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Books on the topic 'Rational view'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 13 February 2022

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1

The theory of intelligence: A sensory-rational view. Springfield, Ill., U.S.A: Thomas, 1990.

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2

Zeytounian, Radyadour Kh. Navier-Stokes-Fourier Equations: A Rational Asymptotic Modelling Point of View. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.

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3

Rational land revisited. Chennai: Emerald Publishers, 2006.

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4

Jing ji she hui xue de xin shi ye: Li xing xuan ze yu gan xing xuan ze = The new view of economic sociology : rational choice and perceptual choice. Beijing Shi: She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she, 2005.

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5

Laurendeau, Albert. La vie-- conside rations biologiques. Que bec [Que .]: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2009.

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6

Angenot, Marc. Colins et le socialisme rationel. [Montréal]: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1999.

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7

E, Brown Michael. Rational choice and security studies: Stephen Walt and his critics. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000.

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8

Picavet, Emmanuel. Choix rationnel et vie publique: Pensée formelle et raison pratique. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1996.

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9

Weinert, Claus. Goethes rationale Empirie in staatsmännischer Praxis, Ästhetik und Naturwissenschaft. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1994.

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10

Roy, Kaushik. Integrating resource-based and rational contingency views: Understanding design of dynamic capabilities of organisations. Ahmedabad: Indian Institute of Management, 2009.

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11

Rawlsian political analysis: Rethinking the microfoundations of social science. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

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12

Ōta, Fumio. The US-Japan alliance in the 21st century: A view of the history and a rationale for its survival. Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental, 2006.

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13

Henning, Tim. From a Rational Point of View. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198797036.001.0001.

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When we discuss normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, hypothetical imperatives (or “anankastic conditionals”), motivating reasons, or weakness and strength of will, we often use verbs like “believe” and “want” to capture a relevant subject’s perspective. According to the received view, what these verbs do is describe the subject’s mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental states consequently appear to play in this discourse. This book uses tools from formal semantics and the philosophy of language to develop an alternative account of sentences involving these verbs. According to this view, called parentheticalism in honour of J. O. Urmson, we very commonly use these verbs in a parenthetical sense. Clauses with these verbs thereby express backgrounded side-remarks on the contents they embed, and these latter, embedded contents constitute the at-issue contents of our utterances. Thus, instead of speaking about the subject’s mental states, we often use sentences involving “believe” and “want” to speak about the world in a way that, in the conversational background, relates our utterances to her point of view. This idea is made precise and used to solve various puzzles concerning normative discourse. The result is a new, unified understanding of normative discourse, which does not postulate conceptual breaks between objective and subjective normative reasons, or normative reasons and rationality, or indeed between the reasons we ascribe to an agent and the reasons she herself can be expected to cite.
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14

A Rational View on Modern Ophthalmic Operation Theatres. Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers, 2008.

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15

Sagar, Lysa. A Rational View on Modern Ophthalmic Operation Theatres. Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers (P) Ltd., 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.5005/jp/books/10021.

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16

Norgate, Williams and. Rational View of Hebrew Chronology Signed E. C. K. HardPress, 2020.

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17

Brooker, Paul, and Margaret Hayward. Rational Leadership. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825395.001.0001.

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This book shows how a business version of rational leadership develops business corporations (and inspires people with confidence) by using the appropriate rational methods. The book presents classic examples of leaders using these corporation-developing methods to establish or enhance an iconic corporation. The main examples are Sloan (General Motors), Ohno (Toyota), Kroc (McDonalds), Walton (Walmart), Grove (Intel), and Whitman (eBay). These examples cover a wide range of different times, from the 1920s to the 2000s, and different industries, from fast-food and the automobile to microprocessors and e-commerce. In addition to being ‘best practice’ examples, they present a ‘leader’s-eye view’ through autobiographical writings, which are supplemented and corroborated by biographical and historical sources. (There are other supplementary examples that include Bezos of Amazon, Sandberg of Facebook, Jobs of Apple, Armani of Armani fashion, and Roddick of The Body Shop.) There is a comparative aspect, too, as the examples also describe the variation in leaders’ selection or emphasising of particular methods, which vary according to the circumstances or a leader’s personal preferences. The conclusion suggests that the book’s approach should also be applied to versions of military leadership and the political leaders of contemporary democracies. The book has been prepared as both an academic monograph and a graduate text, but will also appeal to general readers who are interested in leadership and/or business.
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18

Zeytounian, Radyadour Kh. Navier-Stokes-Fourier Equations: A Rational Asymptotic Modelling Point of View. Springer, 2014.

