To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Realizm moralny.

Journal articles on the topic 'Realizm moralny'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Realizm moralny.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Przełęcki, Marian. "W sprawie realizmu praktycznego." Etyka 39 (December 1, 2006): 15–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.431.

Full text
Abstract:
Realizm praktyczny jest koncepcją etyczną Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, która spotkała się z poważną krytyką — głównie ze strony Henryka Elzenberga. Autor artykułu, uznając słuszność niektórych zarzutów Elzenberga, stara się ich uniknąć dzięki interpretacji postulatu realizmu praktycznego, sugerowanej przez pewne wcześniejsze teksty Kotarbińskiego. Postulat ten, tak rozumiany, nie wyznacza naczelnego ideału naszego postępowania, tylko podaje warunek moralnej dopuszczalności dążenia do przyjętego przez nas ideału. Warunkiem tym ma być nasza troska o dobro innych ludzi, w szczególności — „obrona ich przed nieszczęściem”.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Hittinger, Russell. "Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism." International Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1989): 229–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq198929212.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Fisk, Milton, John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, and Germain Grisez. "Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism." Noûs 26, no. 3 (September 1992): 404. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215972.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Hockaday, Arthur. "Nuclear deterrence, morality and realism." International Affairs 64, no. 1 (1987): 108–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2621505.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Harnden-Warwick, David. "Psychological Realism, Morality, and Chimpanzees." Zygon® 32, no. 1 (March 1997): 29–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0591-2385.681997068.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Digeser, Peter, and Ross Howard Miller. "Realism, morality, and liberal democracy." Journal of Value Inquiry 29, no. 3 (September 1995): 331–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01206987.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Lomia, Ekaterine. "Political Realism in International Relations: Classical Realism, Neo-realism, and Neo-Classical Realism." International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research 7, no. 3 (September 3, 2020): 591–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.46291/ijospervol7iss3pp591-600.

Full text
Abstract:
Realism, also known as political realism, is one of the most dominant theories of international relations. The school of thought in realism was established in the post-World War II era; however, it is widely associated with the ancient Greek studies, particularly, in the works of Thucydides who allows a more sophisticated analysis of the conception of power and its place in the anarchic international system. Unlike idealism and liberalism, which underline the idea of cooperation in international relations, realism stresses a competitive and confrontational side of human nature and argues that in global politics there is no space for morality. Thus, states show constant readiness to obtain power and achieve their political ends. The article aims at studying the basic approach, the theory of realism is based on. The study has been prepared as a result of examining articles and books written by dominant realist scholars who have influential opinions in the field.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Copp, David. "Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 21 (1995): 187–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717438.

Full text
Abstract:
'Internalism’ in ethics is a cluster of views according to which there is an ‘internal’ connection between moral obligations and either motivations or reasons to act morally; ‘externalism’ says that such connections are contingent. So described, the dispute between internalism and externalism may seem a technical debate of minor interest. However, the issues that motivate it include deep problems about moral truth, realism, normativity, and objectivity. Indeed, I think that some philosophers view externalism as undermining the ‘dignity’ of morality. They might say that if morality needs an ‘external sanction’ - if the belief that one has an obligation is not sufficient motive or reason to do the right thing- then morality is debased in status. Even an arbitrary system of etiquette could attract an external sanction under appropriate conditions.Although I believe that the more interesting internalist theses are false, there are important truths that internalism is attempting to capture. The most important of these is the fact that moral judgments are intrinsically ‘normative’ or ‘choice-guiding,’ that they are, very roughly, relevant to action or choice because of their content.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Drees, Willem B. "SCIENCE, REALISM, GALILEO, MORALITY AND MORE." Zygon® 48, no. 1 (February 24, 2013): 3–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2012.01325.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Temasky, P. Lance. "MORAL REALISM REVISITED: ON ACHIEVABLE MORALITY." Educational Theory 42, no. 2 (March 1992): 201–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1992.00201.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
11

Rezkalla, Paul. "Theism & Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Against Moral Realism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12, no. 3 (September 24, 2020): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v12i3.3409.

