Journal articles on the topic 'Reformatio in pejus'

O presente trabalho tem como finalidade tratar da incidência do princípio da reformatio in pejus indireta no tribunal do júri como reflexo do devido processo legal e como regra fundamental do sistema processual, tendo como confrontação o princípio da soberania dos veredictos. Fez-se uma análise introdutória acerca dos princípios constitucionais do tribunal do júri. Em seguida, foram apontadas as diretrizes norteadoras do duplo grau de jurisdição a fim de se entender o real propósito recursal. Por fim, tratou-se sobre a reformatio no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro para se adentrar ao tema específico da pesquisa, a reformatio in pejus indireta no tribunal do júri. Metodologicamente, optou-se por uma pesquisa bibliográfica, consistindo o objetivo geral em demonstrar a possibilidade da incidência da reformatio in pejus indireta no procedimento do tribunal do júri. A técnica de pesquisa utilizada foi baseada em análises de conteúdo normativo, jurisprudencial e bibliográfico.

Administrativo. Serventuário de cartório. Pena Administrativa. Reformatio in pejus. Mandado de segurança. Poder disciplinar da administração e poder punitivo do Estado-sociedade. Diferenças e aproximações. Impossibilidade, em ambas as hipóteses, de se aplicar pena não mais contemplada pela lei e agravar a situação do disciplinado. Recurso ordinário conhecido e provido.O impetrante/recorrente, que é escrivão da 3º Vara da Comarca gaúcha da Gravataí, foi punido com a pena de 10 dias de suspensão pelo juiz diretor. do foro que, uno acto, transformou a penalidade em pena pecuniária. Foi interposto recurso, o qual não foi conhecido. O órgão recursal (corregedorgeral), porém, através de subterfúgio, voltou, de oficio, à penalidade antiga, já não mais contemplada pela legislação.O "poder disciplinar': próprio do Estado-Administração, não pode ser efetivamente confundido com o poder punitivo ", penal, inerente ao EstadoSociedade. A punição do último se faz através do Poder Judiciário; já a do primeiro, por meio de órgãos da própria Administração. Ambos, porém, não admitem a reformatio in pejus, e muito menos a aplicação de pena não mais contemplada pela lei.Recurso ordinário conhecido e provido.

rules of Ch. 45.1 of the Russian Federation code of Criminal Procedure regulating appeals instance in the court proceeding do not specify a person who is or was under procedure of compulsory measures of medical character application among subjects of appeal. The author analyzes the situations when the rights of hereinabove persons can be violated. He puts forward a proposal on legislative improvement of Ch. 45.1 of the Russian Federation code of Criminal Procedure by means of inclusion of a person who is or was under procedure of compulsory measures of medical character application into subjects of appeal and recognition in legislation of reformatio in pejus regulations admissibility towards such persons.

El objetivo general de la investigación fue analizar jurídicamente la impugnación de la víctima frente al principio non reformatio in pejus: proceso penal ecuatoriano. La presente investigación utilizó el método cuantitativo el cual produce datos descriptivos, que se originan por la recolección de datos. Apoyado en la revisión documental-bibliográfica. Conjuntamente, se aplicó el método inductivo-deductivo. Se planteó además el método analítico-sintético. Se concluye que, el derecho de impugnación o el derecho a recurrir permite que se vuelva a examinar el fondo de una decisión a través de una evaluación de las cuestiones de hecho y la aplicación del juicio a esos hechos. Por lo tanto, una apelación o casación debe estar disponible a menos que existan factores que la harían inapropiada. El valor de una apelación debe equilibrarse en las circunstancias particulares.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es realizar una aproximación jurídica a la idoneidad y efectividad de la acción de grupo en Colombia para proteger y reparar derechos colectivos, empleando para tal fin una metodología cualitativa-analítica con herramientas de tipo documental y jurisprudencial. Con este objetivo, el artículo se encuentra dividido en tres partes: en la primera se abordan los antecedentes legales y constitucionales de la acción de grupo en Colombia; en la segunda parte, se analiza el estándar internacional de reparación y su aplicación a los casos más paradigmáticos que hasta la fecha ha conocido la jurisdicción administrativa. Por último, se realiza una aproximación a la nueva interpretación de los principios de congruencia y no reformatio in pejus y su impacto en la protección y reparación de los derechos colectivos. Al final se presentan las conclusiones más relevantes del estudio que establecen que en Colombia es posible emplear las acciones de grupo como mecanismo de reparación de derechos colectivos o difusos.

A esta institución procesal penal, materia de este ensayo, se la estudia como una garantía para el procesado dentro de un juicio en el que ha sido condenado. En esta garantía, el juez superior no puede agravar la pena impuesta y recurrida por el condenado. Este estudio examina su aparición histórica, su ejercicio pleno y los casos por los que se concreta su abolición en el Ecuador. Esta evolución se describe en este breve estudio.

