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Vasilionytė, Ieva. "Kaip galima su sveiko proto morale suderinama moralės teorija." Doctoral thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2014. http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2014~D_20140701_110409-74612.
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Disertacijoje nagrinėjama su sveiko proto morale suderinamos moralės teorijos galimybė. Sveiko proto moralė apribojama dviem pamatinėm prielaidom, arba savybėm: moraliniai sprendiniai turi teisingumo reikšmes ir yra praktinio pobūdžio, t.y. jie yra kažkuria prasme objektyviai teisingi arba klaidingi ir būtinai kreipia mūsų veiksmus. Šiandienėje filosofijoje šios dvi pamatinės sveiko proto moralės savybės atrodo esančios nesuderinamos: juk teisingumo reikšmes gali turėti tik deskripcijos, o deskripcijos nėra preskripcijos, arba iš to, kaip yra, tiesiogiai neseka tai, kaip turėtų būti. Vis dėlto nagrinėjant metodologines, ontologines, epistemologines bei semantines moralės teorijų galimybes, disertacijoje į pagrindinį klausimą atsakoma teigiamai: abi pamatines sveiko proto moralės savybes įkūnijanti moralės teorija yra galima, tik jei ji padaro koherentiškumą savo konstituojančia vertybe ir naudoja racionalistinio internalizmo prieigą. Darbe aptariamos pagrindinės šiandienės metaetikos kontroversijos bei skirtys (moralinis realizmas/antirealizmas, motyvacinis internalizmas/eksternalizmas), išskleidžiama bei papildoma racionalistinio internalizmo teorija.The dissertation explores the question of the possibility of a moral theory compatible with common sense morality. Common sense morality is limited to its two fundamental features, or suppositions: moral judgements are truth apt and practical, i.e. they are at the same time in some sense objectively right or wrong and necessarily action guiding. In contemporary philosophy, the two fundamental features of common sense morality seem to be incompatible: only descriptions can have truth values, but descriptions are not prescriptions, or, to put it otherwise, from the way the things are, it does not follow straightforwardly how the things should be. However, analyses of the methodological, ontological, epistemological and semantic possibilities of moral theories enable a positive answer: a moral theory which embodies the two fundamental features of common-sense morality is possible, only if it makes coherence its constitutive value and uses the approach of rationalist internalism. In this research, the main controversies and distinctions of contemporary meta ethics (moral realism/anti realism, motivational internalism/externalism) are discussed and an account of rationalist internalism is explicated and enforced.
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Vasilionytė, Ieva. "The possibility of a moral theory compatible with common-sense morality." Doctoral thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2014. http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2014~D_20140701_110356-86907.
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The dissertation explores the question of the possibility of a moral theory compatible with common sense morality. Common sense morality is limited to its two fundamental features, or suppositions: moral judgements are truth apt and practical, i.e. they are at the same time in some sense objectively right or wrong and necessarily action guiding. In contemporary philosophy, the two fundamental features of common sense morality seem to be incompatible: only descriptions can have truth values, but descriptions are not prescriptions, or, to put it otherwise, from the way the things are, it does not follow straightforwardly how the things should be. However, analyses of the methodological, ontological, epistemological and semantic possibilities of moral theories enable a positive answer: a moral theory which embodies the two fundamental features of common-sense morality is possible, only if it makes coherence its constitutive value and uses the approach of rationalist internalism. In this research, the main controversies and distinctions of contemporary meta ethics (moral realism/anti realism, motivational internalism/externalism) are discussed and an account of rationalist internalism is explicated and enforced.Disertacijoje nagrinėjama su sveiko proto morale suderinamos moralės teorijos galimybė. Sveiko proto moralė apribojama dviem pamatinėm prielaidom, arba savybėm: moraliniai sprendiniai turi teisingumo reikšmes ir yra praktinio pobūdžio, t.y. jie yra kažkuria prasme objektyviai teisingi arba klaidingi ir būtinai kreipia mūsų veiksmus. Šiandienėje filosofijoje šios dvi pamatinės sveiko proto moralės savybės atrodo esančios nesuderinamos: juk teisingumo reikšmes gali turėti tik deskripcijos, o deskripcijos nėra preskripcijos, arba iš to, kaip yra, tiesiogiai neseka tai, kaip turėtų būti. Vis dėlto nagrinėjant metodologines, ontologines, epistemologines bei semantines moralės teorijų galimybes, disertacijoje į pagrindinį klausimą atsakoma teigiamai: abi pamatines sveiko proto moralės savybes įkūnijanti moralės teorija yra galima, tik jei ji padaro koherentiškumą savo konstituojančia vertybe ir naudoja racionalistinio internalizmo prieigą. Darbe aptariamos pagrindinės šiandienės metaetikos kontroversijos bei skirtys (moralinis realizmas/antirealizmas, motyvacinis internalizmas/eksternalizmas), išskleidžiama bei papildoma racionalistinio internalizmo teorija.
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Lennon, James Preston. "How Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral Realism." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73678.
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Philosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest that assuming cognitive phenomenology does exist, it would have important consequences for other areas of philosophy. In particular, it would have important consequences for moral epistemology – how we come to know the moral truths we seem to know. I argue that adopting cognitive phenomenology and the epistemic principle of phenomenal conservatism can do “double duty” for the moral realist: they provide the moral realist with prima facie grounds for belief in the objectivity of morality, while epistemically vindicating the specific contents of their beliefs.Master of Arts
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Smith, Steven. "Metaphysical realism and moral realism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.358535.
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Dawson, Paul. "Moral cognitivism and moral realism." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.407370.
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Persson, Björn. "Putnam's Moral Realism." Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för kommunikation och information, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-8494.
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Moral realism is the view that there are such things as moral facts. Moral realists have attempted to combat the skeptical problem of relativism, which is that the truth of an ethical value judgment is often, or always, subjective, that is, relative to the parties it involves. This essay presents, discusses, and criticizes Hilary Putnam’s attempt at maintaining moral realism while at the same time maintaining a degree of epistemological relativism. Putnam’s positive account originates in moral epistemology, at the heart of which lies truth, as idealized rational acceptability or truth under ideal conditions. The bridge between moral epistemology and normative ethics stems from Putnam’s disintegration of facts and values. His theory is finalized in the construction of a normative moral theory, in which the central notion is incessant self-criticism in order to maintain rationality. After presenting Putnam’s core thesis, the criticism raised by Richard Rorty, is deliberated upon. Rorty is critical of Putnam’s attempt at holding on to objectivity, because he does not understand how objective knowledge can be both relative to a conceptual scheme, and at the same time objective. The conclusion is that Putnam is unable to maintain his notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability and is forced into epistemological relativism. Putnam’s normative ethics has characteristics in common with virtue ethics, and is of much interest regardless of whether it can be grounded epistemologically or not.
