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Mbonda, Ernest-Marie. "Justice et droits de l'homme chez John Rawls." Paris 4, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA040079.
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Cette étude est une exploration analytique et critique de la théorie de John Rawls à partir du problème de la fonction des droits de l'homme dans cette théorie. Son premier objectif est de montrer qu'une théorie du droit ou de la justice ne peut être éthiquement valide que si elle prend pour critère l'idée régulatrice de l'inviolabilité des droits humains. Cette hypothèse s'appuie sur une confrontation entre le rawlsisme et les théories dominantes de la justice telles l'utilitarisme, le libéralisme, l'égalitarisme et le communautarisme, où il apparait que la supériorité de la théorie de Rawls tient à une compréhension plus complète et plus équilibrée de la notion des droits de l'homme. Le second objectif du travail prolonge le premier en soutenant, contre Rawls, que si la force de sa théorie réside dans la fonction qu'y exerce l'idée des droits de l'homme, la démarche procédurale/contractualiste/constructiviste mise en place pour les légitimer ne constitue pas la poutre maitresse de son argumentation. Cette démarche est présupposée par une fondation éthique. Transcendantale implicite. De cette inversion de l'ordre des raisons dans la construction rawlsienne, on déduit que sa théorie, à moins de renoncer totalement à ce qui en constitue la force, ne peut revendiquer un statut de neutralité. Le pluralisme axiologique qui fonde cette revendication n'est pas aussi radical que semble le supposer Rawls, car une fondation objective et universaliste s'inscrit dans l'ordre non seulement du souhaitable, mais aussi du possible.
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Zvirblis, Alberto Antonio. "John Rawls: uma teoria da justiça e o liberalismo." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2009. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11827.
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Previous issue date: 2009-10-28This dissertation is based on the distributive justice theory of John Rawls. It has the purpose of stressing that the theory of justice as fairness supports, in contemporary world, the maximization in the distribution of primary goods which are essential to human dignity in favor of the least fortunate, who are in the worst position in the social ladder, without jeopardizing the inviolability of individuality, which for Rawls is essential: ―Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.‖ Rawls equitable justice stems from original position, which is contractualist, in that the parties are placed behind the veil of ignorance, with no knowledge of the external world and the social position of each participant, in order to permit the founding of principles of justice that are impartial. , the present dissertation seeks to contribute to the understanding that the theory of justice establishes, in the original position, the principles of justice which all agree with and accept to live under a cooperative liberal democratic system, convinced that the primary goods, increasingly scarce in the face of a growing demand and nobody willing to accept a smaller share, will be distributed in an equitable manner, maximizing the distribution to the least endowed in society
A presente tese é alicerçada na justiça equitativa de JOHN RAWLS. Tem a finalidade a destacar, na atualidade, que a teoria da justiça como equidade procura maximizar a distribuição dos bens primários, essenciais à dignidade humana, em favor dos menos afortunados, que estão na pior posição da escala social, sem prejudicar a inviolabilidade da individualidade, que para RAWLS é de suma importância: ―cada pessoa possui uma individualidade fundada na justiça que nem mesmo o bem-estar da sociedade como um todo pode ignorar‖. A justiça equitativa tem sua origem na posição original, posição esta contratualista, em que as partes são colocadas sob o véu de ignorância, com desconhecimento total do mundo externo e da posição social de cada participante, a fim de que sejam estabelecidos os princípios de justiça de forma imparcial. Portanto, a presente tese tem o escopo contributivo de que a teoria da justiça estabelece, na posição original, os princípios de justiça com os quais todos concordam e passam a conviver em um sistema cooperativo liberal democrático, convictos de que os bens primários, cada vez mais escassos em frente de uma demanda cada vez maior, por ninguém se contentar com uma fatia menor, serão distribuídos equitativamente, maximizando a distribuição aos menos favorecidos
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Kirschbaum, Charles. ""John Rawls: justiça imparcial e seus limites"." Universidade de São Paulo, 2005. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-18062005-201639/.
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Uma Teoria da Justiça de John Rawls surgiu como uma proposta renovada para abordar a equidade das instituições. Uma característica que faz o conceito de Rawls distinto é a aplicação de sua teoria a um escopo restrito: instituições que constituem a estrutura básica da sociedade. Além disso, esse conceito de justiça deve ser imparcial em relação às concepções de Bem dos indivíduos. Essa dissertação explora as razões que levaram Rawls e seus seguidores a escolher essa abordagem e sugere possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria.A Theory of Justice of John Rawls emerges as a renewed proposition to approach the fairness of institutions. A distinctive characteristic of Rawls concept is the application of his theory towards a limited scope: institutions that constitute the basic structure of the society. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Rawls and his followers to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.
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Greene, Andrew. "Rawls's theory of justice a necessary extension to environmentalism." Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/4905.
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John Rawls's stated intergenerational justice scheme, known as the just-savings principle, does not include an institutional concern for the environment and is therefore incomplete and incapable of maintaining meaningfully just relations between generations. The theory's emphasis on economic theory and capital accumulation demonstrates a misinterpretation of environmental issues and concerns as well as their underlying causes and repercussions. This lapse in Rawls's intergenerational scheme exposes flaws in his larger theory of justice by leaving the stability of society in question and placing arbitrary burdens on generations and peoples without institutional recourse. However, by supplementing justice as fairness (JAF) with Rawls's other writings, such as The Law of Peoples, a more satisfactory outline for justice between generations can be achieved and a more comprehensive scheme of intergenerational justice can be incorporated into Rawls's theory of justice.ID: 030422932; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Thesis (M.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-65).
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Biggs, Andrew George. "Rawls as the #Newton of Morals' : the use of scientific method in #A Theory of Justice'." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.283119.
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Wu, Kevin. "John Rawls’ Theory of Justice and Mixed Conception with a Social Minimum Principle." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1218.
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John Rawls was a political philosopher concerned with social justice, specifically the best way that society could be structured so that individual rights and duties were fairly distributed amongst everyone and division of advantages from social cooperation were optimally determined. He believed that this conception of justice rested in principles that would be agreed upon by free, self-interested and rational persons in a starting position of equality and fairness. The principles of the theory of justice are ones that are meant to enable this group of people to cooperate with each other while recognizing that individuals in the group both share the same interests and have conflicting interests. These principles can be understood as underlying our most strongly held ethical beliefs – the ones that exhibit our ability to make the right moral decisions. This paper explains Rawls’ theory of justice, Justice as Fairness, considers an alternative known as “mixed conception” and offers Rawls’ response to the alternative before delving deeper into the debate to understand whether Rawls’ theory of a “mixed conception” should be chosen for a society. Rawls was a notoriously difficult writer so this thesis spends a significant amount of time trying to explicate his views and arguments. With that being said, this thesis does miss out on some key secondary details but hopes to give a clear and compelling picture of his theory, especially the parts that relate to the debate. The debate centers on the choice between the difference principle, which calls for society to maximize the prospects of the least advantaged, and the social minimum principle, which has society set a social minimum that would allow citizens to lead decent lives and take measures necessary to ensure everyone can reach that minimum. In the end, I reach the conclusion that the social minimum principle, in combination with some of Rawls’ other principles, should be used as one of the main principles of justice in society.
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Mackie, Julian E. "Just Housing: An Examination of Inequality in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Fairness." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1195.
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How would a housing system work in a just society? How do we account for differences in opportunity according to one’s birthplace? These two questions, both a result of our recent housing crisis, can be addressed through inquiries into policy, economics, history, or other forms of social sciences. In this paper I attempt to address these questions instead through a philosophical lens by examining the principles that guide the distribution of goods in our society. It is from such a theory that we can construct the fairest government or economic policies.
Theories of distributive justice try to account for the fairest distribution of goods in a society. I take one such theory, John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, and apply it to the distribution of housing. I begin by deconstructing the core principles of Rawls’ theory and analyzing how each applies to housing. Then I make an argument about the fairness of these outcomes. My conclusion is, in fact, Rawls theory does not adequately account for the importance of housing in our society. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate the inequalities that face families throughout our society by illustrating the profound impact of housing on one’s well-being as well as one’s opportunity to succeed.
