Books on the topic 'Republican Party (Ala.)'

Millions of paintings were produced in the Dutch Republic. The works that we know and see in museums today constitute only the tip of the iceberg — the top-quality part. But what else was painted? This book explores the low-quality end of the seventeenth-century art market and outlines the significance of that production in the genre of history paintings, which in traditional art historical studies, is usually linked to high prices, famous painters, and elite buyers. Angela Jager analyses the producers, suppliers, and consumers active in this segment to gain insight into this enormous market for cheap history paintings. What did the supply consist of in terms of quantity, quality, price, and subject? Who produced all these works and which production methods did these painters employ? Who distributed these paintings, to whom, and which strategies were used to market them? Who bought these paintings, and why?

This introductory chapter introduces key figures across a spectrum of black Republican politics and examines their ongoing struggles to effect meaningful change both for African Americans and within the Republican Party over the course of nearly half a century. It illustrates the ways in which black Republicans were conservative and not conservative, and how their ideas overlapped and clashed with even the most reactionary wing of the Republican Party. In no uncertain terms, black Republicans offer a dilemma of sorts; they were far more conservative than their Democratic counterparts but far less conservative than white reactionary Republicans. Above all else, most held fast to a pragmatic ideology that was informed by their day-to-day racial experience rather than by an abstract, dogmatic interpretation of American politics.

This chapter talks about how Richard Nixon's classist appeals for minority enterprise mirrored a theme central to black Republican thought and action. As previously seen, African American party members consistently proposed variations on a single core agenda, wedding liberal appeals for racial equality with a belief in traditional Republican principles. In particular, they had long called for the creation and implementation of a movement for economic civil rights, as an alternative means of reaching full equality. A June 1968 article in Time highlighted the prominent position of this centerpiece of black Republican thought, noting that all three Republican presidential primary candidates had incorporated the concept into their campaign rhetoric. The chapter shows how even as prominent white politicians echoed black Republicans' ideas, blacks themselves were divided about those same politicians.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) required that each state set up a health insurance exchange or lose control to the federal government. Because Republicans had supported the concept before it became part of Obamacare, virtually every state was expected to cooperate and implement this core part of the law. However, 34 states refused to participate. This is a stunning miscalculation by the Obama administration. This book tells the story of what happened in the final two states to choose state control and the two that came the closest. The most intense split was not between Republicans and Democrats, but within the Republican Party. Governors were the most important people in the fight over exchanges, but did not always get their way. The Tea Party defeated the most powerful interest groups. State-level and national conservative think tanks were important allies to the Tea Party. The relative power of these groups was shaped by differences in institutional design and procedures, such as whether a state has term limits and the length of legislative sessions. Opposition was more easily overcome in states whose conditions facilitated the development of legislative “pockets of expertise.” This is a dramatic example of opponents using federalism to block national reform and serves as a warning of the challenge of inducing state cooperation in other policy domains such as the environment and education. Understanding the state-level fights over the ACA’s implementation is crucial to understanding the impact of future reforms.

This chapter reviews the political science literature on polarization, showing that polarization in American politics long precedes the internet and results primarily from asymmetric political-elite-driven dynamics. This chapter first considers the polarization of political elites and the public before discussing how social identity begets party affiliation that helps explain why polarization can take on such deeply affective negative responses to partisans of the other party. The chapter shows that party elites, in particular elected representatives, have experienced significant party polarization in the sense that liberals and conservatives have mostly sorted themselves into Democrats and Republicans, respectively, and that the most visible component of this move was the realignment of Southern Democrats to the Republican Party. The broader population, if it has polarized at all, has polarized affectively—in the way it feels about the other party—rather than ideologically, or the practical policy preferences it holds.

Rome’s building industry shows unprecedented and sustained energy starting in the early third century. The structures of labor that supported this building boom are detailed here using literary and epigraphic evidence. The collapse of forms of dependent labor by ca. 300 BCE coincided with the rise of an urban labor supply characterized by slave- and free-wage labor. We detect signs of significant demographic growth at Rome in this period, and much of this increase was owed to immigrating labor. On the one hand, an active slave market pushed labor to the capital; on the other hand, we see at Rome all the prerequisites for wage-labor, even without direct evidence for wages. It is argued that freely mobile workers formed some significant part of the expansion of the city’s labor supply. The epigraphic corpus relating to the city’s working population in this period also suggests a picture of urban workers of various personal statuses.

