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1
Lupton, Robert N., William M. Myers, and Judd R. Thornton. "Party Animals: Asymmetric Ideological Constraint among Democratic and Republican Party Activists." Political Research Quarterly 70, no. 4 (July 24, 2017): 889–904. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912917718960.
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Existing literature shows that Republicans in the mass public demonstrate greater ideological inconsistency and value conflict than Democrats. That is, despite a commitment to the conservative label and abstract belief in limited government, Republican identifiers’ substantive policy attitudes are nonetheless divided. Conversely, Democrats, despite registering lower levels of ideological thinking, maintain relatively consistent liberal issue attitudes. Based on theories of coalition formation and elite opinion leadership, we argue that these differences should extend to Democratic and Republican Party activists. Examining surveys of convention delegates from the years 2000 and 2004, we show that Democratic activists’ attitudes are more ideologically constrained than are those of Republican activists. The results support our hypothesis and highlight that some of the inconsistent attitudes evident among mass public party identifiers can be traced to the internal divisions of the major party coalitions themselves.
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Pink, Sophia L., James Chu, James N. Druckman, David G. Rand, and Robb Willer. "Elite party cues increase vaccination intentions among Republicans." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 32 (July 26, 2021): e2106559118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2106559118.
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Overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic requires motivating the vast majority of Americans to get vaccinated. However, vaccination rates have become politically polarized, and a substantial proportion of Republicans have remained vaccine hesitant for months. Here, we explore how endorsements by party elites affect Republicans’ COVID-19 vaccination intentions and attitudes. In a preregistered survey experiment (n = 1,480), we varied whether self-identified Republicans saw endorsements of the vaccine from prominent Republicans (including video of a speech by former President Donald Trump), from the Democratic Party (including video of a speech by President Joseph Biden), or a neutral control condition including no endorsements. Unvaccinated Republicans who were exposed to the Republican elite endorsement reported 7.0% higher vaccination intentions than those who viewed the Democratic elite endorsement and 5.7% higher than those in the neutral control condition. These effects were statistically mediated by participants’ reports of how much they thought Republican politicians would want them to get vaccinated. We also found evidence of backlash effects against Democratic elites: Republicans who viewed the Democratic elite endorsement reported they would be significantly less likely to encourage others to vaccinate and had more negative attitudes toward the vaccine, compared with those who viewed the Republican elite endorsement or the neutral control. These results demonstrate the relative advantage of cues from Republican elites—and the risks of messaging from Democrats currently in power—for promoting vaccination among the largest vaccine-hesitant subgroup in the United States.
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McSweeney, Dean. "Republicans in the South." Politics 14, no. 1 (June 1994): 21–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.1994.tb00004.x.
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This article explains the failure of the Republican party to reproduce their dominance of the South in presidential elections at lower electoral levels. First, the foreign policy and social issues that have benefitted Republican presidential candidates have lower salience in state and congressional elections. Second, sustained Republican control of the White House has exposed the party to recurrent mid-term setbacks at lower electoral levels. Third, deficiencies of local party organization and a paucity of identifiers deprives the Republicans of candidates in sufficient quantity and quality to be competitive with Democrats.
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MASON, ROBERT. "CITIZENS FOR EISENHOWER AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1951–1965." Historical Journal 56, no. 2 (May 3, 2013): 513–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x12000593.
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ABSTRACTFounded in support of Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1952 presidential candidacy, Citizens for Eisenhower took on an ambitious mission to revitalize the Republican party by expanding its activist ranks and by supporting the moderation of its conservative policy agenda. The organization proved unable to sustain the impressive momentum that it achieved during the 1952 campaign, however, instead helping to fuel factional opposition that informed the intraparty upsurge of conservatism during the 1950s and afterwards. The Eisenhower administration's efforts to encourage Citizens activists to join the party were flawed, and existing Republican activists often viewed such newcomers with hostility. More significantly, despite recruitment initiatives, in most cases activism in support of Eisenhower did not translate into enthusiasm for the party cause. The history of Citizens for Eisenhower therefore demonstrates the seriousness of Eisenhower's interests as president in boosting the Republican party's fortunes, but also the shortcomings of ‘amateur’ political activity in support of the party cause. It also sheds light on goals and activities of this era's moderate Republicans, together with their role in fostering the conservative resurgence that characterized the post-Eisenhower Republican party.
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Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe. "The Republican People's Party." Turkish Studies 3, no. 1 (March 2002): 102–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005705.
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Rapoport, Ronald B., Jack Reilly, and Walter J. Stone. "It’s Trump’s Party and I’ll Cry if I Want To." Forum 17, no. 4 (March 5, 2020): 693–709. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2019-0041.
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AbstractBased on analysis of a multi-wave national sample panel of Republican identifiers, we show the increasing coherence among rank and file Republicans around evaluations of Donald Trump. Differences between Republicans who preferred Trump for the GOP nomination and those who preferred another candidate (but, unlike the Never Trump group who said they could not support him in the general election if he won the nomination) are muted by the general election and 2018 waves. While “Never-Trumpers” in the nomination wave maintain their affective distance from Trump in the general election and 2018 waves, their evaluations become less negative. Our analysis suggests that Republicans’ favorability toward Trump increasingly aligned with their attitudes toward the Republican Party and their support for Trump’s effort to build a southern-border wall.