A esta institución procesal penal, materia de este ensayo, se la estudia como una garantía para el procesado dentro de un juicio en el que ha sido condenado. En esta garantía, el juez superior no puede agravar la pena impuesta y recurrida por el condenado. Este estudio examina su aparición histórica, su ejercicio pleno y los casos por los que se concreta su abolición en el Ecuador. Esta evolución se describe en este breve estudio.

In the paper, we tried to comprehensively define the field of application of the prohibition of reformatio in peius, and to present theoretical, divergent, interpretations of this provision, as well as to try to illustrate all this with the practice of both regular and constitutional courts. We have seen that the provision of Article 400 of the Montenegrin Code of Criminal Procedure is not enough to be interpreted only linguistically. This provision hides much more. First of all, the phrase "appeal filed only in favor of the defendant" should be interpreted in the same way when the prosecutor filed an appeal that was rejected. In addition, we have seen that this prohibition binds both the second-instance court when deciding on the appeal and the first-instance court in the retrial, if the decision is revoked. The practice of international courts, more specifically the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, represented an unavoidable sequence in the presentation. We have seen that the ECtHR did not affirm this prohibition in its practice. Moreover, it could be said that if the national courts respect the ECHR standards inaugurated so far, a stricter legal qualification and (or) a stricter criminal sanction against the defendant in the new proceedings would be allowed. It only remains for us to see whether the ECtHR, over time, will change this practice, or whether we, under the undoubted authority of this court, will marginalize this provision.

Summary The prohibition of reformatio in peius is an important procedural institute of the remedies procedure. The prohibition of reformatio in peius means the prohibition of changing a decision for the worse, i.e. to the detriment of the person who has been affected by the contested decision and has himself brought an appeal against that decision or in whose favour such an appeal has been brought. The legal regulation of this institute in the Slovak Republic is unsatisfactory, since there is a different legal regime in the application of the prohibition of reformatio in peius in the derivation of administrative liability for offences and other administrative offences. In the present article, the author compares the legal regulation of the institute of the prohibition of reformatio in peius in the Slovak legal system with the aim of possible inspiration of the legal regulation of this institute in the legal systems of selected states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic).

Zabrana reformatio in peius institut je kaznenoprocesnog prava koji derivira iz Ustavom zajamčenog prava na žalbu, čime predstavlja oživotvorenje prava na obranu iako nema eksplicitno ustavno ustoličenje niti izravno proizlazi iz EKLJP-a. Kao sastavnica vladavine prava, zabrana reformatio in peius počiva na postulatu pravičnosti u vidu jamstva okrivljeniku da žalba izjavljena samo u njegovu korist neće rezultirati za njega nepovoljnijom odlukom. Dalekosežnost zabrane reformatio in peius očituje se u okolnosti da ona, jednom ustanovljena, nadilazi i pravomoćnost sudske odluke teveže sud do konačnog okončanja postupka. No prijepore u pravnoj teoriji i sudskoj praksi izaziva opseg primjene te zabrane, napose referira li se ona (samo) na visinu kazne (i težinu kaznenopravne sankcije), ili pak obuhvaća i činjenični opis i pravnu oznaku djela. Autorice u radu analiziraju normativno uređenje instituta zabrane reformatio in peius te se dotiču i sudske prakse u izabranim zemljama kontinentalne pravne tradicije. Rezultati provedenog istraživanja, koji predstavljaju komparativnu podlogu za provedbu drugog dijela istraživanja, gdje će se analizirati hrvatsko normativno uređenje i sudska praksa, upućuju na normativno vezivanje zabrane reformatio in peiusisključivo za pitanje sankcija, ali sudska praksa ide u smjeru (ograničenog) priznavanja prava izmjene pravne kvalifikacije djela samo ako visina izrečene kazne ostane nepromijenjena.

PROHIBITION OF ‘REFORMATIO IN PEIUS’ IN POLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE TRADITION OF ROMAN LAWSummaryThe subject of this paper is an assessment of the influence of Roman law on the contemporary regulations for appeal in Polish civil procedurę as regards the prohibition of reformatio in peius. The author’s analysis shows that despite the general belief that the ban on the worsening of the appellant’s situation in the event of the opposite party failing to lodge an appeal derives from Roman roots, in fact when used in the context of the way in which Polish appeal courts deliver a verdict, the expression reformatio in peius is nothing more than an artificial legal concept derived from Latin.