The year 1796 was marked by Napoleon Bonaparte's brilliant victories in North Italy. The French victories in Italy made possible the creation of the Cisalpine Republic in the Po valley. Milan immediately became, in 1796, a center to which patriots and revolutionaries congregated from all parts of Italy. Other Italian republics were soon set up on the model of the Cisalpine, and in fact, by the turn of 1797–1798, there was a general alarm at the prospect of a “Cisalpinization” of Europe. The Cisalpine Republic is best understood in a broad perspective. This chapter begins with a view of “world revolution” as seen in 1796 from Paris. It then turns to the French attitude to revolution in Italy, then shifts the point of observation to Italy itself, in an attempt to describe the sources of revolutionary agitation in that country from an Italian standpoint. The closing section presents an account of the Kingdom of Corsica.

Beginning with Barry Goldwater’s Operation Dixie in 1964, the Republican Party targeted disaffected white voters in the Democratic stronghold of the American South. To realign these voters with the GOP, the party capitalized on white racial angst that threatened southern white control. However—and this is critical—that decision was but one in a series of decisions the GOP made not just on race, but on feminism and religion as well, in what is called here the “Long Southern Strategy.” In the wake of Second-Wave Feminism, the GOP dropped the Equal Rights Amendment from its platform and promoted traditional gender roles in an effort to appeal to anti-feminist white southerners, and it politicized evangelical fundamentalist Christianity as represented by the Southern Baptist Convention. All three of those decisions were necessary for the South to turn from blue to red. To make inroads in the South, however, GOP politicians not only had to take these positions, but they also had to sell them with a southern “accent.” Republicans had to mirror southern white culture by emphasizing an “us vs. them” outlook, preaching absolutes, accusing the media of bias, prioritizing identity over the economy, depicting one’s way of life as under attack, encouraging defensiveness toward social changes, and championing a politics of vengeance. Over time, that made the party southern, not in terms of place, but in its vision, in its demands, in its rhetoric, and in its spirit. In doing so, it nationalized southern white identity, and that has changed American politics.

This chapter examines how Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy were brought together by a common vision to end slavery. Lincoln, a Springfield lawyer, and Lovejoy, a Princeton pastor, met for the first time at the Springfield State Fair in Illinois on October 4, 1854. At that time, both Lincoln and Lovejoy were angered by the Kansas–Nebraska Act championed by Illinois Democratic senator Stephen A. Douglas. Lincoln wanted the Whigs and Lovejoy wanted the Republican Party to lead the “fusion” movement uniting all those opposed to Douglas's law and advocating the restoration of the Missouri Compromise. In a speech, Lincoln declared, “This...real zeal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but hate.” Lovejoy, one of those in attendance, identified with Lincoln's emotion and conviction, as his brother, Elijah, was murdered by a pro-slavery mob. This chapter first discusses the beginning of the Republican Party in Illinois before turning to his and Lincoln's election to the Illinois House of Representatives on November 7, 1854.

Today all would agree that Mexico and the United States have never been closer--that the fates of the two republics are inextricably intertwined. It has become an intimate part of life in almost every community in the United States, through immigration, imported produce, business ties, or illegal drugs. It is less a neighbor than a sibling; no matter what our differences, it is intricately a part of our existence. In the fully updated second edition of Mexico: What Everyone Needs to Know®, Roderic Ai Camp gives readers the most essential information about our sister republic to the south. Camp organizes chapters around major themes--security and violence, economic development, foreign relations, the colonial heritage, and more. He asks questions that take us beyond the headlines: Why does Mexico have so much drug violence? What was the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement? How democratic is Mexico? Who were Benito Juárez and Pancho Villa? What is the PRI (the Institutional Revolutionary Party)? The answers are sometimes surprising. Despite ratification of NAFTA, for example, Mexico has fallen behind Brazil and Chile in economic growth and rates of poverty. Camp explains that lack of labor flexibility, along with low levels of transparency and high levels of corruption, make Mexico less competitive than some other Latin American countries. The drug trade, of course, enhances corruption and feeds on poverty; approximately 450,000 Mexicans now work in this sector. Brisk, clear, and informed, Mexico: What Everyone Needs To Know® offers a valuable primer for anyone interested in the past, present, and future of our neighbor to the South.

With Franklin Roosevelt in the White House, the Democratic Party gained a firm grip on the American electorate. This finding is based on an examination of close to 200 polls that probed party identifications, beginning in 1937; all but a few were conducted by the Gallup Organization, albeit without any resonance in the press or the halls of academe. In a manner of speaking, FDR made America safe for Democrats. At the same time, according to polls conducted in real time, key groups of the fabled New Deal coalition were less conspicuous than has been widely believed. In the big cities, in the working class, in union households, and among Jewish as well as black Americans, Republicans and Independents combined outnumbered Democrats. Other than among Americans on relief, the Democratic Party enjoyed overwhelming support in only two sizeable groups in real-time polls in the Roosevelt era. They happened to be the same groups that Democrats had been counting on long before the New Deal and the Depression: the white South and Catholics.