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Lelkes, Yphtach, and Paul M. Sniderman. "The Ideological Asymmetry of the American Party System." British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (November 17, 2014): 825–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123414000404.
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Most Americans support liberal policies on the social welfare agenda, the dominant policy cleavage in American politics. Yet a striking feature of the US party system is its tendency to equilibrium. How, then, does the Republican Party minimize defection on the social welfare agenda? The results of this study illustrate a deep ideological asymmetry between the parties. Republican identifiers are ideologically aware and oriented to a degree that far exceeds their Democratic counterparts. Our investigation, which utilizes cross-sectional, longitudinal and experimental data, demonstrates the role of ideological awareness and involvement in the Republicans’ ability to maintain the backing of their supporters even on issues on which the position of the Democratic Party is widely popular. It also exposes two mechanisms, party branding and the use of the status quo as a focal point, that Democrats use to retain or rally support for issues on the social welfare agenda on which the Republican Party’s position is widely popular.
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Ryan, Josh M. "Partisan Dynamics in Presidential Primaries and Campaign Divisiveness." American Politics Research 46, no. 5 (November 23, 2017): 834–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x17738278.
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Observers have noted that the Republican and Democratic primaries differ substantially, with Republicans typically having an easier time selecting their nominee. Previous research has suggested that this may be attributable to Republican Party homogeneity and delegate allocation rules that winnow candidates faster, but there is little empirical evidence on how these factors influence the primary process. Rather than predicting overall vote share or the nominee, I examine the temporal dynamics of each party’s primary campaigns. I show that Republican candidates are over-rewarded for winning elections, while Democrats are rewarded for performing well overall. The result is that late in the campaign, Republicans are much more likely to exit as compared with Democrats, and there is little evidence that these dynamics have changed over time. I conclude that the Republican Party produces systematically shorter and less divisive primaries as a result of its faster and more efficient winnowing process.
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Stroud, Laura R., Jack Glaser, and Peter Salovey. "The Effects of Partisanship and Candidate Emotionality on Voter Preference." Imagination, Cognition and Personality 25, no. 1 (September 2005): 25–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/22pc-5pk7-5ku0-dncq.
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In an experiment, Republican and Democratic participants viewed a video clip of an ostensible congressional candidate labeled as Republican, Democratic, or not given a party label delivering the same speech in an emotionally expressive or unexpressive manner. When the candidate was labeled a Democrat, he was rated more positively by Democratic participants; when labeled a Republican, he was preferred by Republicans. When party label was not provided, the emotionally expressive candidate was preferred; however, when either party label was provided, the unemotional candidate was preferred. These findings underscore the importance of partisanship cues and suggest that in the absence of such influential cues as partisanship, less prominent factors such as emotional expressiveness carry greater influence.
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Feng, Dezheng (William), and Shuo Zhang. "Language, attitudes and party politics." Pragmatics and Society 9, no. 2 (June 28, 2018): 232–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ps.16059.fen.
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Abstract This study investigates Barack Obama’s attitudes towards Republicans and Democrats by analyzing a corpus of 249 Presidential weekly addresses. Analysis shows that Obama’s attitudes towards the Republicans are characterized by a negative judgment of propriety, creating a negative image of the Republican Party, whereas when Republicans and Democrats are mentioned together, his attitudes are characterized by his hopes for and commendations on bipartisan collaboration. An analytical model based on the attitude schema is proposed to explicate the strategies for encoding attitudes. It is found that negative attitudes are always expressed implicitly by recounting events that elicit the attitudes (i.e. behaviors of the Republicans) and performing speech acts that are motivated by the attitudes (i.e. urging the Republicans to stop the wrong behaviors). The patterns of attitudes reflect bipartisan conflict and cooperation on the one hand, and constitute an important strategy to battle against the opposition party and build coalitions on the other.
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Barnes, Tiffany D., and Erin C. Cassese. "American Party Women." Political Research Quarterly 70, no. 1 (November 19, 2016): 127–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912916675738.
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Research on the gender gap in American politics has focused on average differences between male and female voters. This has led to an underdeveloped understanding of sources of heterogeneity among women and, in particular, a poor understanding of the political preferences of Republican women. We argue that although theories of ideological sorting suggest gender gaps should exist primarily between political parties, gender socialization theories contend that critical differences lie at the intersection of gender and party such that gender differences likely persist within political parties. Using survey data from the 2012 American National Election Study, we evaluate how party and gender intersect to shape policy attitudes. We find that gender differences in policy attitudes are more pronounced in the Republican Party than in the Democratic Party, with Republican women reporting significantly more moderate views than their male counterparts. Mediation analysis reveals that the gender gaps within the Republican Party are largely attributable to gender differences in beliefs about the appropriate scope of government and attitudes toward gender-based inequality. These results afford new insight into the joint influence of gender and partisanship on policy preferences and raise important questions about the quality of representation Republican women receive from their own party.
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Huffmon, Scott H., H. Gibbs Knotts, and Seth C. McKee. "Similarities and Differences in Support of Minority and White Republican Candidates." Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics 1, no. 1 (February 9, 2016): 91–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/rep.2015.5.
