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Journal articles on the topic 'Rationalism'
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Tropman, Elizabeth. "Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge." Disputatio 4, no. 33 (November 1, 2012): 459–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2012-0011.
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Abstract According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a priori. Rationalists often defend their position by claiming that some moral propositions are self-evidently true. Copp 2007 has recently challenged this rationalist strategy. Copp argues that even if some moral propositions are self-evident, this is not enough to secure rationalism about moral knowledge, since it turns out that such self-evident propositions are only knowable a posteriori. This paper considers the merits of Copp’s challenge. After clarifying the rationalists’ appeal to self-evidence, I show why this rationalist strategy survives Copp’s challenges to it.
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Hu, Hongyu. "Analysis of the Causes of the Iraq War from Rationalism Perspective." BCP Social Sciences & Humanities 16 (March 26, 2022): 554–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpssh.v16i.512.
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The causes of the Iraq war can be analyzed from both non-rationalism and rationalism. This essay will discuss that the rationalist framework can give a more suitable insight into the purpose and reason driving these states to act. First of all, for the definition of the rationalist framework, it assumes the actors acting rationally. This essay will outline the Iraq War and analyze its reasons from rationalism, resulting in three main causes, power transition, uncertainty and expected value. All of them would lead to the same outcome, preventive war. On the other hand, this essay will discuss the Non-rationalist analysis and I will oppose these explanations to conclude that rationalism can provide a more accurate explanation.
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DiGiuseppe, Raymond, and Jean Linscott. "Philosophical Differences Among Cognitive Behavioral Therapists: Rationalism, Constructivism, or Both ?" Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 7, no. 2 (January 1993): 117–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0889-8391.7.2.117.
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This study attempted to validate Mahoney’s classification of cognitive behavioral therapists into rationalists or constructivists and to verify his hypothesis that Rational-Emotive therapists hold more rationalist attitudes than do other cognitive behavioral therapists. It was also hypothesized that the preference for disputing irrational thoughts early in therapy would also serve to distinguish between general cognitive behavioral and RE therapists. Cognitive behavioral (CB) and RE therapists completed a questionnaire representing Mahoney’s categorization of rationalist and constructivist philosophies and the preference for disputing irrational beliefs early in therapy. Factor analysis yielded three distinct consistent factors named “rationalism,” “constructivism,” and “early disputing.” Each demonstrating adequate internal consistency. Analysis of variance indicated that RE therapists endorsed significantly more rationalist items than cognitive behavioral therapists. There were no significant group differences in the endorsement of constructivist items or disputing irrational beliefs early in therapy. General CB therapists significantly endorsed more constructivist than rationalist philosophies. Results of the study provide empirical support for Mahoney’s two-factor designation, but provide evidence indicating that rationalism and constructivism are not bipolar philosophies. Therapists can hold beliefs on each separately.
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Kurun, Ismail. "Avicenna's Intuitionist Rationalism." History of Philosophy Quarterly 38, no. 4 (October 1, 2021): 317–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.4.02.
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Abstract This study is the first part of an attempt to settle a vigorous debate among historians of medieval philosophy by harnessing the resources of analytic philosophy. The debate is about whether Avicenna's epistemology is rationalist or empirical. To settle the debate, I first articulate in this article the three core theses of rationalism and one core thesis of empiricism. Then, I probe Avicenna's epistemology in his major works according to the first core thesis of rationalism (the intuition thesis). In the end, I find Avicenna committed to this thesis in at least one substantive way, namely, in his claim to intuit the intelligible forms or essences. This suffices to count Avicenna as rationalist. In a subsequent article, I shall probe Avicenna's epistemology according to the other two core theses of rationalism, presenting further evidence that he was a rationalist, not an empiricist.
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Marino, Patricia. "Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence." Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, no. 2 (2010): 227–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552409x12574076813478.
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AbstractThis paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to do, whether you want to do it or not. For these reasons to be non-agent-relative, coherence would have to be grounded in rationality, but I argue that it is not. I analyze, and reject, various strategies for establishing a coherence-rationality connection, considering in detail a purported analogy between desires and a priori beliefs, with particular attention to the case of mathematics.
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Sepetyi, Dmytro. "Non-justificationism and the Negativist Legend about Karl Popper’s Philosophy." Актуальні проблеми духовності, no. 21 (December 27, 2020): 24–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/apd.v0i21.3873.
