To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Rationalist.
Journal articles on the topic 'Rationalist'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Rationalist.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Tropman, Elizabeth. "Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge." Disputatio 4, no. 33 (2012): 459–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2012-0011.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a priori. Rationalists often defend their position by claiming that some moral propositions are self-evidently true. Copp 2007 has recently challenged this rationalist strategy. Copp argues that even if some moral propositions are self-evident, this is not enough to secure rationalism about moral knowledge, since it turns out that such self-evident propositions are only knowable a posteriori. This paper considers the merits of Copp’s challenge. After clarifying the rationalists’ appeal to self-evidence, I show why this rationalist strategy survives Copp’s challenges to it.
2
DiGiuseppe, Raymond, and Jean Linscott. "Philosophical Differences Among Cognitive Behavioral Therapists: Rationalism, Constructivism, or Both ?" Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 7, no. 2 (1993): 117–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0889-8391.7.2.117.
Full textAbstract:
This study attempted to validate Mahoney’s classification of cognitive behavioral therapists into rationalists or constructivists and to verify his hypothesis that Rational-Emotive therapists hold more rationalist attitudes than do other cognitive behavioral therapists. It was also hypothesized that the preference for disputing irrational thoughts early in therapy would also serve to distinguish between general cognitive behavioral and RE therapists. Cognitive behavioral (CB) and RE therapists completed a questionnaire representing Mahoney’s categorization of rationalist and constructivist philosophies and the preference for disputing irrational beliefs early in therapy. Factor analysis yielded three distinct consistent factors named “rationalism,” “constructivism,” and “early disputing.” Each demonstrating adequate internal consistency. Analysis of variance indicated that RE therapists endorsed significantly more rationalist items than cognitive behavioral therapists. There were no significant group differences in the endorsement of constructivist items or disputing irrational beliefs early in therapy. General CB therapists significantly endorsed more constructivist than rationalist philosophies. Results of the study provide empirical support for Mahoney’s two-factor designation, but provide evidence indicating that rationalism and constructivism are not bipolar philosophies. Therapists can hold beliefs on each separately.
3
Hu, Hongyu. "Analysis of the Causes of the Iraq War from Rationalism Perspective." BCP Social Sciences & Humanities 16 (March 26, 2022): 554–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpssh.v16i.512.
Full textAbstract:
The causes of the Iraq war can be analyzed from both non-rationalism and rationalism. This essay will discuss that the rationalist framework can give a more suitable insight into the purpose and reason driving these states to act. First of all, for the definition of the rationalist framework, it assumes the actors acting rationally. This essay will outline the Iraq War and analyze its reasons from rationalism, resulting in three main causes, power transition, uncertainty and expected value. All of them would lead to the same outcome, preventive war. On the other hand, this essay will discuss the Non-rationalist analysis and I will oppose these explanations to conclude that rationalism can provide a more accurate explanation.
4
Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. "Frank Ankersmit as a Rationalist." Journal of the Philosophy of History 12, no. 3 (2018): 345–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341402.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis paper examines Frank Ankersmit as a rationalist. I argue that there is a theory of rationality in Ankersmit, and that rationalism is an essential feature of his philosophy of history. It is salient that, according to Ankersmit, this theory of rationality can be discovered by a priori reasoning through analysing what the concept of representation entails. Ankersmit’s view is that Leibniz has best succeeded in defining what representation is. Further, Leibniz’s theory of representation, and the idea of rationality it entails, are understood to be applicable to history writing, too. The most important standard of rationality is scope. The historian is expected to maximize the scope of her representation, or to create a maximum distance between narrative statements and a narration. The attempts to maximize scope are hampered by other values which stand in opposition to it. For this reason, the historian has to, in effect, find the best possible compromises between two opposing forces – including as much diversity while maintaining as much order as possible, for example. However, no a priori reasoning, or philosophers at large, can in practice determine the most rational representation. This is achieved through historiographical debate and discourse by comparing one representation to its rivals. In the end, I pose some questions and challenges to Ankersmit’s theory of rationality.
5
Elias, Ifeanyi E. Uzoigwe. "A SYNTHESIS OF THE RATIONALIST IDEAS OF PLATO, DESCARTES, SPINOZA, AND LEIBNIZ AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 21ST CENTURY PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE." GPH-International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 05, no. 07 (2022): 26–35. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6907010.
Full textAbstract:
In synthesizing the rationalist postulates of Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, this study seeks to make evident those features that are common to these rationalist philosophers as well as their peculiarities and diversities as independent thinkers. The paper also tries to show the implications of these rationalist ideas for 21st century philosophical discourse. Rationalist epistemology, which came into prominence with the arrival of Rene Descartes to the epistemological rostrum, has been there right from the classical era. Though Plato is not a continental rationalist, he is construed in this research as a ‘charter member’ of the rationalist school of thought. Some of the fundamental features of the rationalists which include the preeminence of reason over and above sense experience, the idea of innatism, intuition, and the indispensable role of the human mind in acquisition of knowledge are all identified in Plato’s epistemic exploits. It is striking that though the rationalists have some features common to them, there also exist areas of epistemic divergence and peculiarities in the manner they conducted their independent debates. This has been construed as a problem by some scholars; however, this work conceives it as epistemic advancement and consolidation. Critical analysis is chiefly the research method employed in this study.