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AbstractHistory has shown that voters tend to support candidates of their own race. This reality has proven particularly challenging for black candidates who have often had difficulty running for office in majority white electorates. However, the vast majority of research on this topic has focused on minority Democrats, not minority Republicans. In this study, we take advantage of a unique set of circumstances in South Carolina's (SC's) 2014 elections where voters had the opportunity to cast ballots for an Indian-American Republican Governor and an African-American Republican Senator. Additionally, the presence of a white Republican Senator seeking reelection provides an important comparison case for determining if there is significant variation in support of these candidates given their different racial profiles, but shared party affiliation. Using unique data from The Winthrop Poll, we find that the determinants of approving of, and voting for, minority Republican candidates, are quite similar to support for the white Republican candidate. It appears that party and ideology are foremost in guiding approval and vote choice decisions among voters in contemporary American politics. Hence, even in SC, support for minority Republicans approximates that given to a white Republican.
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Meeks, Lindsey. "Aligning and Trespassing." Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 93, no. 4 (July 10, 2016): 1050–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077699015609284.
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This study examined how Republican and Democratic candidates utilized Twitter to manage their impressions during the 2012 U.S. Senate elections, and examined their discussion of political issues and character traits across three types of tweets: campaign tweets, campaign-selected retweets, and tweets that mentioned their respective opponent. Candidates aligned with and trespassed party-based ownership of issues and traits across the tweet types. In the aggregate, Republicans discussed Republican-owned issues and traits more than Democrats, and Democrats emphasized Democrat-owned issues more than Republicans. This party alignment broke down when examined across winning and losing candidates, yielding varying routes to electoral success.
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Shaffer, Stephen D., David A. Breaux, and Barbara Patrick. "Mississippi: Republicans Surge Forward in a Two-Party State." American Review of Politics 26 (April 1, 2005): 85–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2005.26.0.85-107.
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Mississippi entered the 21st century as a competitive two-party state far removed from its post-Reconstruction history of one-party Democratic domination. Yet Republican gains which had led to this emerging parity between the parties were not uniform across elective offices, as they had come first in federal elections and only later trickled down to state offices (Aistrup 1996). Mississippi voted Republican for president for the first time since Reconstruction in 1964 and 1972 (by landslide margins), narrowly backed Democrat and born-again southern Baptist Jimmy Carter in 1976, and henceforth has cast every one of its electoral votes for Republican presidential candidates. Enduring U.S. House gains began occurring in the Nixon landslide reelection year of 1972 with victories by Republicans Thad Cochran and Trent Lott. Cochran and Lott then replaced retiring conservative Democratic U.S. senators James Eastland in 1978 and John Stennis in 1988. Democrats remained competitive in U.S. house races at the century’s end, however, retaining two moderate conservative whites (Ronnie Shows and Gene Taylor) and one liberal African American (Bennie Thompson, representing the black majority “Delta” district) as congressmen. With the retirements of boll weevil Democrats Jamie Whitten in 1994 and Sonny Montgomery in 1996, conservative Republicans Roger Wicker and Chip Pickering took their places to maintain two House seats for the GOP.
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Hajnal, Zoltan L., and Jeremy D. Horowitz. "Racial Winners and Losers in American Party Politics." Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 1 (March 2014): 100–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592713003733.
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The Democratic and Republican Parties both make strong claims that their policies benefit racial and ethnic minorities. These claims have, however, received little systematic empirical assessment. This is an important omission, because democracy rests on the ability of the electorate to evaluate the responsiveness of those who govern. We assess Democrats’ and Republicans’ claims by compiling census data on annual changes in income, poverty, and unemployment over the last half century for each of America’s racial and ethnic groups. Judged by the empirical record, it is clear which party truly benefits America’s communities of color. When the nation is governed by Democrats, racial and ethnic minority well-being improves dramatically. By contrast, under Republican administrations, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans generally suffer losses.
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Miller, Warren E. "Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics." American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 557–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963175.
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The argument is presented for defining party identification by the root question, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?” With this definitional base, the partisan balance between Democrats and Republicans between 1952 and 1980 shows no evidence of realignment outside the South, belying the implications of the Markus-Converse and Fiorina analyses that suggest volatility in response to short-term influences. It also appears that the correlation between party identification and voter choices for president are very constant over time in the South as well as outside the South. Party line voting by party identifiers varies by region and party but did not decrease between 1952 and 1988.
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Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. "The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S." Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 3 (August 18, 2008): 433–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592708081218.
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Because the space of policies is two-dimensional, parties in the United States are coalitions of opposed interests. The Republican Party contains both socially conservative and socially liberal groups, though both tend to be pro-business. The increasing dominance of the social conservatives has angered some prominent Republicans, even causing a number of them to change party allegiance. Over time, the decreasing significance of the economic axis may cause the Republican Party to adopt policies that are analogous to those proposed by William Jennings Bryan in 1896: populist and anti-business. In parallel, the Democratic Party will increasingly appeal to pro-business, social liberals, so the party takes on the mantel of Lincoln.