Žalba kao redovito pravno sredstvo u upravnom postupku gledano u cjelini uređena je odredbama Zakona o općem upravnom postupku prilično kvalitetno. Međutim, stajalište je autora da je izostalo potpunije i djelotvornije zakonodavčevo uređenje postupka izmjene rješenja u žalbenom stadiju upravnog postupka. Kako bi se dokazala navedena tvrdnja, ponajprije će se analizirati mogućnosti ulaženja u reformatio in melius i reformatio in peius kao najvažnije aspekte navedene etape žalbenoga postupka. U radu se osobita pozornost pridaje pitanju reformatio in peius budući da navedeno pitanje ulazi u same temelje uređenja žalbe kao pravnog sredstva. U zaključku rada ponovno se u kraćim crtama iznose osnovne teze rada te se zalaže za potpunije i učinkovitije normativno uređenje mogućnosti izmjene rješenja u žalbenom upravnom postupku.

Introducción: La incertidumbre del estado del procesado al establecer un recurso de apelación dentro del sistema procesal Ecuatoriano, se deriva de la mala aplicación e inobservancia al debido proceso en todas las instancias del sistema penal, esto ha llevado que los derechos del recurrente sean vulnerados ante la inobservancia al principio de non reformatio in peius especialmente en segunda instancia, por lo que el objetivo de la investigación fue analizar la aplicación de la garantía de non reformatio in peius, a través de la ley, derecho comparado, jurisprudencia y fundamentación teórica, para prevenir vulneración de principios procesales en segunda instancia del proceso penal evitando infringir el debido proceso, seguridad jurídica y el derecho a recurrir. Metodología: El nivel de investigación fue el descriptivo tomado desde el enfoque cualitativo, empleando la recopilación de información de diferentes bases de datos científicas y jurisprudenciales, publicadas en los últimos cinco años, siguiendo el mismo hilo se incluyó el respectivo análisis jurídico de los cuerpos normativos vigentes en el Ecuador, se aplicó el derecho comparado respecto a la garantía de la non reformatio in peius en relación con otros países con un similar sistema judicial. Conclusión: Como conclusión del presente trabajo de investigación se determinó que la garantía del non reformatio in peius no fue aplicado por los jueces de segunda instancia, por cuanto existen contraposiciones de criterios respecto a su aplicación al no tener positivada esta garantía en el Código Orgánico Integral Penal. Área de estudio general: Derecho. Área de estudio específica: Derecho procesal.

El propósito de este estudio es analizar la prohibición de empeorar la situación inicial de la persona que recurre dentro de un proceso judicial penal, llamado principio “non reformatio in peius”. Esta garantía está establecida en el artículo 77 numeral 14 de la Constitución de la República del Ecuador. El método de investigación utilizado es documental y dogmático, basado principalmente en normas constitucionales, infraconstitucionales, doctrinales y jurisprudencia actualizada. La garantía constitucional, especifica que la situación de quien apela no puede empeorar, menos aun cuando el recurrente es el único que apela ante el tribunal superior. Sin embargo, aunque la contraparte recurra, si ella no solicita expresamente la modificación de lo resuelto por la autoridad inferior, el tribunal de apelación tiene prohibido pronunciarse en perjuicio del reclamante. Respaldados en la actual constitución garantista de derechos que rige, se buscar su absoluta y efectiva aplicación en beneficio de todos los ciudadanos ecuatorianos. Por esta razón se analiza teóricamente el principio “non reformatio in peius”, las generalidades del derecho a recurrir, su evolución, la prohibición de empeorar la situación de quien recurre en la legislación comparada, su concepto y naturaleza jurídica; y, la “non reformatio in peius” en Ecuador.

<p align="justify">En el presente estudio se reflexiona sobre los fundamentos teóricos que deben servir de base a la ordenación jurídica de la prohibición de la reformatio in peius dentro del procedimiento administrativo, a los fines de contribuir a la mayor protección de los derechos de los administrados y el buen hacer de la Administración Pública. Con este propósito se sistematiza en las características, posiciones doctrinales y algunas consideraciones que determinan la efectiva articulación de la prohibición de la reformatio in peius como un principio en materia de recursos administrativos que garantiza los derechos de los administrados dentro del procedimiento administrativo de impugnación.</p>

The principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius is established in Article 134 § 2 of the Law on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts. According to this provision the administrative court is not allowed to issue a decision to the detriment of the complainant. A judgment adverse to the complainant can be exceptionally issued but only if the court fi nds a violation of the law resulting in the annulment of the challenged act or action. This principle is a procedural institution which ensures that the complainant’s situation will not deteriorate due to the decision of the administrative court. There are many interpretative doubts concerning the prohibition of reformatio in peius in the doctrine and the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. This is because administrative courts very rarely issue a decision on the merits. Decisions of administrative courts are basically of cassation nature. When the administrative court allows a complaint, the contested act is generally eliminated from the system of law and the case is returned for re-examination by the public administrative authority. It is therefore very diffi cult to determine the content of the prohibition of reformatio in peius in administrative court proceedings and in practice the prohibition of a change for the worse is not a real guarantee of the protection of the interests of the complainant. In the author’s opinion, the way of approaching the mechanism of application of the prohibition of reformatio in peius by the administrative courts needs to be changed. And yet, a signifi cant improvement in the eff ectiveness of the protection against the worsening of the complainant’s legal situation will only be possible through the introduction of a new legal regulation restricting the jurisdiction of public administrative authority, which will reconsider the case after the cassation judgment issued by the administrative court.