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19

Zeytounian, Radyadour Kh. Navier-Stokes-Fourier Equations: A Rational Asymptotic Modelling Point of View. Springer, 2012.

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20

Zeytounian, Radyadour Kh. Navier-Stokes-Fourier Equations: A Rational Asymptotic Modelling Point of View. Springer, 2012.

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21

Comesaña, Juan. Being Rational and Being Right. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198847717.001.0001.

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This book defends a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. The starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, it argues for a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, “Experientialism,” differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. The book argues that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. The discussion is embedded in a Bayesian framework, and the book also examines the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesaña’s own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism.
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22

Moehler, Michael. Rational Choice Contractarianism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785927.003.0002.

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This chapter discusses Hobbes’ and Gauthier’s moral theories that, from a methodological point of view, are the most important social contract theories for the development of the two-level contractarian theory. With regard to Hobbes’ moral theory, the chapter follows the orthodox interpretation of Hobbes’ moral theory that considers Hobbes to defend a purely instrumental approach to morality, because this interpretation of Hobbes’ moral theory is most relevant for the argument developed in this book. With regard to Gauthier’s moral theory, the chapter discusses both the initial statement of Gauthier’s moral theory in Morals by Agreement as well as the most recent version of Gauthier’s moral theory that de facto rejects orthodox rational choice contractarianism.
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23

Brooker, Paul, and Margaret Hayward. Rational Business Leadership. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825395.003.0001.

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This chapter is an introduction to the book and to the rational type of inspirational leadership which inspires followers with confidence through capable use of appropriate rational means to achieve an objective. The chapter explains why the book focuses on a specialized version of this type of rational leadership, namely the version which uses a set of six rational methods as the appropriate means of developing business corporations: rapid and innovative adaptation; quantitative and strategic calculation; and diverse and institutionalized deliberation. The chapter also describes (1) the featuring of autobiographical material in all the examples to provide a leader’s-eye view; (2) the wide range of classic examples—iconic corporations—presented in the following chapters; (3) variations in selecting and emphasizing methods; and (4) versions of dual-leadership teamwork found among the examples.
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24

Addiction, Change & Choice: The New View of Alcoholism. See Sharp Pr, 1993.

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25

Weirich, Paul. Rational Responses to Risks. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190089412.001.0001.

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A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes to it are rational, and which acts affecting risks are rational. Attention to the nature of risk reveals two types of risk, first, a chance of a bad event, and, second, an act’s risk in the sense of the volatility of its possible outcomes. The distinction is normatively significant because different general principles of rationality govern attitudes to these two types of risk. Rationality strictly regulates attitudes to the chance of a bad event and is more permissive about attitudes to an act’s risk. Principles of rationality governing attitudes to risk also justify evaluating an act according to its expected utility given that the act’s risk, if any, belongs to every possible outcome of the act. For a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent’s preferences among the acts. Maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. This view takes an act’s expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. It takes account of an agent’s attitudes to an act’s risk without weakening the standard of expected-utility maximization. The view extends to evaluations of combination of acts, either simultaneous or in a sequence. Applications cover hedging, return-risk evaluation, professional advice, and government regulation.
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26

Henning, Tim. From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse. Oxford University Press, 2018.

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27

Kiesewetter, Benjamin. The Why-Be-Rational Challenge. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754282.003.0005.