Full text
Abstract:
Evolutionary debunking arguments against morality come in a variety of forms that differ both in how they take evolution to be problematic for morality and in their specific target of morality i.e. objectivity, realism, justification for moral beliefs, etc. For the purpose of this paper, I will first articulate several recent debunking approaches and highlight what they take to be problematic features of evolutionary history for morality. In doing so I will be forced to abstract from some of the specific arguments offered, although I will provide replies to particular aspects of the arguments offered by Michael Ruse, Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. Then, I will show that theists have independent reasons for rejecting certain, core assumptions of these debunking approaches, thus deflating the major thrust of debunking worries for morality. While there may be good responses available to the non-theist realist with respect to several of the worries raised below, this paper will simply show why the theist need not be troubled by contemporary debunking approaches against morality.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
12

Dollenbach, David. "Book Review: Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism." Theological Studies 49, no. 4 (December 1988): 766–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004056398804900426.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
13

Wenker, Kenneth H. "Book Review: Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism." Armed Forces & Society 15, no. 4 (July 1989): 623–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x8901500415.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
14

Harries, Richard. "Book Review: Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism." Theology 92, no. 746 (March 1989): 140–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040571x8909200223.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
15

Erdur, Melis. "Moral Realism and the Incompletability of Morality." Journal of Value Inquiry 52, no. 2 (December 16, 2017): 227–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-017-9611-z.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
16

van Roojen, Mark. "Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality." Philosophical Studies 126, no. 2 (November 2005): 285–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2162-3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
17

Valdecantos, Antonio. "Realismo ético y experiencia moral." Isegoría, no. 17 (November 30, 1997): 107–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.1997.i17.201.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
18

Niquet, Marcel. "FACTICITY AND SOCIOCENTRISM: SOME REMARKS CONCERNING TWO BASIC CONCEPTS OF MORAL THEORY." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 35, no. 113 (April 6, 2010): 301. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v35n113p301-318/2008.

Full text
Abstract:
Faticidade e sociocentrismo são dois conceitos fundamentais com os quais toda teoria moral se vê confrontada. O artigo enquadra o significado deles na deontologia clássica kantiana e no paradigma pós-kantiano da ética do discurso. A discussão dos problemas implicados nesses conceitos leva o autor a defender um paradigma do Realismo Normativo que faz justiça ao conteúdo crítico desses conceitos e às intuições morais contidas neles.Abstract: ´Facticity´ and ´socio-centrism´ denote major structural features of theories of morality. The paper explicates their core-meaning and tries to demonstrate how these notions are instantiated in classical Kantian deontology and the post-Kantian paradigms of discourse-ethics. A justification is attempted for abandoning these theories in favour of a possible successor paradigm of Normative Realism which does better justice to the critical content of these concepts and the morally loaded intuitions contained therein.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
19

Smith, Michael Joseph. "American Realism and the New Global Realities." Ethics & International Affairs 6 (March 1992): 179–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1992.tb00549.x.

Full text
Abstract:
The three books reviewed in this essay, Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View (Mary Maxwell), Righteous Realists: Political Realism, Responsible Power, and American Culture in the Nuclear Age (Joel H. Rosenthal), and Securing Europe (Richard H. Ullman), in some sense represent a reaction to Reagan's ideological policies. Maxwell's book appeals to the sociobiological nature of international morality. Rosenthal's book invites the reader to consider the valid view of the realist model as a venue toward integration of morals with decision making in international relations. Ullman's main premise is that the disintegration of the Soviet empire and reunification of Germany gave a strong impetus for the European states to seek a common ground in all areas through cooperation, particularly on security issues.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
20

Mema, Medlir. "Morality and Realism: A Match Made in Heaven?" SAIS Review of International Affairs 27, no. 1 (2007): 171–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sais.2007.0014.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
21

Dominey, Jane, and Jake Phillips. "Complexity, realism and morality: consultations on probation reform." Criminal Justice Matters 90, no. 1 (December 2012): 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09627251.2012.751224.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
22

Zhao, Michael. "Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality." Philosophical Studies 177, no. 3 (November 15, 2018): 653–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1198-0.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
23

Dudek, Jolanta. "Miłosz Wobec Conrada w Traktacie Moralnym / Miłosz and Conrad in the Treatise on Morality." Ruch Literacki 53, no. 4-5 (July 1, 2012): 489–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10273-012-0031-1.