Tanto la interdicción de la reformatio in peius como el derecho a la reformatio in melius en materia sancionadora constituyen dos relevantes garantías para el obligado tributario, ambas con un manifiesto anclaje constitucional, cuyo alcance y efectos en el ámbito tributario es preciso dilucidar a la luz de la reciente jurisprudencia de los tribunales españoles y supranacionales. Por lo que se refiere a la primera de estas garantías, pese a las polémicas doctrinales suscitadas en la segunda mitad del siglo pasado a raíz de la redacción de los artículos 93 y 119 de la Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo, de 17 de julio de 1958, en la actualidad, tanto el ordenamiento administrativo como el tributario reconocen expresamente la interdicción de la reformatio in peius tras la interposición de un recurso por parte del administrado, derecho íntimamente ligado con los principios constitucionales de seguridad jurídica, prohibición de la indefensión y tutela judicial efectiva.

La non reformatio in peius es un principio constitucional y una garantía procesal que limita la capacidad decisoria del juez superior, prohibiendo agravar la situación del procesado que ha apelado la sentencia o parte de ella como apelante único. La excepción a la aplicación de dicho principio se halla en las decisiones que por ley deben ser sometidas a consulta. En torno a dicho principio se ha consolidado amplia jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional como de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, las cuales han definido su alcance y aplicación contrastando el citado principio con el de legalidad, el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa.

El TEAC resuelve en recurso extraordinario de alzada para la unificación de criterio que si concurre un defecto formal causante de indefensión, el órgano económico administrativo regional debe acordar la retroacción y abstenerse de pronunciarse sobre las cuestiones de fondo. Y si se pronuncia sobre el fondo en sentido favorable a las pretensiones del recurrente, debe preservarse este criterio en aras de evitar la reformatio in peius. Asimismo, el TEAC estima que no procede descontar ni minorar los gastos asociados a los ingresos de la actividad económica de la deudora principal a efectos de determinar el alcance de la responsabilidad del artículo 42.2.a) LGT.