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Roschildt, João Leonardo Marques. "Da construção dos fundamentos do Direito em John Rawls." Universidade Federal de Pelotas, 2010. http://repositorio.ufpel.edu.br/handle/ri/1022.
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Previous issue date: 2010-08-23The focus of the present work is the construction of a concept of Right that is compatible with the notion of justice formulated by John Rawls. The verification of the formal and material structures of justice as fairness will finish determining the type of Right that fits to the Rawlsian thought, which is the interpretative doctrine. Thus it is appropriate to emphasize that the theory of the Right in Rawls is opposed to legal positivism, showing itself independent as a liberal political conception of justice so require
O foco do presente trabalho é a construção de um conceito de Direito que seja compatível com a noção de justiça construída por John Rawls. A verificação das estruturas formas e materiais da justiça como eqüidade acabará determinando o tipo de Direito que cabe ao pensamento rawlsiano, qual seja, a doutrina interpretativa. Nesta medida é adequado destacar que a teoria do Direito em Rawls se contrapõe ao positivismo jurídico, e se mostrando independente como uma concepção política liberal de justiça assim exige
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Harper, Sean Julian. "Desert." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002840.
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This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.
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Engin-Deniz, Egon. "Vergleich des Utilitarismus mit der Theorie der Gerechtigkeit von John Rawls /." Innsbruck : Tyrolia-Verl, 1991. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb366640729.
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McNamee, Blaise. "Education as fairness locating Rawlsian liberalism in liberal education theory /." Diss., Online access via UMI:, 2008.
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Jiang, Xulin. "Political justice and Laissez-faire : a consequentialist optimization of Rawl's scheme of justice as fairness." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2009. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/983.
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Bakali, Hassani Abdellatif. "La Justice sociale dans la société contemporaine : à propos de la théorie rawlsienne de la justice." Paris 8, 2001. http://www.bibliotheque-numerique-paris8.fr/fre/ref/167943/180260413/.
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La réflexion sur la justice sociale suscite un grand intérêt dans la société contemporaine, que ce soit dans les débats sur les principes d'égalité, de liberté, dans les réflexions sur les institutions de l'Etat-Providence et sur la démocratie, ou encore dans les controverses sur le pluralisme et la tolérance. L'actualité de nos sociétés modernes marquées non seulement par l'inégalité et l'injustice, mais aussi par le pluralisme des conceptions du bien et des visions du monde, pousse de plus en plus l'exigence de justice sociale comme une préoccupation majeur des hommes. Mais comment mettre en oeuvre une telle requête quand l'économique domine le politique et impose ses lois, et que les grandes institutions politiques ou autres sont en crise de signification? Quels sont les principes qui permettent d'organiser une juste coexistence stable entre des citoyens qui peuvent affirmer publiquement leur différences tout en. . .
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Rios, Vinícius Custódio. "O acesso à justiça sob o enfoque da teoria da justiça de John Rawls." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2017. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/20591.
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The objective of this work is to study a model of justice that can be objectively appropriated by modern democratic society, addressing the application of justice by the judiciary, providing a reflection on the meaning of some terms such as justice, a sense of justice and equity. To do this study will be used the theory of justice developed by John Rawls. We will seek to identify the applicability of John Rawls' theory of justice in judicial decisions, characterizing and highlighting the relevance of equity so that there is an appropriate and fair mechanism in conflict resolution. The research methodology used to carry out this dissertation is the bibliographical one with doctrinal and jurisprudential grounds, under a deductive and in some points inductive approach
Este trabalho tem por objetivo estudar um modelo de justiça que possa ser objetivamente apropriado pela sociedade democrática moderna abordando a aplicação da justiça pelo judiciário propiciando uma reflexão sobre a significação de alguns termos tais como justiça, senso de justiça, equidade. Para realizar esse estudo utilizar-se-á a teoria da justiça desenvolvida por John Rawls. Buscaremos identificar a aplicabilidade da teoria da justiça proposta por John Rawls nas decisões judiciais, caracterizando e evidenciando a relevância da equidade para que haja um mecanismo apropriado e justo nas soluções de conflitos. A metodologia de pesquisa utilizada para a realização dessa dissertação é a bibliográfica com fundamentação doutrinária e jurisprudencial, sob uma abordagem dedutiva e em alguns pontos indutiva
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Miele, Alex. "An Explanation of John Rawls's Theory of Justice with a Defense of the Veil of Ignorance." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1537.
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John Rawls was a political philosopher who proposed a theory centered around the idea of justice as fairness. His primary concern was social justice, so more specifically, he proposed a basic structure for society that ensures major social institutions like the government fairly distribute fundamental rights and duties and optimally divide advantages brought about by social cooperation. His theory is based on the idea that the correct principles to use for the basic structure of society are those that free and rational people would agree to in attempt to advance their own self-interest from a fair and equal starting position. Rawls proposes three principles that he believes people would agree to in this situation and describes what a society based on these principles would look like. Throughout this paper, I will attempt to explain Rawls’s “Theory of Justice” and defend various aspect of the theory against common objections.
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Trifunovic, Milica. "The principle of solidarity: A restatement of John Rawls' law of peoples." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät I, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16728.
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In der Dissertation habe ich versucht eine Theorie der globalen Gerechtigkeit darzustellen. Diese Theorie hat als ihre Basis das Denken von John Rawls. Rawls hat sich in seinem letzten Buch „Das Recht der Völker“ zu dem Thema geäußert. Ich erläutere seine Gedanken und zugleich kritisiere ich sie. Meine Kritikpunkte an Rawls: 1. Keine detaillierte Erläuterung der Aufteilung in ideale und nichtideale Theorie 2. Unvollkommenheit der Prinzipien für die ideale Theorie der globalen Gerechtigkeit Ich verweise auf die mögliche Verbesserung des Rawlschen Standpunktes über globale Gerechtigkeit durch: 1. eine Unterscheidung der normativen und deskriptiven idealen bzw. nichtidealen Theorie (damit wird die Struktur von Rawls‘s Arguments klarer) 2. Durch die Darstellung von drei Prinzipien die Rawlssche Prinzipien hätten sein könnten (damit bekommt seine Theorie inhaltlich mehr Wert) 3. Durch die Erläuterung des Prinzips der Solidarität als das, was an Rawls‘s Theorie besonders gewesen sein könnte.In my disertation I have tried to present a theory of global justice. This theory has for its basis the thought of John Rawls. Rawls expressed his thaughts about the topic in his last book „The Law of Peoples.“ On the one hand I explain his theory while on the other I criticize it. My critique on Rawls goes accoring the following lines: 1. No elaborated disitiniction betwen the ideal and nonideal theory 2. Unfinished principles for the ideal theory of global justice I point to the possible amelioration of Rawls´ theory of global justice through: 1. Differentiation of the normative and descriptive ideal and nonideal theory (through this disticition is the stucture of Rawls´ argument clearer) 2. Introduction of three prinicples that should have been Rawls´s (through these three principles the content of his theory becomes more valuable) 3. Eplaning the principle of solidarity as the principle that could have been the specific for Rawls´ theory
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Marinho, William Tito Schuman [UNIFESP]. "A concepção da posição original na filosofia de John Rawls: uma reconstrução histórico-filosófica até A theory of justice." Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), 2013. http://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/39318.