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Besides the problems with detachment, proponents of the view that structural requirements of rationality are normative face the challenge to identify a reason that counts in favour of conforming to rational requirements. There are three possible ways to account for this challenge. The first is to present instrumental or other derivative reasons to conform to rational requirements (5.1). The second is to argue that rational requirements are themselves reasons (5.2). The third is to give some kind of buck-passing account of rational requirements, according to which such requirements are verdictive statements about reasons that exist independently of them (5.3–5.4). Chapter 5 argues that none of these strategies succeed. Finally, two accounts that have claimed to explain the normativity of structural rationality without assuming that rational requirements are necessarily accompanied by reasons, are discussed and rejected: the transparency account (5.5), and the apparent reasons account (5.6).
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28

de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno. Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.395.

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Since the end of World War II, foreign policy thinking has been dominated by a realist (or neorealist) perspective in which states are taken as the relevant unit of analysis. The focus on states as the central actors in international politics leads to the view that what happens within states is of little consequence for understanding what happens between states. However, state-centric, unitary rational actor theories fail to explain perhaps the most significant empirical discovery in international relations over the past several decades. That is the widely accepted observation that democracies tend not to fight wars with one another even though they are not especially reluctant to fight with autocratic regimes. By looking within states at their domestic politics and institutionally induced behavior, the political economy perspective provides explanations of the democratic peace and associated empirical regularities while offering a cautionary tale for those who leap too easily to the inference that since pairs of democracies tend to interact peacefully; therefore it follows that they have strong normative incentives to promote democratic reform around the world. Rational choices approaches have also helped elucidate new insights that contribute to our understanding of foreign policy. Some of these new insights and the tools of analysis from which they are derived have significantly contributed to the actual decision making process.
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29

Nations, United. Low-Waste Technologies in Engineering Industries: In View of the Need for the Rational Use of Raw Materials, Improved Manufacturing Efficiency, and Su. United Nations, 1994.

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30

Low-waste technologies in engineering industries: In view of the need for the rational use of raw materials, improved manufacturing efficiency and sustainable industrial development. New York: United Nations, 1994.

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31

United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe., ed. Low-waste technologies in engineering industries: In view of the need for the rational use of raw materials, improved manufacturing efficiency and sustainable industrial development. New York: United Nations, 1994.

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32

Low-waste technologies in engineering industries: In view of the need for the rational use of raw materials, improved manufacturing efficiency, and sustainable industrial development. New York: United Nations, 1994.

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33

Lerner, Adam. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0006.

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People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. The first section of this chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such an explanation. The remaining sections of the chapter argue that each of the standard views in metaethics has trouble providing such an explanation. A metaethical view can provide such an explanation only if it meets two constraints: it allows ordinary moral inquirers to know the essences of moral properties, and the essence of each moral property makes it rational to care for its own sake whether that property is instantiated.
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34

Irwin, T. H. The Subject of the Virtues. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198766858.003.0003.

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Aristotle divides the soul into a rational and a non-rational part, and this division underlies his theory of the virtues. Virtues of character are virtues of the non-rational part. Mediaeval students of Aristotle express this view by saying that the passions are the subject of the virtues. Virtues of character require the agreement of the passions with the rational part of the soul. In a virtuous person, the rational part achieves ‘indirect rationality’, so that it agrees with the ‘direct rationality’ of the desires of the rational part. The capacity of the non-rational part for listening to reason in this way supports Aquinas’ argument for making the passions the ‘subject’ of some virtues of character.
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35

Hicks, Amelia. Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0008.

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Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty. They conclude that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to a decision maker’s moral uncertainty. But this chapter argues that one sometimes has a rational obligation to take one’s moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation. It first provides positive motivation for the view that one’s moral beliefs can affect what it is rational for one to choose. It then addresses the problem of value comparison, according to which one cannot determine the expected moral value of one’s actions. The chapter argues that we should not infer from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty.
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36

Korsgaard, Christine M. A Kantian Case for Our Obligations to the Other Animals. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198753858.003.0008.