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This paper discusses the meaning of non-justificationism as an important part of Karl Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism and William Bartley’s philosophy of pancritical rationalism. Сonstruals and attempted developments of critical rationalism by David Miller and Alan Musgrave are analysed and critically evaluated. The case is made that Miller’s rejection of the relevance of reasons for rationality runs counter to Popper’s view and is not supported by Popper’s and Bartley’s non-justificationist arguments. Besides, it is untenable because rationality cannot be reduced to the validity of arguments plus truth-value attributing «decisions» but essentially involves weighing up reasons for and against available options. With respect to Musgrave’s construal of non-justificationism and critical rationalism as the view that believing a proposition is rational if the proposition best survives critical scrutiny, it is argued that it is vulnerable to the problem of the infinite regress of criticizers (positions with which the scrutiny is to be carried out). The case is made that Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism is to be understood as the identification of rationality with the openness to critical discussion in the search for truth and the claim that such discussion does not require ultimate unrevisable foundations, although it necessarily involves positions that are accepted for the purposes of the argument at hand without being provided with justification. In the perspective of critical rationalism, such positions play the role similar to that of «immediate knowledge» of classical rationalism and empiricism; however, unlike the latter, they are considered as fallible, open to examination, and revisable.
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Kail, P. J. E. "Hume, Malebranche and ‘Rationalism’." Philosophy 83, no. 3 (July 2008): 311–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819108000697.
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AbstractTraditionally Hume is seen as offering an ‘empiricist’ critique of ‘rationalism’. This view is often illustrated – or rejected – by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'. However the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical ‘rationalist’ is with Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows that the fundamental differences (among the many similarities) between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, and that there is some truth in the traditional story. This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called ‘rationalism’.
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Hamzah, Hakma, Achmad Khudori Soleh, and Azmi Putri Ayu Wardani. "Islamic Rationalism." JURNAL PENELITIAN KEISLAMAN 20, no. 1 (June 30, 2024): 94–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/jpk.v20i1.10347.
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Long before Greek philosophy influenced Islamic thought, Islam already had a tradition of rational thinking. This study traces the role of language in the development of Islamic rationalism and addresses 19th-century Orientalists' claims that Islamic philosophy is merely an imitation of Greek philosophy. Using a qualitative library research approach, the study finds:(1) The rationalism in Islam is a genuine product of Islamic intellectual effort, rooted in the Qur'an and Hadith. The interpretation of these sources gave rise to the Islamic rational system, particularly through the study of language (nahw-sarf), proving that Islamic rationalism is an intrinsic part of its tradition.(2) The claim that Islamic rationalism is adopted from Greek thought is countered by evidence that rational thinking was practiced in Islam long before Greek philosophy's influence. Muslim philosophers further developed Greek ideas, creating a unique form of rationality known as hikmah, demonstrating that Islamic philosophy is an original intellectual tradition.
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Havlík, Vladimír. "David Miller a racionalita bez „dobrých důvodů“? Ke kritice Millerovy interpretace kritického racionalismu." Teorie vědy / Theory of Science 40, no. 1 (November 16, 2018): 63–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.46938/tv.2018.383.
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David Miller in his books Critical Rationalism (1994) and Out of Error (2006), as one of the few Popper’s students, tries not only to explain and defend Popper’s critical rationalism but also to develop it further. Miller’s restatement of critical rationalism, however, assumes that no “good reason,” but only arguments are needed for rational action. Th is article focuses precisely on this question of the existence of the so-called “good reasons” in connection with rationality and rational decision-making and shows that Miller’s demand for the absence of “good reasons” is not only too radical but also unacceptable in terms of Popper’s or Musgrave’s concepts of critical rationalism.
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Elizondo, E. Sonny. "More than a feeling." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 3-4 (August 2014): 425–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.959360.
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According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing on underappreciated elements of Kant’s moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational.
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Assunção, Carlos, and Carla Araújo. "Entries on the History of Corpus Linguistics." Linha D'Água 32, no. 1 (April 9, 2019): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2236-4242.v32i1p39-57.