The paper is a continuation of the previous analyses of penal policy pursued by Polish courts. The directions and shape of penal policy are the resultant of many different elements. Analysed in the present paper is the impact on that policy of changes in: penal law; detected crime; and some characteristics of the population of convicted persons. The 1980s abounded in far-reaching changes of penal legislation. In the years 1980-1981, the tremendous “Solidarity” movement failed to bring about a penal law reform despite the fact that its representatives started intensive work toward that aim, preparing and stimulating others to prepare drafts of such reform. The imposition of martial law secured continued power to the communists; its social costs, however, were extremely high. An item on the bill society were forced to pay was the inclusion into penal law of many elements typical of the law of war which aggravated criminal responsibility. Thus (1) the competence of military courts was extended to various categories of civilians; (2) the application of special modes of procedure was introduced or extended, including the single-instance summary proceedings; (3) many statutory penalties were aggravated; (4) many different categories of acts were penalized which had not been punishable before, including in particular pursuit of trade union activities and organization of strikes and protests; (5) internment was introduced as an administrative form of preventive deprivation of liberty. The abrogation of martial law resulted in removal of most but not all of the above aggravations. A new tide of severe provisions came with the acts of May 1985 which in fact created a new “martial law” in penal law. It consisted in: (1) extension of applicability of the existing and introduction of new “simplified” modes of procedure which involved limitation of the defendant’s right to defence; (2) aggravation of the statutory penalties for many acts; (3) vast extension of the application of additional penalties; (4) limitation of the applicability of suspended sentences; (5) exclusion of conditional release of multiple recidivists; (6) extension of the conditions of withdrawal of parole. Therefore, penal policy was shifted twice towards aggravation in the 1980s, the first such shift was made in 1982 and continued with reduced force throughout 1983, and the second one taking place in the years 1985‒1988. Departure from the over-punitive penal law of People’s Republic of Poland started in 1989 with the emergence of the new political order which created the initial conditions for the building of the Third Republic. In 1989, just the first steps were made, followed by few farther in the years 1990‒1991, towards changing the contens of penal law and reforming the most glaring effects of its abuse. Such steps met with immense difficulties. The attachment to former penal law proved strong: to penal law with indefinite statutory features of situences, with severe penalties which could be accumulated and imposed in the conditions of far-reaching limitation of the right to defence or even by default. According to an opinion often expressed in official statements, penal policy was to be determined first and foremost by the state of crime. The extent and trends of crime in general and of the separate offences were to “force” the authorities accordingly to shape penal policy. The incessantly growing threat to public order and citizens’ safety, and to social property in particular, was to justify the need for aggravated and accumulated penalties. Also penal lawyers who noticed the direct relationship between crime and punishment tended ‒ and still tend today for that matter ‒ to suppose that an identical relationship can be found between crime as a mass phenomenon and punishment as a proces of distribution of condemnations through the imposition of penalties by courts. Yet whatever the relations between punishment ‒ its severity in particular ‒ and crime, they are in fact very weak indeed. This is shown by facts: crime comparable as to extent and gravity meets with most different punishment in different countries. A growth in crime sometimes leaves penal policy unchanged, and at other times results in its aggravation or mitigation; similar are the effects of a decrease in crime. Poland is a good example here: in the 1970s, detected crime was on the decrease but penal policy gained in strictness; in the 1980s, crime went up and the aggravation of penal policy continued. In the first of those decades, the decrease in crime was said to have resulted from the particular shape of penal policy pursued then; in the next one, the need forstrict penal policy was argued to follow from the growth in crime. Never mentioned, instead, was a trend of crime which would actually justify a mitigation of penal policy. As we know, the extent and also largely the structure of detected crime, that is of crime recorded by the police, is the resultant of many different organizational, legal, and often also political factors. The real extent and structure of crime can hardly be seen through that screen, and its picture is often distorted. In the former “socialist” states, the extent of crime was a political issue: generally speaking, it shaped the way the authorities expected it to shape. During the 1970s and even in 1980, the number of detected offences ‒ those confirmed in preparatory proceedings ‒ was 320‒350 thousand a year. Starting from 1981, it went up rapidly to 540 thousand in 1984. For the next few years, it was falsely kept at a similar or even somewhat lower level which was to manifest the effectiveness of the drastic statutes of May 1985. Early in the 1990s, the situation was changed radically: the extent of detected crime was no longer perceived as a political issue regulated as the authorities requested. In the years 1990‒1992, the number of detected offences became stabilized at 860‒880 thousand a year. It is believed to have actually gone up, and it no doubt did go up in the economy-related spheres: the real number of offences against foreign currency and customs regulations, tax offences, frauds, embezzlements etc. was indeed greater. III. The above-mentioned growth in the number of detected offences was hardly reflected in the numer of persons found guilty in criminal proceedings. There were about 200 thousand such persons a year, and the numer only went down in years when amnesty laws were passed. Penal legislation provides for different penalties for the separate offences. Therefore, in order to appraise the enhanced or reduced severity of penal policy, it is important to investigate any possible changes in the proportions of those offences throughout the 1980s. In the years 1980‒1991, convictions for crimes (where the statutory penalty is deprivation of liberty for at least 3 years) regularly amounted to 3‒4%, and those for the more serious offences (statutory pelalty of at least 1 or 2 years imprisonment) – to 19‒31%. In the early half of the 1980s, there was a shift towalds a greater proportion of convictions for the less serious offences. The opposite trend could be noticed in the latter half of the decade. Generally speaking, the bulk of convicted persons were guilty of less and less serious offences during the discussed decade, the proportion of convictions for serious crimes remaining rather stable in that period. This trend could be noticed under the statutes of May 1985 which shows how unrelated they were to the real situation in the sphere of crime, and how much they depended on other factors such as e.g. the ruling elites’ desire to have their revenge on society for the events of 1980-1981. The situation changed in the years 1989‒1991 when the proportion of persons convicted for the more serious offences started to go up rapidly. This sole element considered – that is, the structure of crime – were penal policy stable throughout the years l980‒1988, there should have been more and more sentences to penalties not involving deprivation of liberty, and the length of inprisonment should have been reduced. In the years 1989‒1991, instead, a greater number of longer immediate prison sentences could be expected. The most severe, of all penalties provided for by Polish law is capitol puishment. In the years 1981‒1982, there were 3‒4 valid sentences to that pe- nalty a year, the number going up to a dozen or so in the years 1984‒1986. The common courts imposed death penalty for homicide only. Since 1988, not a single valid sentence to death has been imposed by those courts (though it was imposed by invalid sentences in isolated cases). This de facts abolition can be hoped to persist, especially as the new draft penal code does not provide for capital punishment. The death penalty has first of all a symbolic sense; it is difficult to say why the authorities insisted on rejecting all the postulates for its abolition. Instead, the basic instrument that determines the punitiveness of the Polish penal system is unconditional deprivation of liberty. Penal policy of the 1970s had few good points; one of them was a limitation of the use of that penalty, noticeable at the end of the decade. This trend was further intensified in 1981 when 19% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. Under martial law and in the period of its suspension, there was a slight shift away from that policy (2l‒22%). It was finally abandoned in the years 1984‒1986: in 1986, 30% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate inprisonment. In 1988, the policy-makers came back to their senses, and re-orientation of penal policy was started: sentenced to immediate imprisonment were 21% of those found guilty. This proportion went further down to 18% in 1989, but then proceeded to rise again in the years 1990‒1991 (19‒20%). The above-mentioned change in the structure of crime in those years considered, this fact cannot possibly be seen as evidencing the aggravation of penal policy. The imposition of unconditional deprivation of liberty evolved in a way that is worth mentioning here. In the latter half of the 1970s, the number of sentences to that penalty became stabilized at 190-200 