6
Kurun, Ismail. "Avicenna's Intuitionist Rationalism." History of Philosophy Quarterly 38, no. 4 (2021): 317–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.4.02.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This study is the first part of an attempt to settle a vigorous debate among historians of medieval philosophy by harnessing the resources of analytic philosophy. The debate is about whether Avicenna's epistemology is rationalist or empirical. To settle the debate, I first articulate in this article the three core theses of rationalism and one core thesis of empiricism. Then, I probe Avicenna's epistemology in his major works according to the first core thesis of rationalism (the intuition thesis). In the end, I find Avicenna committed to this thesis in at least one substantive way, namely, in his claim to intuit the intelligible forms or essences. This suffices to count Avicenna as rationalist. In a subsequent article, I shall probe Avicenna's epistemology according to the other two core theses of rationalism, presenting further evidence that he was a rationalist, not an empiricist.
7
Elizondo, E. Sonny. "More than a feeling." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 3-4 (2014): 425–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.959360.
Full textAbstract:
According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing on underappreciated elements of Kant’s moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational.
8
Glebe-Møller, Jens. "Grundtvig og rationalisterne." Grundtvig-Studier 62, no. 1 (2011): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/grs.v62i1.16580.
Full textAbstract:
Grundtvig og rationalisterne[Grundtvig and rationalist theology]By Jens Glebe MøllerAs is well known, Grundtvig disliked the Enlightenment and was a staunch opponent of the rationalist theology in his own days as well as in the 17th century. In this essay rationalist theology and its philosophical background is briefly presented as well as an article by Grundtvig from Theologisk Maanedsskrift 1825, in which he vehemently criticises the Enlightenment and, according to him, the widespread influence of rationalist theology in Denmark. A sermon from 1789, as well as the notes taken by Bishop Mynster in his Visitatsdagbøger (Journals of pastoral visitations), corroborate Grundtvig’s statement. However, Grundtvig himself was in more than one aspect an heir to the rationalists he so much despised. For one thing, in all his writings he revered the “truth-loving” reason and adhered to the principle of contradiction.Furthermore, like all the rationalist theologians he denied the dogma of the hereditary sin and devaluated the importance of the creeds of the primitive church as well as of The Augsburg Confession of the Lutheran Churches. While definitely a theologian in his own right, it would be wrong to completely sever Grundtvig from his rationalist heritage.
9
Lee, Byeong D. "A New Defense of the Rationalist Solution to Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle." Grazer Philosophische Studien 101, no. 4 (2025): 468–85. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000228.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The rationalist solution to Kavka’s toxin puzzle, advocated by Gauthier, asserts that it is rational to drink a vial of toxin as initially intended. However, this account faces two serious objections. Bratman argues that Gauthier’s account does not do justice to the temporal nature of the toxin scenario. And Levy objects that it depends on a problematic assumption that the rationality of a course of action transfers to its constituent action. This article aims to defend the rationalist solution against these objections. In response to Bratman’s objection, I argue that it is based on two problematic assumptions. Regarding Levy’s objection, I argue that the rationalist solution does not have to rely on the problematic assumption that the rationality of a course of action transfers to its constituent action.
10
Vasilionytė, Ieva. "RATIONALITY: NORMAL MENTAL FUNCTIONING OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COHERENCE?" Problemos 82 (January 1, 2012): 99–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2012.0.729.
Full textAbstract:
A version of the rationalist internalist argument, employing a pro tanto reading of the term “normative reason”, is often criticized due to its conception of rationality. It is said that the condition of rationality is insufficient to secure the necessary relation between the moral judgement and the respective motivation to act. I claim that such a criticism is based on the false supposition that rationality is to be identified with normal mental functioning. It is shown that for the rationalist internalists rationality does and should rather amount to inner psychological coherence, and that the respective conception of irrationality can account for all the purported counterexamples to the motivational internalism. In addition, I pinpoint that “full rationality” is neither an intuitive notion nor a necessary condition for the rationalist internalism to hold, therefore, a line of criticism employing the notion misses the target.Keywords: rationalist internalism, coherence, full rationality, pro tanto normative reason.Racionalumas: normalus psichinis funkcionavimas ar psichologinis koherentiškumas?Ieva VasilionytėSantrauka Racionalistinio internalizmo argumento versija, normatyvaus pagrindo terminą vartojanti pro tanto reikšme, neretai kritikuojama nusitaikius į jos racionalumo sampratą. Teigiama, kad veikėjo racionalumo sąlyga nėra pakankama būtinam ryšiui tarp moralinio sprendinio arba normatyvaus pagrindo bei atitinkamos motyvacijos veiksmui užtikrinti. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad tokia kritika remiasi klaidinga prielaida, jog racionalumas tapatintinas su normaliu psichiniu funkcionavimu. Parodoma, kad racionalistiniams internalistams racionalumas yra ir turėtų būti tapatintinas veikiau su vidiniu veikėjo psichologijos koherentiškumu, o atitinkama iracionalumo samprata pajėgi apimti visus motyvaciniam internalizmui tariamai prieštaraujančius atvejus. Taip pat patikslinama, jog „visiškas racionalumas“ nėra nei intuityvi sąvoka, nei būtina sąlyga racionalistinio internalizmo teisingumui, todėl kritika, besiremianti šia sąvoka, nepasiekia tikslo.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: racionalistinis internalizmas, racionalumas, koherentiškumas, visiškas racionalumas, pro tanto normatyvus pagrindas.
11
Schinckus, Christophe. "Essay on performance writing: Pataphysical Oulipo-ian perspective on the rationalist programme." Journal of Writing in Creative Practice 14, no. 1 (2021): 59–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/jwcp_00014_1.
Full textAbstract:
This article exemplifies the concept of performance writing through an essay that falls at the crossover point between academic (Apollonian) and artistic (Dionysian) piece of work caricaturing rationalist conservatism. By using an unconventional approach coming from French literature (pataphysics), this article explores the hilarity of well-constructed rationalist conservatism by irrationalizing it through a rigorous absurdity and visual entities. Such writing experience leads the reader to a visual Oulipo-ian dialogue illustrating the tension that an extreme rationalism might generate between thinkers.