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A ideia central da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, a justiça como equidade, como elaborada desde os seus escritos iniciais até a “edição-tradução revista” de A theory of justice, é apresentar uma concepção de justiça que generalize e eleve a um nível mais alto de abstração a tradicional concepção do contrato social, tal como estabelecida por Locke, Rousseau e Kant. O contrato social, no entanto, é substituído por uma situação inicial que contém certas restrições (sobre a concepção de bem e pelo véu de ignorância) aos argumentos, com o objetivo de conduzir as partes a um consenso justo sobre princípios de justiça. Essa interpretação (mais geral e abstrata da concepção do contrato social) é alcançada por intermédio da ideia, tanto intuitiva, quanto fundamental e de justificação, da posição original. A posição original é apresentada como artifício hipotético e heurístico de representação, verdadeiro experimento do pensamento, e a sua construção é analisada segundo suas categorias próprias. Em linhas gerais, é ela uma situação hipotética de liberdade igual (definição) sobre o justo no status quo que, semelhante ao estado de natureza do contrato social (fundamento filosófico), assegura que pessoas livres e iguais (pressupostos), de forma racional, na condição de representantes dos cidadãos de uma sociedade bem-ordenada, sob um véu de ignorância (característica), escolham certa concepção de justiça, com a finalidade de chegar a um consenso sobre os princípios de justiça para a regulação, na cooperação entre todos, da estrutura básica da sociedade (objetivo). A perspectiva adotada na pesquisa é tanto histórica quanto interpretativa. É sugerida, logo na Introdução, uma reanálise da leitura da obra de John Rawls, considerando-a, na perspectiva histórico-evolutiva, não segundo sua “data de publicação”, mas segundo a “evolução de seus conceitos”. Por isso, a edição-revista de A theory of justice e Justice as fairness: A restatement, sob tal justificativa, são realocadas. No Capítulo 1 é apresentada uma visão geral sobre os pontos de vistas morais adotados, como justificativas, pela justiça como equidade. No Capítulo 2 é iniciada a descrição da “evolução conceitual” da posição original, segundo os escritos iniciais de John Rawls, em consideração aos anos de 1950 até 1971. Neste período são apresentados os elementos estruturais da posição original. No Capítulo 3 é analisada a posição original como estabelecida em A theory of justice, nos aspectos que diferem dos escritos anteriores e no que veio a ser considerado como mais polêmico. A “natureza” da posição original como “experimento do pensamento” é discutida. O Capítulo 4 retoma a descrição da “evolução conceitual” da posição original, mas, agora, a partir dos escritos posteriores a 1971, e institui um diálogo das ideias de John Rawls com outros, a partir de seus esclarecimentos, de suas réplicas e de suas (eventuais) revisões, considerando as críticas que lhe foram dirigidas após a edição original de A theory of justice até 1975, ano de publicação da sua “edição-tradução revista” em alemão. Como Conclusão, sugiro que a posição original, ao menos até 1975, é essencial ao sistema filosófico sobre a justiça de John Rawls; porém, isolada, é insuficiente para, no seu plano, justificar, seja inicialmente, a escolha dos dois princípios de justiça da justiça como equidade, ou, seja posteriormente, estabilizá-los. A justiça como equidade, nestas duas etapas ou graus de justificação, de escolha e de estabilidade – e sem considerar o “giro” do liberalismo político –, além da posição original, necessita, como “complemento”, de outras ideias fundamentais: a de pessoa, a de sociedade bem-ordenada e a de equilíbrio reflexivo.
The central idea of John Rawls’ theory of justice, the justice as fairness, as elaborated from his first writings up to the “translated-edition revised” of A theory of justice, is to present a conception of justice that generalizes and elevates to a higher level of abstraction the traditional concept of social contract, such as established by Locke, Rousseau and Kant. The social contract, however, is replaced by an initial situation that contains certain restrictions (about the conception of good and by the veil of ignorance) to the arguments, with the purpose of conducting the parties to a fair consensus about the principles of justice. This interpretation (more general and abstract of the conception of social contract) is reached through the idea, both intuitive and fundamental, and of justification of the original position. The original position is presented as hypothetical and heuristic artifice of representation, a real thought experiment, and its construction is analyzed according to its own categories. In outline, it is a hypothetical situation of equal liberty (definition) about the just in the status quo that, similar to the state of nature of the social contract (philosophical fundament), assures that free and equal persons (presuppositions), in a rational way, in the condition of representatives of citizens of a well-ordered society, under the veil of ignorance (characteristic), choose certain conception of justice, with the purpose of reaching a consensus about the principles of justice for the regulation, in the cooperation among all, of the basic structure of society (objective). The perspective adopted in the research is both historical and interpretative. It is suggested, soon in the Introduction, a re-analysis of the reading of John Rawls’s work, considering it, in the historicalevolutional perspective, not according to “the date of its publication”, but according to the “evolution of their concepts”. For that reason, the revised-edition of A theory of justice and Justice as fairness: A restatement, under such justification, are relocated. On Chapter 1 is presented a general view about the moral point of views adopted, as justifications, by the justice as fairness. On Chapter 2 is initiated a description of the “conceptual evolution” of the original position, according to John Rawls’s initial writings, in consideration to years 1950 to 1971. In that period, the structural elements of the original position are presented. On Chapter 3 is analyzed the original position as established in the A theory of justice, in the aspects that differ from previous writings and which came to be considered as the most controversial. The “nature” of original position as “thought experiment” is discussed. The Chapter 4 retakes the description of the “conceptual evolution” of the original position, but now beginning from writings after 1971 and establishes a dialogue of John Rawls’s ideas with others, starting from his explanations, his replies and his (eventual) revisions, considering the critiques directed to him after the original edition of A theory of justice, up to 1975, year of the publication of the “translatededition revised” in German. As Conclusion, I suggest that the original position, at least until 1975, it is essential to the John Rawls’s philosophical system about justice; however, isolated, it is not sufficient to, in his plan, justify, be initially, the choice of the two principles of justice of the justice as fairness, or, be later, to stabilize them. The justice as fairness, in these two stages or justifications degrees, of choice and of stability – and without considering the political liberalism’s “turn” – besides the original position, needs, as “complement”, of other fundamental ideas: of person, of well-ordered society and of reflective equilibrium.
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Furquim, Lilian de Toni. "O liberalismo abrangente de Ronald Dworkin." Universidade de São Paulo, 2010. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-02122010-111403/.
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O presente trabalho discute o liberalismo abrangente de Ronald Dworkin, como alternativa ao liberalismo político de John Rawls. Dworkin interpreta o liberalismo como uma teoria contínua entre ética e moralidade, ou seja, sem uma separação entre as doutrinas abrangentes e nossas concepções políticas para justificação dos fundamentos constitucionais, respeitando o pluralismo razoável presente na sociedade democrática. O liberalismo abrangente se apresenta como uma teoria liberal na qual a liberdade, a igualdade e a comunidade fazem parte de um único ideal político.The present study discusses Ronald Dworkins comprehensive liberalism as an alternative to John Rawlspolitical liberalism. Dworkin construes liberalism as a continuous theory between ethics and morality, that is, without a separation between comprehensive doctrines and our political conceptions so as to justify constitutional grounds, thus respecting the reasonable pluralism existing in democratic society. Comprehensive liberalism presents itself as a liberal theory in which freedom, equality and community merge into a single political ideal.
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Duckworth, C. "Market participation and embedded critique in John Rawl's theory of justice." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2007. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445469/.
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John Rawls has been criticised for wrongly specifying the relationship between persons' ongoing emotional and intellectual commitments and their capacity to reflect on and revise those commitments. While there are, arguably successful, responses to this critique, the difficulty shows up, I argue, in connection with his representation of the problem of stability. Stability, in an ongoing Rawlsian society, if it is to be realistic, requires an accommodation of competing, personal concerns, concerns grounded in "comprehensive" moral doctrines. However, when appeal to Rawls' principles of justice is required in order to settle disputes, in an ongoing Rawlsian society, the disputants must adopt a neutral standpoint that mutes the practical salience of their personal concerns. Those concerns, then, will not be engaged in deliberation. This has the implication that a person must respond to a judgement that goes against her by rescinding what she sees, prima facie, as a legitimate concern. This represents the problem of stability as one of how to extinguish unsupported practical considerations. The problem ought to be represented, rather, as one of how to accommodate competing concerns while keeping their practical salience, for the individuals whose concerns they are, intact. Ways to attempt to remedy this can be drawn on from outside of Rawlsian theory. In this thesis, however, I attempt to show how one can address the issue from within a Rawlsian account. Centrally, I note that Rawlsian citizens are, by assumption, market participants, at least insofar as they are involved in a system of discretionary exchange, and that, in order to be adequately specified as market participants, they must possess certain characteristics. An exploration of these characteristics offers, or so I argue, a conception of the relationship between ongoing personal commitments and the capacity for radical critique that promises to address the deficiency in Rawls' representation of the problem of social stability.