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Gervais, Bryan T., and Irwin L. Morris. "Reading the Tea Leaves: Understanding Tea Party Caucus Membership in the US House of Representatives." PS: Political Science & Politics 45, no. 02 (March 14, 2012): 245–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096511002058.
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AbstractIn the summer of 2010, 52 Republican members of the US House of Representatives joined the newly formed Tea Party Caucus, bringing the first institutional voice to the Tea Party movement. To understand both thepolicyorientations of the organized Tea Party (in its caucus manifestation) and the institutional strength of the caucus's membership, we assess the extent to which caucus members are distinctive from their fellow Republicans in the US House of Representatives. Our results suggest that membership in the caucus is primarily driven by ideology and economics. Specifically, we find that Tea Party Caucus members are Republicans who are ideologically oriented toward limited government and lower taxes and who hail from particularly prosperous congressional districts. We find no evidence that Tea Party Caucus members serve safer districts or have greater seniority or institutional stature than their Republican colleagues who are not members of the caucus. These findings, we believe, speak not only to the nature and orientations of the Tea Party Caucus, but to the wider Tea Party movement itself.
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Kenneally, James J. "Black Republicans During the New Deal: the Role of Joseph W. Martin, Jr." Review of Politics 55, no. 1 (1993): 117–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500016752.
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In the struggle between Republicans and Democrats for the black vote half a century ago, Joseph W. Martin, Jr., congressman from Massachusetts, played a major role. Using his position as Alf Landon's East Coast campaign manager (1936), minority leader (1939–1946) and chair of the Republican National Committee (1940–1942) he managed to keep the Republican party attractive to many Afro-Americans. Furthermore, the was instrumental in preventing the GOP from abandoning its traditional commitment to blacks in order to win the allegiance of Southern white conservatives. He did this by the type of campaign he conducted, the legislation and causes he supported, and the type of Afro-American he appointed to party positions. As a result it was not until the Martin approach was abandoned in the 1960s that black support for the Republican party plummeted.
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Barber, Michael, and Jeremy C. Pope. "Conservatism in the Era of Trump." Perspectives on Politics 17, no. 3 (August 21, 2019): 719–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s153759271900077x.
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What does the rise and election of Donald J. Trump as president mean for the future of conservatism? Republican elites continue to argue about whether Trump is changing the definition of conservatism for better or worse, although many Republicans seem content to let him shape the issues, direction, and brand of the traditional party of conservatism. We examine the ideological characteristics of different groups of Republican voters across three types of ideology: symbolic, operational, and conceptual. We find distinct differences between Republicans who consistently supported Trump and other groups that either supported him in the general election only and those who never supported him. The Never Trump camp stands out as a group that is less symbolically and operationally conservative but also better able to articulate what it means to be a conservative than do Trump’s core supporters, who look very much the opposite. These results suggest a contemporary Republican Party that is far from unified in what it means to be a conservative.
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Thomsen, Danielle M. "Joining Patterns Across Party Factions in the US Congress." Forum 15, no. 4 (December 20, 2017): 741–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2017-0047.
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Abstract How does the influence of party factions change over time? This article only begins to tackle this question by looking at which party caucuses newly elected members join. I focus on joining patterns in the current 115th Congress to shed light on which factions are more or less influential in Congress today. I show, first, that almost all incoming members joined an ideological faction when they entered office. Furthermore, the Republican Study Committee attracted the most incoming Republicans; the New Democratic Coalition and the Congressional Progressive Caucus attracted the most incoming Democrats. The moderate factions lagged behind the more conservative and liberal factions in the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively. These joining patterns of newly elected members have important implications for the current and future influence that factions can expect to have in the party and chamber.
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Şi̇ri̇n, Funda Selçuk. "The Foundation of the Free Republican Party and Subsequent Developments According to the British Embassy Reports." Archiv orientální 89, no. 1 (June 25, 2021): 85–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.47979/aror.j.89.1.85-121.
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The History of Turkish Democracy from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic is a striking topic for social scientists. They exert themselves to understand dynamics that changed or remained stable during the evolution from sultanate to democracy. One of the most studied topics of the History of Turkish Democracy is doubtless the experience of the Free Republican Party. Qualified as the second trial of a transition to the multiparty system against the early period of the Young Republic’s single-party system, the Free Republican Party is evaluated both as a private attempt to resolve the tension between Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and İsmet (İnönü) on behalf of Mustafa Kemal and as Turkey’s reaction to the Great Depression in 1929. Established as a guided opposition party, it had a profound influence on Turkish political life, despite its short 99-day lifespan. The party was intensely supported by the masses and pushed for power. In historiography, the party’s experience has only been written about with reference to the contemporary press, memoirs, and Turkish archival documents, overlooking the British Embassy Reports. This study aims to contribute to the historiography of the Free Republican Party by comparing different discourses and paradigms in the party’s historiography with the English documents on the foundation of the Free Republican Party and subsequent developments.
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McLay, Mark. "A High-Wire Crusade: Republicans and the War on Poverty, 1966." Journal of Policy History 31, no. 3 (June 13, 2019): 382–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030619000125.