This publication includes the texts of the parish chronicles of the eurpoean north-east part of Russia in the 19th – early 20th centuries. The first issue includes the previously unpublished chronicles of the Poztykerosskaya Troitskaya, Pozhegodskaya (Pozhegskaya) Troitskaya and Palauzskaya Bogorodskaya churches of Ust'sysolskiy uezd of Vologodskaya guberniya (the territory of the modern Komi Republic), stored in the National Archives of the Komi Republic. The publication is addressed to historians, ethnographers, undergraduate and graduate students that studying history, local lore and to all those who interested in the history of the european north of Russia and the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 19th – early 20th centuries.

A Wolf in the City is a study of tyranny and of the tyrant’s soul in Plato’s Republic. It argues that Plato’s critique of tyranny is an intervention in an ancient debate concerning the sources of the crisis of Athenian democracy and the relation between political leaders and the demos in the last decades of the fifth century BCE. The book shows that Plato’s critique of tyranny should not be taken as a veiled critique of the Syracusan tyrannical regime but, rather, as an integral part of his critique of Athenian democracy. The book also offers an in-depth and detailed analysis of all three parts of the tyrant’s soul, and contends that this approach is necessary to both fully appraise the complex psychic dynamics taking place in the description of the tyrannical man and shed light on Plato’s moral psychology and its relation with his political theory.

This introductory chapter examines the political context in which Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Sarah Palin launched their bids for national office, paying attention to the civil rights and feminist movements of the past that has since shaped their 2008 campaigns for president. But all of this history—the centuries of the political exclusion of white women and African American women and men; the struggles and setbacks as they created places for themselves in civic life as citizens, voters, party leaders, and elected officials; shifting political values and the changing fortunes and identities of the Democratic and Republican parties—shaped the conduct and meaning of the 2008 election. Yet the chapter contends that their successes in 2008 were hardly simple American success stories—while these candidates were breaking barriers, they also were juggling the familiar tasks of a presidential bid.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the most significant health reform legislation enacted in generations. However, politics does not end after a bill is signed into law. This chapter outlines why states were given such a prominent role in the implementation of core elements of the ACA, including the health insurance exchanges. This sets the stage for the question of this book: given that state leaders say they want flexibility and that Republicans say they prefer market-oriented reforms, why did so many states reject state control over exchanges? I outline the four main insights from the case study chapters: (1) the importance of governors, (2) the power of the Tea Party, (3) the ways in which differences in institutional design and procedures shaped policy outcomes, and (4) the importance of leadership. I ask whether this episode supports or undermines the federalism notion of states as laboratories of learning.

This chapter examines Abraham Lincoln and Owen Lovejoy's commitment towards holding together the Union while restoring the Founding Fathers' ideology as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. It first considers the debate in the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War about who had the right to investigate whether Democratic generals were not sufficiently committed to the Union cause to engage the rebels in battle. It then discusses laws enacted in the Thirty-Seventh Congress with the aim of promoting the nation's welfare; Lovejoy's bill “to secure freedom to all persons within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government”; Lincoln's proposal for gradual emancipation in the four border states; and the growing friendship between Lincoln and Lovejoy. The chapter also analyzes the Second Confiscation Act; factions within the Republican Party in the House; Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation; and Lovejoy's reelection in 1862. Finally, it addresses the question of whether Lincoln was a radical.

While the eradication of smallpox has long been documented, not many know the Chinese roots of this historic achievement. This book examines the People's Republic of China's public health campaigns of the 1950s to explain just how China managed to inoculate almost six hundred million people against this and other deadly diseases. The book tells the story of the people, materials, and systems that built these campaigns, exposing how, by improving the nation's health, the Chinese Communist Party quickly asserted itself in the daily lives of all citizens. This crusade had deep roots in the Republic of China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, when researchers in China's southwest struggled to immunize as many people as possible, both in urban and rural areas. But its legacy was profound, providing a means for the state to develop new forms of control and of engagement. The book considers the implications of vaccination policies for national governance, from rural health care to Cold War-era programs of medical diplomacy. By embedding Chinese medical history within international currents, the book highlights how and why China became an exemplar of primary health care at a crucial moment in global health policy.