per 100 thousand of adults, a great improvement compared to the early half of that decade (228‒273 per 100 thousand of adults). In the 1980s, the number of unconditional prison sentences went further down to about 150 per 100 thousand of adults, barring the period of validity of the acts of May 1985 when it again exceeded 200. Thus on the whole, the range of imposition of immediate impressonment was further reduced – a most satisfactory development. As regards the length of that penalty, that is the term to be spent in prison, there has been little improvement. Prison terms of under 1 year, considered short in Poland, still constitute a mere 8‒13% of all sentences to unconditional deprivation of liberty. Thus nearly 180 persons per 100 thousand of adults in the years of validity of the statuts of May 1985, and about 130-140 in the other years were sentenced to prison terms of at least one year, the number only going down to somewhat less than 100 in the years when amnesty laws were passed. Instead, the incidence of sentences to long prison terms of at least 3 years remained relatively stable: sentenced to that penalty were 30‒40 persons per 100 thousand of adults. The length of sentences can also be considered from a different angle, i.e. that of the average length of the discussed penalty. In the years 1980‒1991 the average length of unconditional prison term was practically unchanged and amounted to 24‒25 months (barring the year 1985 when it nearly reached 27 months). Therefore, the following trend emerped: the imposition of immediate imprisonment is gradually limited but its average length remains at a practically unchanged level. It is an extremely high level at that, the fact considered that the bulk of offences for which the Polish offenders were convicted involved the lower statutory penalty of 6 months deprivation of liberty at most. Of the greatest importance among the reactions to an offence which do not involve deprivation of liberty in Poland is the penalty of conditional deprivation of liberty. Its incidence went up rapidly under martial law (from 29% in 1980 to 37% in 1982) and remained at a high level for the next few years. It is only recently that the proportion of such sentences has been reduced to its original level. There is a great variety of shapes this particular penalty can assume: it can be combined with fine, supervision, and various duties imposed on the person sentenced to that penalty, and also with additional penalties and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose. In the years 1980‒1984, it was very often combined with fine (7l‒78% of cases). This proportion went down in the next years (to 55‒60%) which was however accompanied by an unusual growth in the imposition of additional penalties, such as in particular confiscation of property and forfeiture of things, and also of payment to the injured personor for a public purpose. In the years 1989‒1991, that is after abrogation of the states of May 1985, the proportion of cases where fine was imposed together with conditional deprivation of liberty again went up to two thirds of all cases of imposition of that penalty. (The amount of fines will be discussed further on). The penalty of limitation of liberty, introduced by tle 1969 penal code, had some problems fighting its way into the practice of criminal justice. In the latter half of the 1970s, though, its proportion among the bulk of penal measures became stabilized at 12‒14%. The same trend could be noticed in the years 1980‒1981. The aggravation of criminal responsibility under martial law resulted in reduction of sentences to that penalty (to as low a level as 7% in 1984). Instead, the next aggravation introduced by the statutes of May 1985 led to a growth in both the number and proportion of sentences to limitation of liberty. Surprising as it may seem at first sight this development can be explained by the fact that by force of the provisions adopted in 1985, that penalty could be imposed in proceedings by penal order, i.e. in the absence of the defendant. His objection to the decision admittedly rendered the order invalid, but he was not protected by the ban on reformatio in peius. In the years 1989–1991 the proportion of limitation of liberty in the bulk of penal measures imposed went down to the extent of rendering that penalty unimportant. In 1989, it was imposed on 7.4% of those found guilty; in 1990 – on 3.5%; and in l991 – on a mere 2.7%. In the 1990s, the relative incidence of imposition of the separate forms of that penalty started to change rapidly. Deduction from the remmeration for work was imposed on 53% of persons sentenced to limitation of liberty in 1989, on 38% in 1990, and on 21% in 1991. Unpaid supervised work came to the foreground (34, 56, and 78% respectively) while referral of the convicted person to work practically disappeared (l3, 6 and, 1% respectively). Fine as a self-standing penalty has never been extensively imposed in Poland as opposed to the situation in many other penal systems, the West European ones in particular. Late in ten 1970s, the proportion of fines became stabilized at 11–13% and remained unchanged throughout the early half of the 1980s. It then proceeded to go up a little in the years 1986–1988 (15–16%), and stopped at 13–15% in the years 1989–1991. The proportion of fines can be expected to grow in the future, mainly at the sacrifice of conditional deprivation of liberty combined with fine. As important as the length of a prison term is the amount of a fine imposed. The repressiveness of fines can be appraised through reference to the average monthly wages in socialized economy. Compared to them, the average fines under the 1969 code evolved significantly. The use of fines was intensified in two parallel ways. First, their imposition together with deprivation of liberty grew more and more frequent (up to 69% of all persons sentenced to a prison term in 1980). Second, the amount of fine was raised (to 2.5 times the monthly wages in 1980). Important changes in this respect took place in the 1980s. In the early half of the decade, the accumulation of fines with deprivation of liberty was further extended (to 75% of prison terms in 1984). On the other hand, the relative amount of fines went down (to about 1,5 times the monthly wages in socialized economy). This situation changed radically with the introduction of the statues of May 1985 which involved a drastic raise in the amount of fines (in the years 1986–1987, to about 4 times the average monthly wages in the case of fines as additional penalties combined with deprivation of liberty, and to 2.5 times – in the case of self-standing fines). A next far-reaching change took place in the years 1989–1991. The relative amount of fine went down to about 0.5 time the monthly wages – a considerable reduction of repressiveness, even the general impoverishment of society considered. One of the penal measures introduced by the 1969 penal code is conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings. It can be applied to first offenders guilty of the less serious acts whose guilt is self-evident. The measure was appllied by the public prosecutor in nearly 90% of cases, and by the court in about l0% of cases only. Like unconditional deprivation of liberty, conditional discontinuance of proceedings can be seen as a specific gauge of aggravation or mitigation of penal policy. With growing severity of that policy, the proportion of persons sentenced to unconditional prison terms goes up, and that of conditionally discontinued proceedings goes down. Is penal policy mitigated, the above proportions are reversed. In the years 1981, 1988, and 1989–1991, proceedings were conditionally discontinued in 24–30% of cases where the suspect was found guilty. Under the special martial law legislation, the proportion was 19–20%, and under the acts of May 1985 – 16–19%. The remaining penal measures, that is additional penalty imposed as the main one, application of educational or corrective measures to persons aged 17 and guilty of misdemeanours, and renouncement of carrying out of the sentence, were used extremely seldom in spite of the considerable possibility of their application (the first two in particular). In the days when those in charge of criminal justice aimed at aggravation of responsibility, there was little room for its mitigation with the use of such measures. The years l980–1988 were characterized first and foremost by a tendency to aggravate penalties. After a short break in 1981, that tendency continued until 1989 when the first changes coul be noticed. In both cases, the period of reorientation of penal policy was too short to yield any farther-reaching changes. In the structure of penal measures, the aggravation of responsibility was expressed mainly in the growing proportion of sentendes to immediate imprisonment and the limited use of conditional discontinuance of proceedings and limitation of liberty when no special procedural provisions incited the use of those measures. The penal policy pursued in the years 1989-1991 was deeply rooted in the practices of people’s Republic of Poland; to be more exact, the trends of that period still today if in a mitigated form. The 1989–1991 mitigation took place on different planes: the legal one, through removal of the specially punitive and glaringly unjust provisions, on the plane of application of law through many small mitigations of penalties which add to a significant whole, and also through a radical reform of prison policy. But the actual mitigation does not go beyond the achievements of “Solidarity” of 1981. As a result, too many and too long sentences of immediate imprisonment are still imposed, and penal measures (imprisonment and fine in particular) are too often accumulated. Briefly speaking, Poland still has the style of punishming shaped after the penal code in force and its interpretation made in the 1970s. A radical abolition of this style and mitigatin of penalties still remains to be done, although the first steps have already been made by now (the virtual abolition of the death penalty and reduction of the amount of fines).