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Abstract:During 1966, the Republican Party launched a largely successful challenge to Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty.” Republican candidates pursued an anti–War on Poverty midterm strategy, which made antipoverty programs the symbol of Great Society liberalism, rather than its more popular programs, such as Medicare or the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Moreover, in Congress and on the campaign trail, Republicans offered well-crafted alternatives—such as their “Opportunity Crusade”—to offset charges of negativism and elitism that had dogged the Grand Old Party (GOP) since the creation of the New Deal in the 1930s. Significantly, while the War on Poverty survived the year, the Republican minority was unexpectedly successful in making important changes to the Economic Opportunity Act during the antipoverty legislation’s renewal. Overall, the Republican challenge to the War on Poverty in 1966, boded ill for the program’s longevity when the GOP finally secured the levers of power.
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Conley, Brian M. "The Politics of Party Renewal: The “Service Party” and the Origins of the Post-Goldwater Republican Right." Studies in American Political Development 27, no. 1 (April 2013): 51–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x13000035.
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The rise of the Republican Right in the 1960s reshaped not only the politics of the Republican Party, but ultimately that of the country as well. What had started as an improbable movement to draft Goldwater for president in 1964 emerged, amid the political and social turmoil of the decade, as the dominant force within the Republican Party. But what has not received as much attention is the significant role that the national Republican Party leadership and the emphasis it placed on party renewal, rather than reform, played in the Right's rapid post-Goldwater ascent. This article examines how the process of party renewal, specifically the emergence of a national “service party” structure, helped not only to unify the GOP after the 1964 Goldwater loss, but also led to the development of a more conservative Republican Party during the second half of the 1960s.
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MASON, ROBERT. "“I Was Going to Build a new Republican Party and a New Majority”: Richard Nixon as Party Leader, 1969–73." Journal of American Studies 39, no. 3 (December 2005): 463–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875805000617.
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Richard Nixon gained a poor reputation as President for his work as leader of the Republican Party. His attitude towards the party was seen as neglectful at best, destructive at worst. It was clear that Nixon revelled in the details of electoral politics as far as his own position was concerned, but it seemed equally clear that he had little concern for the political fortunes of his party at large. Among the most partisan of American politicians during his earlier career, Nixon seemed to shrug off this partisan past when he reached the White House in 1969. But this understanding of Nixon's relationship with the Republican Party is in some respects misleading. Although it is true that his record provides significant examples of presidential neglect of the party, it also contains equally significant examples of presidential concern about the party's future. Few American Presidents of the modern era paid much attention to their responsibility for party leadership, so the nature of Nixon's support for the Republicans distinguishes him as a party leader of notable strength rather than notable weakness.
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Sung-jin Yoo. "2008 Republican Nomination Struggle and Choice of the Republican Party." American Studies 32, no. 1 (May 2009): 169–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.18078/amstin.2009.32.1.006.
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Bruce, John M., John A. Clark, Michael M. Gant, and Linda M. Daugherty. "Tennessee: A Maturing Two-Party System." American Review of Politics 24 (July 1, 2003): 165–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2003.24.0.165-182.
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Although Tennessee has long had a Republican presence in its political system, the two par-ties have only recently become competitive across the state. As a result, party organizations and activists have the opportunity to play an important role in the state’s elections. Activists in the two parties grew increasingly polarized across the decade of the 1990s in terms of their ideologies and issue positions. Organizationally, both parties seem to be settling into their roles in the political system. Democrats take a more pragmatic approach to politics, while Republicans see more dramatic growth in the strength of their organizations.
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Ardoin, Phillip J., and Ronald J. Vogel. "African Americans in the Republican Party: Taking the Road Less Traveled." American Review of Politics 27 (July 1, 2006): 93–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2006.27.0.93-113.
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While most African Americans identify with the Democratic Party, a small minority chooses to identify and support the party of Lincoln. However, very little is known about the demographic make-up or policy preferences of these individuals. Utilizing the 1992-2002 American National Election Studies, we provide a multivariate analysis of the demographic characteristics and policy leanings of African American Republicans. Our analysis suggests several systematic patterns regarding African Americans Republican Party identification. First, as with the general population, we find they are more likely to be male, from the South and to identify themselves as conservatives. However, unlike the general population, we find they are not more likely to maintain upper or middle incomes or to view religion as an important guide in their life. Third, we find African Americans born after 1950 are more likely to identify themselves as Republican. Fourth, we find African American Republicans feel less warmth toward blacks than the majority of their brethren and are less likely to view race or social welfare issues as significant problems in America. Ultimately, we conclude racial issues are still the key to understanding African American Partisanship.
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Chamberlain, Adam. "Voter Coordination and the Rise of the Republican Party: Evidence from New England." Social Science History 38, no. 3-4 (2014): 311–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2015.27.
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The development of the Republican Party is a significant event in American political history. While scholars describe its formation as a realignment caused by the slavery issue, this article reinterprets this perspective. Focusing on gubernatorial elections in New England from 1840 to the mid-1850s, I present evidence that the rise of the Republican Party in the region was due to a lack of strategic voting coupled with third-party, antislavery voting that did not consistently affect the Whigs across states. A counterfactual argument suggests that Whig elites would have sought to change the nature of party politics and, had the distribution of third-party voting affected the Whigs similarly across states, then the Republicans may not have formed. Thus, the distribution of antislavery, third-party voting was more important than the presence of antislavery sentiment. This finding is important for understanding American party development and how strategic voting fits into the study of US elections.