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When we act rationally, we treat things that are good for us as if they were good absolutely. We choose to pursue them, and demand that others respect our choices, thus treating ourselves as ends in ourselves. This argument—Kant’s argument for the Formula of Humanity—establishes that there are two senses in which rationality commits us to the view that we are ends in ourselves. The demands that we make on others commit us to the view that we are ends in ourselves as autonomous lawmakers, and ground our duties to other rational beings. The demands that we make on ourselves when we choose to pursue our good commit us to the view that we are ends in ourselves as creatures who have a good, and ground our duties to other animals. The chapter also examines the difficulties this raises for Kant’s ideal of the Kingdom of Ends.
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37

Sher, George. We’re Number One. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190660413.003.0002.

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When a person must choose among actions that will affect both him and other people, he generally takes the others’ interests to have some rational weight, but not as much as his own. This familiar view is intermediate between two others: first, that only the individual’s own interests give him reason to act, and, second, that everyone else’s interests count just as much as his own. Of these two polar views, each has had forceful proponents and each can be traced to a compelling starting point. By contrast, the intermediate view that actually informs most practice seems much harder to defend. The question in this paper is whether that view is simply an unprincipled compromise between two powerful but irreconcilable intellectual pressures or whether, instead, there is some positive reason to accept it
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38

Parfit, Derek. Subjectivist Reasons. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0014.

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This chapter examines some arguments made in favour of subjectivism. It considers the claim that, if we were fully procedurally rational, we would want to avoid future agony because such agony would interfere with our exercise of our rational capacities. This reply does not explain why we cannot have any reason to want to avoid agony, not as a means of fulfilling some other present desire, but as an end, or for its own sake. There is also the argument that, unless the concept of a reason to have some desire can be reduced to the concept of a reason to have some belief, we cannot have any reasons to have desires. This ingenious argument does not, however, succeed, as the first premise can be plausibly revised to counter the established view on subjectivism. In addition to these arguments, the chapter also explores a different interpretation of these views.
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39

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Thought. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.001.0001.

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According to orthodoxy the study of vagueness belongs to the domain of the philosophy of language. On that view, to solve the paradoxes of vagueness we need to investigate the nature of words like ‘heap’ and ‘bald’. This book criticizes linguistic explanations of the state of ignorance we find ourselves in when confronted with borderline cases and develops, within the framework of classical logic, a theory of propositional vagueness in its stead. The view places the study of vagueness squarely in epistemological terms, situating it within a theory of rational propositional attitudes. Once one has accepted vague propositions, a number of questions about their role in thought become conspicuous. Can one’s total evidence be vague? What sort of support does vague evidence lend to precise matters and conversely? Can rational people agree about the precise whilst disagreeing about the vague? Is it rational to care intrinsically about vague matters? Can one’s attitudes towards vague propositions be relevant in decision making? The book develops a set of positions on these matters, and exploits them in expounding a novel theory of vagueness in which vagueness is defined in terms of its role in thought. The resulting view is applied to a number of problems in the philosophy of vagueness.
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40

Whiting, Daniel. Don’t Take My Word for It. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805403.003.0013.

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Aesthetic testimony is not a source of knowledge; it is not even a source of rational belief. If, for example, Holly tells Harry that Wim Wenders’ Paris, Texas is good, Harry cannot come to know or rationally believe that the film is good on the basis of Holly’s testimony alone. This chapter outlines a novel argument for this view, one which serves also to explain it. That argument appeals to four principles connecting rationality and reasons, reasons and values, belief and affects, and beliefs about reasons and beliefs about value. The chapter motivates and defends each principle in turn, though the main aim is to show how together they cast doubt on the possibility of second-hand aesthetic knowledge.
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41

Ginsborg, Hannah. Empiricism and Normative Constraint. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809630.003.0006.

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McDowell holds that our thinking, in order to have intentional content, must stand in a normative relation to empirical reality. He thinks that this condition can be satisfied only if we adopt “minimal empiricism”: the view that beliefs and judgements stand in rational relations to perceptual experiences, conceived as passive. I raise two complementary difficulties for minimal empiricism, one challenging McDowell’s view that experiences, conceived as passive, can be reasons for belief, the other challenging his view of experience as presupposing conceptual capacities. I go on to argue that minimal empiricism is not necessary for satisfying the condition that thinking be normatively related to the empirical world. There is another way of understanding the relation between thought and reality which construes it as normative without being rational: we can understand it as the world’s normative constraint on the activity through which empirical concepts, and hence empirical thinking, become possible.
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42

Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Men; A Vindication of the Rights of Woman; An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution. Edited by Janet Todd. Oxford University Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/owc/9780199555468.001.0001.