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Hager, Eric. "Which moral realism?" Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2003. http://www.tren.com.
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Corvino, John. "Hume's moral realism /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Hager, Eric R. "Which moral realism?" Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2003. http://www.tren.com.
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Frimannsson, Gudmundur Heidar. "Moral realism, moral expertise and paternalism." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14812.
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In this essay I examine the notion of moral objectivity of moral properties. Moral objectivity seems to be able to resist the arguments of subjectivists. There seem to be true moral sentences and moral facts can explain actions and occurrences in the world. Values seem best accounted for in objective terms and persons can have interests or good independently of their desires. It seems to be reasonable to think of the nature of moral value in terms of consequences. Knowledge requires truth so the objectivity of moral properties makes moral knowledge possible. Moral knowledge should be accounted for in similar terms as other kinds of knowledge. The major requirement on moral knowledge is coherence. Moral expertise is both possible and plausible and so are moral experts. Paternalism is possible because our values can conflict: autonomy can conflict with general welfare. Paternalism is making someone do what is in his own interest. This seems best thought of in terms of the consequences for his good. The justification of paternalistic interventions seems best based on the weighing of the consequences of the intervention and the decision of the agent. One thing which must be taken into this weighing is the rationality of the decision of the agent. Rationality is basically thought of as the maximization of good. Autonomy is part of everyone's good. It can conflict with the agent's general or overall welfare. But the importance of autonomy for every agent creates a presumption against paternalism. But paternalism can maximize autonomy and paternalism can be justified to secure some minimal autonomy. So paternalism and autonomy seem to be compatible.
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Sias, James. "Naturalism and Moral Realism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/21.
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My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either (a) build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures (or varying moral belief systems) into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But, according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge.
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Zhu, Xiaoyu. "Peter Railton's moral realism." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ54272.pdf.
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Smith, Michael Andrew. "Motivation and moral realism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335725.
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Rauckhorst, Garrett. "Railton's Reductive Moral Realism." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1366631026.
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Lesandrini, Jason. "A Defense of Moral Realism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2006. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/9.
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This thesis will explain in detail two closely related but jointly defensible moral realist positions. I show how each position responds to the initial dilemma of whether moral judgments are propositions. Following this discussion, I defend this combined position against an objection that the position is inherently contradictory. I conclude that one can coherently maintain both positions without a contradiction.
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Hull, G. T. B. "Moral realism and social criticism." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2012. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1369567/.
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In many contexts, including multicultural societies and various international settings, ethical disputes arise between parties who do not share an ethical outlook. It can seem impossible for such disputes to be resolved rationally, as the parties in question will generally not take the same sorts of consideration to bear on the matter under dispute. If, however, it could be shown that there are ways of assessing an ethical outlook for correctness, neither merely by checking it for internal coherence, nor simply by assessing it by the standards of a different ethical outlook, this would mean there exist resources allowing at least some such disputes to be resolved rationally. In order to establish whether such resources exist it is necessary to consider what it is to have one ethical outlook rather than another. The existence and applicability of “thick ethical concepts” can form the basis for a defence of moral realism: a realist conception of ethical properties and moral reasons for action, and a cognitivist conception of the mental states which allow an individual (in good cases) to track ethical facts. A fresh understanding of the nature of intentional action which remedies difficulties with orthodox action theory provides additional support for this view. This realist view allows the critical force of two forms of social criticism from the German philosophical tradition to be reassessed. Nietzschean criticism by genealogy can undermine ethical views if their acceptance is shown to have come about in a way which renders continued acceptance irrational. Criticism of reification, pioneered by Lukács, can ground rejection of aspects of an ethical outlook if it is shown to involve systematic misapprehension of intentional actions as mere natural happenings. In both cases, the most faithful interpretation provides a rational resource for neutral arbitration between ethical outlooks in a context of pluralism.
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Boeddeling, Annika. "Moral realism : time to relax?" Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/274563.
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This thesis critically assesses ‘relaxed realism’ – a group of views that have entered the metaethical debate recently (Dworkin, 1996; Kramer, 2009; Parfit, 2011; Scanlon, 2014). Relaxed realism promises a novel perspective on our normative practice. In particular, it aims for a view that is genuinely distinct from traditional non-naturalism on the one hand, and sophisticated forms of expressivism on the other. This thesis calls into question whether such an aspiration can be met. The approach is twofold. First, the thesis argues that relaxed realism can meet various of its objectives better by relying on theoretical resources that expressivism offers. To argue for this claim, it discusses three challenges that relaxed realism should be able to meet according to its own objectives. With regards to each challenge, it then shows that as it stands relaxed realist views fail to adequately respond to it. Finally, the thesis suggests that relaxed realism can better respond to the respective challenges – and hence, better meet their own objectives – by endorsing certain expressivist resources. Second, the thesis argues that relaxed realism is an inherently unstable view. It does so by raising a dilemma. Either relaxed realism fails to establish the desired difference to expressivism or it succeeds, but at the expense of erasing the difference to traditional non-naturalism. The conclusion of the thesis is critical: the relaxed realist aspiration for a novel take on our normative practice – distinct from both traditional non-naturalism and expressivism – remains unmet.
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Tropman, Elizabeth L. "Moral realism and the new intuitionism." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3230540.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2006.Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Dec. 4, 2008). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3013. Adviser: David C. McCarty.
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Ingram, Stephen. "Robustness in moral reality." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2016. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14374/.
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This thesis examines the metaethical theory known as 'Robust Realism'. According to defenders of this view, there exist irreducible, non-natural, mind-independent, and categorically authoritative moral properties. The central aim of this thesis is to identify the best way of understanding and motivating these claims. In other words, I intend to develop a compelling metaphysics for Robust Realism. I don't plan to show that Robust Realism is true, but I do plan to identify the best formulation of it. I will thereby put us in a better place to assess its viability against rival views of moral reality. The robustly realistic theory that I will develop is built around the idea that there are necessary moral norms. In other words, norms that have authority in every possible world. I show how positing such norms enables the Robust Realist to defuse two influential ways of objecting to their claim that moral properties are irreducible. I provide an account of necessary moral norms as fundamental entities with a modal jurisdiction that, unlike the many non-fundamental moral norms, is not limited by any contingent presupposition. I show that the mind-independence of moral properties and norms takes us some way toward the elimination of those contingent limiting factors. I use this account to clarify the categoricity of moral direction, and in turn show how the categoricity of moral direction can be used in defence of an interestingly non-naturalist view of moral reality. I thereby give a compelling metaphysics for Robust Realism, but I do not thereby show that this theory is true. I thus consider prominent ways of arguing about moral reality, to assess whether we can decide the matter one way or another. Unfortunately, however, I show that debate about moral reality often results in a persistent stalemate. I diagnose this by appealing to deep differences in 'temperament' and 'existential need'. I thus conclude that we might need to limit the ambitions of metaethical inquiry.
