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1
Verbeek, Bruno. Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5.
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Cicmil, Svetlana. Knowledge, interaction, and project work: From instrumental rationality to practical wisdom. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2003.
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3
Verbeek, Bruno. Instrumental rationality and moral philosophy: An essay on the virtues of cooperation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2001.
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4
Verbeek, Bruno. Instrumental rationality and moral philosophy: An essay on the virtues of cooperation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
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5
Zwecke und Mittel in einer natürlichen Welt: Instrumentelle Rationalität als Problem für den Naturalismus? Paderborn: Mentis, 2010.
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6
1945-, Lasvergnas Isabelle, ed. Le vivant et la rationalité instrumentale. Montréal: Liber/Cahiers de recherche sociologique, 2003.
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Giust-Desprairies, F. La résistible emprise de la rationalité instrumentale. ESKA, 2000.
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8
Brunero, John. Instrumental Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746935.001.0001.
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Rationality requires that we intend the means we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. This book explores several interrelated issues regarding the formulation and status of this requirement of means–ends coherence. I argue that means–ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality, and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. But nor, I argue, is means–ends coherence strongly normative in that we always ought to be means–ends coherent. Why is this requirement in place? One popular strategy looks to the connection between intention and belief, and aims to explain means–ends coherence by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. I argue that this strategy is unpromising. I instead propose that we look to the constitutive aim of intention. Just as belief has a constitutive aim (truth) that can explain some of the theoretical requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs, intention has a constitutive aim (what I call “controlled action”) that can explain some of the requirements of consistency and coherence governing intentions. In particular, I argue that we can understand means–ends coherence by understanding the constitutive aims of both of the attitudes governed by the requirement, intention and belief. In being means–ends incoherent, you are setting yourself up to fail, assuring that you either have a false instrumental belief or your intention won’t issue in action.
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Verbeek, B. Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy: Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. Springer Netherlands, 2010.
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10
Bratman, Michael E. Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0003.
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This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya, and John Broome. The essay sketches a proposed alternative to such cognitivism: the practical commitment view of instrumental rationality. The essay explores the challenge posed for cognitivism by the possibility of false beliefs about one’s own intentions; and the essay also explores the idea that, while belief aims at truth, intention aims at coordinated, effective control of action.
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Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence. Oxford University Press, 2020.
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12
Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency. Oxford University Press, 2020.
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Tenenbaum, Sergio. Rational Powers in Action. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851486.001.0001.
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Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of instrumental rationality. Where many theories of rational agency focus on instantaneous choices between sharply defined outcomes, treating the temporally extended and partially open-ended character of action as an afterthought, this book argues that the deep structure of instrumental rationality can only be understood if we see how it governs the pursuit of long-term, indeterminate ends. These are ends that cannot be realized through a single momentary action, and whose content leaves partly open what counts as realizing the end. For example, one cannot simply write a book through an instantaneous choice to do so; over time, one must execute a variety of actions to realize one’s goal of writing a book, where one may do a better or worse job of attaining that goal, and what counts as succeeding at it is not fully determined in advance. Even to explain the rational governance of much less ambitious actions like making dinner, this book argues that we need to focus on temporal duration and the indeterminacy of ends in intentional action. Theories of moment-by-moment preference maximization, or indeed any understanding of instrumental rationality on the basis of momentary mental items, cannot capture the fundamental structure of our instrumentally rational capacities. This book puts forward a theory of instrumental rationality as rationality in action.
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Schrum, Ethan. The Instrumental University. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501736643.001.0001.
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This book argues that Clark Kerr, Gaylord P. Harnwell, and other post-World War II academic leaders set the American research university on a new course by creating the instrumental university. With its emphasis on procedural rationality, organized research, and project-based funding by external patrons, the instrumental university would provide technical and managerial knowledge to shape the social order. Its leaders hoped that by solving the nation’s pressing social problems, the research university would become the essential institution of postwar America. On this view, the university’s leading purposes included promoting economic development and coordinating research from many fields in order to attack social problems. Reorienting institutions to prioritize these activities had numerous consequences. One was to inject more capitalistic and managerial tendencies into universities. Today, those who decry universities’ corporatizing and market-driven tendencies often trace them to the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s. This book suggests that a fuller explanation of these tendencies must highlight their deeper roots in the technocratic progressive tradition that originated in the 1910s, particularly the organizational changes within universities that this tradition spawned from the 1940s onward as part of the instrumental university.
