Journal articles: 'Rational irrationality'

1

Mele, Alfred. "Rational irrationality." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 26 (2004): 31–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20042677.

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Brogan, Joseph V. "Rational Irrationality." Review of Politics 68, no. 3 (June 2006): 500–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670506210180.

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del Bueno, Dorothy J. "Rational Irrationality." JONA: The Journal of Nursing Administration 21, no. 1 (January 1991): 7???8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00005110-199101000-00003.

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Caplan, Bryan. "Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality." Kyklos 54, no. 1 (February 2001): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00138.

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Zaostrovtsev, A. P. "On Rational Irrationality." Journal of the New Economic Association 33, no. 1 (2017): 151–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2017-33-1-8.

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Billon, Alexandre. "Irrationality and Happiness." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11, no. 1 (June 7, 2017): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i1.108.

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There is a long tradition in philosophy of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only we were more rational, it is claimed, we would live happier lives. I argue that such optimism is misguided and that, paradoxically, people with desires, like us, cannot be both happy and rational. More precisely, if someone rational has desires he will not be fully happy, and if he has some desires that are rational and – in a yet-to-be-specified sense – demanding, he will be frankly unhappy. Call this claim Rational Pessimism. The argument for Rational Pessimism can be considered as a variation on a Schopenhauerian argument that bluntly claims that, because desires involve lack and suffering, desiring souls like us cannot be happy. I argue that, even if Schopenhauer’s argument escapes most attacks that have been targeted against it, it faces decisive empirical objections. I argue that Schopenhauer’s argument can, however, be rescued if it is assumed that we are rational.

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Şen, Zekai. "Rational Method Irrationality with Rectification." Turkish Journal of Water Science and Management 1, no. 1 (January 31, 2017): 6–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.31807/tjwsm.297140.

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Goetz, Melanie. "The irrationality of rational numbers." Journal - American Water Works Association 105, no. 7 (July 2013): 82–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5942/jawwa.2013.105.0096.

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Deutsch, Morton. "The Irrationality of Rational Deterrence." Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 32, no. 3 (March 1987): 218–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/026881.

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Fehr, Ernst, and Jean-Robert Tyran. "Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): 43–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196651.

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In their personal lives, many economists recognize that they are surrounded by individuals who are less than fully rational. In their professional lives, however, economists often use models that examine the interactions of fully rational agents. To reduce the cognitive dissonance of this situation, many economists believe that interactions in markets will correct or offset individually anomalous behaviors—although the reasons for this belief are often not clearly spelled out. This paper presents evidence indicating that “strategic complementarity” and “strategic substitutability” are important determinants of aggregate outcomes. Under strategic complementarity, a small amount of individual irrationality may lead to large deviations from the aggregate predictions of rational models; under strategic substitutability, a minority of rational agents may suffice to generate aggregate outcomes consistent with the predictions of rational models. Thus, the presence of strategic substitutability or complementarity seems to be a key condition in determining when a population that is heterogeneous with regard to rationality reaches either a “rational” or an “irrational” outcome.

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Horton, Richard. "Offline: The rational irrationality of fear." Lancet 375, no. 9712 (January 2010): 360. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(10)60106-7.

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12

Frances, Bryan. "THE IRRATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF." Think 15, no. 42 (December 9, 2015): 15–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000196.

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Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In my previous essay (THINK 40) I explained why they think so many religious beliefs are rational. In this essay I explain why they think those same beliefs are irrational.

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Bobrova, Lyubov. "LESSONS OF PREDICTABLE IRRATIONALITY." Filosofiya Referativnyi Zhurnal, no. 3 (2021): 114–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/rphil/2021.03.05.

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Yao, Xiao Bo, Chuan Feng Han, and Shao Long Wan. "Incomplete Rationality vs. Incomplete Strategy in Minority Game Model." Advanced Materials Research 629 (December 2012): 735–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.629.735.

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Based on standard minority game, an Irrationality Agent Minority Game (IAMG) model is proposed, in which agents are less rational to make use of its strategy properly at each step. The control parameter of irrationality, pI, represents the probability of an agent acting irrationally, which could be explained with the personal defect. Like the incomplete (strategy) minority game (IMG) model introduced in our previous paper, this IAMG model also has three failsafe mode including (R0) random action, (R1) random strategy and (R4)”Back- to-Best”. The IAMG model can be explain with analytic equations similar with the IMG, and simulation results match the trend of the conclusion. Irrationality shows a great effect on system efficiency, and system efficiency reaches its top value at a smaller pIc than pIc in IMG. The IAMG and IMG model can be used to explain the deviation of some game theory simulations, and to understand the system performance with abundant agents of various characters.