Full text
Abstract:
Summary It would appear that Czesław Miłosz’s Treatise on Morality - one of whose aims was to “stave off despair” - was largely inspired by the writings of Joseph Conrad. That Miłosz had no wish to draw his readers’ attention to this is perfectly understandable, given Conrad’s particularly low standing in the eyes of communist State censors. This long poem, which extols human freedom and pours scorn on socialist realism (together with its ideological premises), is one of Miłosz’s best known works in his native Poland, where it was published in 1948. The Treatise on Morality may well have been inspired by three of Conrad’s essays that were banned in communist Poland: ‘Autocracy and War’ (1905), ‘A Note on the Polish Problem’ (1916) and ‘The Crime of Partition’ (1919). After the Second World War, translations of these three essays were not available to the general Polish reader until … 1996! Conrad’s writings helped Miłosz to diagnose Poland’s political predicament from a historical perspective and to look for a way out of it without losing all hope. An analysis of the Treatise on Morality shows that only by reconstructing the Conradian atmosphere and context - alluded to in the text - can we fully grasp all the levels of the poet’s irony, which culminates in a final “punchline”. Apart from allusions to The Heart of Darkness and the brutal colonization of the Congo, the fate of post-war Poland is also seen through the optic of those of Conrad’s novels that deal with the subject of depraved revolutionaries: Nostromo (1904), TheSecret Agent (1907) and Under Western Eyes (1911). Conrad’s ideas for ways to fight against bad fortune and despair are suggested not only by his stories Youth (1902) and Typhoon (1903) - and by his novels The Nigger of the “Narcissus” and Lord Jim - but also and above all by his volume of memoirs entitled A Personal Record (1912), in which he relates his yearning for freedom as the young, tragic victim of a foreign empire. In an article entitled ‘Joseph Conrad in Polish Eyes’ and published in 1957 - on the hundredth anniversary of Conrad’s birth - Miłosz writes that, through his writings, Conrad fulfilled the hopes of his father (who gave him the name “Konrad”) and that although “the son did not want to assume a burden that had crushed his father, he had nevertheless become the defender of freedom against the blights of autocracy”
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
24

Luque Sánchez, Pau. "Las dos vías del realismo moral." Discusiones 10 (March 13, 2021): 275–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2011.2531.

Full text
Abstract:
El realismo moral es una de las dos posiciones dominantes en el debate metaético (la otra sería el antirrealismo), tanto en la actualidad como a lo largo del siglo XX. Sostiene dos grandes tesis. Por un lado, el significado de los juicios morales es apto para ser evaluado en términos de verdad y de falsedad. Esta es la denominada tesis del cognitivismo semántico. Por otro lado, la segunda tesis afirma que tales juicios hacen referencia a la existencia de hechos o propiedades morales, que actúan como condiciones de verdad de los juicios morales. Esta segunda tesis es conocida como la tesis ontológica. El artículo explica y pone en cuestión las diferencias ontológicas y epistemológicas entre ambas tesis.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
25

Καλοκαιρινού (Eleni Kalokairinou), Ελένη. "Γιατί οι ηθικές βελτιώσεις χαρακτήρα είναι καταδικασμένες να αποτύχουν; Η κριτική των φιλοσοφιών της αρετής." Bioethica 4, no. 1 (February 22, 2018): 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/bioeth.19695.