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Swedeen, Paula. A critique of the operation of instrumental rationality in the Global biodiversity strategy. 1993.
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Biro, Andrew. Human Nature, Non-human Nature, and Needs. Edited by Teena Gabrielson, Cheryl Hall, John M. Meyer, and David Schlosberg. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199685271.013.19.
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This chapter assesses the relevance of Frankfurt School critical theory for contemporary environmental political theory. Early Frankfurt School thinkers such as Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse developed a critique of instrumental rationality that provides a powerful framework for understanding the domination of nature in modernity, including an inability to articulate and defend human needs. Habermas subsequently attempts to mitigate this totalizing critique, countering instrumental rationality with a focus on communicative rationality. This Habermasian turn both provides new openings and forecloses certain possibilities for environmental political theory; deliberative democracy is emphasized, but with a renewed commitment to anthropocentrism. The chapter then explores whether Habermas’s communicative turn could be “greened,” either through an expansion of the subjects of communicative rationality, or by critically examining the extent to which human beings themselves can articulate their genuine needs.
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Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0014.
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Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model of practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. This chapter argues that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provides normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the correct epistemic verdicts. On this account, epistemic permissibility can be understood on the model of the wide-scope instrumental norm for instrumental rationality, while normative evidential reasons for belief can be understood in terms of instrumental transmission.
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Kiesewetter, Benjamin. The Why-Be-Rational Challenge. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754282.003.0005.
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Besides the problems with detachment, proponents of the view that structural requirements of rationality are normative face the challenge to identify a reason that counts in favour of conforming to rational requirements. There are three possible ways to account for this challenge. The first is to present instrumental or other derivative reasons to conform to rational requirements (5.1). The second is to argue that rational requirements are themselves reasons (5.2). The third is to give some kind of buck-passing account of rational requirements, according to which such requirements are verdictive statements about reasons that exist independently of them (5.3–5.4). Chapter 5 argues that none of these strategies succeed. Finally, two accounts that have claimed to explain the normativity of structural rationality without assuming that rational requirements are necessarily accompanied by reasons, are discussed and rejected: the transparency account (5.5), and the apparent reasons account (5.6).
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Siegel, Harvey. Education's Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190682675.001.0001.
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This collection extends and further defends the “reasons conception” of critical thinking that Harvey Siegel has articulated and defended over the last three-plus decades. This conception analyzes and emphasizes both the epistemic quality of candidate beliefs, and the dispositions and character traits that constitute the “critical spirit”, that are central to a proper account of critical thinking; argues that epistemic quality must be understood ultimately in terms of epistemic rationality; defends a conception of rationality that involves both rules and judgment; and argues that critical thinking has normative value over and above its instrumental tie to truth. Siegel also argues, contrary to currently popular multiculturalist thought, for both transcultural and universal philosophical ideals, including those of multiculturalism and critical thinking themselves. Over seventeen chapters, Siegel makes the case for regarding critical thinking, or the cultivation of rationality, as a preeminent educational ideal, and the fostering of it as a fundamental educational aim. A wide range of alternative views are critically examined. Important related topics, including indoctrination, moral education, open-mindedness, testimony, epistemological diversity, and cultural difference are treated. The result is a systematic account and defense of critical thinking, an educational ideal widely proclaimed but seldom submitted to critical scrutiny itself.
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Beller, Steven. 7. Consequences. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198724834.003.0007.
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The shift from persecution and expulsion of Jews to industrially organized genocide marked a dramatic escalation of Nazi policy. ‘Consequences’ shows that central to any explanation for the Holocaust was the intentionalist and ideological motivation of the extreme racial antisemitism of Hitler and the Nazi leadership; but another vital enabling factor was the more functionalist role of self-interested instrumental rationality, or opportunism, and lack of resistance of the German populace. Nazi antisemitic policies proceeded by default. The Holocaust was enabled by many modern elements: bureaucratic efficiency, rational organization, anonymity, economic incentivization, and the employment of various technological innovations.
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Kauppinen, Antti. Practical Reasoning. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.18.
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This chapter discusses two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions to come to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is, roughly, a process of responding to apparent reasons. Its standards of correctness derive from what we objectively have reason to do, if things are as we suppose them to be. I argue that a version of the latter has some significant advantages. This has some surprising consequences for how we should conceive of the structure and process of instrumental reasoning in particular.
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Verbeek, B., and Bruno Verbeek. Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy - An Essay on the Virtues of Cooperation (THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY A: Volume 33) Philosophy and Methodology of the Social. Springer, 2002.