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Francis, Kathryn B., M. Gummerum, G. Ganis, I. S. Howard, and S. Terbeck. "Alcohol, empathy, and morality: acute effects of alcohol consumption on affective empathy and moral decision-making." Springer, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/17169.
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YesRationale: Hypothetical moral dilemmas, pitting characteristically utilitarian and non-utilitarian outcomes against each other, have played a central role in investigations of moral decision-making. Preferences for utilitarian over non-utilitarian responses have been explained by two contrasting hypotheses; one implicating increased deliberative reasoning, and the other implicating diminished harm aversion. In recent field experiments, these hypotheses have been investigated using alcohol intoxication to impair both social and cognitive functioning. These studies have found increased utilitarian responding, arguably as a result of alcohol impairing affective empathy. Objectives: The present research expands existing investigations by examining the acute effects of alcohol on affective empathy and subsequent moral judgments in traditional vignettes and moral actions in virtual reality, as well as physiological responses in moral dilemmas. Methods: Participants (N = 48) were administered either a placebo or alcohol in one of two dosages; low or moderate. Both pre- and post intervention, participants completed a moral action and moral judgment task alongside behavioural measures of affective empathy. Results: Higher dosages of alcohol consumption resulted in inappropriate empathic responses to facial displays of emotion, mirroring responses of individuals high in trait psychopathy, but empathy for pain was unaffected. Whilst affective empathy was influenced by alcohol consumption in a facial responding task, both moral judgments and moral actions were unaffected. Conclusions: These results suggest that facets, beyond or in addition to deficits in affective empathy, might influence the relationship between alcohol consumption and utilitarian endorsements.
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Lariguet, Guillermo. "Intuitionism and Moral Reasoning." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/115831.
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My goal for this paper can be presented as follows: I will attempt to show that objections to intuitionism, although they are serious, do not undermine entirely its fertility for knowledge and moral reasoning. This is probably the perception of contemporary philosophers like David Enoch, Robert Audi, Russ Shafer-Landau or John McDowell. In order to fulfill the objective mentioned above, I will do the following. First, I will outline broadly two of the paradigmatic features of moral intuitionism in order to identify it as a particular metaethics doctrine. Secondly, I will summarize some of the main objections that have been raised in order to discredit the value of moral intuitionism as a source both of moral knowledge and of valid support for moral reasoning. In third place, I will try, also briefly, to explain some of the possible (not all of course) answers to the objections previously mentioned in the paper. Fourth, I will recapitulate the more fruitful aspects of intuitionism, especially in regard to moral reasoning.Mi objetivo para este trabajo puede presentarse de la siguiente forma: se intentará mostrar que las objeciones al intuicionismo, si bien son serias, no minan en forma absoluta su fertilidad para el conocimiento y el razonamiento moral. Probablemente esta sea la percepción de filósofos contemporáneos como David Enoch, Robert Audi, Russ Shafer-Landau o John McDowell. Para poder cumplir con el antes dicho objetivo, en este trabajo haré lo siguiente. En primer lugar, esbozaré, a grandes rasgos, dos de las características paradigmáticas del intuicionismo moral a fin de que podamos identificarlo como una corriente metaética particular. En segundo lugar, sintetizaré algunas de las principales objeciones que, por diversos conductos, han buscado desacreditar el valor del intuicionismo moral como fuente de conocimiento moral y también de apoyo válido para el razonamiento moral.En tercer lugar, intentaré, también de manera sumaria, explicitar algunas de las posibles (no todas, desde luego) respuestas a las antes mencionadas objeciones. En cuarto lugar, recapitularé los aspectos rescatables del intuicionismo, especialmente en lo que atañe al razonamiento moral.
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Alexander, David Eric Beaty Michael D. "Teleological moral realism an explication and defense /." Waco, Tex. : Baylor University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2104/5225.
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Berman, A. J. "Schiller's 'Wallenstein' : the morality of self-assertion." Thesis, University of Leeds, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.376502.
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Cooper, James A., and res cand@acu edu au. "The Cognitive Anatomy of Moral Understanding and the Moral Education Question: A study in the philosophy of moral education." Australian Catholic University. School of Religious Education, 2008. http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp180.20112008.
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This study investigates the problem of contemporary interpretations of the moral education question, as informed by rival moral-philosophical and epistemological traditions. In this study, the moral education question is taken to mean, ‘What educational form and content may best assist students in becoming ethically minded and morally good people?’ Accordingly, this necessitates a consideration of what is meant by morality and what are the central characteristics of the moral life (i.e. moral philosophical perspectives), as well as how such accounts of morality are seen to relate to the educational aims of knowledge and intellectual development (i.e. underlying epistemology).This study shows that current interpretations of moral education (as efforts to ‘teach values’) are predominantly informed by the ‘juridical ethical tradition,’which, in turn, is underpinned by a distinctive epistemology (or ‘Juridicalism’).The thesis proposes that Juridicalism is philosophically contestable because it leads to a partially distorted conception of the moral life and hence of moral education. Generally, by regarding the cognitive dimensions of moral thought and action as separate from and independent of the emotional-volitional dimensions, Juridicalism is an obstacle to understanding the proper moral educational task of schools. Notably, Juridicalism leads to a questionable emphasis on the importance of ‘values’, as expressed in generally agreed rules and principles, as opposed to particular and substantive moral judgements.A critique of Juridicalism is developed, focussing on its underlying conception of human reason as inspired by a distinctly Modern mind-body/world dualism argue that the fragmented and reductive epistemology of Juridicalism signals the need for a richer and more variegated theory of cognition, marked specifically by an integrated anthropology and substantive theory of reason. Further, such an epistemology is located in the realist philosophy of classical antiquity particularly within the Aristotelian tradition. I propose a defence of what I call ‘Classical Realism’, in contrast to Juridicalism, highlighting its distinctively integrated account of the mind/soul and body/world relationship, and substantive conception of practical rationality or moral understanding. Classical Realism also makes central the notion of knowledge as ‘vision’ in order to explain how the rational and affective dimensions of human nature come together in moral thought and action. Finally, the moral education question is reconsidered in light of the visional ethical perspective emerging from Classical Realism. In this light I interpret the moral education question as a matter of nurturing the (intellectual) capacity for and habit of correct vision and, relatedly, moral judgement. Further, this task is shown to be vitally connected with the school’s focus on developing knowledge and the intellect through the teaching of traditional academic and practical disciplines. Some initial comments are made concerning the pedagogical implications of such an interpretation, while some associated challenges and questions for further research are highlighted.