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Corpus linguistics is anchored in a theoretical paradigm characterised by an empiricist approach and as well as by a conception of language as a probabilistic system. In linguistics, empiricism Empiricism is an approach that grants primordial status to data coming from the observation of language, generally grouped together in a corpus, as opposed to rationalism Rationalism. Rationalism is based on the study of language through introspection, which is regarded as a way of assessing models of structural functioning and the formation of the cognitive process of language. As a result, there is a chasm between the philosophical perspectives characteristic of the empiricist and rationalist conceptions of language, represented by its main contributors. On the one hand, there is Halliday, a representative of the empiricist conception, and, on the other hand, Chomsky, the greatest figure of Rationalism rationalism in linguistics. However, new approaches need to be taken into consideration. From all these conceptions the greatest number of works of corpus linguistics has been derived, in the areas of lexicography and terminology – production of dictionaries, glossaries, terminological databases, etc.
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Kalbasi, Fahimeh. "The Role of Rationalism and Thoughtfulness in Educating the Moral Society Using Imam Ali Hadiths." International Journal of Cultural and Religious Studies 2, no. 2 (December 1, 2022): 53–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.32996/ijcrs.2022.2.2.6.
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In Islamic culture, rationality and the implementation of the secondary meanings for rationality and wisdom have a unique interpretation in Islam that is not comparable to other religions and cultures. Rationalism has such a high status in Islamic jurisprudence that Islamic rationalism is complete. Islam considers moral education as the leading foundation for a complete education. Therefore, rational education is parallel to moral education. Moral education is the guidance and education of the human psyche through the rational side. In rational education, the heart of man is the center of rationalism. The heart of every human is educated through the verses of the Qur'an and the hadiths of the Imams. Therefore, the social structure of an Islamic society is endowed with an infinite moral aspect that stabilizes man's situation in society and clarifies his relationship with society - the demands and conditions of the new situation guide the individual and society to grow. According to Nahj-Al-Balaghah, optional behavior is attributed to a human being. A wise person is expected to improve and develop the compelling aspects of rationalism and guard against inhibiting factors of rationalism. Therefore, the wise person can appropriately benefit from the achievements of forward-looking action and begin a life of happiness and pride. In many narrations of Imam Ali (A.S.) about the qualities of wisdom and the forward-looking wise man, wisdom is the most vital source to recognize truth and falsehood and perform good deeds. This paper examines the role of rationalism and thoughtfulness in educating the moral society through the hadiths of Imam Ali (A.S.).
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Doney, Willis. "RATIONALISM." Southern Journal of Philosophy 21, S1 (March 26, 2010): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1983.tb01533.x.
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Riley, Jonathan. "Interpreting Berlin’s Liberalism." American Political Science Review 95, no. 2 (June 2001): 283–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401002039.
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I argue that Isaiah Berlin’s pluralistic liberalism is best interpreted as a sophisticated form of liberal rationalism, as Berlin himself suggests. His value pluralism, even if it is viewed (as his critics typically view it, with considerable justification) as claiming that any choice between conflicting incommensurable values cannot be a rational choice, does not subvert his liberalism. Rather, this agonistic pluralism emanates from his liberal rationalism, which pictures reason as too weak to resolve conflicts of incommensurables. Yet, reason remains strong enough to discover that certain basic liberal values, including those associated with some minimum core of equal rights, are far more important than any competing values created by mankind. Berlin apparently sees his pluralistic liberal rationalism as a genuine rationalism that, in stark contrast to mainstream utopian rationalisms which wildly exaggerate the power of reason, makes suitable room for the valid insights provided by the romantics.
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Ishaya, Samuel. "In Defence of Critical Rationalism." NIU Journal of Humanities 9, no. 1 (March 31, 2024): 169–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.58709/niujhu.v9i1.1849.
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The early Greek philosophers invented the tradition of adopting critical attitude towards explanations that were robed in mythic garbs. They not only challenged the explanations of the ancients, they also criticized and falsified long standing traditions with empirical observations and tests. This attitude to knowledge is what Karl Popper described as critical rationalism. Critical rationalists believe that scientific theory or any other claim to knowledge can and should be rationally criticized and if they have empirical content can and should be subjected to tests which may falsify them. Claims to knowledge that are potentially falsifiable can be admitted to the body of empirical science while not foreclosing further falsification. But this kind of rationalism was faulted by some philosophers including Paul Feyerabend who argued that it may not be easy for science to grow by the rules of critical rationalism but that scientific knowledge will be better off with the method of ‘anything goes’. The objective of this paper was to critically evaluate some of the criticisms against critical rationalism to ascertain their validity or otherwise. The analytic method was used. The paper is of the view that the rejection of critical rationalism and the recommendation of anarchism for the growth of science is misplaced because lawlessness breeds neither growth nor knowledge. Keywords: Critical rationalism, Falsification, Anything-goes, Conjectures, Knowledge
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BENNETT, JOSHUA. "A HISTORY OF “RATIONALISM” IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN." Modern Intellectual History 15, no. 1 (November 3, 2015): 63–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244315000438.