Full text
Abstract:
All kinds of enhancements, cognitive, physical, psychological, moral etc. are at the center of moral debates nowadays. In particular the moral enhancements of character by virtue of pharmacological and biotechnological means are widely discussed, as they raise a number of questions regarding human autonomy and freedom. In the present article, we argue that if we study carefully the way in which the moral enhancements are applied according to the bioethicists Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, we will realize that they are logically impossible. That is, if we analyze the logical procedure of enhancing characters morally, as this is presented in Aristotle’s and Kant’s moral account, then we will understand that the kind of moral enhancement of character by virtue of biotechnological means which the two philosophers put forward is doomed to fail. Furthermore, we will also understand that the two philosophers offer an impoverished conception of morality, since reason, the basic element of the moral process, plays no role in the account of moral reasoning they propound.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
26

Barkin, J. Samuel. "The Tragedy of Realism: Morality, Power, and IR Theory." International Studies Review 6, no. 3 (September 2004): 508–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2004.00444.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
27

Wrightson, Patricia Stein. "Morality, realism, and foreign affairs: A normative realist approach." Security Studies 5, no. 2 (December 1995): 354–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419508429271.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
28

Scott, Sasha A. Q. "Mediatized Witnessing and the Ethical Imperative of Capture." International Journal of E-Politics 8, no. 1 (January 2017): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijep.2017010101.

Full text
Abstract:
What does it mean to witness in an age saturated with media technology? This paper argues the need to rescue witnessing as a concept from its conflation with the watching and passive consumption of events. As an inherently political practice, the mediatization of witnessing is bound within questions of ethics and morality and has the potential to realign power and control in society. This article explores these issues through the witnessing of public death events: those shocking, exceptional and morally significant deaths that become ‘public' through their mediation, observing that the continuous and contiguous production and consumption of media content has given rise to new performative rituals of local witnessing for (potentially) global audiences. I argue that the mediatization of witnessing serves to increase our moral awareness of seeing, rendering an ethical imperative of capture on those that witness, and thereby closing the veracity gap between events and their meaning.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
29

Suparta, Suparta. "Implementasi Kurikulum Muatan Lokal Berbasis Akhlak di Kabupaten Bangka Tengah." Edugama: Jurnal Kependidikan dan Sosial Keagamaan 5, no. 2 (December 1, 2019): 112–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.32923/edugama.v5i2.973.

Full text
Abstract:
Moral Education is the key to the success of education as a whole, both in the household, school, and community. During this time, a child is often only equipped with religious knowledge in the form of cognitive, while the inculcation of the foundations of faith is merely a slogan, an expression without reality. As a result, children have a lot of knowledge and intelligent brains, but have behaviors that are not in accordance with their knowledge. For this reason, the teachings of Islam should not be used as objects that are only studied and understood and memorized. However, the teachings of Islam must be subject to be understood, memorized and practiced. In fact, the tendency of teenagers today is to prioritize materialist and hedonic orientations, so that they are morally and spiritually poor. Thus the morality possessed is not an Islamic personality but an instant personality that he gets from the guidance of a misleading spectacle. To realize this expectation, there must be a local curriculum based on Akhak.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
30

Evans, J. D. G. "Cultural Realism: the ancient philosophical background." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40 (March 1996): 47–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005853.

Full text
Abstract:
I understand Pluralism to be the doctrine that, either generally or with reference to some particular area of judgement, there is more than one basic principle. It endorses the possibility that some particular case may arise which will be adjudicated in one way if one principle is applied while another principle points otherwise and to an answer which, at least in practice, is incompatible. Thus in morality, according to pluralism there may be more than one correct answer to the question of which of the decisions available in some particular situation is the best (Kekes, 1993, esp. pp. 9–15; see also the valuable collection of essays Paul, Miller and Paul, 1994).
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
31

Latey, Maurice. "Political realism and international morality: ethics in the nuclear age." International Affairs 64, no. 3 (1988): 474–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2622865.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
32

Faraci, David. "David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism." Journal of Value Inquiry 46, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 259–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
33

Hamdani, Basrir. "Realisme Moral dalam Pandangan Ṭabāṭabā’ī (Respons terhadap Natuaralisme, Emotivisme, dan Anti-Realisme Moral)." ILMU USHULUDDIN 7, no. 1 (May 14, 2020): 19–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/iu.v7i1.14760.