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Shepski, III Stanley John. "The Reality Behind Moral Experience." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194736.
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Moral realism, as I conceive it, is the view that there are moral facts that are independent of what any agent, whether hypothetical or actual, thinks about them. I defend moral realism by arguing that we are epistemically justified in accepting it on the basis of our first-personal moral experience, or "moral phenomenology". Moral realists often assert that our moral phenomenology supports their view, but they do not usually explain how. I fill this explanatory gap through careful attention to individual cases and conclude that our moral experience suggests the following: (1) There are objectively correct answers to moral questions; and (2) these answers have normative authority over moral agents. Some forms of moral realism can easily accommodate these two theses, but I argue that selected major competing theories cannot. Specifically, constructivism, expressivism, and naturalist versions of moral realism cannot accommodate these theses.One might question whether we ought to rely on the deliverances of our moral phenomenology, but I argue that we have good reason to trust our moral experience, just as we have good reason to trust our perceptual, mnemonic, and logical experiences. I argue that our moral experience provides defeasible justification for accepting moral realism, and, in response to concerns raised by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), I address potential defeaters of this justification related to partiality, emotion, illusion, and the origins of our moral beliefs.I conclude by responding to two traditional arguments against non-naturalist moral realism: the so-called arguments from disagreement and queerness. I argue that moral realists can explain the existence of moral disagreement as well as irrealists can, and that the argument from queerness either fails or collapses into other forms of argument.I remain neutral on the metaphysical commitments of moral realism, but in so far as many have thought it to depend on some form of platonism, I briefly defend platonism in Appendix A.
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Devitt, Michael. "Realismo moral: una perspectiva naturalista." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113208.
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1. ¿Qué es el realismo moral? El artículo rechaza las respuestas habituales (Sayre-McCord, Railton) en términos de verdad y significado. Estas respuestas estándares están parcialmente motivadas por el fenómeno del no-cognitivismo. Ciertamente el no-cognitivismo es problemático para formular una respuesta abiertamente metafísica, no obstante es posibleformular tal respuesta. 2. ¿Por qué creer en el realismo moral? Él es prima facie plausible, mientras que sus alternativas no lo son. Preocupación central: ¿cómo se puede lograr que el realismo moral coincida con una perspectiva naturalista del mundo? 3. ¿Y qué sucede con los argumentos en contra del realismo moral? El artículo analiza críticamente el argumentoproveniente de la extrañeza”, el proveniente de la relatividad, el proveniente de la explicación, así como los argumentos epistemológicos. 4. El artículo concluye con algunas observaciones breves e insuficientes sobre la realización del proyecto naturalista.
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Kavetski, Silvio. "Realismo, naturalismo e semântica moral." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2017. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/178105.
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Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2017.Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-08T04:12:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 346221.pdf: 1214904 bytes, checksum: 07b4dbfac412c6185be453a7719573f8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017
O naturalismo moral é a teoria metaética que sustenta que fatos e propriedades morais são fatos e propriedades naturais. Desde que G. E. Moore apresentou o seu argumento da questão aberta, tem havido várias críticas a essa teoria, o que fez com que os filósofos articulassem várias teorias metaéticas alternativas ao naturalismo, tais como intuicionismo, emotivismo, prescritivismo e a teoria do erro. Mas a partir da década de oitenta David Brink, Richard Boyd e Nicholas Sturgeon desenvolveram uma nova versão do naturalismo moral ? o naturalismo não reducionista ? que, argumentativamente, evita essas objeções e apresenta inúmeras outras vantagens. O resultado foi uma reascensão do realismo moral naturalista. No entanto, dois filósofos formularam uma objeção ao naturalismo não reducionista, que ficou conhecida como ?Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral?, que tem gerado bastante discussão. O objetivo deste trabalho é reconstruir as linhas principais desse debate mostrando que: o naturalismo não reducionista realmente tem boas respostas a algumas críticas frequentes, tais como o argumento da questão aberta de Moore, a reformulação de Hare deste argumento, à objeção construtivista, à crítica de relativismo, ao argumento do desacordo moral etc; e que, mesmo que o argumento da terra gêmea moral seja o seu principal problema, o que parece ser o caso, há algumas estratégias de respostas possíveis a favor do naturalista.
Abstract : Moral naturalism is the metaethical theory that maintains that moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties. Since G. E. Moore presented his open question argument there have been several critiques to this theory, which made the philosophers articulate several alternative metaethical theories to naturalism as intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism and the error theory. But from the eighties David Brink, Richard Boyd and Nicholas Sturgeon developed a new version of moral naturalism ? the non reductionist naturalism ? that, arguably, avoids these objections and it have numerous another advantages. The result was a resurrection of naturalistic moral realism. However, two philosophers formulated an objection to non reductionist naturalism that became known as ?Moral Twin Earth Argument? that has generated much discussion. The objective of this work is to reconstruct the main lines of this debate showing that: the non reductionist naturalism really have good replies to some frequent critiques such as Moore?s open question argument, Hare?s reformulation of this argument, the constructivist?s objection, the critique of relativism, to the moral disagreement?s argument etc; and that, even if the moral twin earth argument be its main problem, what looks to be the case, there are some possible response strategies in favor of the naturalist.
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Tiefensee, Christine Marx Johannes. "Moral realism : a critical analysis of metaethical naturalism /." Marburg : Tectum Verlag, 2008. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9783828895348.
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Hay, Carol. "Realism for relativists, a case for moral constructivism." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ62361.pdf.
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Tiefensee, Christine. "Moral realism a critical analysis of metaethical naturalism." Marburg Tectum-Verl, 2005. http://d-nb.info/987403958/04.
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Basik, Nathan. "An evolutionary approach to intuitionism and moral realism." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2008. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3344560.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Political Science and the School of Arts and Sciences, 2008.Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Oct. 6, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-02, Section: A, page: 0671. Adviser: Russell Hanson.