This book takes an in-depth look at German journalism from the late Weimar period through the postwar decades. Illuminating the roles played by journalists in the media metropolis of Hamburg, the book focuses on the lives and work of three remarkable individuals: Marion Countess Dönhoff, distinguished editor of Die Zeit; Paul Sethe, “the grand old man of West German journalism”; and Hans Zehrer, editor in chief of Die Welt. All born before 1914, Dönhoff, Sethe, and Zehrer witnessed the Weimar Republic's end and opposed Hitler. When the latter seized power in 1933, they were, like their fellow Germans, confronted with the difficult choice of entering exile, becoming part of the active resistance, or joining the Nazi Party. Instead, they followed a fourth path—“inner emigration”—psychologically distancing themselves from the regime, their writing falling into a gray zone between grudging collaboration and active resistance. During the war, Dönhoff and Sethe had links to the 1944 conspiracy to kill Hitler, while Zehrer remained out of sight on a North Sea island. In the decades after 1945, all three became major figures in the West German media. The book considers how these journalists and those who chose inner emigration interpreted Germany's horrific past and how they helped to morally and politically shape the reconstruction of the country. With fresh archival materials, the book sheds essential light on the influential position of the German media in the mid-twentieth century and raises questions about modern journalism that remain topical today.

Republicans and Democrats increasingly distrust, avoid, and wish harm upon those from the other party. To make matters worse, they also increasingly reside among like-minded others and are part of social groups that share their political beliefs. All of this can make expressing a dissenting political opinion hard. Yet digital and social media have given people new spaces for political discourse and community, and more control over who knows their political beliefs and who does not. With Democracy Lives in Darkness, Van Duyn looks at what these changes in the political and media landscape mean for democracy. She uncovers and follows a secret political organization in rural Texas over the entire Trump presidency. The group, which organized out of fear of their conservative community in 2016, has a confidentiality agreement, an email listserv and secret Facebook group, and meets in secret every month. By building relationships with members, she explores how and why they hide their beliefs and what this does for their own political behavior and for their community. Drawing on research from communication, political science, and sociology along with survey data on secret political expression, Van Duyn finds that polarization has led even average partisans to hide their political beliefs from others. And although intensifying polarization will likely make political secrecy more common, she argues that this secrecy is not just evidence that democracy is hurting, but that it is still alive, that people persist in the face of opposition, and that this matters if democracy is to survive.

The fifth volume in this six-volume collection of Otto Kirchheimer’s (1905–1965) works is entitled Politische Systeme im Nachkriegseuropa (Political Systems in post-war Europe) and contains 34 works by Kirchheimer, published between 1950 and 1967, on changes to political orders in modern industrial societies. Geographically, these studies focus not only on the Federal Republic of Germany but also on developments in other Western European democracies, the USA and the GDR. In these writings, Kirchheimer pays particular attention to changes in the party systems in these countries, the changing role of the parliamentary opposition, the calculated influence of associations and interest groups, the intensification of bureaucracy and the strengthening of the executive, and the political attitudes and expectations of citizens in modern democracies. In addition, this volume contains a comprehensive bibliography of all Kirchheimer’s published works plus a selection of his unpublished writings. This book will appeal to all those interested in politics, law, contemporary history and sociology.

Was the French Revolution the victory of an all-conquering bourgeoisie that made up the foundation of the nineteenth-century France of the ‘notables’? How far did the older elites of the ancien régime succeed in taking part in the political, social and cultural reordering of the first decades of the new century? This chapter examines the significance of these questions in relation to the construction and legitimation of elite power after the fall of Robespierre. Exploring both political and intellectual developments, it reveals the dynamics which account for the major rupture between the dominance of a republican elite under the Directory, and the foundations of the power of the Empire’s so-called ‘Granite masses’. Study of the various components of elite domination involves not merely scrutiny of the role played by the state, but also of changing attitudes towards the common people, against whom the evolving position of the elite was constructed.

Today’s ideological division on the U.S. Supreme Court is also a partisan division: all the Court’s liberals were appointed by Democratic presidents, all its conservatives by Republican presidents. That pattern never existed in the Court until 2010, and this book focuses on how it came about and why it’s likely to continue. Its explanation lies in the growing level of political polarization over the last several decades. One effect of polarization is that potential nominees will reflect the dominant ideology of the president’s political party. Correspondingly, the sharpened ideological division between the two political parties has given presidents stronger incentives to give high priority to ideological considerations. In addition to these well-known effects of polarization, The Company They Keep explores what social psychologists have taught us about people’s motivations. Justices take cues primarily from the people who are closest to them and whose approval they care most about: political, social, and professional elites. In an era of strong partisan polarization, elite social networks are largely bifurcated by partisan and ideological elites, and justices such as Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg live in milieus populated by like-minded elites that reinforce their liberalism or conservatism during their tenure on the Supreme Court. By highlighting and documenting this development, the book provides a new perspective on the Court and its justices.