O Direito Brasileiro tem como princípio a proibição de uma instância julgadora recursal prejudicar, de algum modo, a situação do recorrente, quando só este interpõe recurso contra uma decisão judicial. Tal vedação, conhecida como princípio da non reformatio in pejus, é aplicada, por previsão legal, ao processo penal e, por interpretação sistemática, ao processo civil. O processo administrativo, objeto de análise do presente trabalho, por muito tempo foi considerado carente de legislação específica. Por tal motivo, é corriqueira a utilização de disciplina e princípios de outros ramos do direito processual a esta espécie de procedimento. Ocorre que, em 29 de janeiro de 1999, foi publicada a Lei nº 9.784, a qual passou a regular o processo administrativo no âmbito da Administração Pública Federal. Com a nova disciplina legal, tornou-se razoável a defesa da autonomia do Direito Processual Administrativo, o qual passou a ter seus próprios fundamentos. Inovando na legislação brasileira, a aludida lei previu a possibilidade de reformatio in pejus no processo administrativo, disposição esta cujos fundamentos pretender-se-á estudar. Sabe-se que não será tarefa simples entender o porquê da possibilidade de reforma prejudicial ao recorrente neste tipo de procedimento. Objetiva-se traçar as peculiaridades do processo administrativo e suas espécies, para encontrar os fundamentos, as condições e os limites da reformatio in pejus. Tem-se, ainda, como objetivo deste trabalho a análise do procedimento necessário para a implementação da reformatio in pejus, bem como o desenvolvimento do estudo acerca da possibilidade de desistência do recurso, nos casos em que se vislumbrar a aplicação deste tipo de reforma. O aprofundamento de tema tão tormentoso resultou em um estudo que pretende ser útil aos operadores do direito administrativo.