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Nunes, Cristina de Moraes. "RESPONSABILIDADE E SENTIMENTOS MORAIS: UMA PROPOSTA DE NATURALIZAÇÃO DA RESPONSABILIDADE MORAL." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2016. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/3869.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorThis study seeks to address the relevance of moral sentiments for moral responsibility attribution through reactive theory of Peter Strawson and his critics. The central thesis which I try to hold onto is that the attribution of moral responsibility is something quite complex, it is related to how we respond the actions of the agents, but also involves the rational capacity of reflective self-control agent, being able to present reasons for his action and be able to control his desires. Thus, the morally responsible agent is one that is motivated by his desires, but he is able to reason morally on what the consequences of his action. In other words, be a responsible person involves having social competence to act in accordance with moral norms, but also be able to reflect on his practice, so a subject with normal cognitive powers and able to regulate his beliefs and desires. Given the cultural pluralism, we note that there is a symmetrical relationship between the moral sentiments and moral beliefs, so that the moral sentiments may be influenced by moral beliefs we form throughout our life as well as moral beliefs are formed from feelings. These moral beliefs may be revised or regulated, this review may come from the acquisition of new information, which may come from comparing our set of beliefs with the set of beliefs of another culture. But this regulation of moral beliefs is the result of an evolutionary process that our species suffered, which it has made over the years, people could improve their way of working with the others, and also be able to autonomously question whether certain beliefs are in fact true. What I propose is that science is an ally of ethics, and scientific explanations can contribute to a better understanding of what is morally right and wrong. Understanding our human nature we become more able to 'see' the world differently and realize that certain emotions can contribute to our social life. In this way, we can realize that it makes no sense to continue resentful of someone in a situation which the agent has good grounds for leaving to feel such a feeling. Realizing this we can notice the complexity of our human species and how much we still need to advance the field of morality, seeking a moral improvement that does not happen only in the context of standards, but mostly at maturity that allows being able to analyze the circumstances and the reasons for the action with greater discernment. To defend such a position, I will use Strawson reactive theory, and criticism raised to such a theory by Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998), namely that Strawson fails to present a rational capacity guide the allocation of moral responsibility. The solution to this problem is to defend the rational capacity, as well as the social competence of the agent, it is a necessary condition to consider the morally responsible people, including the rational capacity of the agent is what allows him to reflect on his social practice. To better assess these issues it is necessary an analysis of the moral psychology and knowledge to know about the way people in their daily lives assess the actions of the agents and consequently assign moral responsibility to them. So my goal is to show how proposal of Strawson is still relevant to discussions about attribution of moral responsibility, as well as propose a progress in discussion on this topic by means of a moral realist naturalist position.
O presente estudo busca tratar da relevância dos sentimentos morais para a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, através da teoria reativa de Peter Strawson e de seus críticos. A tese central, a qual procuro sustentar, é que a atribuição de responsabilidade moral é algo bastante complexo, está relacionada à forma como reagimos frente às ações dos agentes, mas também envolve a capacidade racional do agente de autocontrole reflexivo, estando apto em apresentar razões para a sua ação e ser capaz de frear os seus desejos. Desse modo, o agente moralmente responsável é aquele que se sente motivado por seus desejos, mas é capaz de raciocinar moralmente sobre quais seriam as consequências da sua ação. Em outras palavras, ser uma pessoa responsável envolve ter competência social para agir de acordo com as normas morais, mas também ser capaz de refletir sobre a sua prática, ou seja, um sujeito com suas capacidades cognitivas normais e capaz de regular as suas crenças e desejos. Dado o pluralismo cultural, podemos notar que há uma relação simétrica entre os sentimentos morais e as crenças morais, de modo que os sentimentos morais podem ser influenciados pelas crenças morais que formamos ao longo de nossa vida, bem como as crenças morais serem formadas a partir dos sentimentos. Essas crenças morais podem ser revisadas ou reguladas, essa revisão pode vir da aquisição de novas informações, que podem vir da comparação de nosso conjunto de crenças com o conjunto de crenças de outra cultura. Mas também essa regulação das crenças morais é resultado de um processo evolutivo que sofreu a nossa espécie, que fez com que, ao longo dos anos, as pessoas pudessem aprimorar o seu modo de conviver com as demais e também ser capaz de autonomamente questionar se determinadas crenças são, de fato, verdadeiras. O que proponho é que a ciência é uma aliada da ética, sendo que as explicações científicas podem contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do que é correto e incorreto moralmente. Compreendendo a nossa natureza humana, tornamo-nos mais aptos a ver o mundo de maneira diferente e perceber que certas emoções podem contribuir para a nossa vida social. Dessa maneira, podemos dar-nos conta de que não faz sentido continuar ressentido com alguém numa situação em que o agente apresenta boas razões para que deixemos de sentir tal sentimento. Perceber isso faz com que notemos a complexidade de nossa espécie humana e o quanto ainda precisamos avançar no campo da moralidade, buscando um aprimoramento moral que não se dá apenas no âmbito de normas, mas principalmente na maturidade que permite sermos capazes de analisar as circunstâncias e as razões para a ação com maior discernimento. Para defender tal posição, utilizarei a teoria reativa de Strawson e a crítica levantada a tal teoria feita por Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) e Fischer e Ravizza (1998), a saber, que Strawson falha em apresentar uma capacidade racional que guie a atribuição de responsabilidade moral. A solução para tal problema é defender que a capacidade racional, assim como a competência social do agente, é uma condição necessária para considerar as pessoas moralmente responsáveis, inclusive a capacidade racional do agente é que lhe permite refletir sobre a sua prática social. Para avaliar melhor tais questões, faz-se necessária uma análise sobre questões de psicologia moral e de conhecimento moral, para saber como as pessoas, no seu cotidiano, avaliam as ações dos agentes e, consequentemente, atribuem-lhes responsabilidade moral. Portanto, o meu objetivo é mostrar como a proposta strawsoniana continua sendo relevante para as discussões sobre a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, mas também apresentar uma proposta de avanço na discussão sobre esse tema através de uma posição naturalista realista moral.
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Ferguson, Neil. "Moral truncation in Northern Ireland : myth or reality?" Thesis, Ulster University, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.268529.
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Lévi, Ide. "Réalisme moral ou volontarisme théologique ? : le problème de l’objectivité des valeurs et des normes morales en contexte théiste (perspectives médiévales et contemporaines)." Thesis, Paris, EPHE, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016EPHE5078.