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“Rationalism” became the subject of intense debate in nineteenth-century Britain. This article asks why this was so, by focusing on the usage and implications of the term in contemporary argument. Rationalism was successively defined and redefined in ways that reached to the heart of Victorian epistemological and religious discussion. By treating rationalism as a contextually specific term, and examining how its implications changed between the 1820s and the early twentieth century, the article brings new perspectives to bear on the development of nineteenth-century freethought and countervailing religious apologetic. It underlines the importance of history, and constructions of intellectual lineage, as ways of establishing the relationship between rationality and religion in a progressively wider-ranging Victorian debate about the sources of knowledge and value.
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Metelyova, Tatyana. "The crisis of rationality as a symptom of the crisis of systematicity." Sententiae 8, no. 1 (December 11, 2023): 17–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.31649/sent08.01.017.
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The author shows that the search for new, non-classical forms of rationality is a symptom of the crisis of systematicity in human existence. Rationalism is a worldview correspondence to systemic human existence, and the limits of rationalism coincide with the limits of systematicity. Referring to postmodern philosophy, the author proves that human existence is not limited to systematicity. The scientific scope of the general, the ratio, is inferior to other horizons – aesthetic, moral, mystical, etc. culture-building existence has now declared itself as the only truly human, supersystemic being-in-freedom, whose logic is not limited to rationality. The crisis of rationality has led to an understanding of man as not needing any guidance, and the highest manifestation of his unlimited freedom is his own uncaused self-restraint.
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Kwasnicki, Witold. "Legacy of Ludwig von Mises: Rationalism." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 57, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 41–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2019-0003.
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Abstract There are three intentions (aims) of this paper. First, to focus the attention of readers to three not so well known and least frequently quoted by economists of Mises’s books, namely his 1957 Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution, and two closely related The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (1962), and Epistemological Problems of Economics (1933/1960). The second aim is to outline Mises’s legacy, presented in the form of eleven dimensions of Mises’s Intellectual Universe. The eleven dimensions of Mises’s system are: Economics as science, praxeology, and human action; Methodological dualism; Judgments of value and subjectivism; Individualism; Rationalism and human action; Consumer; Cooperation and competition; Thymology; Mathematics in economics; Predictions; and Historical analysis. Third, to present the main issues related to Mises’s concept of rationalism. There is no mention of Ludwig von Mises’s concept of rationality in a great number of books and papers dealing with the understanding of the rationality of human beings. The concept of rationality proposed by Ludwig von Mises is neglected by modern researchers and economists of different schools, but especially by mainstream economists. A good example of neglecting Mises’s ideas on rationality is the latest book by Nassim Taleb, Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Although Taleb’s proposition of understanding rationality and irrationality is very close to the concept of Mises, he does not refer to Mises’s work at all. No single word on Mises in that book!
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Waters, James W. "Ecology, Divinity, and Reason." Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology 24, no. 2 (July 10, 2020): 184–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685357-20201002.
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Abstract Eco-feminist Val Plumwood has argued that as heirs of rationalism, the developed world has created an ecological crisis that is truly a crisis of reason. Of primary concern is the “rationalist hyper-separation of human identity from nature,” which has caused a great epistemological schism between ethics and ecology. Assuming the ecological crisis is, as Plumwood argues, an epistemological crisis enflamed by the human/non-human, ethical/ecological divisions that take place in modern forms of rationalism, this essay argues that certain western interpretations of Christian divinity—particularly the notion of divinity purported by Thomas Aquinas—have historically supported hegemonic forms of rationalism and human supremacy. After showing that certain Thomist formulations of the divine have buttressed the anthropocentric elements of modern rationalism, I venture a reading of Christian divinity that is radically relational in character. This reading of the divine highlights the inseparability of the human and non-human, and begins doing so by emphasizing the intimate connection between human and non-human animality. Such a re-framing of divinity, I argue, could help bridge the human/non-human, ethical/ecological divides, complicate anthropocentric logic, and mitigate the vast eco-epistemological crisis of our day.