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Biggs, Kenneth Howard. "The Liberal-Communitarian Debate and the Development of a Political Conception of the Person." PDXScholar, 1993. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4570.
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Without doubt, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is one of the most important statements of Anglo-American political philosophy in the twentieth century. Through a revival of the social contract device, Rawls formulates a set of principles of correct political association ("the right") that he argues must be considered as prior to any conception of the good. These principles apply to all persons as free and equal beings in society, but more importantly they assume some things about the nature of persons in that society. On the institutional aspect of his theory, Rawls conceives of the state as a neutral arbiter of the good. This, coupled with a conception of persons as individuals that affirm the values of autonomy and equality, has drawn extensive critical fire from philosophers within and without liberalism. One such group of critics, the communitarians, claim that Rawls's idea of the person is too abstract or "groundless" to account for shared values, and thus fails to appreciate the extent to which we understand ourselves as embedded within our culture. Michael Sandel has thus argued that Rawls's person so conceived is too abstract to be of any theoretical let alone practical use, while Alasdair Macintyre has argued that such a conception of persons is incoherent: liberal "persons" do not know themselves, and so they cannot know what is right or what is good. This thesis analyzes the liberal-communitarian debate by comparing and contrasting some terms used by both sides in the debate. By analyzing the terms, I will present a liberal conception of the person as properly understood in Rawls's theory. ' Rawls has not been idle since the publication of A Theory of Justice. He has defended his theory in a series of articles and lectures that have developed his position in response to these and other criticisms. Specifically, by positing his theory within liberal-democratic culture, by acknowledging individual formative conceptions of the good, and by emphasizing and relying upon a modus vivendi view as the basis for political liberalism and a liberal culture, Rawls has answered the communitarian objections by incorporating and responding to those pertinent criticisms. I will argue that Rawls's recent emphasis on a theory of political liberalism successfully accounts for his idea of persons because it accords with our considered moral principles, it treats persons as free and equal beings worthy of respect, and it incorporates the only coherent construction of the social embeddedness thesis to a greater degree than communitarians acknowledge or appreciate. Rawls's political liberalism thus surpasses this aspect of the communitarian critique.
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Malm, Samuel. "Rawls problem of securing political liberties within the international institutions." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-148927.
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In Law of Peoples Rawls tries to work out a theory that will ensure a fair interaction between the world’s ‘peoples’ (synonymous with “nations”). By this he means a description of international rules that both liberal and non-liberal peoples can accept, with the purpose of eradicating political injustices in the world; which Rawls believes is the big cause of the greatest evils in the world. Furthermore, in his theory, Rawls envisions a set of international institutions (WTO, World Bank and “the UN”) that will work as the basic structure for implementing this scheme of law; global rules of trade; providing loans; facilitation of capital investment, etc. However, the theory lacks a description of which political liberties the peoples would want to secure, within the international institutions, and of what principles of distribution they should be assigned. Accordingly, I will in this essay try to establish which rights the peoples—as Rawls envisions them—would want to secure, and why they would want to be viewed as equal to everybody else, by reasons of the institutions profound and pervasive effect on peoples success. Furthermore, I will contend that this equality in political liberties, and especially the ‘principle of equal participation’, will be impaired by the inequalities in resources that Rawls accepts between the peoples. Consequently, an issue of how wealthier peoples will use their power to promote their self-interest, and the lack of belief that constitutional safeguards, within the international institutions, will constrain them from using means of agitation.
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Carmichael, Charles Benjamin. "The Proper Metric of Justice in Justice as Fairness." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/54.
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I explore the problem of using primary goods as the index for determining the least-advantaged members in a society in Rawls’s theory of justice. I look at the problems presented to Rawls by Amartya Sen and his capabilities approach. I discuss the solutions to Sen’s problems given by Norman Daniels, who argues that primary goods are able to take capabilities into account. Finally, I supplement Daniels, arguing that the parameters Rawls uses to define his theory limit Sen’s objection and that primary goods are the appropriate metric of justice in Rawls’s theory.
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Michel, Voltaire de Freitas. "O princípio da diferença e o Kantismo na teoria da justiça de John Rawls." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/98543.
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A tese trata do princípio da diferença na teoria da justiça de John Rawls, confrontando-o com a alegada raiz kantiana desta teoria, e sustentando que ambos – o princípio da diferença e a interpretação kantiana de Rawls – seriam incompatíveis, em razão do caráter conseqüencialista do princípio. Como resultado, nos escritos tardios de Rawls, o princípio da diferença passa a ocupar um espaço secundário na teoria da justiça, assim como a própria interpretação kantiana.The thesis deals with the principle of difference in John Rawls’s theory of justice, facing it with the Kantian interpretation, and holds that both – the principle of difference and Rawls’s Kantian interpretation – are incompatible, due to the consequentialist character of the principle of difference. As a result, in Rawls’ later writings, the principle of difference abandoned, as well as the Kantian interpretation.
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Beltrame, Bruno. "O debate de Amartya Sen com Kenneth Arrow e John Rawls e a abordagem das capacidades." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2009. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/9379.
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The aim of this dissertation is to inquire in what sense it is reasonable to locate in Kenneth Arrow s social choice theory and in John Rawls theory of justice the two main theoretical roots of Amartya Sen s capability approach. It will be argued that Arrow s social choice theory had the role of revealing the main deficiencies of the welfare economics theory. Thus, Arrow s analysis points the limitations to be fulfilled in order to arrive at satisfactory theory of social choice indicating, in this sense, the paths to be pursued. In the same manner, it is argued that Ralws theory of justice provided important elements that inspirated certain ethical positions present in Amartya Sen s thought, which appear in his approach to the problem of social choice. To conclude, the main features of the capability approach that can be directly associated with these two theoretical origins are exposed, and it is argued that Sen s theory simultaneously solves the deficiencies pointed by him in the theoretical structure of Arrow s social choice and embodies, even though in a modified way, elements of Rawls thought
O objetivo dessa dissertação é investigar em que sentido é pertinente localizar na teoria da escolha social de Kenneth Arrow e na teoria da justiça de John Rawls as duas principais raízes teóricas da abordagem das capacidades de Amartya Sen. Argumentar-se-á que a teoria da escolha social de Arrow cumpriu o papel de explicitar as deficiências da teoria econômica do bem-estar. Desse modo, as análises de Arrow apontam as limitações a serem superadas para se chegar a uma teoria satisfatória da escolha social indicando em certa medida rumos a serem seguidos. Da mesma maneira argumenta-se que a teoria da justiça de Rawls forneceu elementos importantes que inspiraram certos posicionamentos éticos evidentes no pensamento de Amartya Sen e que se refletem em suas análises da escolha social. Por fim são apresentadas as principais características da abordagem das capacidades que podem ser diretamente associados a estas duas origens teóricas, e será argumentado que a teoria de Sen ao mesmo tempo soluciona as deficiências apontadas por ele na estrutura teórica da escolha social de Arrow e incorpora, ainda que de forma modificada, elementos presentes no pensamento de Rawls
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Carey, Brian Patrick. "Perfecting the art of the possible : a constraint-based view of ideal and non-ideal theory." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/perfecting-the-art-of-the-possible-a-constraintbased-view-of-ideal-and-nonideal-theory(b5635235-ffd5-4adf-a447-b0894e3ef372).html.