The Laws is Plato’s second attempt to outline an ideal society. It does not, as often thought, introduce the rule of law as a rejection of the rule of virtue in the Republic. In the Laws the place of law in the development of virtue is rethought, and Plato tempers the importance of obedience to law with the need for citizens to understand their laws as structuring a virtuous way of life in which they actively participate. Plato now develops a fresh methodology for political thought, one which learns from the past, and recognizes the value in a good society of citizen participation, and of a number of modified Athenian political institutions, in which all citizens play a part, rather than most submitting to the expertise of a few. Less approachable than the Republic, the Laws is richer in political and ethical ideas and sets the project of an ideal society in a wider and richer context. One idea, namely that citizens should comprehend their laws as shaping a good way of life, is taken up and developed independently by Cicero and by Philo of Alexandria, who in different ways draw out some implications of the Laws.

Do bots have the capacity to influence the flow of political information over social media? This chapter answers this question through two methodological avenues: a) a qualitative analysis of how political bots were used to support United States presidential candidates and campaigns during the 2016 election, and b) a network analysis of bot influence on Twitter during the same event. Political bots are automated software programs that operate on social media, written to mimic real people in order to manipulate public opinion. The qualitative findings are based upon nine months of fieldwork on the campaign trail, including interviews with bot makers, digital campaign strategists, security consultants, campaign staff, and party officials. During the 2016 campaign, a bipartisan range of domestic and international political actors made use of political bots. The Republican Party, including both self-proclaimed members of the “alt-right” and mainstream members, made particular use of these digital political tools throughout the election. Meanwhile, public conversation from campaigners and government representatives is inconsistent about the political influence of bots. This chapter provides ethnographic evidence that bots affect information flows in two key ways: 1) by “manufacturing consensus,” or giving the illusion of significant online popularity in order to build real political support, and 2) by democratizing propaganda through enabling nearly anyone to amplify online interactions for partisan ends. We supplement these findings with a quantitative network analysis of the influence bots achieved within retweet networks of over 4 million tweets, collected during the 2016 US election. The results of this analysis confirm that bots reached positions of measurable influence during the 2016 US election.

This chapter sketches out a broad overview of economic panics and workers' responses to them in the United States from Jacksonian times to the Great Depression. Since the founding of the Republic, working men and women have been all too familiar with alternating periods of boom times and hard times, with seasonal unemployment, with marked differences in availability of jobs among various parts of the country, and with general depressions abruptly precipitated by overproduction of wares or by bank panics. Not all downturns struck with the same severity. The crisis of the early 1840s pitched nine state governments into default (primarily in the rapidly expanding cotton kingdom), while the depression that began in 1873 sent ten state governments into default over the ensuing eleven years. The sharp collapse between the spring of 1907 and the spring of 1908 so crippled the economy that for many months more immigrants left the United States for their homelands or other countries than disembarked here. The depressions of 1873–79, 1893–98, and 1929–40 set the stage for fundamental restructuring of industrial, agricultural, and political life.

Baseball spread beyond US borders, taking hold in the Caribbean and parts of the Pacific, but never attained the global influence that British sport achieved. A. G. Spalding’s efforts to export the game and, with it, “American” values, via his 1888–1889 circumnavigation of the world met with little success. Baseball could not dislodge British football, rugby, and cricket, which had already gained purchase abroad due to Britain’s larger global presence. In the Caribbean, where baseball became the dominant sport, Cuba, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and other countries made the game into their own national pastimes. Baseball there, open to players of all races and nations, modeled the democratic version of sport that would not exist in US pro leagues until integration after World War II. Since then, Major League Baseball has attracted ever-greater numbers of players from abroad, first from the Caribbean and more recently from Japan and Asia.

The Strangers in Our Midst tells the story of how American evangelicals have responded to refugees and immigrants—ranging from the Cuban refugee influx in the 1960s, to Southeast Asian refugees in the 1980s, to undocumented immigrants from Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. Evangelical Christians have been a pillar of US immigration and refugee policy since the end of World War II in two key ways: by acting as refugee sponsors and by offering legalization assistance to undocumented immigrants. They developed an elaborate evangelical theology of hospitality, which emphasized scriptural commands to “welcome the stranger.” Initially, evangelicals did not distinguish between legal immigrants and refugees and “illegal,” undocumented immigrants. However, a growing anti-immigrant consensus in American society at large and their political alignment with the Republican Party caused them to shed their welcoming approach to immigrants in the 1990s. Evangelicals were now divided in their stances on immigration, as conservative evangelicals viewed only legal immigrants as deserving of their aid, while progressive evangelicals—led by their Latinx coreligionists—emphasized the need for Christians to help all immigrants. In the twenty-first century, a group of Latinx evangelical leaders resurrected and reshaped the evangelical theology of hospitality in an effort to turn the tide in the evangelical debate on immigration. The results are mixed: unprecedented numbers of evangelicals favor a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Yet as the 2016 presidential election showed, this preference had no impact on their political choices.