12
Lohschelder, Sarah. "Why North Korean Foreign Policy Is Rational: an Application of Rationality Theories." Yonsei Journal of International Studies 9, no. 1 (2017): 56–83. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13329656.
Full textAbstract:
This article discusses whether the accusations against North Korea for pursuing irrational foreign policy are justified. To do so, the article will seek to define rational as well as irrational behavior. Rationalist behavior will be divided into two categories: strict rationality (rational choice theory) and loose rationality (constructivism, prospect theory, and cognitive models). These definitions will be applied to two case studies: the Agreed Framework of 1994 with the United States and South Korea’s Sunshine Policy during its early phase from 1998 until 2003. Each case study will consider rationalist and irrational explanations of North Korean foreign policy separately and then comparatively assess their explanatory merits. This analysis will indicate the conclusion that rationalist explanations are best able to account for North Korean foreign policy in a consistent manner. Based on the information currently available, it will be argued that North Korea is a rational actor in its foreign policy.
13
O’Leary, Chris. "Public Service Motivation: A Rationalist Critique." Public Personnel Management 48, no. 1 (2018): 82–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091026018791962.
Full textAbstract:
There has been a significant and growing interest, and growing empirical research, around Public Service Motivation (PSM) in recent years. There are few critiques of the construct, and none from a rationalist perspective. Given that the origins of PSM lie in attempts by public administration scholars to counter rationalist explanations of bureaucratic behavior, this lack of countercriticism is surprising. This article provides a rationalist critique of PSM. It argues that PSM is consistent with, and not an alternative to, rationalist understandings of what motivates individuals. It also argues that a significant gap in the PSM literature is around how civil servants and others make decisions; decisions about the public interest, and thus how and when to allocate public resources. It concludes that seeing PSM as consistent with rationality, and specifically as a form of expressive interests, answers many of the remaining questions about PSM and addresses the substantive gaps in the construct.
14
Marino, Patricia. "Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence." Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, no. 2 (2010): 227–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552409x12574076813478.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to do, whether you want to do it or not. For these reasons to be non-agent-relative, coherence would have to be grounded in rationality, but I argue that it is not. I analyze, and reject, various strategies for establishing a coherence-rationality connection, considering in detail a purported analogy between desires and a priori beliefs, with particular attention to the case of mathematics.
15
Agassi, Joseph. "The Limited Rationality of Technology." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49, no. 2 (2018): 160–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393118814765.
Full textAbstract:
Ingemar Nordin’s Using Knowledge: On the Rationality of Science, Technology, and Medicine is a critical rationalist examination of medicine as a social system, largely science-based, but including quackery. Thus rationality is limited, as befits the author’s fallibilism.
16
Shook, John R. "Rationalist atheology." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78, no. 3 (2014): 329–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9498-6.
Full text
17
Dudler, Max. "Rationalist Practice." Architectural Design 77, no. 5 (2007): 60–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ad.516.
Full text
18
Antonyuk, Halyna. "Homo rationalis: the formation of the new views on a person in the Ukraininan educational thought of the 17th – 18th centuries." Visnyk of the Lviv University. Series Pedagogics, no. 36 (2022): 3–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.30970/vpe.2022.36.11495.
Full textAbstract:
The article examines the development of the new views of humans, Homo rationalis, in the Ukrainian educational thought of the 17th-18th century. The study is based on the example of translated from Latin philosophical disciplines taught in the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. It was found that new ideas were connected to the strengthening of rationalist tendencies in all spheres of public life as well as in the practice of educational institutions, which deployed their activity at that period. Rationalist manifestations were clearly evident in teaching of human-oriented disciplines, in particular in Ethics. Ethics studies were a response to the social demands of the era, which called for a new individual – educated and active, who would direct their knowledge and skills to build a harmonious society, organized on a rational basis. Similar ideas and goals were dominant at the Ethics courses where the issues of freedom of will, the highest good, the purpose of human life and the possibilities of achieving happiness in real earthly life were developed. National Ethics taught during the described period became the platform for discussing the issues of the role of education and upbringing and possibility for people to realize their skills and abilities. Those courses emphasized the idea that a person, homo rationalis, armed with advanced scientific knowledge, guided by personal experience and cognitive abilities based on sensory perception and laws of thinking, can explore the world, and then, driven by rationalist principles, control and improve it. Ethics studies of the outlined epoch presented a combination of the achievements of rationalist Western European philosophical thought with its own irrational mental traditions dating back to the 10–11th, 12–15th centuries. The educational heritage presented in the courses of Kyiv Ethics of the 17–18th centuries deserves to be creatively used in the context of forming the life program of a person of the 21st century. Keywords: Ukrainian educational space, rationalist tradition, philosophical courses, Aristotelianism, ethics, freedom of will, higher good, happiness, person.
19
Deitelhoff, Nicole, and Harald Müller. "Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas." Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005): 167–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210505006364.
Full textAbstract:
Jürgen Habermas' thinking gained influence within the German International Relations (IR) community in the early 1990s. At the core of the so-called ‘ZIB-debate’ was the controversy whether rationalist theory can explain interstate cooperation. Constructivists accused rationalists of ignoring communication, language and reason, thereby leaving a logical gap in their analyses of interstate cooperation. This gap exists between the plausible motivation for states to cooperate and their actual achievement of cooperation. Rationalist approaches assume that actors face problematic, interdependent situations, in which they can only optimise their preferences by collaboration. Such situations involve a plausible motivation for actors to cooperate but they are not a sufficient condition to ensure that cooperation will actually happen. What is missing is a theoretical link between a general motivation to cooperate and its realisation, given that rationalist theory, following realism, regularly assumes a dangerous anarchical environment with its daunting security dilemma. These circumstances make cooperation risky and should normally work as a show-stopper for nation-states to collaborate.