O texto remete a um breve histórico da remessa necessária, apontando as diversasnormas que a prevê no nosso ordenamento jurídico, além do art. 475 do Código de ProcessoCivil, com uma abordagem das suas principais características e natureza jurídica, desaguandona velha polêmica estabelecida em torno do princípio da “non reformatio in pejus”, no quedefende o autor a impossibilidade de agravamento da situação do ente público em sede deremessa necessária, especialmente por força do princípio da adstrição ou da congruência(arts. 128 e 460 do CPC), sempre evidenciando o entendimento expressado no âmbito dadoutrina e da jurisprudência.

A revisão da decisão, em sede de recurso administrativo, tem gerado alguns sérios questionamentos, dentre eles, pode-se mencionar a temática da reforma para pior da situação jurídica do recorrente. Assim sendo, esse breve estudo questiona a viabilidade da reforma para pior e quais os seus limites, bem como é salientada a importância dos princípios do regime jurídico-administrativo para melhor compreensão do sentido e alcance da aplicação do art. 64 da Lei Geral do Processo Administrativo Federal (LGPAF).

SUMARIO.- I. LA INICIATIVA. II. RASGOS GENERALES DE LOS PROYECTOS. A) Cuestiones sistemáticas y competenciales. B) El contenido de los proyectos. 1. La óptica dominante: la mejora del funcionamiento interno de la Administración. 2. Escaso alcance innovador. 3. Preocupación abrumadora por la Administración electrónica. III. LAS INNOVACIONES. A) Errores, ambigüedades, incertidumbres. B) Reformas desafortunadas. 1. Régimen de identificación de los ciudadanos. 2. Deber de conocer el código de identificación. 3. Plazos fijados en horas. 4. Deber de comunicación electrónica. 5. Poderes y comparecencias electrónicas. 6. Supuestos generales de producción de silencio negativo. 7. Obligaciones de colaboración de los ciudadanos. 8. Mutación del instituto de las actuaciones previas. 9. Generalización del sistema de clemencia. III. LAS DEFICIENCIAS NO CORREGIDAS. A) Las reformas cruciales nunca abordadas. 1. La precisión del régimen de la caducidad de los procedimientos iniciados de oficio. 2. El eterno problema de las “notificaciones del mes de agosto”. 3. El engañoso efecto liberalizador de las declaraciones responsables y de las actividades comunicadas. 4. El problema de los actos dictados en ejecución de reglamentos anulados. 5. El inmovilismo del sistema de recursos. 6. La asignatura pendiente de la confidencialidad. B) Otras cuestiones de menor entidad. 1. Las relaciones de procedimientos. 2. Los tratamientos desigualitarios. 3. La interdicción de la reformatio in pejus. 4. La prohibición de abstención. IV. CONCLUSIÓN.

Abstract The performance of appeal systems has been frequently been conditioned by the availability of human and financial resources. Scholars have suggested measures for reducing the financial and administrative burden of appeal tribunals; however, such proposals must be assessed considering their impact on the primigenial objectives pursued by these systems, particularly their capacity to reduce the harm produced by judicial errors. This study assesses diverse options for reducing caseload burdens in an administrative appeal system, including abandoning the prohibition of the Reformatio in Peius (RIP) principle, elevating fees for appealing and introducing subsidies and penalties to defendants. The results show that increasing appeal fees may allow a similar effect on the reduction of caseload burden as abandoning no RIP but at a lower cost in terms of noncorrected errors. The results are robust to different assumptions regarding the informational signals sent by defendants to tribunals during the administrative process.