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Husnasya, Dealinda, and Mawardi Ihsan. "Drug Dosing Rationality Based on Jelliffe Equation in Acute Kidney Injury." JURNAL MANAJEMEN DAN PELAYANAN FARMASI (Journal of Management and Pharmacy Practice) 8, no. 4 (February 12, 2019): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jmpf.39921.

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Patients with Acute Kidney Injury (AKI) experience changes in unstable kidney function which is characterized by instability of serum creatinine values that affect the concentration of drugs in the body. Therefore, adjusting the dosage and frequency of the drug is an important concern. This study aimed to determine the proportion of rational drug dosage regimens in hospitalized patients with AKI. This research was a retrospective observation study with cross sectional design. Sample collection was carried out using simple random sampling method for patients who were hospitalized with AKI during January 1st till December 31, 2017. Data analysis was carried out descriptively to see the proportion and description of the rationality of each dosage regimen given to patients. This research was conducted at the dr. Sardjito General Hospital Yogyakarta. The results showed that the proportion of rational drug dosage regimens given to 100 inpatients with AKI was 60.00% based on literature and 94.12% based on predictive steady-state concentration calculation. Irrationality of the dosing regimen because of administration interval was 52.84%; because of dose was 17.05%; and because of both were 30.11%. The irrationality based on predictive steady concentration showed that drug concentration below minimum effective concentration was 33.33% and over minimum toxic concentration was 66.67%. The proportion of rational drug dosage regimens given to 100 inpatients with AKI based on literature and calculation of predictive steady-state concentrations were quite high. However, some dosing regimens were still irrationally prescribed with the irrationality form were generally in the form of irrational delivery interval with excessive drug concentration.

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16

Tirole, Jean. "Rational irrationality: Some economics of self-management." European Economic Review 46, no. 4-5 (May 2002): 633–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00206-9.

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Brahmana, Rayenda, Chee-Wooi Hooy, and Zamri Ahmad. "Debunking the Monday Irrationality through the External Affection of Investors." Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business 18, no. 1 (February 19, 2016): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/gamaijb.9293.

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This study aims to reveal the mechanism of the influences of the full moon and high temperatures on investors’ Monday irrationality. In contrast to other studies, this research was built under a retroductive approach by using a time series quasi experimental study. Investors were directly assessed for their irrationality by using an adapted psychometric test on 4 occasions. The results indicate that there were indeed effects of the full moon and high temperatures on investors’ irrationality. Because the full moon and high temperatures frequently occurred on Mondays, it is most probably those two variables that were the drivers of the Monday irrationality. In the end, we concluded that the rational behaviour assumption can no longer be held. Instead of rationality, the investors were quasi rational. The utility function of Von Neumann-Morgenstern in decision making has to be replaced by the hedonic utility.

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18

Gitlin, David E., and Carolyn M. Tucker. "Ability to Discriminate Rational Responses to Items on the Irrational Beliefs Test as a Predictor of Rationality and Trait Anxiety." Psychological Reports 62, no. 2 (April 1988): 483–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1988.62.2.483.

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In this study were examined correlations among irrationality, ability to discriminate rationality, and trait anxiety. The Irrational Beliefs Test with standard instructions was the estimate of subjects' rationality. The same test with instructions to mark the most rational responses to test items assessed ability to discriminate rationality. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory measured trait anxiety. For subjects, 152 college students, a significant positive correlation was found between irrationality and trait anxiety and a significant but low correlation between irrationality and discrimination ability. The correlation was deemed too weak to have practical utility. There was no significant correlation between discrimination ability and trait anxiety. It was concluded that gains reported from Rational Emotive Therapy, such as increased rationality and anxiety reduction, may be primarily due to factors other than teaching clients to discriminate rational from irrational beliefs.

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19

Sinhababu, Neil. "The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6, no. 1 (June 5, 2017): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i1.58.

