Academic literature on the topic 'Reformed epistemology'

This thesis examines Reformed epistemology as it finds expression in the writings of Abraham Kuyper, Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga. It seeks to develop three main themes of this kind of approach in order to see whether they constitute an adequate foundation for a coherent account of faith and to examine their significance for educational theory. The themes studied are: belief in God may be properly basic in a rational noetic structure; divine revelation can be selfauthenticating; and sin has noetic effects. Discussion of the third of these is focused upon rational autonomy and, in particular, upon the form it takes in the pancritical rationalism of W. W. Bartley. The position developed is a moderate form of foundationalism which seeks to ground belief in God in an immediate awareness of him speaking through the propositions of scripture. It opposes an ideal of theonomous response to divine revelation to that of unlimited rational autonomy. The study of educational issues commences with an examination of the relationship between a Reformed Christian worldview and educational (or other) theory construction and argues for the transformation from within of the areas of knowledge through the introduction into them of Christian presuppositions. In accordance with this strategy for the integration of faith and learning, a study is made of the implications of the Reformed critique of autonomy for educational aims and methods and for discussions of the issue of indoctrination. The final issue dealt with is that of whether or not it is right or necessary to set up separate schools of Reformed Christian and other outlooks in our contemporary pluralist society. The conclusion reached is that there is a place for good Reformed Christian schools but nevertheless the Reformed Christian teacher may, in good conscience, teach in a state school.

Recent scholarship has increasingly recognized the unity of Herman Bavinck's (1854-1921) thought, shedding the once-predominant reading that Bavinck was a conflicted thinker caught between modernity and orthodoxy. There were 'two Bavincks', the secondary literature claimed. The catalyst of unity for Bavinck's thinking is located in his deployment of organic language to characterize particular theological loci. The organic motif stems from Bavinck's Trinitarian doctrine of God, according to which God exists as the archetypal and self-existent Three-in-One. Creation, then, is an ectypal reflection of the triune Godhead, and as such can be described as an organism comprising of many unities-in-diversities. This new reading, propelled by James Eglinton, argued that for Bavinck the Trinity ad intra leads to an organic cosmology ad extra. Though this reading has showcased the unity of Bavinck's thought in general, current scholarship on Bavinck's theological epistemology remains fractured along the lines of the 'two Bavinck' thesis, with two sides that emphasize, respectively, the modern strand of Bavinck's thinking or his classical, orthodox, side. This thesis reinvestigates the primary texts in which Bavinck discusses epistemology and argues that the organic motif is also the lens through which his epistemology is to be read. In doing so, this thesis argues that the organic motif allowed Bavinck to utilize both classical (Thomistic) and post-Kantian sources in a way that produces coherence rather than inconsistency. Thus, it is unnecessary to pit Bavinck's use of classical sources against his use of modern sources: particular deployment is not systematic endorsement. The thesis, then, is that a Trinitarian doctrine of God ad intra produces not merely an organic cosmology ad extra, but also an organic epistemology. It then proceeds to demonstrate this in two ways. First, the thesis observes that Bavinck characterizes the sciences (wetenschappen) as a single organism made up of a unity-in-diversity. The specialization and divisions of the sciences mean that each field has its own sphere of existence with unique grounds and methodologies, but there is an underlying theological unity between them that relativizes that diversity precisely because all of the sciences are theological. Second, for Bavinck subjective knowledge can organically correspond with objects because both participate in a larger, organic universe. Mental representations connect with the world because all of creation is primordially interconnected by way of God's organic design. In each of these steps Bavinck's eclectic use of sources and overall creativity and unity are displayed. This thesis also relates his discussion both to his interlocutors and contemporary philosophical and analytic epistemology. Hence, this thesis not only demonstrates the overall coherence of Bavinck's thought, thereby further eradicating ill-conceived notions of there being 'two-Bavincks', but also showcases potentially generative insights concerning the place of theology within the university and the resources theology might provide for philosophical epistemology.

Recent literature in religious epistemology has overlooked a significant debate in mainstream epistemology. In short, theories in religious epistemology have failed to consider the value problem. This essay, then, hopes to rectify this omission by arguing that one of the most influential accounts of religious epistemology - reformed epistemology - fails to adequately account for the value of knowledge. I argue, however, that a reasonable way out for the reformed epistemologist comes by way of endorsing the achievement thesis. The achievement thesis, put simply, states that knowledge is valuable because it is a cognitive achievement - unlike, for example, mere true belief. The central question of this essay, then, is this: Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? In order to better answer this question I highlight two different ways in which one can understand the nature of cognitive achievements. First, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is always primarily creditable to the agent. Or, second, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is jointly creditable to the agent. Both, I argue, are compatible with knowledge and the achievement thesis. Whether knowledge of God is primarily or jointly creditable, however, will depend on the way in which one understands the role the agent plays in the belief forming process. Given the nature of reformed epistemology, I argue that knowledge of God is the kind of achievement that is jointly creditable. Further, and central to the argument, I argue that the reformed epistemologist is in a good position to meet the requirements for the strong achievement thesis. The strong achievement thesis argues that an achievement should be understood in terms of overcoming some obstacle whereby the agent's belief is the result of some ability that can be credited to the agent. The account I propose not only meets the requirements of the strong achievement thesis, but also retains a distinctive feature of reformed epistemology - namely, that the belief in God can be said to overcome the obstacle of cognitive malfunction that, as the reformed epistemologist argues, is brought about by sin. It's an achievement becasue it overcomes an excessively hostile environment (what I call the maxi-environment) that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. In the end, it is possible to provide an account of reformed epistemology where the value of knowledge (over and above mere true belief) is adequately demonstrated.