20
Wendland, Aaron James. "Rationalism and Relativism: An Essay on John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott." NaUKMA Research Papers in Philosophy and Religious Studies, no. 9-10 (January 20, 2023): 107–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.18523/2617-1678.2022.9-10.107-118.
Full textAbstract:
This essay creates an unlikely conversation between two 20th century thinkers: John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott. I say “unlikely” because apart from a few scant remarks in the writing of each the two did not directly engage each other. The essay begins by examining Oakeshott’s explication of “The Rationalist” and her tradition in the history of political thought. Specifically, the essay shows that rationalism in politics involves the belief that reason is an infallible guide to political activity and that the Rationalist seeks certainty and perfection in political affairs. The essay goes on to tease out the rationalistic tendencies in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, and then it analyzes Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and applies these criticisms to Rawls. Briefly, Oakeshott marks a distinction between technical and practical knowledge, and he argues that the principles that make up technical manuals like A Theory of Justice are abridgments of and no substitute for the understanding we gain through our practical experience and our participation in a given political tradition. While explaining Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and Rawls, the essay indicates some of the relativistic proclivities in Oakeshott’s appeal to political practices and traditions, and then it entertains objections to Oakeshott that a Rawlsian might offer. Here Rawls’ commitment to the liberal tradition and the relativity implicit in his explanations of “reflective equilibrium” and “reasonableness” are examined and Rawls’ similarities to Oakeshott are noted. Ultimately, this essay argues that the strength of Rawls’ work lay not in the fact that his principles of justice are established by rational agents in an original position, but in the fact that they are principles that emerge from and cohere with ideas deeply rooted in the Western tradition itself.
21
Lechowska, Ewa. "Approaches in research on flood risk perception and their importance in flood risk management: a review." Natural Hazards 111, no. 3 (2021): 2343–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-05140-7.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe study of flood risk perception factors can be considered by using different paradigms. In an attempt to understand risk perception, two basic paradigms can be distinguished: rationalist and constructivist. The rationalist approach tends to focus on modeling, characterizing, and predicting behavioral results regarding various threats. According to the constructivist paradigm, threats are perceived as socially constructed. This review paper aims to assess the importance of the rationalist and constructivist approaches in research on flood risk perception and flood risk management more broadly by answering the questions: (1) Which paradigm dominates the research of flood risk perception?, (2) What is the relationship between rationalistic and constructivistic factors (e.g., stimulation, weakening, strengthening, etc.)?, (3) which factors are more effective in moderating attitudes toward flood risk? The paper concludes by pointing out the desired direction of research on flood risk perception from the perspective of improving flood risk management. In contemporary empirical works managing the perception of flood risk, a rationalistic approach that psychometrically searches for cognitive models dominates. Often, statistically obtained dependencies are mutually exclusive. Studies on perception that apply the constructivist approach are in an early stage of development, nevertheless providing consistent results. They indicate that the social, political, cultural, religious, and historical contexts shape the perception of flood risk. On the basis of the aforementioned information, research on flood risk in a constructivist approach should be expanded, as it provides a clear, often underappreciated catalog of contextual factors shaping risk perception and, importantly, simultaneously moderating the influence of rationalist factors on flood risk perception.
22
Dousa, Thomas M. "Intellection and Intuition: On the Epistemology of S.R. Ranganathan." NASKO 7, no. 1 (2019): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.7152/nasko.v7i1.15637.
Full textAbstract:
The Indian librarian and library theorist S.R. Ranganathan (1892-1970) is generally recognized as a seminal figure in the development of facet analysis and its application to classification theory. In recent years, commentators on the epistemology of knowledge organization have claimed that the methods of facet analysis reflect a fundamentally rationalist approach to classification. Yet, for all the interest in the epistemological bases of Ranganathan’s classification theory, little attention has been paid to his theory of how human beings acquire knowledge of the world – i.e., his epistemology proper – or to the question whether this theory reflects a rationalist outlook. This paper examines Ranganathan’s statements on the origins of knowledge to assess if they are congruent with rationalist epistemology. Ranganathan recognized two different modes of knowledge – intellection (i.e., intellectual operations on sense data) and intuition (i.e., direct cognition of things-in-themselves) -- and it is in virtue of the latter that his epistemology can be considered to fall within the ambit of rationalism. Intuition as a source of knowledge plays a role in Ranganathan’s classification theory, most notably in his model of scientific method underlying classification development, his vision of the organization of classification design, and his conceptualization of seminal mnemonics and a reduced number of fundamental categories as important elements in the design of classification notation. Not only does intuition subtend the rationalism of Ranganathan’s epistemology but it also serves as a bridge to another often-neglected aspect of his thought, namely his valorization of mysticism. Indeed, Ranganathan’s theory of knowledge is best characterized as mystical rationalism
23
Raab, Ruslan S. "Two types of jurisprudence from a perspective of critical rationalism." RUDN Journal of Law 28, no. 1 (2024): 44–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2337-2024-28-1-44-62.