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This volume brings together extracts of the major political writings of Mary Wollstonecraft in the order in which they appeared in the revolutionary 1790s. It traces her passionate and indignant response to the excitement of the early days of the French Revolution and then her uneasiness at its later bloody phase. It reveals her developing understanding of women’s involvement in the political and social life of the nation and her growing awareness of the relationship between politics and economics and between political institutions and the individual. In personal terms, the works show her struggling with a belief in the perfectibility of human nature through rational education, a doctrine that became weaker under the onslaught of her own miserable experience and the revolutionary massacres. Janet Todd’s introduction illuminates the progress of Wollstonecraft’s thought, showing that a reading of all three works allows her to emerge as a more substantial political writer than a study of The Rights of Woman alone can reveal.
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43

Lorino, Philippe. Pragmatism and Organization Studies. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198753216.001.0001.

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The development of pragmatist thought (Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead) in the first half of the twentieth century in the United States deeply impacted political science, semiotics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, education, law. Later intellectual trends (analytical philosophy, structuralism, cognitivism) focusing on rational representations or archetypical models somehow sidelined Pragmatism for three decades. In the world of organizations, they often conveyed the Cartesian dream of rational control, which became the mainstream view in management and organization research. In response to the growing uncertainty and complexity of situations, social sciences have experienced a “pragmatist turn.” Many streams of organization research have criticized the view of organizations as information-processing structures, controlled through rational representations. They share some key theoretical principles: the processual view of organizing as “becoming”; the emphasis on the key role of action; the agential power of objects; the exploratory and inquiring nature of organizing. These are precisely the key theses of pragmatists, who formulated a radical critique of the dualisms which hinder organization studies (thought/action, decision/execution, reality/representation, individual/collective, micro/macro) and developed key concepts applicable to organization studies (inquiry, semiotic mediation, habit, abduction, trans-action, valuation). This book aims to make the pragmatist intellectual framework more accessible to organization and management scholars. It presents some fundamental pragmatist concepts, and their potential application to the study of organizations, drawing conclusions concerning managerial practices, in particular the critique of the Taylorian tradition and the promotion of continuous improvement. To enhance accessibility, each theme is illustrated by real cases experienced by the author.
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44

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Uncertainty. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0008.

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Recent forms of expressivism attempt to explain the sense in which certain propositions are ‘non-factual’ in terms of principles about attitudes towards those propositions. Following recent expressivist accounts of conditionals and modals, a version of expressivism about vagueness is explored, which maintains that to have a credence in a vague proposition is just to have your credences in the precise propositions distributed in a certain way. Whilst this form of expressivism is ultimately rejected, a consequence of the view can be exploited to partially capture the intuition that certain subject matters are non-factual. This principle, Rational Supervenience’, effectively states that all disagreements about the vague ultimately boil down to disagreements about the precise: any two rational priors that agree about all precise propositions agree about everything. While the Principle of Plenitude states that there is a proposition occupying every evidential role, Rational Supervenience entails conversely that every proposition occupies some evidential role.
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45

Irwin, Terence. Ethics Through History. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199603701.001.0001.

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This book is a selective discussion of the tradition in moral philosophy that runs from Socrates to the present. The main themes: (1) Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics take different positions in debates the relation between morality (including right action and the character of virtuous agents) and the human good. Aquinas’ version of an Aristotelian view identifies the human good with the fulfilment of human nature and capacities in a just society. These facts about the human good can be discovered by rational reflexion on human nature and human needs. (2) These views both about the content of ethics and about the sources of ethical knowledge are questioned by Scotus and later writers on natural law. Voluntarists take the principles of natural law and moral right to be the products of will; naturalists take them to be discovered by reason. (3) The dispute about will and reason is the source of the long dispute between sentimentalists (Hutcheson, Hume) and rationalists (Butler, Price, Reid) about whether moral judgment has a non-rational or a rational basis. Kant tries to resolve this dispute. (4) These arguments lead to further discussion about what makes morally right actions right. Sentimentalists, followed by Mill and Sidgwick and by later utilitarians, argue that actions are right in so far as they maximize pleasure. Others, including the rationalists, Kant, Ross, and Rawls, argue that moral principles are not subordinate to utility.
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46

Lord, Errol. The Importance of Being Rational. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815099.001.0001.