Full text
Abstract:
The main purpose of this article is to point out Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s metaethical idea, that is moral realism, based on the principle of moral philosophy which found in his theory of I’tibāriyat, a theory of perception dealing with various kinds of perception related to practical action of human being whether individual or social. Departing from many problems related to ontological and epistemological statuses of morality that have not been solved yet by several modern metaethical theories, cognitivism and non-cognitivism, this Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s metaethical idea is considered enable to give alternative solutions by proposing two points as the results of reflection on it that morality in the case of metaethical study is imaginative-cognitive-relative and existent in threefold components (action, pupose, and nature of an actor). The elaboration of this reflection in the same time constitutes a response to those modern metaethical theories especially Naturalism, Emotivism, and Anti-Realism. The method by which the writer presents this article is analytical-critical-comparative method, that is, to analyze every idea or theory of metaethics mentioned and, then, by comparative-critical approach, the writer attempts to provide a response to some claims from Naturalism, Emotivism, and Anti-Realism.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
34

Björnsson, Gunnar, and Ragnar Francén Olinder. "Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 13, no. 1 (January 11, 2016): 101–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01301001.

Full text
Abstract:
Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch’s handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
35

Park, Jaehan. "Realism and Morality: E.H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939." SAIS Review of International Affairs 39, no. 1 (2019): 107–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sais.2019.0010.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
36

Matsumoto, Masakazu. "Amoral realism or just war morality? Disentangling different conceptions of necessity." European Journal of International Relations 26, no. 4 (March 24, 2020): 1084–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066120910233.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper addresses a misconception in the popular contrast between amoral realism and just war theory and clarifies the linguistic source of the misconception by disentangling the two interpretations of necessity. First, we can, and should, distinguish the Thucydidean “causal” conception of necessity, which is the basis for just war thinkers when they attack realist thought, from the Machiavellian “telic” conception. The paper, then, proceeds to reconsider the relationship between realism and morality through a textual analysis of representative contemporary realist theories and clarifies that their necessity judgments contain both causal and telic meanings. According to those supporting the moral view, the pursuit of national interest and security can be interpreted as emerging from their sense of moral duty. Realists are, even if partially, in line with just war theorists in evaluating the moral appropriateness of a war in itself and its methods. Finally, the paper explores the substantive disagreement between the two camps regarding the principle of discrimination, to demonstrate why they should still be assumed to have separate theories. In conclusion, their difference lies in not whether they place importance on the necessity judgment, among other considerations on the morality of war, but the extent to which they do so.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
37

Cuneo, T. "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, by David Enoch." Mind 121, no. 484 (October 1, 2012): 1059–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs093.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
38

Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons. "From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 28, no. 83 (January 8, 1996): 3–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1996.1037.

Full text
Abstract:
En años recientes, las defensas del realismo moral han adoptado lo que llamamos la “semántica moral de la nueva ola”, la cual analiza las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos morales tales como “bueno” y “correcto” semejantes a las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos para clases naturales en la ciencia, y se inspira también en temas funcionalistas de la filosofía de la mente. Este tipo de perspectiva semántica que encontramos en las perspectivas metaéticas de David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton y otros, es el cimiento semántico crucial de una clase naturalística de realismo moral que estos filósofos apoyan —una perspectiva que promete dar una forma fuerte de realismo moral. Nosotros sostenemos que la semántica moral de la nueva ola nos conduce, de una u otra forma, al relativismo moral —una perspectiva que no es compatible con el tipo de realismo moral que estos filósofos pretenden defender. Es así que nuestra discusión muestra que si la semántica moral de la nueva ola es la mejor esperanza para defender el realismo moral naturalístico, entonces este tipo de perspectiva es insostenible. Nuestro trabajo está dividido en 7 secciones además de una conclusión. En la sección 1, explicamos la motivación que hay detrás de la semántica moral de la nueva ola. En la sección 2, pasamos al trabajo de Brink y Boyd cuyas perspectivas combinadas producen una perspectiva metaética, según la cual los términos morales como “bueno” y “correcto” quieren referir rígidamente a las propiedades funcionales de segundo orden cuya esencia funcional la revela cualquier teoría moral que surge de la aplicación correcta de la metodología coherentista. La perspectiva Brink- Boyd toma como modelo al psicofuncionalismo de la filosofía de la mente para entender las propiedades morales. En la sección 3, diferenciamos las diferentes formas del relativismo, arguyendo que ciertas formas son culpables de chauvinismo, y luego, en la sección 4, sostenemos que el psicofuncionalismo de la filosofía de la mente es culpable de una forma chauvinista de relativismo conceptual. En la sección 5, mostramos entonces cómo la versión Brink-Boyd de la semántica moral de la nueva ola también es culpable de un relativismo conceptual chauvinista en la ética. En la sección 6, pasamos a la propuesta de Railton (inspirada por la versión de la teoría de identidad psicofísica defendida por D.M. Armstrong y David Lewis) de que hay que comprender los términos morales en tanto que refieren no-rígidamente a las propiedades naturales. En la sección 7, sostenemos que en una interpretación de la propuesta de Railton, su perspectiva es culpable de un relativismo conceptual chauvinista, y en una interpretación alternativa, su perspectiva es culpable de una indeterminación moral radical. Ambos modos, tanto la perspectiva de Railton como la perspectiva de Brink-Boyd, no ayudan en la defensa de una forma fuerte de realismo moral: irónicamente, la semántica moral de la nueva ola nos conduce a un relativismo moral. [Traducción: Claudia Chávez A.]
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
39