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Christine Korsgaard has argued that Humean views about action and practical rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action. According to the Humean theory of action, agents do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. According to the Humean theory of rationality, it is rational for agents to do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. Thus Humeans are committed to the impossibility of practical irrationality – an unacceptable consequence. I respond by developing Humean views to explain how we can act irrationally. Humeans about action should consider the immediate motivational forces produced by an agent's desires. Humeans about rationality should consider the agent's dispositional desire strengths. When (for example) vivid sensory or imaginative experiences of desired things cause some of our desires to produce motivational force disproportional to their dispositional strength, we may act in ways that do not maximize expected desire-satisfaction, thus acting irrationally. I argue that this way of developing Humean views is true to the best reasons for holding them.

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20

Borwein, Peter B. "On the irrationality of certain series." Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 112, no. 1 (July 1992): 141–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030500410007081x.

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21

Barbero, Carola. "Genuine and rational tears." Theoria, Beograd 53, no. 2 (2010): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1002005b.

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In this paper I examine the emotions we feel while reading a work of fiction. Some philosophers think that our emotional engagement with fiction gives rise to a paradox and involves either irrationality or participation in a game of make believe. In this paper I argue that an Object Theory in a Meinongian style, by supporting a realistic perspective on fictional emotions, is able to dissolve the paradox of fiction.

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22

KWON, DOYONG. "A devil's staircase from rotations and irrationality measures for Liouville numbers." Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 145, no. 3 (November 2008): 739–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305004108001606.

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AbstractFrom Sturmian and Christoffel words we derive a strictly increasing function Δ:[0,∞) → . This function is continuous at every irrational point, while at rational points, left-continuous but not right-continuous. Moreover, it assumes algebraic integers at rationals, and transcendental numbers at irrationals. We also see that the differentiation of Δ distinguishes some irrationality measures of real numbers.

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23

Geyer, Felix. "Pockets of irrationality in an increasingly rational world." Kybernetes 30, no. 9/10 (December 2001): 1155–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03684920110405728.

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Fischler, Stéphane, and Tanguy Rivoal. "Irrationality exponent and rational approximations with prescribed growth." Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 138, no. 03 (March 1, 2010): 799. http://dx.doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9939-09-10084-9.

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25

Kombos, N. A., G. P. Fournet, and R. E. Estes. "Effects of Irrationality on a Trail Making Performance Task." Perceptual and Motor Skills 68, no. 2 (April 1989): 591–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.1989.68.2.591.

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45 rational and 45 irrational thinkers as defined by Ellis's (1962) theory and assessed by their scores on the Irrational Belief Test were compared on a series of Trail Making tasks. Both groups were assigned to one of three conditions which involved presentation of irrational, neutral, and rational self-referent statements. Superior performance displayed by the rational group provided support for the rational-emotive theory position that irrational beliefs (ideas) generalize their adverse effect to actual performance situations. Except for the first trial the data did not support the expectation that types of self-statements differentially influence efficiency of performance.

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Marcovecchio, Raffaele, and Wadim Zudilin. "Hypergeometric rational approximations to ζ(4)." Proceedings of the Edinburgh Mathematical Society 63, no. 2 (February 3, 2020): 374–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0013091519000427.

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AbstractWe give a new hypergeometric construction of rational approximations to ζ(4), which absorbs the earlier one from 2003 based on Bailey's 9F8 hypergeometric integrals. With the novel ingredients we are able to gain better control of the arithmetic and produce a record irrationality measure for ζ(4).

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27

Ancell, Aaron. "Political irrationality, utopianism, and democratic theory." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 19, no. 1 (December 6, 2019): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594x19889108.

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People tend to be biased and irrational about politics. Should this constrain what our normative theories of democracy can require? David Estlund argues that the answer is ‘no’. He contends that even if such facts show that the requirements of a normative theory are very unlikely to be met, this need not imply that the theory is unduly unrealistic. I argue that the application of Estlund’s argument to political irrationality depends on a false presupposition: mainly, that being rational about politics is something people could easily do if they tried. Since the empirical evidence shows that being rational about politics is actually quite difficult, Estlund’s argument comes up short. Moreover, I argue that the argument cannot plausibly be extended to insulate normative theories of democracy from facts about political irrationality because of the need for constraints of realism to explain the crucial role that appeals to (reasonable) disagreement play within such theories.

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Dehdashti, Shahram, Lauren Fell, Abdul Karim Obeid, Catarina Moreira, and Peter Bruza. "Bistable probabilities: a unified framework for studying rationality and irrationality in classical and quantum games." Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 476, no. 2237 (May 2020): 20190839. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0839.