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Chiappin, José R. Novaes. "Rationality, Decision, Problem Solving and The Program of Rationalism." Ciência e filosofia, no. 5 (December 1, 1996): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2447-9799.cienciaefilosofi.1996.105315.
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Neste ensaio, procura-se introduzir um esboço de um programa de pesquisa acerca da natureza, objeto, estrutura e dinâmica das teorias e modelos da racionalidade. Este programa envolve, em primeiro lugar, uma reconstrução racional dessas teorias e modelos ao longo da história da filosofia. E, em segundo lugar, a partir desses quadros teóricos reconstruídos, são enquadradas e sustentadas teses e colocados e resolvidos problemas específicos a respeito das concepções filosóficas que partilham dessas teorias e modelos de racionalidade. Ambos os objetivos são perseguidos segundo a estratégia de apresentar inicialmente os principais instrumentos teóricos, entre os quais se destacam as noções de programa de pesquisa, da metodologia da teoria da ciência, teoria de solução de problemas, de modelos de decisão e modelos de conhecimento, e depois proporcionar aplicações destes instrumentos, com os quais enquadramos e reconstruímos, de maneira geral, as teorias ou modelos de racionalidade. De maneira particular, este ensaio propõe-se a reconstruir, com os instrumentos acima, o programa do racionalismo clássico e defender, no quadro teórico proporcionado por esta reconstrução, três teses principais sobre ele. A primeira afirma que o elemento básico deste programa consiste em assumir que a natureza característica do conhecimento (ciência) é a certeza. Assim, o objetivo é apontar que para este particular programa a noção fundamental é que todo conhecimento é conhecimento certo. A segunda tese afirma que este programa contém duas vertentes: a intelectualista e a empirista. Com tal tese pretende-se que o programa racionalista clássico forme um quadro teórico abrangente no interior do qual são construídas estas duas vertentes da teoria do conhecimento da filosofia clássica e no interior do qual todos os problemas dessas teorias do conhecimento devem ser resolvidos. Finalmente, a terceira tese pretende afirmar que este programa, com sua pressuposição do conhecimento como conhecimento certo, é um programa degenerativo. Ele é degenerativo no sentido de que a extensão de seu domínio do conhecimento, ao longo das tentativas de implementa-lo e desenvolve-lo com Locke e, então, Hume, segundo a exigência do conhecimento certo, diminui, até o ponto, com Hume, de transformar-se num domínio vazio. Mas, neste artigo, o objetivo é apenas apresentar o programa de pesquisa sobre a racionalidade
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Margineanu, Valentin. "From the rationalism abandonment to the return to rationality." Journal of the National Institute of Justice, no. 1(64) (May 2023): 19–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.52277/1857-2405.2023.1(64).03.
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The article represents a plea for the return to rationality in law by approaching the fundamental aspect, the material aspect of rationality in law, that rationality which allows the identification of criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of law and the relationship between Law and Act. In this context, a historical retrospective of the evolution of the concept of rationality in law is carried out, which demonstrates the need to continue this theoretical approach until it becomes a reality in the conditions in which we aim to overcome the gap between the theoretical and applied framework, and the getting out of the crisis of law. Also, the vital necessity to return to rationality in law is justified, including through practical but also scientific arguments. At the same time, the study represents an appeal, a call to return to rationality and responsibility in the knowledge and application of the law and to continue efforts in order to achieve this desideratum.
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Kalderon, Mark Eli, and Jerrold Katz. "Realistic Rationalism." Philosophical Review 109, no. 3 (July 2000): 456. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2693707.
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Norris, Christopher. "Naturalistic rationalism." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 50 (2010): 88–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20105071.
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TACHIBANA, Kiichi. "Tolerant Rationalism." Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 9, no. 5 (2000): 245–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.4288/jafpos1956.9.245.
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Brown, Harold I. "Critical Rationalism." International Studies in Philosophy 35, no. 4 (2003): 378–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil2003354162.
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Resnik, Michael D. "Realistic Rationalism." Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 4 (1999): 207–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil199996427.
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Peacocke, Christopher. "Moral Rationalism." Journal of Philosophy 101, no. 10 (2004): 499–526. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2004101104.
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Leech, Jessica. "Modal Rationalism." Dialectica 65, no. 1 (January 20, 2011): 103–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01251.x.