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Pearcy, Mark, and Jeremiah Clabough. "Discussing the elephant in the room: the Republican Party and race issues." Social Studies Research and Practice 14, no. 3 (November 18, 2019): 377–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ssrp-03-2019-0019.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the subtle racist rhetoric used by members of the Republican Party over the last 60 years connected to issues of race. The authors start by providing a brief history of the Republican Party and race issues. Then, the authors discuss the civic thinking skills stressed within the C3 Framework, specifically the ability to analyze politicians’ arguments. Then, the focus shifts to look at the racial literacy framework discussed by King et al. Finally, three activities are provided that enable students to grasp the subtle racist rhetoric used by some Republicans connected to issues of race. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the authors explore race issues with members of the modern Republican Party. The authors design three classroom-ready activities by drawing on the best teaching practices advocated for in the C3 Framework. To elaborate, these activities allow students to research and analyze arguments made by some Republican politicians. This enables students to engage in the four dimensions of the Inquiry Arc in the C3 Framework. Findings The authors provide three activities that can be utilized in the high school social studies classroom to enable students to dissect American politicians’ messages connected to race issues. These activities can be adapted and utilized to enable students to examine a political candidate’s messages, especially those that contain subtle racist rhetoric. By completing the steps of these three activities, students are better prepared to be critical consumers of political messages and to hold elected officials accountable for their words, policies and actions. Originality/value In this paper, the authors explore the role of racist political rhetoric employed by members of the Republican Party over the last 60 years. The authors use the racial literacy framework advocated for by King et al. in three classroom-ready activities. The three activities are provided to help students break down the racist political rhetoric employed by notable members of the Republican Party.
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Bullock, Charles S. "Comment: The Gift that Keeps on Giving? Consequences of Affirmative Action Gerrymandering." American Review of Politics 16 (April 1, 1995): 33–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.1995.16.0.33-39.
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Various interpretations are being given to the 1994 elections. Aside from President Clinton’s unpopularity and an expanding Republican base, some Republicans running in the U.S. House and state legislative contests benefitted from redistricting decisions made two or three years earlier. A number of observers agree with an unsigned observation in The New Republic that "The racial gerrymandering of 1990 was key to this year’s Republican victory" (Anonymous 1994, 12). At a minimum, the Faustian agreement between Republicans and black Democrats contributed to the continuing implosion of the Democratic party in the South.
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Dochuk, Darren. "The Fissuring of the Republican Party." New Labor Forum 25, no. 1 (December 11, 2015): 26–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1095796015620172.
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Russell, Annelise. "U.S. Senators on Twitter: Asymmetric Party Rhetoric in 140 Characters." American Politics Research 46, no. 4 (June 23, 2017): 695–723. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x17715619.
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The U.S. Senate is a party-polarized institution where divisive political rhetoric stems from the partisan divide. Senators regularly chastise political opponents, but not all senators are equally critical. Research finds that elite party polarization is asymmetrical with greater divergence by Republicans, so I expect Republican senators to mimic that trend with higher levels of partisan rhetoric. To assess the variance in partisan rhetoric, I catalogue senators’ Twitter activity during the first 6 months of the 113th and 114th Congresses, and find that Republicans are more likely to name-call their Democratic opponents and to make expressions of intraparty loyalty, particularly when they are the minority party.
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McLAY, MARK. "THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE LONG, HOT SUMMER OF 1967 IN THE UNITED STATES." Historical Journal 61, no. 4 (March 13, 2018): 1089–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x17000504.
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AbstractDuring the summer of 1967, the United States experienced a series of race riots across the nation's cities as largely black neighbourhoods rebelled against the conditions in which they were living. The crisis reached its apogee in July when the worst riots since the American Civil War struck Detroit. In this atmosphere, legislators were faced with a stark choice of punishing rioters with stricter crime measures or alleviating living conditions with substantial federal spending. Despite being a minority in Congress, elected Republicans found themselves holding the balance of power in choosing whether the federal government would enforce law and order or pursue social justice for ghetto residents. While those Republicans who pursued ‘order’ have been given prominence in historiographical narratives, such politicians only represent one side of the Republican response. Indeed, moderate and progressive Republicans rallied to save Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty and a host of urban spending initiatives that had appeared politically doomed. These actions reveal that scholars have overestimated Republican conservatism during the 1960s. Nonetheless, the rioting left a long-term legacy that enabled ‘order’ eventually to triumph over ‘justice’ in the following five decades.
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Adorf, Philipp. "Die Republikanische Partei nach den Wahlen 2020: Nach oder inmitten der Trump-Ära?" Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 52, no. 2 (2021): 289–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0340-1758-2021-2-289.