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This article presents a unified probabilistic framework that allows both rational and irrational decision-making to be theoretically investigated and simulated in classical and quantum games. Rational choice theory is a basic component of game-theoretic models, which assumes that a decision-maker chooses the best action according to their preferences. In this article, we define irrationality as a deviation from a rational choice. Bistable probabilities are proposed as a principled and straightforward means for modelling (ir)rational decision-making in games. Bistable variants of classical and quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken are analysed in order to assess the effect of (ir)rationality on agent utility and Nash equilibria. It was found that up to three Nash equilibria exist for all three classical bistable games and maximal utility was attained when agents were rational. Up to three Nash equilibria exist for all three quantum bistable games; however, utility was shown to increase according to higher levels of agent irrationality.

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Dehdashti, Shahram, Lauren Fell, and Peter Bruza. "On the Irrationality of Being in Two Minds." Entropy 22, no. 2 (February 4, 2020): 174. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22020174.

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This article presents a general framework that allows irrational decision making to be theoretically investigated and simulated. Rationality in human decision making under uncertainty is normatively prescribed by the axioms of probability theory in order to maximize utility. However, substantial literature from psychology and cognitive science shows that human decisions regularly deviate from these axioms. Bistable probabilities are proposed as a principled and straight forward means for modeling (ir)rational decision making, which occurs when a decision maker is in “two minds”. We show that bistable probabilities can be formalized by positive-operator-valued projections in quantum mechanics. We found that (1) irrational decision making necessarily involves a wider spectrum of causal relationships than rational decision making, (2) the accessible information turns out to be greater in irrational decision making when compared to rational decision making, and (3) irrational decision making is quantum-like because it violates the Bell–Wigner polytope.

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Murru, Nadir. "On the periodic writing of cubic irrationals and a generalization of Rédei functions." International Journal of Number Theory 11, no. 03 (March 31, 2015): 779–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793042115500438.

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In this paper, we provide a periodic representation (by means of periodic rational or integer sequences) for any cubic irrationality. In particular, for a root α of a cubic polynomial with rational coefficients, we study the Cerruti polynomials [Formula: see text], and [Formula: see text], which are defined via [Formula: see text] Using these polynomials, we show how any cubic irrational can be written periodically as a ternary continued fraction. A periodic multidimensional continued fraction (with pre-period of length 2 and period of length 3) is proved convergent to a given cubic irrationality, by using the algebraic properties of cubic irrationalities and linear recurrent sequences.

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Nathan, Joseph Amal. "The Irrationality of e x for Nonzero Rational x." American Mathematical Monthly 105, no. 8 (October 1998): 762. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2588994.

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Yang, Bijou, and David Lester. "Reflections on rational choice—The existence of systematic irrationality." Journal of Socio-Economics 37, no. 3 (June 2008): 1218–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2007.08.006.

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33

Hoffman, Tom. "Rational Choice and Political Irrationality in the New Millennium." Critical Review 27, no. 3-4 (October 2, 2015): 299–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2015.1111679.

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34

Shaffer, Michael J. "Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality." Metaphilosophy 50, no. 4 (July 2019): 563–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12382.

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Saputra, Nopriadi, and Maria Grace Herlina. "Double Sided Perspective of Business Resilience: The Rationality and Irrationality of SME Experience." 12th GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 12, no. 1 (October 8, 2021): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gcbssproceeding.2021.12(16).

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COVID-19 has created a killing field for SME as one of national economics pillars. Business resilience becomes crucial issue. It has stimulated the owner and/or managers of SME to do many things for saving the SME from its bankruptcy rationally and/or irrationally. This study aimed to elaborate business resilience and to test the impact of rational and irrational factors on business resilience. The rational factors consist of: (1) implementation of health protocol in doing business, (2) developing business flexibility, and (4) improving alliance capability. The rational factors consist of (4) enhancing pro-social leadership a (5) conducting workplace spirituality. This study is cross-sectional survey with causal approach for testing five hypothesizes. Convenience method was used as sampling method. This study involved 506 small medium enterprises in Jawa and Sumatera, the two biggest islands in Indonesia. Collected data were structured with PLS based Structural Equation Modelling. Proposed research model was described into second order construct and tested by validity and reliability analysis, measurement model analysis and structural model analysis. Keywords: Resilience, Flexibility, Spirituality, Pro-Social Leadeship

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Bastianelli, Francesco, Pietro De Poi, Lawrence Ein, Robert Lazarsfeld, and Brooke Ullery. "Measures of irrationality for hypersurfaces of large degree." Compositio Mathematica 153, no. 11 (September 4, 2017): 2368–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1112/s0010437x17007436.