Full textAbstract:
Our understanding of legal ideas is most reflected in the ability to categorize them unambiguously. At the same time, modern science faces many difficulties in categorizing legal ideas. Problems associated with categorizing complex authors such as F.C. von Savigny or L.L. Fuller are just one example. In the light of these challenges approaches that go beyond traditional views are becoming increasingly relevant. An example of such an approach is the critical-rationalist perspective on the categorization of legal ideas. This article aims to comprehensively reconstruct this critical-rationalist typology. The key role in achieving this goal is played by the intellectual legacy of Friedrich Hayek as a representative of the epistemology of critical rationalism who managed to adapt it for understanding jurisprudence. As a result of a comprehensive reconstruction of the critical-rationalist typology of legal ideas implicit in Hayek’s works we can conclude that, from the perspective of critical rationalism, all legal ideas can be divided into two categories: “critical” and “Cartesian”. The difference between these two categories lies in how much a given legal idea is based on the belief in the intellectual capabilities of human mind. The belief that human mind can effectively govern legal system of the whole society in a centralized manner generates a Cartesian view of law as a set of consciously created rules of a specific kind. The irreducibility of law to consciously constructed prescriptions due to the human mind’s inability to manage a complex social system will reflect a different, «critical-rationalist» perspective on law. This perspective will include a ban on centralized management of legal system of the whole society, as well as an explanation of such “informational” properties of that system, which exceed the capabilities of any human mind.
24
Saroh, Septiani. "The Philosophy of Rationalist." Journal of Innovation in Teaching and Instructional Media 4, no. 3 (2024): 114–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.52690/jitim.v4i3.782.
Full textAbstract:
Rationalism or the rationalist movement is a philosophical school which states that truth can be obtained only through proof, logic and analysis of facts. All sources of knowledge and rationalism come from the mind or are realistically rational. This article provides information regarding the fields of economic philosophy, politics, education and religion. According to Hastuti (2018), Rational Theology believes that knowledge about God and good and bad can be obtained with the power of reason. Therefore, thanking God before the revelation is mandatory. Apart from that, because reason can also know good and bad, everyone is obliged to do good things such as being honest, acting fairly and abandoning bad things such as lying and being blindly unjust. Meanwhile, in traditional theology, the human mind has no ability except knowing God. Meanwhile, the other three things can only be known through revealed information. Therefore, the issue of the good or bad value of an action cannot be determined by reason but must be determined by revelation. Lying, for example, is a bad act because revelation states it so.
25
Ahmed, Dildar, та Dr Amjad Hayat. "عقلیت پسند رجحانات کے تفسیری اصول و ضوابط کا تنقیدی جائزہ". Al-Duhaa 2, № 02 (2021): 31–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.51665/al-duhaa.002.02.0086.
Full textAbstract:
Rationalist tendencies mean those individuals and groups who prefer reason over divine teachings and explain the Holy Quran on their own. Mostly, they do this type of fabrication through so-called reasoning, but sometimes they get influenced by Europe. The article highlights their rationalist approaches in Exegesis of the Holy Quran and how they opposed the majority of the Quran Commentators while making their own rules. This research work explores the historical background, basic rules, and methods of those rationalists, their disagreement with most of the conventional interpreters, and the impacts of their self-made foundations. Moreover, it presents a comparison of their invented rules and well-accepted rules of the Quran Explainers to a clear course of commentary for every Muslim reader. The summary contains how these rationalists plant rules to have their self-wished results and ignore authentic traditions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), deny different dialects of the holy Quran, refuse reasons of revelations, and explain Huroof e Muqataat as they deem fit.
26
Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change." International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 553–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/00208180152507551.
Full textAbstract:
Why do agents comply with the norms embedded in regimes and international institutions? Scholars have proposed two competing answers to this compliance puzzle, one rationalist, the other constructivist. Rationalists emphasize coercion, cost/benefit calculations, and material incentives; constructivists stress social learning, socialization, and social norms. Both schools, however, explain important aspects of compliance. To build a bridge between them, I examine the role of argumentative persuasion and social learning. This makes explicit the theory of social choice and interaction implicit in many constructivist compliance studies, and it broadens rationalist arguments about the instrumental and noninstrumental processes through which actors comply. I argue that domestic politics—in particular, institutional and historical contexts—delimit the causal role of persuasion/social learning, thus helping both rationalists and constructivists to refine the scope of their compliance claims. To assess the plausibility of these arguments, I examine why states comply with new citizenship/membership norms promoted by European regional organizations.
27
Kent, Laurence. "Becoming-Flashdrive: The Cinematic Intelligence of Lucy." Film-Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2020): 284–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/film.2020.0146.
Full textAbstract:
An important but easily forgotten moment in the history of film-philosophy is Jean Epstein's assertion that cinema, more than merely thinking, has a kind of intelligence. If it is a newfound conception of rationality that is needed for any contemporary ethical relation to the world, as thinkers from Reza Negarestani and Pete Wolfendale to feminist collective Laboria Cuboniks have espoused in their respective neo-rationalist projects, then cinema as a thinking thing must be interrogated in its relation to reason. A somatophilia of purely affective and phenomenological approaches in film theory alongside micropolitical injunctions to undermine common-sense and liberate one's desire in extremity can fall limp in view of such calls for universal thinking around rationality. To understand cinema's specific form of intelligence, this article will explore Luc Besson's Lucy (2014) as an instance of how film is able to represent intelligence. Besson's film provides a site where Western cultural anxieties and assumptions around intelligence are manifested. This will allow an explication of contemporary approaches to intelligence in philosophy whilst confronting these discourses with the insidious problematics of gender and race that undergird the film. I argue that Lucy shares many of its ambitions with the emerging vectors of thought associated with the neo-rationalist perspective in its engaging with a rethinking of universal values and the Promethean possibilities of human action. Reading the film through these philosophies will help position the ethical stakes it sets up, but also to distinguish it from a trend of contemporary “posthuman” films that it finds itself in company with. While it is certainly true that posthuman themes, as well as transhumanist fantasies, seem to permeate Besson's film, this article will incorporate another neologism, taken from neo-rationalist thinkers, in order to emphasise moments that can be productive from the standpoint of a philosophical account of intelligence: “rationalist inhumanism.”