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23
Smith, Peter Scharff. Prisoners’ Families, Public Opinion, and the State. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810087.003.0008.
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This chapter moves the focus from the offender-state binary to a broader discussion about the relationship between penal policies, prisons, and society. It does so using a partly Durkheimian approach. The sociologist Émile Durkheim saw the function of the institutions of penality less as a form of instrumental rationality and more as a kind of routinized expression of emotion. According to such an approach, thinking of punishment as a calculated instrument for the rational control of conduct would be to miss its essential character, to mistake superficial form for true content since the essence of punishment is irrational, unthinking emotion fixed by a sense of the sacred and its violation. Furthermore, this chapter suggests that interpreting and implementing the rights of prisoners’ children and families provides a perspective on criminal justice systems, which can potentially change the current state-offender dynamic.
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Kristjánsson, Kristján. Grief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809678.003.0007.
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Chapter 7 has three interrelated aims. The first is to analyse the concept of grief; the second is to argue for the putative rationality of grief; and the third is to offer a moral justification of grief along broadly Aristotelian lines as an intrinsically virtuous trait of character. With regard to this third and ultimate aim, the chapter argues not only that grief plays an unappreciated positive role in our moral experiences but fleshes out a case for what exactly that positive moral role is. More precisely, it is argued that grief is best justified as an Aristotelian desert-based emotional trait, incorporating two distinct desert-motivated desires, one specifically directed at the memory of the dead person as deserving of homage, the other more cosmically focusing on the general undeservingness of good people passing away. The argument goes against the grain of most previous instrumental justifications of grief.
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Jamison, Andrew. Science and Technology in Postwar Europe. Edited by Dan Stone. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560981.013.0032.
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In the decades that have followed World War II, science and technology have come to play ever more central roles in the lives and life worlds of Europeans. Indeed, in the twenty-first century there is very little that goes on in Europe without there being at least some influence from science and technology. Europe has become a place where scientific ‘facts’ and technical ‘artifacts’ permeate our existence. They have infiltrated our languages, altered our behaviour, changed our habits, and, perhaps most fundamentally, imposed their instrumental logic – what philosophers call technological rationality – on our social interaction and the ways in which we communicate with one another. The advent of industrialisation led to the formation of a number of new scientific and engineering fields – thermodynamics, biochemistry, public health, electrical engineering, city planning, among others – and new forms of higher education and communication. This article focuses on science and technology in postwar Europe, and looks at postwar reconstruction, reform, and the age of commercialisation.
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Proust, Joëlle. Consensus as an Epistemic Norm for Group Acceptance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0008.
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What are the propositional attitude(s) involved in collective epistemic agency? There are two opposing camps on this question: the ascribers have defended an extended notion of belief, while the rejectionists have claimed that groups form goal-sensitive acceptances. Addressing this question, however, requires providing responses to four preliminary queries. (1) Are group attitudes reducible to the participants’ attitudes? (2) Is epistemic evaluation sensitive to instrumental considerations? (3) Does accepting that p entail believing that p? (4) Is there a unity of epistemic rationality across levels? Both “believing” and “accepting as true”, as applied to plural subjects, fail to provide satisfactory answers to these four queries. An alternative analysis for epistemic group attitude called “accepting under consensus” is proposed. This attitude is shown to reflect actual group agency, and to offer consistent and independently justified answers to the queries. On this analysis, an individualist epistemology cannot simply be transferred to collective agents.
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Hanna, Jason. Soft Paternalism II. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190877132.003.0007.
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This chapter continues the examination of the hard paternalism/soft paternalism distinction begun in chapter 6. It focuses on the impairment exception. According to the impairment exception, it is easier to justify intervention in imprudent and impaired choices, such as those affected by temporary emotional distress, than it is to justify intervention in comparably imprudent but unimpaired self-regarding choices. In order to defend this view, one must offer an account of impairment that yields intuitively plausible implications about cases, and one must also show that this account of impairment is morally relevant. It is argued that soft paternalists have failed to complete either of these tasks. The chapter focuses on Joel Feinberg’s notion of voluntariness and on attempts to defend the hard/soft distinction by appeal to some notion of instrumental rationality. It concludes that the hard/soft distinction, and the many anti-paternalist views that rely on it, ought to be rejected.
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Pouliot, Vincent. Teaching International Political Sociology. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.311.
