the more difficult it is to sustain a high-trust society. At the same time, the larger societies become, the more likely rational self-interest and tribalism will undermine crucial but highly trust-dependent institutions like democratic voting and a free press. This book shows how culture uniquely addresses this problem by aligning individual interests with the common good when specific kinds of moral beliefs are strongly held by most people. Culture also matters instrumentally because childhood instruction, a hallmark of culture, helps overcome the irrationality of adult individuals choosing to have moral beliefs that they know will limit their ability to promote their own welfare at the expense of the common good in the future. The analysis has surprising implications for the family, religion, government, and the stability of Western free market democracies.

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21

Dawes, Robyn. Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo-Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally. Westview Press, 2003.

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22

Leonard, David K. Why Is It Rational for Structural Reform to Be Delayed an Irrationally Long Time? (IDS Discussion Papers). Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 1992.

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23

Tritten, Tyler. Reason as Consequent Universal: On Thinking and Being. Edinburgh University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.003.0005.

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Turning to the later Schelling, this chapter shows how Schelling regards reason itself as a matter of fact rather than as a self-founding truth of reason. There is not being because there is reason or thinking, but there is reason because there is being. Reason is thus only explicable through a historical, rather than rational, account of its emergence from non-reason. Reason is thus a contingently eternal matter of fact, something which eternally is but could have never been, consequent upon pre-rational being. Schelling does not fall prey to irrationalism, but he does ask why there is reason rather than unreason. Reason too is something for which an account must be given.

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24

Moten, James M., and C. W. Copeland. Insurance and Risk Management. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190269999.003.0017.

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According to modern portfolio theory (MPT), rational market participants make most decisions and seek to be compensated for additional risk. However, investors sometimes behave irrationally owing to preconceived notions and biases based on past experience. Behavioral finance offers an alternative view to MPT, suggesting that individuals often make irrational decisions. This chapter explores how individuals make decisions to buy different types of insurance, even when faced with predicable outcomes involving the frequency and severity of the loss. That is, individuals appear to buy insurance only when the frequency of loss is low and the severity of loss is high; otherwise they self-insure.

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25

Beller, Steven. 5. The perils of modernity. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198724834.003.0005.

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In addition to the ‘irrationalist’ critique of ‘Jewish’ modernity that informed some antisemitism, there was another, ‘rational’ side to antisemitism. ‘The perils of modernity’ considers the irony that the biggest threat to Jews in Central and Eastern Europe was the modernization of society given the form that this modernization took. The influence of racial theory was also closely bound up with the much increased prestige of nationalism in early 20th-century Europe. Once the definition of modernity had shifted to the more ‘organic’ and collectivist model, in which the ‘reactionary rationalism’ of biological thinking—and race—played such a large role, Jewish difference became racially defined, and hence impossible to overcome.

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26

Papish, Laura. Kantian Self-Deception. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190692100.003.0004.

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This chapter explores what exactly self-deception is from a Kantian point of view. It is shown that though Kant initially seems to explain self-deception by drawing on the concept of an internal or inner lie, this does not provide a fruitful path forward. However, with the aid of certain source materials—in particular, Kant’s lectures on logic—a much more promising account of self-deception can be developed. On this account, self-deception is a rationally sophisticated and rationally minded form of irrationality, one that involves a process Kant refers to as rationalization (Vernünfteln). This chapter both explores rationalization and offers several illustrations of its use. The chapter also demonstrates that since the boundary between impermissible self-deceit and justified doxastic voluntarism depends on the laudability of motives and goals, self-deceptive rationalization must ultimately be understood more as a normative concept than a descriptive one.

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27

Moggach, Douglas. Romantic Political Thought. Edited by Paul Hamilton. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696383.013.34.

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In assessing the political charge of Romanticism, Georg Lukács castigated it for its irrationalism and proto-fascistic tendencies, while Jacques Barzun stressed its anti-totalitarian character, its promotion of individuality and diversity against imposed uniformity and coercion. More recent critics have produced a complex typology of Romantic political critiques of modernity, from restorationist conservative to utopian socialist. This chapter takes its lead from Hegel’s diagnosis of modern freedom, and of Romanticism’s place in it, locating common elements and variations in Romantic cultural critique. Among the recent revivals of the Romantic spirit are the counterculture of 1960s, and postmodern assaults on subjective coherence and rational autonomy. For all its limitations, the course of Romanticism is not yet run.

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28

van Hooft, Edwin. Self-Regulatory Perspectives in the Theory of Planned Job Search Behavior: Deliberate and Automatic Self-Regulation Strategies to Facilitate Job Seeking. Edited by Ute-Christine Klehe and Edwin van Hooft. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199764921.013.31.

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Because job search often is a lengthy process accompanied by complexities, disruptions, rejections, and other adversities, job seekers need self-regulation to initiate and maintain job search behaviors for obtaining employment goals. This chapter reviews goal/intention properties (e.g., specificity, proximity, conflicts, motivation type) and skills, beliefs, strategies, and capacities (e.g., self-monitoring skills and type, trait and momentary self-control capacity, nonlimited willpower beliefs, implementation intentions, goal-shielding and goal maintenance strategies) that facilitate self-regulation and as such may moderate the relationship between job search intentions and job search behavior. For each moderator, a theoretical rationale is developed based on self-regulation theory linked to the theory of planned job search behavior, available empirical support is reviewed, and future research recommendations are provided. The importance of irrationality and nonconscious processes is discussed; examples are given of hypoegoic self-regulation strategies that reduce the need for deliberate self-regulation and conscious control by automatizing job search behaviors.

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29

Varol, Ozan O. The Broken Promise. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190626013.003.0020.

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This chapter analyzes coups that begin with promises of democratic rule but end with the establishment of dictatorship. Some coup makers lose their enthusiasm for democracy for irrational reasons. A successful victory against a dictator can foster self-indulgent fantasies about future possibilities. Although plenty of military leaders irrationally prefer dictatorship out of ignorance or ego, others choose dictatorship in a rational decision-making process. Although the costs of authoritarianism outweigh its benefits for many militaries, for some militaries, that calculus may be reversed. For example, the coup makers may believe that a loyalist dictator will benefit them more than democratic rule. Particularly when they’re confident the dictator will stay loyal to their interests for the long term, the coup makers may throw their support behind a dictator, as opposed to subjecting their future to the vagaries of democratic politics.

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Books on the topic 'Rational irrationality'

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