28
Rocca, Michael Della. "A Rationalist Manifesto." Philosophical Topics 31, no. 1 (2003): 75–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2003311/215.
Full text
29
Eddington, Ross Elliot. "Millett's Rationalist Error." Hypatia 18, no. 3 (2003): 193–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hyp.2003.0058.
Full text
30
Eddington, Ross Elliot. "Millett's Rationalist Error." Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 18, no. 3 (2003): 193–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/hyp.2003.18.3.193.
Full text
31
Eddington, Ross Elliot. "Millett's Rationalist Error." Hypatia 18, no. 3 (2003): 193–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2003.tb00827.x.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines Millett's condemnation of Ruskin in Sexual Politics (1977) to demonstrate that Ruskin's views on women are the product of a specific mode of experience—one that precludes his views being representative of traditional Victorian patriarchy. The article uses Oakeshott's philosophical framework of different modes of experience to illustrate that Millett narrowly interprets Ruskin's statements on women from her own modal perspective without considering his broader belief in the imaginative over the rational faculty.
32
BonJour, Laurence. "A Rationalist Manifesto." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 18 (1992): 53–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1992.10717298.
Full textAbstract:
Perhaps the most pervasive conviction within the Western epistemological tradition is that in order for a belief to constitute knowledge it is necessary (though not sufficient) that it be epistemically justified: that the person in question have a reason or warrant which makes it at least highly likely that the belief is true. Historically, most epistemologists have distinguished two main sources from which such justification might arise. It has seemed obvious to all but a very few that many beliefs are justified by appeal to one’s experience of the world. But it has seemed equally obvious to most that there are other beliefs, including many of the most important ones that we have, which are justified in a way which is entirely independent of any appeal to such experience, justified, as it is usually put, a priori, by reason or pure thought alone.
33
Leon, Arcelino. "Calculative Faculty By Reasoning: Hobesian Rationalism And The Contemporary Legal Approach." IOSR Journal of Business and Management 26, no. 11 (2024): 01–07. http://dx.doi.org/10.9790/487x-2611090107.
Full textAbstract:
Background: This article examines Thomas Hobbes' rationalist philosophy and its influence on contemporary legal frameworks, particularly the evolution from positivism to the conception of fundamental rights. Hobbes' theory of "calculative reasoning" is central to understanding the role of reason in law, marking a shift from religious and traditional rationalism to a logic-based approach that applies scientific methods to social organization and individual rights. Materials and Methods: This study employs a bibliographic approach, using a literature review to trace Hobbes' philosophical roots and their evolution in legal thought. Comparisons are made with thinkers like Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Locke, analyzing how classical theories informed Hobbes' concept of reason as calculation. A deductive method is used to assess Hobbes' impact on legal positivism and modern legal rationality. Results and Conclusions: Hobbes' concept of calculative reasoning significantly influenced the legal system by establishing reason as a tool for logical and precise decision-making within jurisprudence. This theoretical evolution supports the structure of modern states and democratic systems, with rationality as a guiding principle for laws protecting individual rights, including property and freedom. Hobbes’ rationalism contributed to transforming legal philosophy by grounding it in logical assessment, moving away from metaphysical and theological interpretations, thereby shaping contemporary legal doctrines regarding the social contract and fundamental rights.
34
Kirshner, Jonathan. "Classical Realism in World Politics. Précis to a Symposium." Analyse & Kritik 45, no. 2 (2023): 349–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2023-2014.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This paper introduces some of the major themes of An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics, and provides a short illustration of how the analytical apparatus elaborated there can offer fruitful insights into understanding enduring puzzles in international relations. An Unwritten Future explores, illuminates and interrogates Classical Realism, an approach to the study of world politics that is contrasted with Structural Realism and with the ‘hyper-rationalist’ perspective associated with the ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’ school of thought. It elucidates the fundamental flaws of those two highly influential paradigms, and explains why Classical Realism, with its emphasis on what Structural Realism and Hyper-rationalism forbid—content, purpose, history, and irreducible uncertainty—provides a more promising and productive point of departure for students of international relations.
35
Kail, P. J. E. "Hume, Malebranche and ‘Rationalism’." Philosophy 83, no. 3 (2008): 311–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819108000697.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractTraditionally Hume is seen as offering an ‘empiricist’ critique of ‘rationalism’. This view is often illustrated – or rejected – by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'. However the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical ‘rationalist’ is with Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows that the fundamental differences (among the many similarities) between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, and that there is some truth in the traditional story. This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called ‘rationalism’.
36
Shihadeh, Ayman. "Psychology and Ethical Epistemology." Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies 21, no. 2 (2021): 81–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/jais.9573.
Full textAbstract:
We examine a hitherto unstudied debate, turning on the epistemology of value judgements, between Ashʿarīs and Baṣran Muʿtazilīs of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. Al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī countered Muʿtazilī ethical realism, here defended by al-Malāḥimī, by developing an emotive subjectivism underpinned by increasingly sophisticated psychological accounts of ethical motivation. Value judgements, they maintained, arise not from knowledge of some ethical attributes of acts themselves, but from subjective inclinations, which are often elusive because they can be unconscious or indirect. We also argue against the widespread notion that Ashʿarīs espoused an anti-rationalist ethics, and we show that they were not only ethical rationalists, but also the more innovative side in this debate.