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We study various measures of irrationality for hypersurfaces of large degree in projective space and other varieties. These include the least degree of a rational covering of projective space, and the minimal gonality of a covering family of curves. The theme is that positivity properties of canonical bundles lead to lower bounds on these invariants. In particular, we prove that if $X\subseteq \mathbf{P}^{n+1}$ is a very general smooth hypersurface of dimension $n$ and degree $d\geqslant 2n+1$, then any dominant rational mapping $f:X{\dashrightarrow}\mathbf{P}^{n}$ must have degree at least $d-1$. We also propose a number of open problems, and we show how our methods lead to simple new proofs of results of Ran and Beheshti–Eisenbud concerning varieties of multi-secant lines.

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Heimonen, Ari, Tapani Matala-Aho, and Keijo Väänänen. "An application of Jacobi type polynomials to irrationality measures." Bulletin of the Australian Mathematical Society 50, no. 2 (October 1994): 225–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0004972700013691.

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The paper provides irrationality measures for certain values of binomial functions and definite integrals of some rational functions. The results are obtained using Jacobi type polynomials and divisibility considerations of their coefficients.

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Hančl, Jaroslav, Ondřej Kolouch, and Lukáš Novotný. "A Criterion for linear independence of infinite products." Analele Universitatii "Ovidius" Constanta - Seria Matematica 23, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auom-2015-0029.

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Abstract Using an idea of Erdős the paper establishes a criterion for the linear independence of infinite products which consist of rational numbers. A criterion for irrationality is obtained as a consequence.

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HANČL, JAROSLAV, and ONDŘEJ KOLOUCH. "ERDŐS’ METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE IRRATIONALITY OF PRODUCTS." Bulletin of the Australian Mathematical Society 84, no. 3 (July 13, 2011): 414–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0004972711002309.

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AbstractThis paper deals with a sufficient condition for the infinite product of rational numbers to be an irrational number. The condition requires only some conditions for convergence and does not use other properties like divisibility. The proof is based on an idea of Erdős.

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LUCA, FLORIAN, and YOHEI TACHIYA. "IRRATIONALITY OF LAMBERT SERIES ASSOCIATED WITH A PERIODIC SEQUENCE." International Journal of Number Theory 10, no. 03 (March 18, 2014): 623–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793042113501121.

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Let q be an integer with |q| > 1 and {an}n≥1 be an eventually periodic sequence of rational numbers, not identically zero from some point on. Then the number [Formula: see text] is irrational. In particular, if the periodic sequences [Formula: see text] of rational numbers are linearly independent over ℚ, then so are the following m + 1 numbers: [Formula: see text] This generalizes a result of Erdős who treated the case of m = 1 and [Formula: see text]. The method of proof is based on the original approaches of Chowla and Erdős, together with some results about primes in arithmetic progressions with large moduli of Ahlford, Granville and Pomerance.

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Havârneanu, Grigore M., and Corneliu E. Havârneanu. "When norms turn perverse: Contextual irrationality vs. rational traffic violations." Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 15, no. 2 (March 2012): 144–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.2011.12.003.

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Cook, John, and Stephan Lewandowsky. "Rational Irrationality: Modeling Climate Change Belief Polarization Using Bayesian Networks." Topics in Cognitive Science 8, no. 1 (January 2016): 160–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12186.

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43

Bennett, Michael A. "Effective measures of irrationality for certain algebraic numbers." Journal of the Australian Mathematical Society. Series A. Pure Mathematics and Statistics 62, no. 3 (June 1997): 329–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s144678870000104x.

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AbstractIn this paper, we derive a number of explicit lower bounds for rational approximation to certain cubic irrationalities, proving, for example, that for any non-zero integers p and q. A number of these irrationality measures improve known results, including those for . Some Diophantine consequences are briefly discussed.

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Leinonen, Leena, Marko Leinonen, and Tapani Matala-aho. "On approximation measures of q-exponential function." International Journal of Number Theory 12, no. 01 (February 2016): 287–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793042116500172.