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Kalderon, M. E. "REALISTIC RATIONALISM." Philosophical Review 109, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 456–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-456.
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Dasgupta, Shamik. "Metaphysical Rationalism." Noûs 50, no. 2 (November 19, 2014): 379–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12082.
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Geurst, Jeroen, and Charles Rattray. "Nuanced Rationalism." Architectural Research Quarterly 17, no. 3-4 (December 2013): 330–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1359135514000189.
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Minogue, Kenneth. "Economic Rationalism." Economic Affairs 14, no. 1 (November 1993): 58–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.1993.tb00097.x.
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Resnik, Michael D., and Jerrold J. Katz. "Realistic Rationalism." Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 4 (April 1999): 207. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2564703.
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Mahmoud, Tamer Nagy. "Arab Rationalism." Foreign Policy, no. 136 (May 2003): 90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3183634.
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CLARK, ANDY. "Minimal Rationalism." Mind 102, no. 408 (1993): 587–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/102.408.587.
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CLARK, ANDY. "Minimal Rationalism." Mind 102, no. 408 (1993): 588–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/102.408.588.
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Lam, Chi-Ming. "Confucian Rationalism." Educational Philosophy and Theory 46, no. 13 (October 13, 2014): 1450–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2014.965653.
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Minogue, Kenneth. "Rationalism revisited." Society 43, no. 2 (January 2006): 81–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02687375.
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Dousa, Thomas M. "Intellection and Intuition: On the Epistemology of S.R. Ranganathan." NASKO 7, no. 1 (September 23, 2019): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.7152/nasko.v7i1.15637.
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The Indian librarian and library theorist S.R. Ranganathan (1892-1970) is generally recognized as a seminal figure in the development of facet analysis and its application to classification theory. In recent years, commentators on the epistemology of knowledge organization have claimed that the methods of facet analysis reflect a fundamentally rationalist approach to classification. Yet, for all the interest in the epistemological bases of Ranganathan’s classification theory, little attention has been paid to his theory of how human beings acquire knowledge of the world – i.e., his epistemology proper – or to the question whether this theory reflects a rationalist outlook. This paper examines Ranganathan’s statements on the origins of knowledge to assess if they are congruent with rationalist epistemology. Ranganathan recognized two different modes of knowledge – intellection (i.e., intellectual operations on sense data) and intuition (i.e., direct cognition of things-in-themselves) -- and it is in virtue of the latter that his epistemology can be considered to fall within the ambit of rationalism. Intuition as a source of knowledge plays a role in Ranganathan’s classification theory, most notably in his model of scientific method underlying classification development, his vision of the organization of classification design, and his conceptualization of seminal mnemonics and a reduced number of fundamental categories as important elements in the design of classification notation. Not only does intuition subtend the rationalism of Ranganathan’s epistemology but it also serves as a bridge to another often-neglected aspect of his thought, namely his valorization of mysticism. Indeed, Ranganathan’s theory of knowledge is best characterized as mystical rationalism
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Castellano-Durán, Rubén D. "Rationalizing ‘Vivir Bien’: The Modern State and the formal limits to transformative rationalism in Bolivia." Intersections 9, no. 3 (2023): 87–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v9i3.1139.
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Drawing on the 2011 march against a highway project through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and IndigenousTerritory (TIPNIS) in Bolivia, this paper reviews Max Weber’s conceptions on rationality, situating the TIPNIS protestin the interface between the modern formal-instrumental rationality of Bolivian State with the Substantive rationalityproposed as ‘Vivir Bien’; an umbrella term for a conglomeration of Latin American indigenous proposals for asustainable human and nature relationship beyond neoliberalism, colonialism, and their cultural and environmentalconsequences. As any modern institution, the Bolivian State seeks to impose modern means-ends calculations,discourses and practices, thus subduing the original transformational potential of ‘Vivir Bien’ as a different rationality,with its means-ends framework, knowledge and patterns of action.In this regard, from a Weberian critique of Modernity, two questions will be raised. First, to recognize the modernstate as the institutional embodiment of modern formal-instrumental rationality, bounded to the means-ends frameworksettled by Modernity. Secondly, to evaluate the conditions for the possibility of incorporating other rationalities into themodern state, allowing another means-ends calculation for state policy-making as well as other patterns of action andsociality.From these considerations, this paper realizes modern rationalism in front of other rationalisms, other humanworldviews and practices in a critical search of alternative approaches and proposals to attend to local and globalproblems that threaten sustainable human existence, from environmental devaluation to social inequality.