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Teaching international political sociology (IPS) is intellectually rewarding yet pedagogically challenging. In the conventional International Relations (IR) curriculum, IPS students have to set aside many of the premises, notions, and models they learned in introductory classes, such as assumptions of instrumental rationality and canonical standards of positivist methodology. Once problematized, these traditional starting points in IR are replaced with a number of new dispositions, some of which are counterintuitive, that allow students to take a fresh look at world politics. In the process, IPS opens many more questions than it provides clear-cut answers, making the approach look very destabilizing for students. The objective of teaching IPS is to sow the seeds of three key dispositions inside students’ minds. First, students must appreciate the fact that social life consists primarily of relations that make the whole bigger than the parts. Second, they must be aware that social action is infused with meanings upon which both cooperative and conflictual relations hinge. Third, they have to develop a degree of reflexivity in order to realize that social science is a social practice just like others, where agents enter in various relations and struggle over the meanings of the world. There are four primary methods of teaching IPS, each with its own merits and limits: induction, ontology, historiography, and classics.
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Pu, Xiaoyu. Rebranding China. Stanford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9781503606838.001.0001.
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China plays a variety of status games, sometimes emphasizing its status as an emerging great power and other times highlighting its status as a fragile developing country. The reasons for this are unclear. Drawing on original Chinese sources, social psychological theories, and international relations theories, this book provides a theoretically informed analysis of China’s global rebranding and repositioning in the twenty-first century. Contrary to offensive realism and power transition theory, the book argues that China is not always a status maximizer eager to replace the United States as the new global leader. Differing from most constructivist and psychological studies that focus on the status seeking of rising powers, this study develops a theory of status signaling that combines both rationalist and constructivist insights. The book argues that Chinese leaders face competing pressure from domestic and international audiences to project different images. The book suggests that China’s continual struggle for international status is primarily driven by domestic political calculations. Meanwhile, at the international level, China is concerned about over-recognition of its status for instrumental reasons. The theoretical argument is illustrated through detailed analysis of Chinese foreign policy. Examining major cases such as China’s military transformation, China’s regional diplomacy, and China’s global diplomacy during the 1997 Asian and 2008 global financial crises, this book makes important contributions to international relations theory and Asian studies.
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Williams, John. The International Society – World Society Distinction. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.337.
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The English School, or society of states approach, is a threefold method for understanding how the world operates. According to English School logic, there are three distinct spheres at play in international politics, and two of these are international society and world society—the third being international system. On the one hand, international society (Hugo Grotius) is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and rationalism puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and institutions at the centre of international relations (IR) theory. This position has some parallels to regime theory, but is much deeper, having constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications. On the other hand, world society (Immanuel Kant) takes individuals, non-state organizations, and the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and revolutionism puts transcendence of the state system at the centre of IR theory. Revolutionism is mostly about forms of universalist cosmopolitanism. This position has some parallels to transnationalism but carries a much more foundational link to normative political theory. International society has been the main focus of English School thinking, and the concept is quite well developed and relatively clear, whereas world society is the least well developed of the English School concepts and has not yet been clearly or systematically articulated.
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Milnes, Tim. The Testimony of Sense. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812739.001.0001.
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British intellectual culture witnessed a sharp reduction in the volume of epistemological debate between the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This change coincided with a relocation of philosophical discourse from the treatise to the informal writing of the essayist. This study argues that these two phenomena are related. Around the middle of the eighteenth century, the idea of intersubjectivity emerged as a counterdiscourse to scientific empiricism. Exemplified by Hume’s ‘easy’ philosophy, it sought to reground epistemological correspondence in social correspondence, in the circulation of trusting conversation. Contemporaneously, the rise of the essay, like the concern with trust, reveals the period’s preoccupation with the ways in which intellectual life was being shaped by economic change. The essay genre sought to effect a performative critique of instrumental reason which, while essentially nostalgic in its desire for unsystematic accomplishment, presented a pragmatic counterthrust to Enlightenment rationality. For David Hume and Samuel Johnson, the performance of virtue represents and enacts the social solidarity that either underpins norms or reflects moral truths. For later essayists, however, the fiction of familiarity was both more tenuous and more urgent. In the Romantic period, the essayist’s primary burden became one of establishing social and epistemological norms through the exercise of imaginative power. In the essays of Charles Lamb and William Hazlitt, the enactment of familiar conversation created an experience of singularity and enchantment that was linked to idealized and nostalgic forms of sociability. Thus, while the eighteenth-century essay consolidated ‘truth’, the Romantic essay produced it.