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Selon la version courante du « dilemme d’Euthyphron », on considère que lorsque les théistes tentent de décrire la relation entre Dieu et la morale, ils doivent choisir entre volontarisme théologique et objectivisme robuste (le réalisme moral, en particulier). Selon la première option, les statuts moraux fondamentaux dépendent essentiellement des volontés contingentes, ou nécessaires, de Dieu. Selon la deuxième, Dieu agit en conformité avec un ordre moral objectif et nécessaire, en lui-même indépendant de sa volonté, comme il l’est de tout type de volonté ou de pro-attitude, au moins pour ce qui est des statuts moraux fondamentaux (et les propriétés morales sont conséquentielles aux propriétés non morales, sinon réductibles à elles). Ici nous argumentons en faveur de l’existence d’une troisième possibilité pour les théistes, refusant l’externalisme moral assumé par les deux premières options. Selon cette troisième option, on nie qu’objets, états de choses, actions ou personnes puissent posséder une valeur ou générer des obligations morales indépendamment de l’ensemble de nos pro-attitudes et des fins que nous sommes inclinés à poursuivre. Nous proposons, contre les objections réalistes en particulier, la défense d’une version universaliste (ou non relativiste) de cette position métaéthique, et tentons de montrer sa compatibilité avec le théisme classique : la théorie anti-objectiviste de la loi naturelle, selon laquelle les valeurs et les normes pertinentes pour nous dépendent de notre complexe motivationnel, en dépendant de nos inclinations universellement partagées et des fins (ou de la fin) en lesquelles (en laquelle) nous trouvons notre achèvement et notre bonheurAccording to the common version of the “Euthyphro dilemma”, it is generally considered that when theists try to describe the relation between God and morality, they must either opt for theological voluntarism or for hard objectivism (moral realism, in particular). According to the first option, fundamental moral statuses depend essentially on God’s contingent, or even necessary, will. According to the second, God acts in conformity to an objective (and necessary) moral order that is in itself independent of His will, as it is of any kind of pro-attitude, will or desire, at least for the most fundamental and prior moral statuses (and moral properties are consequential upon nonmoral ones, if not reducible to them). I argue here for the existence of a third possibility for theists, rejecting the metaethical externalism assumed by the first two options. According to this third option, it is not the case that objects, state of affairs, actions or persons can have value or generate obligations to us independently of all our pro-attitudes and of the ends we are inclined to pursue. I propose a defence, against realist objections in particular, of a universalist (or non relativist) version of that metaethical position and try to show its compatibility with classical theism : the anti-objectivist natural law theory, according to which values and norms relevant for us depend on our motivational set, depending on our – universally shared – natural inclinations or essential dispositions to love and pursue certain ends (or possibly one ultimate end) preferently to others, and to find our completion and happiness in them (in it)
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Nørgaard, Thomas. "Compassion." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.273326.
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Merli, David Allen. "Moral disagreement and shared meaning." Connect to this title online, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1069868437.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003.Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 277 p.; also includes graphics Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-278). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.
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Kalf, Wouter Floris. "Moral error theory : a cognitivist realist defence." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2013. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/5499/.
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This dissertation argues that moral error theory is the most plausible metaethical theory if we assume the truth of cognitivism about moral judgments and the moral statements that express them. According to moral error theory, various moral statements carry a non-negotiable commitment to a robust kind of categorical moral normativity, which means that this commitment cannot be denied on pains of changing the subject. Unfortunately, there is no such robust categorical moral normativity, at least not in the actual world. This entails that these moral statements are always untrue, or ‘in error’. In arguing for moral error theory, the thesis first argues that the standard argumentative strategy for establishing moral discourse’s non-negotiable commitment—viz., forging a relation of conceptual entailment between moral statements and the statement that there exists robust categorical moral normativity—is highly problematic. It also argues that forging a presupposition relation can work, but that error theorists are best advised to pursue a completely new strategy, which uses a relation of metaphysical entailment. The dissertation then argues that moral discourse metaphysically entails robust moral categorical normativity and proceeds to present a new argument against its existence. According to this argument, various sorts of hypothetical and categorical normativity exist because these can be grounded in a naturalistically respectable metaphysic; unfortunately, categorical moral normativity cannot be so grounded. Finally, the dissertation explores an often ignored answer to the following question: what (prudentially) should we with our error-riddled moral discourse? I argue for revolutionary cognitivism. This is the view that we should continue to use moral language and fully believe what we say but that what we say should be purged of its error. We should revolutionize our moral thought and start to conceive of morality’s normativity in a less robust way than we currently do.
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Forsey, K. Jane. "Interpretation, identity and moral realism, Taylor's ontology of the self." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0001/MQ28198.pdf.
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Gong, Susan Peterson. "The Moral Realism of Student Question-Asking in Classroom Practice." BYU ScholarsArchive, 2018. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/6888.
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Question-asking has long been an integral part of human learning. In scholarly investigations over the past several decades, questions have been studied in terms of the answers they generate, their grammatical structure, their cognitive functions, their logical content, and their social dynamics. Studies of student classroom questioning have focused on science education and reading instruction particularly; they detail the reasons why students don't ask questions and explore a plethora of recommendations about teaching students how to question. This qualitative study addressed question-asking from a hermeneutic moral realist perspective, studying question-asking as it unfolded in the everyday practice of learning in a graduate seminar on design thinking. Findings of the study included seven themes that fit within three broader metathemes about the complexities and virtues of classroom questioning, the sociality of question-asking, and the temporality of questions in practice. Specific themes of the study concerned the complexity of overlapping practices within the classroom, ways in which students evaluated the quality and virtue of their questioning interactions, the moral reference points that guided student participation in various kinds of questioning (i.e., convergent questions, divergent questions, challenges to others), and the temporality of question-asking that reflected the way questions mattered to the students and how different aspects of the subject matter were disclosed and concealed in the process of learning. Findings from this study suggest that a moral realist-oriented inquiry can provide a wide-ranging and nuanced set of insights regarding question-asking as a part of student learning.
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Macdonald, Iain Ezra. "Two sources of moral reasons." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/981.
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One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other – whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct sources of moral reasons. The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism, whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals – but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons. Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory for applied ethics.
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Fearn, Joseph. "Moral realism : an anti-projectionist account of moral values as aspects of the manifest image." Thesis, University of Northampton, 2001. http://nectar.northampton.ac.uk/2787/.
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This thesis will argue that a significant part of our moral experience can be explained by an analogy with the phenomenon of aspect perception discussed by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. I will argue that projectivism cannot give a satisfactory account of moral perception. This difficulty constitutes an argument against projectivism; namely that projectivism is hopeless as an account of the phenomenology of morality, because it is at variance with the way we actually think and talk morally. It will be shown how quasi-realism is an attempt to remove the most important range of objections to projectivism - namely that it cannot account for the phenomena of serious moral thought and talk. I argue that the project of quasi-realism ultimately fails, leaving realism as the theory most able to account for our moral experience. I shall reveal the untenable assumptions of the ‘Absolute’ viewpoint entailed by the non-realist arguments of J.L.Mackie, and reveal the perpectival outlook that lies behind an aspect-seeing account of moral perception, and also illuminate why the key issue for moral realism is the question of whether we can establish moral objectivity. I shall then go on to say how much objectivity is possible. Finally, I shall show how a Wittgensteinian analogy between moral values and aspects helps to explain our common moral experience. The ability to perceive moral values will be shown to be tied in with the concept-dependency of moral perception, relying on discriminations that can only be made through the use of language, and hence through a shared form of life. The account will be shown to be fully capable of giving an account of our common moral experience
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Karlsson, Patrik. "Huemers moraliska realism och 'argumentet från oenighet'." Thesis, Örebro University, Department of Humanities, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-1262.