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The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book’s central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. The book defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. It is shown that these views not only help to support the book’s main thesis, they also help to resolve several important problems that are independent of rationality. The account of possession provides novel contributions to debates about what determines what we ought to do, and the account of correctly responding to reasons provides novel contributions to debates about causal theories of reacting for reasons. After defending views about possession and correctly responding, it is shown that the account of rationality can solve two difficult problems about rationality. The first is the New Evil Demon problem. The book argues that the account has the resources to show that internal duplicates necessarily have the same rational status. The second problem concerns the ‘normativity’ of rationality. Recently it has been doubted that we ought to be rational. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that the requirements of rationality are the requirements that we ultimately ought to comply with. If this is right, then rationality is of fundamental importance to our deliberative lives.
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47

Jacobs, Jonathan. Gratitude, Humility, and Holiness in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198796497.003.0006.

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Important medieval Jewish thinkers such as Saadia Gaon and Baḥya ibn Pakuda assigned a crucial role to reason and the intellect in their understanding of Judaism. They did not thereby challenge Jewish tradition as much as show its rational depth and truth. They believed that tradition supports reason, and reason is to be employed in deepening our understanding of tradition. This view also shaped their conceptions of holiness. Our best understanding of divine wisdom and the commandments—and thus, our best prospect for striving to be holy—involves the exercise of reason. Revelation is a source of rational wisdom. Although the holiness attainable by human beings is not purely or exclusively intellectual, it depends on an appreciation of divine holiness through the understanding.
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48

Kelly, Thomas. Disagreement in Philosophy. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.6.

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This article explores the epistemological significance of disagreement in philosophy in the light of some currently prominent theories of disagreement. More specifically, it asks whether the kind of pervasive and intractable disagreement that is characteristic of philosophy warrants a certain kind of skepticism about the subject. Some hold that, given the kind of disagreement found in philosophy, it would be irrational to hold confident views about controversial philosophical questions. According to this line of thought, the rational response to the diversity of opinion within philosophy is that of the philosophical agnostic, who consistently suspends judgment about controversial issues. Against this, it is argued that there is no plausible view about the epistemology of disagreement on which philosophical agnosticism is compelling.
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49

Schellenberg, Betty A., and Karen O’Brien. Bluestocking Women and Rational Female Fiction. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199574803.003.0008.

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This chapter examines views on the emerging novel developed by a loose network of mid-eighteenth-century women who came to be known as the Bluestocking circle, and the legacy of these views for succeeding women novelists. It will look at how Frances Burney's four fictional works can be seen as furthering, while revising, this legacy within an increasingly mainstream novel tradition, but also at how ongoing resistance to this generic mainstream resulted in consistently ‘Bluestocking’ forms of rational fiction in a primarily Scottish Enlightenment context. The brief overview of Burney's rational fictions focuses on a seeming paradox in her version of the rational novel—her tendency to subject her heroines to a bout of madness.
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50

Wedgwood, Ralph. Epistemic Teleology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0005.

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Wedgwood focuses his discussion around two evaluative concepts: correctness and rationality. Wedgwood proposes that these two concepts are related in the following way: one belief state is more rational than another if and only if the first has less expected inaccuracy than the former. He argues, however, that this view should not be understood as a form of consequentialism since it is not the total consequences of a belief state that determine its rationality. The view is rather a version of epistemic teleology. Wedgwood deploys this view to illuminate the difference between synchronic and diachronic evaluation of belief states as well as to disarm objections that have been leveled against epistemic consequentialism.
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