 Keywords: al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Malāḥimī, Avicenna, Ashʿarism, Muʿtazilism, Value Theory, Moral Realism and Anti-Realism, Emotivism, Moral Psychology, Rationalism, Intellect (ʿaql), Estimation (wahm), Disposition (ṭabʿ), Widely-Accepted Premises (mashhūra), Reputable Premises (maḥmūda)
37
Stern, Robert. "Pippin on Hegel." Hegel Bulletin 10, no. 01 (1989): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200004602.
Full textAbstract:
Ever since Plato coined the metaphor, it has been tempting to treat the history of philosophy as a series of battles between Gods and Giants, as a ‘clash of argument’ between idealists and materialists, rationalists and naturalists, and idealists and realists. Many commentators, provoked by Hegel's combative remarks, have been led to see the Kant-Hegel relation in this way; and yet it has not always been easy to determine either what the issue between these two antagonists really is, or indeed which of them is the Giant and which the God. Robert Pippin, in his new book, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. xii + 327, hb £30.00, pb £10.95) casts new light on the nature of the struggle, and makes clear what was at stake: a non-rationalist, non-metaphysical answer to the sceptic, and with it absolute knowledge. Pippin's densely written but engrossing book provides the focus of discussion for this issue of the Bulletin. The contributions by H.S. Harris and Terry Pinkard offer critical comments on Pippin's approach to Hegel, and they are followed with a response by Pippin himself. These pieces were originally presented as a meeting of the Western APA, and assume an acquaintance with Pippin's argument, which I will try to outline in what follows. Like many recent commentators, Pippin begins by insisting that we take seriously Hegel's claim to have ‘completed’ Kant, and so rejects any metaphysical, rationalist readng of Hegel. On the other hand, Pippin wants to understand Hegel's claim to have found a form of idealism that answers Kant's transcendental scepticism regarding the ‘thing-in-itself’, without collapsing back into rationalism.
38
Sokolov, Artemii Vyacheslavovich. "Progressivism as a variety of eschatological myth." Философская мысль, no. 3 (March 2025): 57–76. https://doi.org/10.25136/2409-8728.2025.3.72675.
Full textAbstract:
The article explores progressivism as a continuation of the eschatological tradition within European rationalism. It analyzes how the ideas of linear progress, formulated during the Enlightenment, became a secularized version of religious eschatological concepts. It examines how modernity, despite its rationalist orientation and scientific criteria, itself develops apocalyptic motifs of salvation in the form of science and technological advancement. A comparative analysis of scientific rationalism and the eschatological myth reveals their structural similarities. As a contrasting element, the “palingenetic myth” is also considered, offering deeper insight into the features of the eschatological model. The object of study is progressivism and its “temporal paradigm” as part of the European tradition of scientific rationalism, while the subject is eschatology as the root of progressivism. The article employs the following scientific methods: metatheory and philosophy of science, the historical method, and evolutionism as a scientific approach. Its scholarly contribution lies in analyzing the relationship between “myth” and the “temporal paradigm” of modern science, demonstrating that the latter, contrary to rationalist logic, is not an “abstract point of reference.” Myth is considered a concrete, sensuous reality shaping the perception of the world, including that of the scientist and science itself. The study argues that even within rationalism and progressivism, eschatological concepts retain their mythological structure, raising questions about the true nature and trajectory of science and the possibility of its emancipation from myth. In this context, the research offers a new perspective on the interplay between scientific and mythological categories, emphasizing their role in ordering the chaos of the surrounding world and shaping cultural identity.
39
Ye, Fei. "Explore the Application and Development of Minimalism in Product Design." Highlights in Science, Engineering and Technology 106 (July 16, 2024): 7–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/yfvjwm70.
Full textAbstract:
In the early 20th century, Germany was the first country to prevail in “Minimalist Design”, and then it became the mainstream rationalist spirit in Germany at that time, such rationality comes from two sides which are science and humanism. However, from the aspect of scientism, the progress of science can make the future of mankind better, while from the aspect of humanism, it is the spirit of humans themselves. So, “Minimalist Design” is a reflection of this rationalism. Then with the change of the times, the pace of social life has accelerated, “Minimalist Design” has become a mainstream concept in today’s society. “Minimalist Design” brings endless convenience to human beings, but also explains that products do not necessarily need a lot of fancy design to join it. Therefore, this research will first elaborate on and interpret the idea of “Minimalist Design”, secondly, the structural framework of “Minimalist Design” is analyzed, and the products designed by some famous “Minimalist” designers are analyzed.
40
WEBER, MYLES. "A Thick-Skulled Rationalist." Arion: A Journal of the Humanities and the Classics 19, no. 2 (2011): 155–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/arn.2011.0036.
Full text
41
Aikin, Scott F. "Xenophanes the High Rationalist." Epoché 19, no. 1 (2014): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche201482215.
Full text
42
Kirshner, Jonathan. "Rationalist explanations for war?" Security Studies 10, no. 1 (2000): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410008429423.
Full text
43
Polkinghorne, John. "Thoughts of a rationalist." Nature 416, no. 6881 (2002): 583–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/416583a.
Full text
44
Quek, Kai. "Rationalist Experiments on War." Political Science Research and Methods 5, no. 1 (2015): 123–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.24.
Full textAbstract:
Private information and the commitment problem are central to the rationalist theory of war, but causal evidence is scarce, as rationalist explanations for war are difficult to test with observational data. I design laboratory experiments to isolate the effects of private information and the commitment problem on the risk of conflict. I find that the commitment problem sharply increases the incidence of conflict, but there is no significant difference in conflict incidence with or without private information in the shadow of shifting power. I also investigate the realism of the positive experimental results with a case study of Japan’s decisionmaking on the eve of the Pacific War. The permutation of formal, experimental and historical methods applies the strength of one method to compensate for the weakness of another. Convergent results from the different methods strengthen the causal inference.