Providing a comprehensive history of Italy from around 1800 to the present, Italy in the Modern World traces the social and cultural transformations that defined the lives of Italians during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The book focuses on how social relations (class, gender and race), science and the arts shaped the political processes of unification, state building, fascism and the postwar world. Split up into four parts covering the making of Italy, the liberal state, war and fascism, and the republic, the text draws on secondary literature and primary sources in order to synthesize current historiographical debates and provide primary documents for classroom use. There are individual chapters on key topics, such as unification, Italians in the world, Italy in the world, science and the arts, fascism, the World Wars, the Cold War, and Italy in the twenty-first century, as well as a wealth of useful features for students, including: * Comprehensive bibliographic essays covering each of the four parts. * 23 images and 12 maps Italy in the Modern World also firmly places both the nation and its people in a wider global context through a distinctly transnational approach. It is essential reading for all students of modern Italian history.

After ten years, we have before us a new study on the position of young people in Slovenia, Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020). The national study, which concerns itself with the young generation, specifically 15- to 29-year olds, is of paramount importance for the client (Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth), as well as for young people and society as a whole. With the aid of the Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020) study and the recommendations that researchers offered as part of the final report, the Office’s goal is primarily to formulate evidence-based public policies that have an impact on young people’s lives. These should create better conditions for young people’s transition to adulthood and give mature generations peace of mind, knowing that the young generation is empowered and well prepared to face all life circumstances. However, is this true? So what are young people like at this moment in time?

To an unappreciated degree, the history of Western philosophy is the history of attempts to understand why mathematics is applicable to Nature, despite apparently good reasons to believe that it should not be. A cursory look at the great books of philosophy bears this out. Plato's Republic invokes the theory of “participation” to explain why, for instance, geometry is applicable to ballistics and the practice of war, despite the Theory of Forms, which places mathematical entities in a different (higher) realm of being than that of empirical Nature. This argument is part of Plato's general claim that theoretical learning, in the end, is more useful than “practical” pursuits. John Stuart Mill's account of the applicability of mathematics to nature is unique: it is the only one of the major Western philosophies which denies the major premise upon which all other accounts are based. Mill simply asserts that mathematics itself is empirical, so there is no problem to begin with.

Virtually all Hong Kong Cantonese speakers know of 懶音 (“lazy pronunciation”), which refers to the colloquial pronunciation of Cantonese that differs from prescribed dictionary pronunciation. Speakers of the colloquial variety are essentialized as “lazy” and said to be responsible for “destroying Chinese culture.” These language ideologies about the aesthetics and cultural qualities of Cantonese are part of a process of differentiation associated with the renegotiation of local Hong Kong identity in the period of political change around the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997. Thus the standardization of Cantonese is at the center of social, cultural, and political negotiation with regard to community boundaries and identities. The changes in Hong Kong’s political sovereignty, from its position as a Chinese Qing dynasty–ruled rural island, to a British crown colony, and then to a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, make a unique and interesting study for language standardization processes and shifts in language ideologies.

The Occupy Wall Street protests popularized the notion that “We are the 99 percent” mobilized against the political and economic interests of “the top 1%.” Some protestors wore Guy Fawkes masks in honor of the anarchist hero V, from Alan Moore’s comic book V for Vendetta. The 2016 United States Presidential election saw further evidence of populist unrest, with Democratic Primary candidate Bernie Sanders and Republican Party nominee Donald J. Trump making the economic fears of the beleaguered working- and middle-classes centerpieces of their campaigns. Since populist movements play an increasingly important role in global politics, it is important to consider how the often dismissed and demonized members of the working-classes are represented in popular culture. This book is about how these individuals – and the class conflicts they face in their daily lives – are depicted in comic books and their high-profile film and television adaptations. The essays in this book examine the horror-westerns The Walking Dead and Preacher, and the superhero comics Daredevil, Luke Cage, Jessica Jones, Superman, The Fantastic Four, and Guardians of the Galaxy. Superpowered and non-superpowered comic book heroes provide a unique opportunity to reflect upon the emotionally charged issues surrounding “class” in a borderline safe space. The scholars who wrote these essays hope that, by discussing fictional working-class superheroes such as Spider-Man and Lois Lane in both an intellectual and entertaining manner, they will encourage more fruitful and enlightened ways of discussing vitally significant issues of wealth disparity and class identity in the real world.