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Donald Trump’s loss in conjunction with the outcome of congressional elections has left the Republican Party entirely removed from the political levers of power in Washington, D .C . - a mere four years after they had obtained unified control of government at the federal level. What are the lessons Republicans can draw from these results? How can a President who engaged in open efforts to overturn a democratic election result continue to elicit a degree of support among the party’s rank-and-file that has made him the current favorite to win the Republican Party’s presidential nomination in 2024? Explanations are found both in the 45th President’s governing record as well as in the composition of today’s Republican electorate, which largely subscribes to Donald Trump’s nativist populist worldview. The attitudes present among Republican voters were one of the key reasons why most Republican officials in Washington ultimately decided to at least tacitly support Trump’s anti-democratic lie of a “stolen election”. This may only have been a harbinger of the future threat Republicans pose to US democracy.
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O’Brian, Neil A. "Before Reagan: The Development of Abortion’s Partisan Divide." Perspectives on Politics 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2019): 1031–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592719003840.
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What explains the alignment of antiabortion positions within the Republican party? I explore this development among voters, activists, and elites before 1980. By 1970, antiabortion attitudes among ordinary voters correlated with conservative views on a range of noneconomic issues including civil rights, Vietnam, feminism and, by 1972, with Republican presidential vote choice. These attitudes predated the parties taking divergent abortion positions. I argue that because racial conservatives and military hawks entered the Republican coalition before abortion became politically activated, issue overlap among ordinary voters incentivized Republicans to oppose abortion rights once the issue gained salience. Likewise, because proabortion voters generally supported civil rights, once the GOP adopted a Southern strategy, this predisposed pro-choice groups to align with the Democratic party. A core argument is that preexisting public opinion enabled activist leaders to embed the anti (pro) abortion movement in a web of conservative (liberal) causes. A key finding is that the white evangelical laity’s support for conservative abortion policies preceded the political mobilization of evangelical leaders into the pro-life movement. I contend the pro-life movement’s alignment with conservatism and the Republican party was less contingent on elite bargaining, and more rooted in the mass public, than existing scholarship suggests.
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Noel, Hans. "Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667, no. 1 (August 17, 2016): 166–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716216662433.
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Both the Republican and Democratic parties are internally divided. Each contains a party regular wing, which is interested in winning office and in the compromises necessary to govern. And each contains an ideological wing, which is interested in close adherence to the core coalition of the party. But the nature of the cleavage is very different within the parties. Among Democrats, the cleavage is mild, with most members belonging to the party regular camp, to the chagrin of ideologues, who are for the most part Bernie Sanders supporters. The cleavage among Republicans, though, is so deep that the party could not find a way to bridge it in the so-called invisible primary for 2016, creating an opening for Donald Trump, who is from neither camp.
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Newman, James, Stephen D. Shaffer, and David A. Breaux. "Mississippi: Conservative Ideologues Battle the Party of Inclusion." American Review of Politics 24 (April 1, 2003): 69–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2003.24.0.69-89.
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Republican grassroots party activists in Mississippi constitute an essentially conservative, higher income, middle aged, and white male organization, which has become even more so since 1991. Democrats are a truly biracial party with equal numbers of men and women and a more middle class background, but it has become more liberal since 1991 due to the influx of more African-Americans into the organization. Compared to Republicans, Democrats have a more professional orientation geared towards winning elections rather than fighting for ideological purity, and have become increasingly active over the last decade to meet the growing GOP electoral challenge.
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Rafail, Patrick, and John D. McCarthy. "Making the Tea Party Republican: Media Bias and Framing in Newspapers and Cable News." Social Currents 5, no. 5 (March 1, 2018): 421–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2329496518759129.
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Research on the Tea Party emphasizes the role of Fox News in magnifying the movement’s early successes. Fox News is credited with legitimizing the Tea Party’s grievances, allowing the movement to make rapid inroads into the Republican Party. We argue that such depictions of the Tea Party’s relationship to the Republican Party are at least partially the product of an oversimplified media narrative emphasizing the seamless integration of the two. We analyze 201,678 media documents from blog posts from Tea Party organizations, Fox News, MSNBC, and 785 newspapers. Our results show marked differences between how the Tea Party frames itself compared with other media sources frame the movement. MSNBC and Fox News discuss the Tea Party strategically, respectively, treating the movement as representing the worst and best aspects of the Republican Party. This is in stark contrast to how the activists frame the movement as conservative, but not strictly Republican, and often in conflict with the goals of the Republican Party.
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CONNOR, EMMET O. "COMMUNISTS, RUSSIA, AND THE IRA, 1920–1923." Historical Journal 46, no. 1 (March 2003): 115–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x02002868.
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After the foundation of the Communist International in 1919, leftists within the Socialist Party of Ireland won Comintern backing for an Irish communist party. Encouraged by Moscow, the communists hoped to offset their marginality through the republican movement. The Communist Party of Ireland denounced the Anglo-Irish treaty, welcomed the Irish Civil War, and pledged total support to the IRA. As the war turned against them, some republicans favoured an alliance with the communists. In August 1922 Comintern agents and two IRA leaders signed a draft agreement providing for secret military aid to the IRA in return for the development of a new republican party with a radical social programme. The deal was not ratified on either side, and in 1923 the Communist Party of Ireland followed Comintern instructions to ‘turn to class politics’. The party encountered increasing difficulties and was liquidated in January 1924. The communist intervention in the Civil War highlights the contrast between Comintern and Russian state policy on Ireland, and was seminal in the evolution of Irish socialist republicanism.