45
Fearon, James D. "Rationalist explanations for war." International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300033324.
Full textAbstract:
Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.
46
Klein, Devorah, David Woods, Gary Klein, and Shawna Perry. "EBM: Rationalist Fever Dreams." Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 12, no. 3 (2018): 227–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1555343418779677.
Full textAbstract:
In 2016, we examined the connection between naturalistic decision making and the trend toward best practice compliance; we used evidence-based medicine (EBM) in health care as an exemplar. Paul Falzer’s lead paper in this issue describes the historical underpinnings of how and why EBM came into vogue in health care. Falzer also highlights the epistemological rationale for EBM. Falzer’s article, like our own, questions the rationale of EBM and reflects on ways that naturalistic decision making can support expertise in the face of attempts to standardize practice and emphasize compliance. Our objectives in this commentary are first to explain the inherent limits of procedural approaches and second to examine ways to help decision makers become more adaptive.
47
Vasiliu, Daniela. "C. S. Lewis: The Romantic Rationalist." Linguaculture 2014, no. 2 (2014): 105–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lincu-2015-0031.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The paper “C. S. Lewis: The Romantic Rationalist” presents the way C. S. Lewis gives an account in his first fictional (allegorical) book, The Pilgrim’s Regress, of how he discovered Christianity on the converging paths of romanticism and rationalism. The outstanding scholar and author whose intellectual and spiritual development has turned him into one of the most influential Christian writers of the twentieth century became an atheist in his teens and after a long journey through different philosophical convictions he converted to Christianity in his early thirties, a change that affected his entire work. His love of literature was essential in discovering both the rational and the imaginative appeal of Christianity, which led him into a vision of the reality of the world and of life that satisfied the longing of his heart and the hunger of his imagination.
48
Stegner, Tadeusz. "Racjonaliści i ortodoksi. Pastor Leopold Otto wobec głównych nurtów w dziewiętnastowiecznym protestantyzmie." Przegląd Humanistyczny, no. 67/1 (October 11, 2023): 63–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/2657-599x.ph.2023-2.5.
Full textAbstract:
Two currents clashed in Protestantism in the 19th century, including in the Kingdom of Poland: the Rationalist, whose adherents believed that the content of the revelation should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirements of rational thinking, according to which God should be known through using reason, and the second current, the Orthodox, which strictly followed the principles established by Martin Luther. The former had considerable support among the clergy, the latter among the majority of the faithful. To the Orthodox movement belonged Leopold Otto, a pastor in Warsaw and Cieszyn, editor of Zwiastun Ewangeliczny [The Evangelical Announcer], the first periodical of Polish evangelicals. In the press and in sermons printed later, he argued with the views of the rationalists. The vehemence of Otto’s attacks on rationalism stemmed not only from religious motives, but also from the fact that its supporters were at the same time opponents of the national idea propagated by Otto in Poland. Dostęp do pełnych treści artykułu jest płatny i dostępny tylko dla
49
Kemp, Ryan, and Frank Della Torre. "Kierkegaard’s Strong Anti-Rationalism: Offense as a Propaedeutic to Faith." Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 27, no. 1 (2022): 193–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2022-0010.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract In a now classic paper, Karen Carr argues that Kierkegaard is a religious “anti-rationalist”: He holds that reason and religious truth exist in necessary tension with one another. Carr maintains that this antagonism is not a matter of the logical incoherence of Christianity, but rather the fact that genuine submission to Christ precludes approaching him through demonstration. In this essay, we argue that while Kierkegaard is in fact an anti-rationalist, the literature has failed to appreciate the full strength of his position. It is not just that reason and obedience are in tension; rather, Kierkegaard holds the stronger view that reason is actively offended by Christianity’s primary claims. Not only is reason incapable of generating any positive evidence for the truth of Christianity, more radically, it provides evidence against it. In order to make this case, we offer a close reading of Practice in Christianity, developing a typology of Kierkegaard’s account of Christ’s “offense.” Finally, having motivated Kierkegaard’s strong anti-rationalism, we consider why, on his account, anyone would want to be a Christian.
50
Alkahtani, Hezam Sultan J., JM Muslimin, Fakih Fadilah Muttaqin, Syahrul Ramadhan Hidayat, and Abdulbosit Rakhimjonov Rafikjon Ugli. "Islam, Averrorism and Democracy: A Review of Public Education and Social Equity." Al-Hayat: Journal of Islamic Education 9, no. 1 (2025): 91–105. https://doi.org/10.35723/ajie.v9i1.80.
Full textAbstract:
This study explores the relationship between Islam, Averroism, and democracy within public education, emphasizing their impact on social equity. It investigates how Islamic principles such as justice (ʿadl), consultation (shūrā), and public interest (maṣlaḥah), alongside Ibn Rushd’s rationalist philosophy, can support the development of inclusive and democratic educational frameworks. Employing a qualitative approach, the research integrates philosophical and theological analysis with a review of educational policies in Muslim-majority countries, analyzing primary and secondary sources to assess the alignment of religious ethics, rational inquiry, and democratic values in education. Using thematic analysis, the study identifies challenges in balancing traditional religious curricula with modern pedagogical methods, particularly in fostering critical thinking and democratic participation. Despite these obstacles, it underscores the potential for integrating religious ethics and rationalist thought to establish more equitable and participatory education policies. By synthesizing Islamic traditions, Averroist rationalism, and democratic ideals, this research provides a novel perspective on education reform and offers valuable insights for policymakers, educators, and researchers. Future studies should explore the empirical application of this framework across diverse educational settings to enhance inclusivity and social justice.