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The aim of this thesis is to describe and defend ‘The Constraint-Based View’, which is a particular conception of the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theories of justice. Traditionally, ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘full compliance’, while non-ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘partial compliance’. In other words, ideal theories assume that those for whom the theory is meant to apply will be entirely willing and able to comply with the theory’s requirements, while non-ideal theories do not. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I describe and assess this original conception as well as several alternative accounts of ideal and non-ideal theory, in order to offer a broad survey of the existing literature, and to identify the various ways that these conceptions fail to capture fully the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. In Chapter 2, I draw a distinction between two different approaches to theorising about justice. ‘Axiological’ or ‘A-Type’ approaches are characterised by the fact that they include almost no assumptions as inputs to the theory, and that they are not intended to provide action-guiding recommendations as part of the outputs of the theory. In contrast, ‘Practical’ or ‘P-Type’ approaches include additional assumptions as part of their inputs and are intended to form part of a process that ultimately produces action-guiding recommendations. In Chapter 3, I describe and defend my preferred conception of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory – the ‘Constraint-Based View’ (CBV). According to the CBV, there is a spectrum of theoretical approaches that can be more or less ideal, depending on the extent to which they include ‘soft constraints’ as part of the inputs to the theory. Soft constraints are facts about the world that can be changed, in contrast to hard constraints, which are facts about the world that cannot. I argue that this way of thinking about the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory is more useful than the alternative conceptions considered in Chapter 1. In Chapter 4, I examine the roles that feasibility considerations should play in ideal and non-ideal theory, from the perspective of the CBV and in Chapter 5, I explain the implications of adopting the CBV for what I call ‘transitional theory’, which is concerned with the transition from the status quo towards a more ideal state of affairs. In Chapter 6, I offer an example of the CBV in action, by considering its implications for the debate over duties of justice towards future generations.
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Heinz, Vanessa. "Der Schleier des Nichtwissens im Gesetzgebungsverfahren." Baden-Baden Nomos, 2008. http://d-nb.info/993924190/04.
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Ingham, Stuart. "Taking men as they are : an essay defending John Rawls' deference to "human nature" from the "concessionary criticism" of G.A. Cohen." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17180.
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G.A. Cohen argues that John Rawls' method of political philosophy--in particular his sensitivity to the facts of human nature--leads him inexorably to producing a nonideal conception of justice. In this thesis I defend Rawls against this accusation by demonstrating that the facts of human nature that he shows deference towards are a product of the "free development" of his ideal conception of the person. The result is that Rawls' conception of justice has the power and status that Rawls affords it, and that Cohen's critique fails to cause internal damage to Rawls' theory. My thesis is thus what the subtitle says it is: an essay in defence of John Rawls' deference to "human nature" from the "concessionary criticism" of G.A. Cohen.
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Artenosi, Daniel. "Constructing a moral education theory of punishment." Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=79282.
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This thesis reconstructs John Rawl's Original Position in order to show that within a liberal democratic culture, the institution of punishment ought to conform to the Moral Education Theory of Punishment, put forth by Jean Hampton. According to Hampton, punishment should facilitate a medium where the state educates the criminal on the moral implications of her wrongdoing. I argue that citizens would select the Moral Education Theory of Punishment in the Original Position, since it offers the best opportunity to redress two calamities related to the criminal's wrongdoing---namely, that it threatens the moral status of the victim, and that it results from the wrongdoer's deficient moral sensibility. Upon consideration, the representatives in the Original Position recognize that redressing either of the two calamities necessitates redressing the other; thus, both objectives reinforce one another. Consequently, the representatives would unanimously select the principles of punishment manifest in the Moral Education Theory.
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Astrinidis, Alexandros. "La perception d'une législation juste par les enfants : essai de sociologie législative suivant la théorie de J. Rawls." Paris 2, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA020086.
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La legislation juste est importante pour organiser la vie sociale. Pour cette raison, dans cet essai de sociologie legislative, une enquete sociologique-type dont le fondement theorique est inspire par la definition de la justice de j. Rawls et par la methode de sa theorie, est proposee. Cette enquete a pour ambition de degager le contenu que chaque societe bien precise attribue aux notions de la justice et de la legislation juste. Ladite enquete contient un questionnaire-type sur la justice et sur la solution juste a divers problemes legislatifs : elles sont concues comme le contenu d'un contrat social historique et impartial entre enfants qui choisissent les regles d'une cooperation ideale entre eux. Ce questionnaire integre plusieurs elements necessaires a la definition du contenu desdites notions tels que la connaissance des problemes et l'impartialite des reponses : 1) la connaissance objective des problemes est fournie dans le questionnaire qui est chaque fois elabore par les scientifiques et qui est adapte a la maturite d'esprit des enfants. 2) l'impartialite des reponses est egalement integree : les sujets de l'enquete sont des enfants presumes plus eloignes que les autres tranches d'age des interets socio-economiques particuliers a defendre. Les enfants peuvent repondre de facon impartiale, comme plusieurs indices en temoignent. La perception du contenu de la notion de la justice et d'une legislation juste par les enfants peut etre representative de leur societe et pourrait orienter la regulation juridique. Par cet essai de sociologie legislative, une pratique generalisee d'une enquete-type, pratique auxiliaire aux institutions democratiques existantes, est proposee. Dans cette enquete, la connaissance des problemes legislatifs a resoudre, la participation du corps social a la prise des decisions et leur impartialite sont combinees. Ainsi, cet essai contribue a une renouveau democratique.
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Gomes, Fabiano Soares. "As razões do direito: um estudo da razão pública a partir do modelo liberal-igualitário de John Rawls." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2012. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=4097.
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Em 1993, John Rawls, notável filósofo e professor da distinta Harvard University, publicou seu Political Liberalism, um livro em que pela primeira vez sintetiza sistematicamente o conceito de razão pública, uma ideia chave de sua teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness). Segundo Rawls, a razão pública consiste fundamentalmente no modo e conteúdo adequados ao debate e à fundamentação de escolhas essenciais de justiça no espaço público de uma democracia constitucional. Nesse sentido, Rawls advoga que o único meio razoável de justificação da coerção estatal reside no reconhecimento e/ou obtenção de consensos (overlapping consensus) em relação às escolhas essenciais de uma sociedade democrática, o que só é possível se atores públicos e privados se despojarem de suas respectivas doutrinas filosóficas ou morais abrangentes ao debater e decidir tais questões essenciais de justiça. A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a proposta de razão pública de Rawls, dentro do contexto de sua teoria da justiça como equidade, propondo-se a verificar se o pensamento rawlsiano procede no contexto jurídico-filosófico da pós-modernidade e se a sua teoria pode ser concretamente aplicada aos ordenamentos jurídicos contemporâneos, em especial no que tange ao conteúdo e pleno exercício da liberdade religiosa pelos cidadãos de um estado constitucional democrático.In 1993 John Rawls, a notable American philosopher and professor of the distinguished Harvard University, published his Political Liberalism, a book that presents for the first time Rawlss idea of public reason, a key concept of his theory of justice. To Rawls public reason is fundamentally the proper form and content of public debate, as well as the justification of essential decisions of basic justice in a constitutional democracy. In this sense, Rawls claim that the only reasonable justification for state coercion lays on an overlapping consensus regarding the essential choices of a democratic society, which is possible only if public and private actors surpass their own personal moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public debate of such essential decisions of basic justice. This dissertation thesis aims to verify the rawlsian proposal of public reason in the context of justice as fairness, reflecting whether Rawls proposal fits a post-modern juridical and philosophical reality. The work also aims to analyze if Rawls theory can be effectively applied to modern constitutional states, especially regarding the content and exercise of religious freedom by the citizens of a democratic constitutional state.
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Carbone, Diego Cassiano Lorenzoni. "A teoria da justiça como equidade e as ações afirmativas." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2017. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/12706.
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John Rawls conceives society as a cooperation system. To govern this system, he developed
the theory of justice as fairness (JAF). His theory, from its emergence in the early 1970s to the
present, has been commonly associated with public policies called affirmative action (AFs).