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Hall, John R., and Ernest Gellner. "Reason and Culture: The Historic Role of Rationality and Rationalism." Contemporary Sociology 22, no. 2 (March 1993): 286. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2075816.
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Levchenko, Tetyana. "Rationalism and fideism in the discourse of Ukrainian Protestantism." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 91 (September 11, 2020): 151–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2020.91.2138.
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The article analyzes the forms of rationalism and fideism proposed by Ukrainian Protestant theologians at the beginning of the XXI century. It turns out that these forms of rationalism and fideism were made possible by overcoming the anti-intellectualism that was characteristic of Protestantism in Soviet times. The opposition of tendencies to rationalism and fideism is connected with the positioning of Ukrainian Protestants in the postmodern times. Proponents of de facto rationalism propose to reconstruct the modern religious worldview, re-synthesizing elements of liberal and fundamentalist concepts. The study shows that hopes for the restoration of the modern worldview in the face of the challenges of the early XXI century contain elements of utopianism. Proponents of Fideism suggest taking full account of the real state of affairs in the postmodern era and recognizing the impossibility for Christians to use modern rationalism in all its forms. At the same time, faith acquires special significance as an expression of the personal relations of the holy people with God.
Ukrainian Protestant rationalism in the article is analyzed on the example of the work of Sergei Golovin as the most consistent expression of this worldview. It has been proven that his ideas depend on the concepts of Norman Geisler, a prominent Protestant theologian. Golovin, imitating Geisler, believes that the Christian worldview should be the final superstructure over the foundation of classical logical rationalism and the ontology of being. This logic comes from classical Thomism. Golovin's rationalism is the rationalism of formal logic. Golovin's first controversial proposal is to reduce the paradoxes and contradictions contained in the Bible. Such a reduction contradicts the biblical studies of the beginning of the 21st century, and therefore can no longer be convincing for professional theologians. For ordinary believers, this reduction is an obscure rationalization of the image of God they have in reading the Scriptures. The second controversial proposition is to convert people first to logical rationality as the ideological foundation of humanity, and then to their conversion to Christianity. Such a proposal is largely outdated, because in the twentieth century it became clear that rationality in itself can be an instrument of any worldview and does not ensure the preservation or rehabilitation of humanity. By comparing it with theological practices of restoring humanity through the ethics of accepting another, the author argues that the restoration of humanity is possible through recourse to the potential of existentialist spirituality, theology of interpersonal communication, and other practical strategies of Christian theology. The biggest shortcoming of Sergei Golovin's rationalism is the proposal to build his own "scientific creationism", which denies the basic scientific theories of today. The most successful element of Golovin's system was social ethics, which offers the idea of a modern state governed by the rule of law as one that can be deduced from the spirit and letter of the biblical commandments.
The fideism of Ukrainian Protestant theology is born from the understanding that the ethical acceptance of others and love for them is possible only on the basis of personal faith. The challenges of the beginning of the 21st century require the acceptance of another, but individuals and communities lack the natural strength to accept such. And only faith and faith-generated love help to be open to others. Also, the post-capitalist economy of mutual gift, proposed by theologians and Christian communities, is based only on personal faith. It has been proven that the fideism of Ukrainian Protestant theology is closer to the ideas of postconservatism than the concepts of postliberalism.
It has been found that radical protection of individual rights and humane treatment of others is common to the rationalism and fideism of modern Ukrainian Protestant theology. It is these ideas that are important for understanding what humanity is, which should be a prerequisite for being a true Christian.
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Lyubimova, Tatyana B. "Uniformity vs. Unity." Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62, no. 7 (October 10, 2019): 54–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-7-54-72.