Only the Clothes on Her Back tells the history of law and commerce in the United States between the Revolution and the Civil War through textiles and the legal principles associated with them. Those principles existed not in statutes or treatises, but in social and cultural practices, commonly known then, but now long forgotten, which made textiles—clothing, cloth, bedding, and accessories, such as shoes and hats—a unique form of property that people without rights could own and exchange. Textiles' value depended on law, which was what made them a secure form of property for marginalized people, who not only used these goods as currency, credit, and capital, but also as entre into the new republic's economy and governing institutions. Using original archival research, the first part of the book reconstructs the governing order in which textiles' legal principles flourished and follows the implications, recasting our understanding of production and exchange. The second part pieces together the rules that governed trade: trunks established ownership; witness testimony served instead of receipts; accounts were kept in diaries, if they were recorded at all. These practices might seem outside law, but they were not. The third part follows the legal downfall of textiles, showing how the practices associated with them became suspect as the federalism system elevated the possession of rights over other means of making property claims. By the mid—nineteenth century, textiles no longer had the legal power they once had, but most Americans had nothing to replace them.

Antonin Scalia and American Constitutionalism is a critical study of Justice Antonin Scalia’s jurisprudence, his work on the U.S. Supreme Court, and his significance for an understanding of American constitutionalism. After tracing Scalia’s emergence as a hero of the political right and his opposition to many of the decisions of the Warren Court, this book examines his general jurisprudential theory of originalism and textualism, arguing that he failed to produce either the objective method he claimed or the “correct” constitutional results he promised. Focusing on his judicial performance over his thirty years on the Court, the book examines his opinions on virtually all of the constitutional issues he addressed, from fundamentals of structure to most major constitutional provisions. The book argues that Scalia applied his jurisprudential theories in inconsistent ways and often ignored, twisted, or abandoned the interpretive methods he proclaimed, in most cases reaching results that were consistent with “conservative” politics and the ideology of the post-Reagan Republican Party. Most broadly, it argues that Scalia’s jurisprudence and career are particularly significant because they exemplify—contrary to his own persistent claims—three paramount characteristics of American constitutionalism: the inherent inadequacy of “originalism” and other formal interpretive methodologies to produce “correct” answers to controverted constitutional questions; the relationship—particularly close in Scalia’s case—between constitutional interpretations on one hand and substantive personal and political goals on the other; and the truly and unavoidably “living” nature of American constitutionalism itself. As a historical matter, the book concludes, Scalia stands as a towering figure of irony because his judicial career disproved the central claims of his own jurisprudence.

This book is a reconstruction of the way Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was read and used by English political and religious writers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The book is broad in approach, covering the reception of all of Grotius’ key works and a wide range of topics. It has much to say also about the search for peace in an age of religious conflict and about the cultural roots of the Enlightenment. Most of all, this book aims to deepen our understanding of the connections that made English political thought part of the history of European thought. To this end, it brings together a succinct account of Grotius’ own thinking on key topics; maps these accounts onto English debates, to show why his ideas were seen to be relevant at key moments; shows awareness of the possibilities for misappropriation inherent in reception; and adds something new to our understanding of why seventeenth-century Englishmen argued in the ways that they did. The subject the book covers is potentially of wide interest to historians of political thought, religion, and culture; to British and European historians; and to historians with an interest in international history, specifically the cultural and intellectual links between England and the Dutch Republic.

The period of about a year beginning late in 1797 was the high point of the whole decade, and indeed of all European history until 1848, in the matter of international agitation stirred up by the revolutionary-democratic movement. This chapter attempts to recapture this moment of excitement, and to offer an impression of the movement as a whole before following it again in separate countries. Events happened so swiftly, with so little central direction, and yet with so many immediate repercussions over hundreds and thousands of miles, that no plan of exposition can do justice to the reality, which is best seen, though elusively, in any number of chain reactions. For example, in March 1798 the French occupied the Swiss city of Bern and seized its famous “treasure” of some 6,000,000 livres in coin. The money was used to help finance Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, which in turn was directed in part against the British in India, where the Earl of Mornington was at war with Tipu Sultan who considered himself an ally of the French Republic.

This new edition provides a thorough reappraisal of one of the most remarkable and controversial sections of the Republic. Book 5's radical proposals for the ideal state include an argument for the essential equality of the sexes; provision for full female participation in the work of the Guardians (including warfare); the abolition of the family for this same ruling class, with a sexual as well as economic system of communism; and a policy of eugenic control. Plato feared that some of this material would arouse amusement in his readers; in fact, parts of Book 5 have been subsequently used to support a charge of totalitarianism against Plato, while other elements have led to description of him as the first feminist. Book 5 also examines the relation between knowledge and belief, and in doing so embarks on the great structure of metaphysical thought which forms the centrepiece of the entire work. All these topics receive fresh and detailed consideration in the introduction and commentary, which are designed to make this important work accessible to a wide range of readers. Greek text with translation, commentary and notes.