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Finns det värdefakta? Kan vi ha kunskap i moralfrågor? Finns det över huvud taget rätt och fel i moralfrågor? Med dessa frågor i bakhuvudet vill författaren undersöka ett vanligt argument mot moralisk realism i allmänhet, och Michael Huemers variant av moralisk realism i synnerhet. Detta antirealistiska argument säger att det är så pass vanligt med oenigheter i moralfrågor och att den bästa förklaringen till detta är att moralen är subjektiv. Argumentet säger vidare att etiken lider av bristande konvergens beträffande upplösta etiska oenigheter över tid, jämfört med exempelvis naturvetenskapen. Detta faktum verkar, menar vissa antirealister, ytterligare tala emot att det existerar värdefakta. Med detta som utgångspunkt tar uppsatsförfattaren reda på varför argumentet misslyckas med att skada Michael Huemers moraliska realism.
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Valenzuela, Pulgar Sergio Luis Esteban. "Libertad, determinismo y las posibilidades del realismo moral." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2016. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/140000.
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Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)El problema de la posibilidad del libre albedrío o libertad de la voluntad por contraposición a la inexorabilidad del determinismo causal es moderno. Hay antecedentes en la historia de la filosofía del problema como la oposición “libertad y necesidad”, pero es la respuesta kantiana a una serie de preguntas lo que determinó el problema y el devenir de sus subsecuentes formulaciones.1 Sin ir más lejos, para los antiguos y escolásticos existe un fin del hombre, el conocido argumento del ergón. En el contexto moderno, el que cada cual pudiera elegir los propios fines, amparado en la idea de autonomía, comporta un giro de máxima importancia en la reflexión ética y supone la afirmación de una libertad diferente de la que era tratada por los escolásticos
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Gong, Susan Peterson. "The Moral Realism of Student Question-Asking in a Classroom Ecology." Thesis, Brigham Young University, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10831473.
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Question-asking has long been an integral part of human learning. In scholarly investigations over the past several decades, questions have been studied in terms of the answers they generate, their grammatical structure, their cognitive functions, their logical content, and their social dynamics. Studies of student classroom questioning have focused on science education and reading instruction particularly; they detail the reasons why students don’t ask questions and add a plethora of recommendations about teaching students how to question. This qualitative study addressed question-asking from a hermeneutic moral realist perspective, studying question-asking as it unfolded in the everyday practice of learning in a graduate seminar on design thinking. Findings of the study included seven themes that fit within three broader metathemes about the complexities and virtues of classroom questioning, the sociality of question-asking, and the temporality of questions in practice. Specific themes that emerged from the study concerned the complexity of overlapping practices within the classroom, ways in which students evaluated the quality and virtue of their questioning interactions, the moral reference points that guided student participation in various kinds of questioning (i.e., convergent questions, divergent questions, challenges to others), and the temporality of student question-asking that reflected the way questions mattered to students and how different aspects of the subject matter were disclosed and concealed in the process of learning. Findings from this study suggest that a moral realist-oriented inquiry can provide a wide-ranging and nuanced set of insights regarding question-asking as a part of student learning.
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Mitchell, Steven Cole. "Against Metaethical Descriptivism: The Semantic Problem." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/202935.
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In my dissertation I argue that prominent descriptivist metaethical views face a serious semantic problem. According to standard descriptivism, moral thought and discourse purports to describe some ontology of moral properties and/or relations: e.g., the term `good' purports to refer to some property or cluster of properties. Central to any such theory, then, is the recognition of certain items of ontology which, should they actually exist, would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts. And since one commonly accepted feature of moral thought and discourse is a supervenience constraint, descriptivists hold that any ontology suitable for morality would have to supervene upon non-moral ontology. But this lands descriptivists with the task of providing a semantic account capable of relating this ontology to moral terms and concepts. That is, they must explain why it is that certain items of ontology and not others would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts, in a way that is consistent with the supervenience constraint. I argue that this important explanatory task cannot be carried out. And because the problem generalizes from metaethics to all normativity, we are left with good reason to pursue alternatives to descriptivist accounts of normative semantics.
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Houston, Graham Richard. "Virtual morality : virtual reality, human values and christian ethics in postmodernity." Thesis, Heriot-Watt University, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10399/1280.
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Khameh, Armin. "The morality of toleration : towards a realist account of political toleration." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2015. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/13309/.
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Western societies today are marked by a broad liberal consensus in favour of toleration. Yet, some philosophers have charged that toleration as a liberal ideal is incoherent. Some have argued that toleration is incompatible with liberal political orders. Others have suggested that in a truly liberal society it is practically redundant. These charges are based on two interrelated claims: 1) Toleration involves, semantically and historically, power asymmetries and hierarchical positioning; hence toleration is an inegalitarian practice in nature, and therefore unjust (inegalitarian charge). 2) In a constitutional liberal order, the state’s justice-based duty of non-interference is a morally more appropriate response to diversity than is toleration; hence toleration is a redundant practice (redundancy charge) In order to reconcile toleration with liberal political practice, in this thesis, I investigate the validity of these claims. My contention is that toleration can resist the inegalitarian charge. This is the aim that I pursue in the first two chapters. I argue firstly that the supposition of a right to interference as a necessary component of the concept of toleration address the inegalitarian charge. I then articulate a two-level model of tolerant deliberation that does a better job than existing theories explaining the relation between reasons in favour and against interference with the disapproved-of. I will finally argue that political toleration completes, rather than replicates, justice-based non-interferences. A defence of this “complementarity thesis,” requires two moves. First, I construct a formal theory of political toleration that goes beyond the state’s justice-based duty of non-interference. Second, I demonstrate how and under what conditions political toleration, as a distinct form of the state’s non-interference, can be enacted. Inspired by the revival of interest in political realism in recent years, I argue that the emergence of the “extraordinary politics” permits the state to exclude/suspend its justice-based interference. The latter is tantamount to what I refer to as acts of political toleration.
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Pereira, Edineyalison Wallas Henriques Ferreira. "Falha a fala, fala a bala: a construção épica em cidade de Deus, de Paulo Lins." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2013. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/6246.