Gibbard, Allan. "What's Morally Special about Free Exchange?" Social Philosophy and Policy 2, no. 2 (1985): 20–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003198.

Full text
Abstract:
Is there anything morally special about free exchange? In asking this, I am asking not only about extreme, so-called “libertarian” views, on which free exchange is sacrosanct, but about more widespread, moderate views, on which there is at least something morally special about free exchange. On these more compromising views, other moral considerations may override the moral importance of free exchange, but even when rights of free exchange are restricted for good reason, something morally important is lost. For some, free exchange may preserve liberty, in some morally significant sense, or realize some such moral value as “to each his own.” Alternatively, a system of free exchange may have a special moral status by virtue of the kinds of pragmatic arguments that economists give, arguments that free exchange produces good social results. Whether free exchange has any such virtues as these is the broad question I address in this paper. I offer what I have to say somewhat in the spirit of an overview. Philosophical scrutiny and economic analysis combine, it seems to me, to delineate fairly clearly what is, and what is not, morally special about free exchange.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
40

Jaeger, Hans-Martin. "Hegel's reluctant realism and the transnationalisation of civil society." Review of International Studies 28, no. 3 (July 2002): 497–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210502004977.

Full text
Abstract:
Qualifying a realist interpretation, this essay argues that the dialectical involvement of the state as an individual with its external relations exposes international politics as a matter of both anarchy and war, and mutual recognition and practical morality among states in Hegel's theory of international relations. With the absolute distinction between internal community and external anarchy removed, Hegel's account of civil society becomes relevant to his theory of international relations. Both as an analogy and concretely, it provides indications for a partial transcendence of sovereign statehood and international anarchy by institutionalised co-operation and political (self-)regulation in a transnationalising civil society.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
41

Putterman, Ethan. "Realism and Reform in Rousseau's Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica." Political Studies 49, no. 3 (August 2001): 481–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00322.

Full text
Abstract:
Of all of the criticisms leveled against Rousseau's practical political writings few have been as pervasive as the charge of intentional utopianism. Over the years this charge has not gone entirely unanswered but, for the most part, the scholarly response has been to identify these works' realism solely in terms of Rousseau's desire to educate a corrupt Europe morally. In this essay, I reexamine the question of utopianism in Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne and Projet pour la Corse to argue that the most egregiously fanciful or eccentric recommendations in these works actually demonstrate evidence of the philosopher's practicality and seriousness about constitutional reform in Poland and Corsica. To appreciate this realism though, readers must turn to Rousseau's opaque remarks about opinion's relationship to the laws in the Lettre à d'Alembert and other writings.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
42

Gutauskas, Mintautas. "CINIZMAS IR NIHILIZMAS." Religija ir kultūra 10 (January 1, 2012): 22–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/relig.2012.0.2741.