Coalitions among political parties govern most of Europe’s parliamentary democracies. Traditionally, the study of coalition politics has been focused on Western Europe. Coalition governance in Central Eastern Europe brings the study of the full coalition life-cycle to a region that has undergone tremendous political transformation, but which has not been studied from this perspective. The volume covers Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. It provides information and analyses of the cycle, from pre-electoral alliances to coalition formation and portfolio distribution, governing in coalitions, the stages that eventually lead to a government termination, and the electoral performance of coalition parties. In Central Eastern Europe, few single-party cabinets form and there have been only a few early elections. The evidence provided shows that coalition partners in the region write formal agreements (coalition agreements) to an extent that is similar to the patterns that we find in Western Europe, but also that they adhere less closely to these contracts. While the research on Western Europe tends to stress that coalition partners emphasize coalition compromise and mutual supervision, there is more evidence of ‘ministerial government’ by individual ministers and ministries. There are also a few coalition governance systems that are heavily dominated by the prime minister. No previous study has covered the full coalition life-cycle in all of the ten countries with as much detail. Systematic information is presented in 10 figures and in more than one hundred tables.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy provides, twice each year, a collection of the best current work in the field of ancient philosophy. Each volume features original essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, from the beginnings to the threshold of the middle ages. From its first volume in 1983, OSAP has been a highly influential venue for work in the field, and has often featured essays of substantial length as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Volume LVIII contains: a close reading of Plato’s argument for the unity of the political arts in the Statesman; a new interpretation of the lowest part of the Divided Line in Plato’s Republic, based on the perception of value properties; an analysis of Plato’s treatment of belief attribution in the Theaetetus, the Gorgias, and the Meno; a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument for why direct demonstrations are superior to those which argue by reduction ad impossibile in Posterior Analytics 1. 26; an interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of spontaneous generation that emphasizes the role of putrefaction; a sceptical reading of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations; a comprehensive survey of Sextus Empiricus’ attitude towards religious belief and practice; and a review essay of Miriam Griffin’s collected papers, which discusses not only the question of how precisely philosophy affected statesmen in Rome, but also larger methodological questions about the history of philosophy.

This book investigates political thought under the conditions of the postwar welfare state, focusing on the Federal Republic of Germany (1949–89). It argues that the welfare state informed and altered basic questions of democracy as those institutions take on broader and more concrete forms after the 1950s. These questions were especially important for West Germany, given its recent experience with the collapse of capitalism, the disintegration of democracy, and National Socialist dictatorship after 1930. Three central issues emerged. First, the development of a nearly all-embracing set of social services and payments recast the problem of how social groups and interests related to the state, as state agencies and affected groups generated their own clientele, their own advocacy groups, and their own expert information. Second, the welfare state blurred the line between state and society that is constitutive of basic rights and the classic world of liberal freedom. Rights became claims on the state, and social groups became integral parts of state administration. Third, the welfare state potentially reshaped the individual citizen, who became wrapped up with mandatory social insurance systems, provisioning of money and services related to social needs, and the regulation of everyday life. This book describes how West German experts sought to make sense of this vast array of state programs, expenditures, and bureaucracies aimed at solving social problems. Coming from politics, economics, law, social policy, sociology, and philosophy, they sought to conceptualize their state, which was now social (one German word for the welfare state is indeed Sozialstaat), and their society, which was permeated by state policies.

Abandoned housing projects is one of the major problems in housing industry in Peninsular Malaysia.The reasons leading to this problem are many.This catastrophe has caused multifarious problems to the stakeholders, particularly the purchasers who become the aggrieved parties.To date, there is no effective and once-and-for-all means to face the problems of abandoned housing projects.One of the factors which causes abandonment of housing projects in Peninsular Malaysia, is the lack of political will on the part of the government to adopt an affirmative better housing delivery system such as the full build then sell system and the introduction of a housing development insurance to face the problems of housing abandonment.This book provides in-depth analysis of the terms and conditions of the statutory standard sale and purchase agreements as enshrined in Schedules G, H, I and J of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989.The objective of this book, among others, is to identify the weaknesses of the terms of the agreements, if any, which may have contributed to the problem of abandoned housing projects and their consequential troubles. As comparative analyses, the terms and conditions of the sale and purchase agreements as applicable and enforced in the Republic of Singapore and New South Wales, Australia, are chose.The purpose of these comparative analyses is to find the terms and conditions in these foreign jurisdictions agreements which can be learned and adopted in the statutory standard sale and purchase agreements (Schedules G, H, I and J).It is also for the betterment of the Malaysian housing industry as a whole, and to protect the interests of the stakeholders, in particular the purchasers, as against the problems of housing abandonment and its consequences.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.