Despite this association, there are two relevant situations that deserve analysis and lead us to
our research problem: Rawls never wrote directly about affirmative action, despite the large
extent of his work; and there are arguments supporting the incompatibility between the JAF
and the AFs. In view of that, this paper deals with the following problem: is there
incompatibility between the theory of justice as fairness and affirmative action? Our
hypotheses are: (i) that affirmative action is not provided for in the JAF and, in general,
cannot be simply derived from that theory; and (ii) that, despite this, there is no
incompatibility between the JAF and the AFs. The broader objective of this paper, besides the
specific objective of responding to the research problem, will be to demonstrate that there is
no room for simplistic associations between the JAF and the AFs, as there are relevant
arguments that must be faced by those who wish to study the subject - either to defend the
AFs or not - especially those arguments concerning Rawls's distinction between ideal theory
and non-ideal theory. In the first chapter, basic concepts will be presented for the general
understanding of the theory of justice as fairness. In the second chapter, after exposing the
concept and taxonomy of affirmative action, some of Rawls's arguments that found JAF's two
principles of justice will be analyzed in order to verify if such arguments present any
incompatibility with affirmative action. Next, an analysis of the validity of some objections
made by Robert Taylor in the paper Rawlsian Affirmative Action will be done, where Taylor
argues that certain categories of affirmative action are incompatible with the JAF in the
scenarios of ideal theory and non-ideal theory. Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn, in the
sense that: (i) affirmative action is not foreseen in the JAF and cannot be simply derived from
it; (ii) that the arguments of possible incompatibility analyzed here are invalid; and (iii) that,
apart from the existence of other arguments not studied here, such public policies are not
incompatible with the theory of justice as fairness.John Rawls concebe a sociedade como um sistema de cooperação. Para reger esse sistema, desenvolveu a teoria da justiça como equidade (TJE). Sua teoria, do surgimento no início da década de 1970 até hoje em dia, tem sido comumente associada às políticas públicas denominadas ações afirmativas (AFs). Apesar dessa associação, há duas situações relevantes que merecem análise e nos levam ao nosso problema de pesquisa: Rawls nunca escreveu sobre ações afirmativas diretamente, apesar da grande extensão de sua obra; e existem argumentos sustentando a incompatibilidade entre a TJE e as AFs. Diante disso, o presente trabalho enfrentará o seguinte problema: existe incompatibilidade entre a teoria da justiça como equidade e as ações afirmativas? Nossas hipóteses são: (i) que as ações afirmativas não estão previstas na TJE e, em geral, não podem ser simplesmente derivadas daquela teoria; e (ii) que, apesar disso, não há incompatibilidade entre a TJE e as AFs. O objetivo mais amplo do trabalho, para além do objetivo específico de responder ao problema de pesquisa, será demonstrar que não há espaço para associações paroquiais entre a TJE e as AFs, pois há argumentos relevantes que devem ser enfrentados por quem pretender estudar o tema – seja para defender as AFs ou não –, sobretudo aqueles argumentos relativos à distinção de Rawls entre teoria ideal e teoria não-ideal. No primeiro capítulo, serão apresentados conceitos básicos para a compreensão geral da teoria da justiça como equidade. No segundo capítulo, após expor conceito e taxonomia das ações afirmativas, serão analisados alguns dos argumentos de Rawls que fundamentam os dois princípios de justiça da TJE, para verificar se tais argumentos apresentam alguma incompatibilidade com as ações afirmativas, e a seguir será analisada a validade de algumas objeções feitas por Robert Taylor no artigo Ações Afirmativas Rawlsianas, sustentando que determinadas categorias de ações afirmativas são incompatíveis com a TJE, nos cenários da teoria ideal e da teoria não-ideal. Ao final, serão expostas conclusões, no sentido de que: (i) as ações afirmativas não estão previstas na TJE e não podem ser simplesmente derivadas dela; (ii) que os argumentos de possível incompatibilidade, aqui analisados, são inválidos; e (iii) que, ressalvada a existência de outros argumentos aqui não estudados, tais políticas públicas não são incompatíveis com a teoria da justiça como equidade.
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Bassegio, Luana Fischer. "Direitos humanos e justiça internacional : o cosmopolitismo como uma alternativa ao direito dos povos." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/149558.
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Direitos humanos e justiça internacional são temas que abrangem várias categorias de discussão. Ambos são igualmente importantes e sem um somos incapazes de alcançar o outro. Esse trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar as principais teorias políticas contemporâneas que tratam desse tema, em busca da que melhor responde a seguinte questão-problema: qual proposta de filosofia política se adapta uniformemente a valoração dos direitos individuais e argumenta como fatores internacionais afetam a sociedade doméstica? Fazemos uma revisão bibliográfica a partir da obra Uma teoria da justiça de John Rawls, apontamos como o debate se expandiu para o âmbito internacional e quais as críticas que foram feitas ao longo desse processo. Demonstramos como as relações internacionais afetam a política interna de sociedades em desenvolvimento e, assim, não somente devem ser consideradas quando pensamos em direitos individuais, mas também devem se tornar parte essencial e imprescindível de uma teoria de justiça. Por fim, concluímos como a proposta cosmopolita, coerente e precisamente se apresenta como a melhor alternativa a favor dos direitos individuais e, o Imposto Global de Recursos, assegura uma regularidade necessária para a discussão de justiça internacional.Human rights and international justice are issues that span multiple categories of discussion. Both are equally important and none of them are unable to reach the other by itself. This study aims to present the main contemporary political theories that address this topic, in search of the best answer to the question-problem: which proposed political philosophy evenly fits the valuation of individual rights and argues as international factors affect the domestic society? We review the literature from the work A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, point out how the debate has expanded to the international level and what the criticisms that have been made throughout this process. We demonstrate how international relations affect the domestic policy of developing societies and, thus, should not only be considered when we think about individual rights, but also should become essential and an indispensable part of a theory of justice. At last, we conclude that the consistent and accurately cosmopolitan proposal presents itself as the best alternative in favor of individual rights, and the Global Resources Tax ensures the needed regularity for the discussion of international justice.
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Andrade, Analice Cabral Costa. "Consenso sobreposto rawlsiano: uma ponte entre o direito e a filosofia." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2017. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/6652.
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Essa dissertação se prende a analisar a teoria da justiça de John Rawls e seus conceitos de véu da ignorância, consenso sobreposto, justiça como equidade e contrato social, compreendendo qual o significado do direito das minorias e analisando a teoria da justiça de Rawls frente ao ordenamento atual de direito (direito geral), verificando a relação desta com o direito das minorias. Para o Direito, precisa-se proteger a minoria da possibilidade de discriminação. A importância, portanto, desse assunto é analisar os princípios jurídicos e os ideais filosóficos da teoria de justiça de John Rawls a fim de esclarecer a relação entre os direitos das maiorias( geral) e o direito das minorias e a aplicação do consenso sobreposto como meio de diminuir as diferenças que o direito quer instituir.
This dissertation relates to analyze the theory of justice of John Rawls and his concepts of veil of ignorance, overlapping consensus, justice as fairness and social contract, understanding the meaning of the rights of minorities and analyzing the theory of justice Rawls against the land current law (general right), verifying its relation to the rights of minorities. To the right, one must protect the minority of the possibility of discrimination. The importance, therefore this issue is to analyze the legal principles and philosophical ideals of John Rawls theory of justice in order to clarify the relationship between the rights of the majority (general) and the rights of minorities and the application of the overlapping consensus as a means to reduce the differences that the right wants to impose.
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Lemaire, André. "L'enjeu de la rationalité dans la Théorie de la justice de John Rawls." Sherbrooke : Université de Sherbrooke, 2000.
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Rouge-Pullon, Cyrille. "Justice sociale et efficacité économique : John Rawls et l'économie politique." Paris 10, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA100135.