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The question of whether it is possible to philosophize outside the categories of rationalist philosophy is not limited to methodology. It has ideological overtones. Namely, the rationalism that has developed in philosophy in modern times, after Descartes, is inevitably supplemented by mechanics. The world is seen as a machine, the living is reduced to mechanisms. Rationalism becomes a machine of mentality. Taking it as a model of normal thinking, giving it a universal value, we thereby impose Western way of thinking on other cultures with a different mentality. The question, therefore, is not about the method of scientific knowledge but about the power realized through the transformation of mentality. Scientific knowledge conquers space. Philosophy produces a transformation of mentality. New rationalism, according to G. Bachelard, is in dialectical relation with the usual realism of the natural Sciences. In this process, there is the implementation of new schemes developed in the complex interaction of “ratio” and experiment. Modern science is the collective creation of a new reality. This is the reality of the “picture of the world.” There is another view of science, rationalism and modern philosophy. According to him, rationalism is dualism, atomism and social individualism. These features reveal the anti-traditional and anti-metaphysical spirit of modern Western civilization. The traditional approach is non-duality, unity provided by metaphysical principles. The new rationalism in science is characterized by the belief in the infinite progress of knowledge. But knowledge itself, from the point of view of tradition, is devoid of great value. Philosophy uses categories of ancient Greek philosophy or German classical philosophy, but they cannot be considered universal. They corresponded not only to the time and place, the conditions in which they arose, but also to the characteristic mentality of the peoples and individuals who created them. They are not suitable for understanding the metaphysical doctrines of traditional cultures. The language of traditional cultures is symbolic and synthetic in contrast to the analytical language of Western science and philosophy.
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Touraine, Alain. "The crisis of progress." European Review 1, no. 2 (April 1993): 117–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798700000466.
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The idea of continuous progress for mankind is no longer unquestioned. Problems of equality, rationality and emotion are unsolved. Conflict exists between cultural conformity and the threat of internationalism. In particular, modern rationalism is in conflict with traditional beliefs.
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Prelevic, Dusko. "Chalmers’ defense of the conceivability argument." Theoria, Beograd 54, no. 2 (2011): 25–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1102025p.
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Modal rationalism is a view according to which conceivability a priori entails metaphysical possibility. One of the most influential objections against this view is the claim that there are necessary a posteriori statements. For it seems that their falsity is conceivable but nevertheless metaphysically impossible. However, David Chalmers argues that modal rationalism could be compatible with the existence of necessary a posteriori statements because epistemic two-dimensional semantics framework could explain their nature and there are relevant senses of conceivability and possibility which could plausibly be connected. This paper assesses Chalmers? argument and shows that shifting the burden of proof to the skeptics is one of its best features. The zombie argument is a useful example which shows that even without epistemic two-dimensional semantics modal rationalism could be effective in metaphysics (i.e. it could defeat minimal physicalism). It is also argued in this paper that making parody of the zombie argument, in order to turn the table on modal rationalists, could be a better tool for distinguishing two senses of ideal positive primary conceivability. The zombie argument could be expressed in ?non-idealized? sense of ideal positive primary conceivability, while parody is bound to its ?idealized? reading only. This makes parody liable to objections which do not affect the zombie argument. The zombie argument and modal rationalism still stand.
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Chesterton, G. K. "Christianity and Rationalism." Chesterton Review 34, no. 1 (2008): 25–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chesterton2008341/279.
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Hämäläinen, Hasse. "Swedenborg’s Religious Rationalism." Journal of Early Modern Studies 10, no. 2 (2021): 91–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jems202110215.
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This article argues that contrary to a received interpretation, Emanuel Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences (scientia correspondentiarum), according to which each empirical reality has a corresponding spiritual reality, is closer to Spinozistic monism than Neoplatonic idealism. According to the former, there is only one substance: God, which we can cognize through its spiritual and material aspects. According to the latter, the material world consists of substances that receive their form through participation in the ideas of the spiritual world. The article will show that although some of Swedenborg’s claims can appear as expressing Neoplatonic idealism, his reading of the Bible as a guide for moral improvement, his rejection of the religious mysteries that cannot be rationally understood, his various examples of correspondences, his view that we can cognize God by studying the correspondences, and his definition of God as the only substance, make evident that he does not consider the spiritual realities ideas in the Neoplatonic sense. The article will interpret Swedenborg to think that the spiritual realities are learned concepts that enable us to describe and experience the world as having spiritual significance and thus acquire a fuller cognition of God.
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Aune, Bruce. "Against Moderate Rationalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2002_25.
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Lloyd, Genevieve. "Reconsidering Spinoza’s ‘Rationalism’." Australasian Philosophical Review 4, no. 3 (July 2, 2020): 196–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2021.1962647.
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Clarke, Justin Robert. "Affirming Anti-Rationalism." Southwest Philosophy Review 31, no. 1 (2015): 217–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201531122.
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