Full text
Abstract:
Straipsnyje cinizmas ir nihilizmas yra lyginami jų ontologinių nuostatų aspektu. Fiksuojama, kad cinizmas ir nihilizmas viešumoje dažnai yra sutapatinami dalykai. Pripažįstama, kad santykyje su morale ir vertybėmis jie yra panašūs, jiems abiem yra būdingas neigimas ir demaskavimas. Tačiau toliau įrodinėjama, kad ontologinių nuostatų aspektu jie skiriasi: cinizmo pagrindas yra ciniškasis realizmas, kuris steigiasi tiesos ir nuogos tiesos perspektyvoje, o nihilizmas yra toks mąstymas, kuris panaikina realizmo galimybę, iliuzijos ir tikrovės skirtumą. Taip pat abu yra lyginami refleksyvumo aspektu – nihilizmas parodomas kaip refleksyvus mąstymas, o cinizmas kaip „praktinis“ savęs nereflektuojantis požiūris. Galiausiai parodoma, kad tiek nihilizmo, tiek cinizmo „tiesa“ yra performatyvi, tik skirtingai steigiasi demaskavimo būdu.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: cinizmas, nihilizmas, realizmas, Nietzsche. CYNICISM AND NIHILISMMintautas Gutauskas SummaryThis article compares cynicism and nihilism, based on their ontological premises. One can notice that they are frequently considered as identical in the public discourse; indeed, they seem similar due to their relationship with morality and values; they both exercise negation and unmasking. However, it can be proven that they differ in terms of their ontological premises: while cynicism is based on the cynical realism, which is constituted in the perspective of the naked truth, nihilism is a form of thinking, which annihilates the possibility of realism itself and extinguishes the distinction between reality and illusion. Both of them are also compared from the aspect of reflexivity: nihilism is shown as a reflective thinking, while cynicism turns out to be a “practical” thinking without self-reflection. Finally, it is shown that although the truth of both nihilism and cynicism is enrooted in performativity, it is constituted differently by the way of unmasking.Keywords: cynicism, nihilism, realism, Nietzsche.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
43

Carlson, John D. "THE MORALITY, POLITICS, AND IRONY OF WAR: Recovering Reinhold Niebuhr's Ethical Realism." Journal of Religious Ethics 36, no. 4 (December 2008): 619–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2008.00365.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
44

Heathwood, Chris. "Could Morality Have a Source?" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6, no. 2 (June 5, 2017): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i2.62.

Full text
Abstract:
It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par with realism in this respect. Second, it explains why it seems that morality in fact couldn’t have a source.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
45

Brzezińska, Monika M. "The international leader and his moral code according to the theory of realism." Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka, no. 24 (May 11, 2020): 180–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/csp.2020.24.1.26.

Full text
Abstract:
As analysis shows, every international leader (whether a Hegemon, Stabilizer or other) has his own moral code. They differ from each other, which generates conflicts and does not foster cooperation. The more versatile the values, the greater the chance of peace, but because a realistic leader is characterized by untenable and selfish morality, which is neither lasting nor certain.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
46

Assumpção, Gabriel Almeida. "OS POSTULADOS DA RAZÃO PRÁTICA PURA E O CRISTIANISMO." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 43, no. 135 (May 1, 2016): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v43n135p99-120/2016.

Full text
Abstract:
Resumo: A leitura da Crítica da Razão Prática permite perceber que a moral kantiana não consiste em mero formalismo, abrindo espaço para uma discussão sobre os fins morais. O fim último a que o ser racional cuja vontade é determinada pela lei moral se propõe a produzir é o conceito de sumo Bem, ligação sintética a priori entre virtude como causa e felicidade moralmente condicionada como efeito. Ciente das dificuldades para a produção do objeto proposto, Kant recorre aos postulados da razão prática pura (liberdade, imortalidade da alma e existência de Deus) e estabelece um contraponto entre o cristianismo e escolas pagãs da antiguidade que não aceitariam tais pressuposições (na visão de Kant), os estóicos e os epicuristas. Buscamos mostrar, com o presente estudo, a fecundidade do diálogo entre Kant e o cristianismo, bem como o esforço kantiano de tentar fazer jus a diferentes dimensões do ser humano: tanto a afetividade quanto a moralidade.Abstract: Reading the Critique of Practical Reason enables us to realize that Kantian morality is not mere formalism, but is rather an opening to discuss moral ends. The ultimate goal of the rational being, whose will is determined by moral law, is the concept of the Highest Good, the a priori synthetic connection between virtue as a cause and a morally conditioned happiness as an effect. Aware of the difficulties related to the proposed object, Kant resorts to the postulates of practical reason (freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of God) and counterpoints Christianity with two ancient pagan schools, the Stoics and the Epicureans, which, according to the philosopher, would not accept such assumptions. The present study aims to show there is a fecund dialogue between Kant and Christianity, as well as the author’s attempt to do justice to the following dimensions of the human being: affectivity and morality.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
47