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La philosophie depuis l'antiquite ne s'est que peu penchee sur le domaine de l'economie, et reciproquement, l'economiste se fait rarement philosophe. L'ouvrage de john rawls, theorie de la justice, rompt avec cette tradition et s'est en quelques annees, impose comme un classique incontournable, renouvelant, par sa pertinence et sa profondeur, l'ensemble des debats portant sur la question de la justice sociale. Se situant a la croisee des chemins entre le liberalisme politique et le liberalisme economique, rawls tente de concilier des exigences de justice pesant sur les institutions de base des societes democratiques modernes - entendues comme espaces de cooperation entre les individus -, et les imperatifs d'efficacite economique. Comme philosophie politique, l'ambition premiere est de s'inscrire comme alternative a la philosophie utilitariste dominante, insatisfaisante selon lui, en ce qu'elle autorise le sacrifice de quelques-uns pour le plus grand bonheur de tous, au detriment des droits fondamentaux et inviolables qu'il convient de reconnaitre a chacun. En tant que philosophie economique, la justice comme equite soumet les activites marchandes aux imperatifs de liberte et de dignite individuelle, tout en preservant l'efficacite economique. La bonne societe rawlsienne se doit en outre de garantir l'egalite des chances de chacun et de peser sur les inegalites de telle sorte que celles-ci soient profitables aux plus defavorises. Ce faisant, elle se heurte a l'hostilite, d'une part de ceux qui estiment qu'elle legitime une interference trop importante de l'etat a l'encontredes mecanismes du marche, et d'autre part, de ceux qui ne voient dans cette theorie qu'un panegyrique supplementaire en faveur du liberalisme americain. Cette etude se propose d'evaluer la portee de la critique adressee a l'utilitarisme, la pertinence des principes de justice, l'interet d'une telle philosophie pour les sciences economiques mais aussi pour la pratique democratique.
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Wellum, Jonathan Mark. "A Calvinistic critique of John Rawls's A̲ t̲h̲e̲o̲r̲y̲ o̲f̲ j̲u̲s̲t̲i̲c̲e̲." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1990. http://www.tren.com.
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Matar, Sayed. "Les fondements de la justice politique : théorie rawlsienne et communautarisme." Thesis, Paris 4, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010PA040075.
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Si l’étude de la mouvance dite « communautarienne » semble si digne d’attention, c’est précisément parce que ses arguments ne sont pas avancés au nom de communautés closes et régressives mais au nom de la démocratie elle-même. Le « communautarisme philosophique » qui nous intéresse ici se distingue radicalement d’une vision ethnique ou holistique du lien politique. De façon synthétique, l’argument communautarien soutient la priorité du bien sur le juste (right), priorité au double sens d’un primat politique et d’une antériorité morale et culturelle, c’est-à-dire du contenu du bien sur les procédures garantissant l’équité. Inversement, pour les « libéraux », la priorité du juste sur le bien signifie que les droits individuels ne peuvent pas être sacrifiés au nom d’un bien commun, et que les principes de justice (les droits fondamentaux) ne peuvent être dérivés d’une conception du bien et doivent au contraire être établis indépendamment de toute conception du bien. Libéral, John Rawls, situe le malaise de la tradition démocratique par l’incapacité de cette dernière à articuler de manière équitable les notions de liberté et de l’égalité. S’amorce ainsi un débat, pour les communautariens, autour de la définition de l’identité démocratique : le politique et le culturel précèdent-t-ils le droit ou les droits subjectifs libéraux l’emportent toujours par leur priorité ?If the study of the movement known as ‘‘communitarianism’’ seams worthy of attention, this is precisely because its arguments are not advanced on behalf of regressed and closed communities but in the name of democracy itself. The ‘‘philosophical communitarianism’’ that interests us here is radically different vision of holistic ethnic or political link. In brief, the communitarian argument supports the priority of the good on the right, priority in the double meaning of a primate politic and has a prior moral and cultural anteriority, that is to say, the content of the course procedures guaranteeing fairness. Conversely, for the liberals, priority of the right over the good means that individuals rights can’t be sacrified in the name of a common good, and that the principles of justice (human rights) cannot be derived from a conception of the good and instead must be established independently of any conception of the good. Liberal, John Rawls, situates the discomfort of the democratic tradition by the inability of the latter was handed manner to articulate the concepts of liberty and equality. Begins as a debate, for communitarians, around the definition of democratic identity : do the political and the cultural define the right or are the liberal subjective rights won by their priority?
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Liotti, Maria Cecilia. "Rawls' Kantian egalitarianism and its critics." Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=79961.
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This thesis explores the role of the concept of equality in John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls argues that the Kantian idea of the moral equality of persons translates into a primary principle of equal basic liberties, followed by a principle of fair equality of opportunity that addresses the moral arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies. Furthermore, the "difference principle" specifies that social and economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the worst-off group. Libertarian critics such as Robert Nozick argue that Rawls' "difference principle" is inconsistent with a Kantian respect for the moral equality of persons as ends in themselves. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' egalitarian commitments are not supportable via a Kantian conception of the moral subject of justice as an autonomous pre-social self. This thesis defends Rawls' theory of justice against these challenges.
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Bradford, W. "Value and justice : property, economic theory and Rawls." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.596847.
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The thesis examines a particular contention made by John Rawls with regard to his account of the derivation of the principles of justice. In both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism Rawls maintains that the specification of property rights over the means of production is not part of the question of justice, but should rather reflect the customs and traditions of particular societies. It is argued in the thesis that this position cannot be maintained within the context of Rawls's overall argument. In particular, it is contended that Rawls's position on this reflects his uncritical reliance on Koopmans's Three Essays on the State of Economic Science (in which institutional detail such as the specification of property rights over the means of production is explicitly characterised as irrelevant) as a statement of the 'laws' of economics presumed known to those in the Original Position. The assumptions made by Rawls in constructing his argument, particularly his account of the circumstances of justice, are shown to reflect the strong, and in the context of Rawls's account, damaging assumptions underlying Koopmans's theoretical framework. These include the exclusion of preferences over work and the assumption that efficiency is unrelated to property rights specifications. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that these problems reflect a deeper issue: the theory of value upon which economic theories rest. The works of Luigi Pasinetti are employed to show the importance, for Rawls, of the distinction between theories based on exchange and those based on production. The latter are more suited to Rawls's project, and an example of them, Pasinetti's 'natural' system, is shown to be more suitable than Koopmans's framework as an account of economic theory in the Original Position.
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Trindade, Ubiratan. "Justiça distributiva: uma leitura da obra de John Rawls." Universidade do Vale do Rio do Sinos, 2008. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/2031.
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Previous issue date: 17Milton Valente
Uma distribuição de renda mais justa tem sido debatida como forma de viabilizar as sociedades democráticas com características liberais. O problema a ser examinado nesta investigação é justamente as possibilidades que têm os governos chamados liberais, de promoverem reformas que resultem em tais possibilidades. Neste sentido, nós estaremos dando enfoque à obra Uma teoria da justiça do filósofo norte-americano John Rawls. Inserida na tradição contratualista, elabora uma proposta de justiça como eqüidade, colocando-se como uma alternativa à doutrina utilitarista. Governos democráticos, conforme Rawls, devem ser garantidores de políticas públicas que tenham como conseqüência uma firme justiça distributiva. Esses governos devem ser plurais, e conflitos de ordem filosófica, moral ou religiosa não devem impedir um acordo razoável como forma de viabilizar a estrutura básica da sociedade. Utilizando-se de um artifício racional, em que os acordos celebrados são válidos para todos, Rawls cria o artifício da posição ori
A fairer income distribution has been debated as a way of making viable the democratic societies with liberal characteristics. The problem to be examined in this investigation is exatly the possibilities that the governments called liberal have, promoting reforms that result in such possibilities. In this way, we will be giving focus on the work A theory of justice from the American philosopher Jhon Rawls. Inserted in the contractualist traditions, it elaborates a justice as fairness, placing itself as an alternative to the utilitarian doctrine. The democratic governments, according to Rawls, must ensure that public politics have a consistent distributive justice as a consequence. These governments must be plural, and conflits of philosophical, moral or religious order must not prevent a reasonable agreement as a way of making viable a basic structure of the society. Using a rational artifice in which the agreementes are valid for everyone, Rawls creates the artifice of original position. In this situation th
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Arvan, Marcus Samuel. "A Non-Ideal Theory of Justice." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195992.