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Rhodes, Jesse H., and Zachary Albert. "The transformation of partisan rhetoric in American presidential campaigns, 1952–2012." Party Politics 23, no. 5 (October 19, 2015): 566–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068815610968.
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What are the dynamics of partisan rhetoric in presidential campaigns? (How) has presidential candidate partisanship changed over time? Analyzing a comprehensive dataset of party-related statements in presidential campaign speeches over the 1952–2012 period, we show that Democratic and Republican candidates have taken distinctive approaches to partisanship. Overall, Democratic candidates have been partisans, while Republicans have largely refrained from partisan rhetoric on the campaign trail. However, this difference has narrowed substantially over time, due to a dramatic decline in the partisanship of Democratic presidential candidates. We argue that Democratic and Republican candidates have adopted different campaign strategies that reflect both enduring party differences and changing political contexts. Though naturally inclined to partisanship, Democratic candidates have adopted more conciliatory strategies primarily in response to growing public antipathy toward partisan rancor. In contrast, Republicans’ tendency toward more conciliatory rhetoric has been reinforced by political developments discouraging partisan campaigning.
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McCright, Aaron M., Riley E. Dunlap, and Chenyang Xiao. "Increasing Influence of Party Identification on Perceived Scientific Agreement and Support for Government Action on Climate Change in the United States, 2006–12." Weather, Climate, and Society 6, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 194–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/wcas-d-13-00058.1.
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Abstract Since the mid-2000s, U.S. conservative leaders and Republican politicians have stepped up efforts to challenge the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic climate change (ACC). Especially with the rise of the Tea Party in 2009, ACC denial has become something of a litmus test for Republican politicians to prove their conservative bona fides. Two recent studies find that misperception of scientific agreement on ACC is associated with lower levels of support for government action to deal with ACC. Using nationally representative survey data from 2006 and 2012, the analytical model developed in those two studies was applied to investigate whether the effect of political orientation on perceived scientific agreement and support for government action to reduce emissions has increased since the heightened ACC denial by Republican politicians beginning in 2009. The results indicated that political ideology and party identification are moderately strong predictors of perceived scientific agreement; beliefs about the timing, human cause, seriousness, and threat of global warming; and support for government action in both 2006 and 2012. Further, as expected, the effect of party identification on perceived scientific agreement and support for government action increased from 2006 and 2012, evidence that rank-and-file Republicans in the general public are more strongly embracing the ACC denial espoused by Republican politicians in recent years. Such increased partisanship poses a formidable barrier to public understanding of ACC.
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Goldberg, Michael Lewis. "Women and the Republican Party, 1854-1924." Annals of Iowa 61, no. 4 (October 2002): 447–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.10640.
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Rae, Nicol C. "The Modern Republican Party: Resurgence or Decline?" Journal of American Studies 22, no. 2 (August 1988): 225–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875800022003.
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In the study of contemporary American politics the phenomenon referred to as the “decline of party” has aroused considerable debate. Many writing on this subject maintain that American parties have been in a longterm and irreversible process of secular decline. Others hold that American parties have merely changed their role in the political system and although increasingly eliminated from presidential politics have developed considerably as national political organisations. This latter thesis has particular reference to the Republican party. The GOP has won four of the last five presidential elections, and has developed its national party organisation to a level of efficacy and sophistication unprecedented in American history.
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Skocpol, Theda, and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez. "The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism." Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 3 (August 31, 2016): 681–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592716001122.
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Presidential election years attract attention to the rhetoric, personalities, and agendas of contending White House aspirants, but these headlines do not reflect the ongoing political shifts that will confront whoever moves into the White House in 2017. Earthquakes and erosions have remade the U.S. political terrain, reconfiguring the ground on which politicians and social groups must maneuver, and it is important to make sure that narrow and short-term analyses do not blind us to this shifting terrain. We draw from research on changes since 2000 in the organizational universes surrounding the Republican and Democratic parties to highlight a major emergent force in U.S. politics: the recently expanded “Koch network” that coordinates big money funders, idea producers, issue advocates, and innovative constituency-building efforts in an ongoing effort to pull the Republican Party and agendas of U.S. politics sharply to the right. We review the major components and evolution of the Koch network and explore how it has reshaped American politics and policy agendas, focusing especially on implications for right-tilted partisan polarization and rising economic inequality.
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Krason, Stephen M. "Conservatism and the Republican Party on Economics." Catholic Social Science Review 25 (2020): 275–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cssr2020251.
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Varon, Elizabeth R., and Melanie Susan Gustafson. "Women and the Republican Party, 1854-1924." Journal of American History 89, no. 3 (December 2002): 1057. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3092401.
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Caffrey, Margaret M. "Women and the Republican Party, 1854–1924." History: Reviews of New Books 30, no. 3 (January 2002): 97–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2002.10526097.
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Simpson, M. "Party, Society, Government: Republican Democracy in France." French History 17, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 460–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/fh/17.4.460-b.
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Owens, John E. "The Trump Party: Republican in Name Only." Political Insight 12, no. 2 (June 2021): 32–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/20419058211022938.
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