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We shall present effective approximation measures for certain infinite products related to [Formula: see text]-exponential function [Formula: see text]. There are two main targets. First we shall prove an explicit irrationality measure result for the values [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text], and [Formula: see text], [Formula: see text]. Then, if we restrict the approximations of [Formula: see text] to rational numbers of the shape [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text], we may replace Bundschuh’s irrationality exponent [Formula: see text] by [Formula: see text]

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Acland, Daniel. "Poverty, Irrationality, and the Value of Cash Transfers." Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 12, no. 2 (2021): 227–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bca.2020.22.

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AbstractIt has been demonstrated that irrationality reduces the efficiency of individuals’ allocations, as measured by their “true” or rational preferences. There is also evidence that poverty increases irrationality of different sorts. As a result, the net benefit to society of a cash transfer from taxpayers to welfare recipients may not be zero. The fact that the transfer will be allocated less efficiently by the recipients than by the taxpayers will reduce the value of the transfer, while if the transfer increases recipients’ rationality, it will increase the efficiency of the allocation of their pretransfer budgets, thus increasing the value of the transfer. The net effect on society will be positive or negative, depending in large part on the degree to which the transfer increases rationality. I model these effects in the context of present-biased preferences and explore the effect of irrationality, income, and the size of transfer on the value of transfers. I conclude that under a plausible range of conditions, transfers can generate a substantial positive net benefit. I also model the choices of a fully rational paternalist and find little support for paternalistic in-kind transfers.

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Caplin, Andrew, and Mark Dean. "Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition." American Economic Review 105, no. 7 (July 1, 2015): 2183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140117.

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Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reflect irrationality, as opposed to a rational trade-off between the costs of information acquisition and the expected benefits of learning? We develop a revealed preference test that characterizes all patterns of choice “mistakes” consistent with a general model of optimal costly information acquisition and identify the extent to which information costs can be recovered from choice data. (JEL D11, D81, D83)

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Humphrey, Mathew. "Rational Irrationality and Simulation in Environmental Politics: The Example of Climate Change." Government and Opposition 44, no. 2 (2009): 146–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.01280.x.

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AbstractDo western publics make ‘demands’ for environmental policy that they have no desire to see enacted? The thesis that they do has been put forward recently by advocates of the ‘post-ecologist’ paradigm such as Ingolfur Blühdorn. Taking the example of climate change, this article assesses survey results that provide indicative evidence that such ‘simulative’ demands may exist. I suggest that such demands are, however, best explained through conceptual tools available from game-theoretic and rational-actor models of political behaviour, in particular rational ignorance and rational irrationality, rather than with the societal-level accounts preferred by Blühdorn and others.

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Schmidt, Sebastian. "Why We Should Promote Irrationality." Grazer Philosophische Studien 94, no. 4 (October 24, 2017): 605–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09404001.

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The author defends the claim that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality by arguing (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that we can often (purposefully) influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational belief and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse than having a rational one. In support of the second claim, the author then explains how the control we have over our beliefs could look like. In conclusion, the author suggests that the argument of this essay is not restricted to the irrationality of beliefs, but can be applied to irrational states of mind in general (like desires, intentions, emotions, or hopes). In an outlook on the “ethics of belief” debate, the author points out that the argument of this essay need not conflict with evidentialism, but does so when combined with another plausible claim about the meaning of doxastic ought-statements.

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Psaroudakēs, Stelios, and Fotis Moschos. "An Experimental Investigation of Rhythmic Irrationality." Greek and Roman Musical Studies 6, no. 2 (August 24, 2018): 339–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22129758-12341326.

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Abstract The present paper investigates ‘rhythmic irrationality’ in the medium of recited ‘word’, as this is defined by Aristoxenos and Dionysios Halikarnasseus in three rhythmic contexts: that of the anapaest, of the dactyl, and of the trochee (choreios). For this purpose, computer experiments have been devised, one for each of the aforementioned irrationalities: against the background of a monitored metronome, a line in each rhythm is initially recited in the rational mode. The line is subsequently recited another seven times, with the podic duration which is to suffer diminution or augmentation, in steps of eighths of the time unit. The eight vocal renderings of each line are then assessed psychoacoustically, in order to locate: (a) the point at which our hearing detects the onset of irrationality, and (b) the point at which a shift from the original rhythm to another is sensed.

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Väänänen, Keijo. "On rational approximations of certain Mahler functions with a connection to the Thue–Morse sequence." International Journal of Number Theory 11, no. 02 (March 2015): 487–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793042115500244.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Rational irrationality'

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