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This dissertation constructs a "non-ideal theory" of justice: a systematic theory of how to respond justly to injustice. Chapter 1 argues that contemporary political philosophy lacks a non-ideal theory of justice, and defends a variation of John Rawls' famous original position - the Non-Ideal Original Position - as a method with which to construct such a theory. Finally, Chapter 1 uses the Non-Ideal Original Position to argue for a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory: a principle that requires injustices to be dealt with in whichever way will best satisfy the preferences of all relevant individuals, provided those individuals are all rational, adequately informed, broadly moral, and accept the correct "ideal theory" of fully just conditions. Chapter 2 then argues for the Principle of Application - an epistemic principle that represents the Fundamental Principle's satisfaction conditions in terms of the aims of actual or hypothetical reformist groups. Chapters 3-5 then use these two principles to argue for substantive views regarding global/international justice. Chapter 3 argues that the two principles establish a higher-order human right for all other human rights to promoted and protected in accordance with the two principles of non-ideal theory. Chapter 4 argues that the two principles defeasibly require the international community to tolerate unjust societies, provided those societies respect the most basic rights of individuals. Finally, Chapter 5 argues that the two principles imply a duty of the international community to ameliorate severe poverty, as well as a duty to implement "fair trade" practices in international economics.
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Martin, Andrew Joseph. "Public values? Public virtues? a critique of John Rawls' idea of public reason /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2005. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p068-0575.
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Silva, Hudson Marcelo da. "Os direitos fundamentais na doutrina de John Rawls." [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278625.
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Orientador: João Carlos Kfouri Quartim de MoraesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A questão dos direitos fundamentais ocupa um lugar de destaque na obra de John Rawls. O filósofo estadunidense empreendeu grande esforço para explicar as liberdades fundamentais e sua prioridade por entender que as doutrinas tradicionais, especialmente o utilitarismo, não são capazes de assegurar os direitos fundamentais aos cidadãos vistos como pessoas livres e iguais. Segundo o autor, os direitos fundamentais devem ser garantidos a todos os cidadãos indistintamente, pois são vistos como bens necessários para o desenvolvimento das duas capacidades morais da pessoa, quais sejam: a de ter uma concepção de bem e um senso de justiça. Apesar de Rawls conferir prioridade aos direitos fundamentais, ele aceita que tais direitos podem sofrer restrições. Tais restrições serão aceitas quando surgirem conflitos entre as diversas liberdades, com o objetivo de proteger o sistema global de liberdades. Serão também aceitas quando forem necessárias para promover as mudanças sociais necessárias para que todos os cidadãos possam efetivamente gozar das liberdades. Após revisar sua teoria, Rawls passou a defender explicitamente a necessidade de garantir aos indivíduos as condições materiais básicas necessárias para o efetivo exercício dos direitos fundamentais. Este estudo pretende analisar a questão da prioridade das liberdades fundamentais e também a sua relação com a questão da soberania popular.
Abstract: The question of the basic rights occupies a place of prominence in the workmanship of John Rawls. The american philosopher undertook great effort to explain the basic freedoms and its priority for understanding that the traditional doctrines, especially the Utilitarianism, aren?t capable to assure the basic rights to the seen citizens as free and equal persons. According to author, the basic rights must indistinctly be guaranteed to all the citizens, therefore they are seen as necessary goods for the development of the two moral capacities of the person, which are: a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. Although Rawls to confer priority to the basic rights, he accepted it that such rights can suffer restrictions. Such restrictions will be accepted when to appear conflicts between the diverse freedoms, with the objective to protect the global system of freedoms. They will be also accepted when they will be necessary to promote social changes necessaries so that all the citizens can effectively enjoy of the freedoms. After to revise his theory, Rawls started to defend explicit the necessity to guarantee to the individuals the necessary basic material conditions for the effective basic right of action. This study intends to also analyze the question of the priority of the basic freedoms and its relation with the question of the popular sovereignty.
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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梁醒洲 and Sing-chow Leung. "Social justice: a critical comparison of the theories of Robert Nozick and John Rawls." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1987. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31207753.
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Galko, Catherine M. "Identity, persons, and political theory a defense of John Rawls /." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2008. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0022900.
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O'Kelly, CiaraÌn. "A theory of allegiance : between the human and the local." Thesis, University of Reading, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272227.
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Schmitz, Pércio Davies. "A questão do indivíduo e da sociedade em John Rawls." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2012. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/5395.
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A presente dissertação de Mestrado trata da questão da justiça que é tema controverso e aberto desde os primórdios das indagações filosóficas sobre o tema. Nossos dias são marcados por contradições acerca da própria visão de homem e de sociedade, principalmente após termos vivenciado ao mesmo passo as maravilhas do avanço técnico, científico e cultural dos dois últimos séculos, também as atrocidades realizadas contra o homem ferindo os seus direitos mais fundamentais, em especial os fatos históricos do século XX, como as duas grandes guerras. Esse paradoxo entre o enaltecimento das potencialidades humanas e a própria redução utilitária da condição humana leva à busca de uma nova teoria da justiça que seja capaz de repensar o valor do humano e a sua condição natural e que a mesma não seja simplesmente uma condição instrumental e calcada nos princípios de maior satisfação para o maior número de indivíduos, próprios do utilitarismo que se impunha até o momento. O tema proposto visa situar a visão de homem, no interior do contexto da justiça, focando-se especificamente na questão do atomismo social do indivíduo, presente na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, que o entende uma parte autônoma no interior de uma doutrina contratualista, atomizada portanto, e que se dá, privilegiadamente, em sua teoria, no “momento” ahistórico da posição original. Aqui o enfoque será dado à teoria da justiça de Rawls e se pretende considerar as críticas à questão do atomismo elaboradas por Taylor, no contexto do debate atual entre liberalismo e comunitarismo.
This dissertation is on the issue of justice which is an open and controversial theme since the earliest times of the philosophical questions about the topic. Our time is marked by contradictions about the own vision of man and society, mainly after we have experienced both the wonders of the technical scientific and cultural development of the last two centuries and also carried out the atrocities against man, hurting his most fundamental rights, specially the historical facts of the twentieth century, as the two world wars. This paradox between the enhancement of the human potential and the very utilitarian reduction of the human condition lead us to a search of a new theory of the justice that is able to rethink the value of the human and its natural condition and that it is not only an instrumental condition grounded upon the principles of greater satisfaction for the greatest number of individuals, typical of the utilitarianism that was imposed so far. The proposed debate aims to locate the vision of man within the context of justice focusing specifically on the issue of the individual’ social atomism that is present in the theory of justice as John Ralws fairness that means it as an autonomous part within a contractual doctrine, thus atomized , and which gives, as a privilege in his theory, in the a-historical “moment” of the original position and, on the other hand, the Charles Taylor’s opposed vision that, introducing concepts as the one of interiority, of recognition and of no decomposition of the goods, which are genuinely social, tends to locate his vision of man in an human being located within a broader context than himself. Here the focus is going to be given to Rawls’ justice theory and one intend to consider the criticism to the atomism issue elaborated by Taylor within the context of the current debate between liberalism and communitarians.
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Guillarme, Bertrand. "Rawls : la justification contractualiste de la démocratie libérale." Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995IEPP0004.
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Dillon, Lisa. "Three-strikes legislation and the evolution of the liberal conception of justice." Huntington, WV : [Marshall University Libraries], 2006. http://www.marshall.edu/etd/descript.asp?ref=633.
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Lemaire, André. "L'enjeu de la rationalité dans la théorie de la justice de John Rawls." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ61796.pdf.
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