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In this piece of work, entitled Falha a fala, fala a bala: The epic construction in Cidade de Deus, by Paulo Lins, we propose a textual analysis of this novel, in which we seek to comprehend how the narrative techniques used and the hero characterization proposed by the narrator are articulated. There is no unity in Cidade de Deus narrative voice, in the sense of a person recognizable in the real world, but it is formed by a mix of different points of view, what causes moral judgments impossible to find a unity. The dynamic form of the narrator shares with the character the incapacity to observe their reality as a whole, and both are involved in an ideology that alienates them and represses their voices as autonomous human beings. Thus, the techniques used by Paulo Lins work as irony, for it conveys that, if the use of such techniques may make the novel a commercial product, on the other hand, the same procedures are revealed to be inefficient to produce positive solutions to the drama theme of the text. In our approach, we follow the footsteps of preexistent critics that seeks to identify marks of literality in Lins novel, and recognize that the techniques used by the narrator, such as the detailed description of violence and the fast pace of action scenes, are not just a thoughtless reproduction of clichés, but has a recognizable function in a text the seeks to be as realistic as possible.
Em Falha a fala, fala a bala: A construção épica em Cidade de Deus, de Paulo Lins, propomos uma análise textual deste romance, através da qual buscamos compreender como se articulam as técnicas narrativas utilizadas e a caracterização do herói proposta pelo narrador. A voz narrativa de Cidade de Deus não possui unidade, no sentido de um indivíduo localizável na realidade, mas constitui-se de uma mescla de diversos pontos de vista, o que impossibilita o julgamento moral de encontrar uma unidade. A forma dinâmica do narrador compartilha com o personagem a incapacidade de observar sua realidade como um todo, e ambos estão envolvidos em uma ideologia que os aliena e reprime suas vozes como indivíduos autônomos. Assim, as técnicas utilizadas por Paulo Lins funcionam como uma ironia, pois deixam claro que, se por um lado técnicas provenientes da indústria cultural podem dar à obra um caráter mais comercial, por outro, os mesmos procedimentos são desmascarados como incapazes de produzir solução diante do drama tratado. Em tal abordagem, nos filiamos a uma fortuna crítica que busca localizar aspectos de literariedade no romance de Lins, e reconhecer que as técnicas midiáticas utilizadas pelo narrador, como a minuciosa descrição da violência e a velocidade nas cenas de ação, antes de serem uma mera reprodução impensada de clichês, possuem funcionalidade estrutural numa obra que busca ser a mais realista possível.
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Wittwer, Silvan. "Evolution and the possibility of moral knowledge." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/33281.
Full textAbstract:
This PhD thesis provides an extended evaluation of evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics. Such arguments attempt to show that evolutionary theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, lead to moral scepticism: the implausible view that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified (e.g. Joyce 2006, Street 2005, Kahane 2011). To establish that, these arguments rely on certain epistemic principles. But most of the epistemic principles appealed to in the literature on evolutionary debunking arguments are imprecise, confused or simply implausible. My PhD aims to rectify that. Informed by debates in cutting-edge contemporary epistemology, Chapter 1 distinguishes three general, independently motivated principles that, combined with evolution, seem to render knowledge of robustly objective moral facts problematic. These epistemic principles state that (i.) our getting facts often right in a given domain requires explanation - and if we cannot provide one, our beliefs about that domain are unjustified; (ii.) higher-order evidence of error undermines justification; and (iii.) for our beliefs to be justified, our having them must be best explained by the facts they are about. Chapters 2-4 develop and critically assess evolutionary debunking arguments based on those principles, showing that only the one inspired by (iii.) succeeds. Chapter 2 investigates the argument that evolution makes explaining why we get moral facts often right impossible. I argue that Justin Clarke-Doane's recent response (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) works, yet neglects an issue about epistemic luck that spells trouble for robust moral objectivity. Chapter 3 discusses the argument that evolution provides higher-order evidence of error regarding belief in robustly objective moral facts. I show that such an argument falls prey to Katia Vavova's (2014) self-defeat objection, even if evolutionary debunkers tweak their background view on the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. Chapter 4 develops the argument that evolution, rather than robustly objective moral facts, best explains why we hold our moral beliefs. I offer a systematic, comprehensive defence of that argument against Andreas Mogensen's (2015) charge of explanatory levels confusion, Terrence Cuneo's (2007) companion in guilt strategy, and David Enoch's (2012, 2016) appeal to deliberative indispensability. Chapter 5 brings everything together. It investigates whether robust moral objectivity survives the worry about epistemic luck raised in Chapter 2 and the explanatory challenge developed in Chapter 4. Making progress, however, requires a better idea of how we form true, justified beliefs about and acquire knowledge of robustly objective moral facts. Since it offers the most popular and best-developed epistemology of robustly objective morality, my inquiry in Chapter 5 focuses on contemporary moral intuitionism: the view that moral intuitions can be the source of basic moral knowledge. I argue that its success is mixed. While moral intuitionism has the conceptual tools to tackle the problem of epistemic luck from Chapter 2, it cannot insulate knowledge of robustly objective moral facts against the sceptical worry raised by the evolutionary debunking argument developed in Chapter 4. Thus, evolutionary theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, does lead to a form of unacceptable moral scepticism.
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Walsh, Joseph Paul. "Evolutionary ethics without the error : how care ethics can vindicate moral realism." Thesis, University of Kent, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.633527.
Full textAbstract:
In this thesis I defend a form of moral realism against Richard Joyce's evolutionary argument for an error theory. I explain how evolutionary data can be used to explain human behaviour, ultimately endorsing a developmental systems perspective on the evolution of traits. I argue that evolutionary theories of ethics, developmentally conceived, are best demarcated from non-evolutionary ethical theories by appealing to the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. I then set out Joyce's argument for an error theory, and in so doing respond to his claim that moral properties cannot be successfully naturalised. I then consider different naturalistic approaches to moral realism, assessing whether these approaches successfully meet Joyce's sceptical challenge. I look first at Philippa Foot's neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics, arguing that her position fails because of her commitment to eudaimonism, and to a welfarist conception offunction. I then consider Jesse Prinz's realist sentimentalism. This too, I argue, fails to constitute a convincing reply to Joyce, owing to internal inconsistencies, and to the failure of Prinz's theory to meet certain criteria intuitively constitutive of moral realism. Finally, I argue that a successful realist response to Joyce can be made by developing an evolutionary account of care ethics. I begin to develop such an account in the final chapter of the thesis, showing how the theory which I sketch meets each of the aspects of Joyce's argument for an error theory.