Spegele, Roger D. "Political Realism and the Remembrance of Relativism." Review of International Studies 21, no. 3 (July 1995): 211–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500117668.

Full text
Abstract:
With the precipitate and well-deserved demise of positivism as the only theory of knowledge backstopping international relations, a large number of ethical issues, emasculated by positivism's non-cognitivist views of morality, are emerging for philosophical reflection and analysis. One of the most important of these is relativism. Despite its obvious (and increasing) significance, however, few international theorists have specifically addressed the issues it raises. One of the main reasons for this neglect, this article argues, lies in the conspicuous failure on the part of the newer normative approaches to international relations even to acknowledge that a relativist interpretation is a plausible construal of their position. In the next section, three examples of such failure will be described. It is no accident that these examples derive from anti-realist positions. A perspicuous feature of anti-realism has been its evident incapacity to give sufficient weight to the fact that the world is divided into antagonistic groups which have serious, perhaps even irreconcilable, moral and political conflicts with one another. But whatever may be the case for anti-realists, revisionary political realism is in no position to obscure its relation to relativism. The possibility of relativism, for the revisionary political realist, arises from simple reflection on the realist tradition.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
48

Blackburn, Simon. "Postawy i sądy." Etyka 22 (December 1, 1986): 105–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.326.

Full text
Abstract:
The paper is an attempt to show how a theory of morality which sees moral judgements as essentially expressions of personal attitude, can nevertheless explain and justify the way in which morality seems objective, and authoritative. It explores the genesis of notions of improvement, and correctness, and truth, in moral matters, thus trying to explain our right to these concepts, which other theories, such as realism, take too much for granted.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
49

Evron. "Realism, Irony and Morality in Edith Wharton's The Age of Innocence." Journal of Modern Literature 35, no. 2 (2012): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/jmodelite.35.2.37.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
50

Erman, Eva, and Niklas Möller. "Political Legitimacy in the Real Normative World: The Priority of Morality and the Autonomy of the Political." British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (June 4, 2013): 215–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123413000148.

Full text
Abstract:
According to what has recently been labeled ‘political realism’ in political theory, ‘political moralists’ such as Rawls and Dworkin misconstrue the political domain by presuming that morality has priority over politics, thus overlooking that the political is an autonomous domain with its own distinctive conditions and normative sources. Political realists argue that this presumption, commonly referred to as the ‘ethics first premise’, has to be abandoned in order to properly theorize a normative conception of political legitimacy. This article critically examines two features of political realism, which so far have received too little systematic philosophical analysis: the political realist critique of political moralism and the challenges facing political realism in its attempt to offer an alternative account of political legitimacy. Two theses are defended. First, to the extent that proponents of political realism wish to hold onto a normative conception of political legitimacy, refuting wholesale the ethics first premise leads to a deadlock, since it throws the baby out with the bathwater by closing the normative space upon which their account of political legitimacy relies. This is called the ‘necessity thesis’: all coherent and plausible conceptions of political legitimacy must hold onto the ethics first premise. Secondly, accepting this premise – and thus defending an ethics first view – does not entail that the political domain must be seen as a subordinate arena for the application of moral principles, that political normativity is reduced to morality or that morality trumps other reasons in political decision making, as claimed by political realists. Rather, the ethics first view is compatible with an autonomous political domain that makes room for an account of political legitimacy that is defined by and substantiated from sources of normativity specifically within the political. This is called the ‘compatibility thesis’.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography