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1

Shafter, Jonathan. "The Due Diligence Model: A New Approach to the Problem of Odious Debts." Ethics & International Affairs 21, no. 1 (March 2007): 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2007.00060.x.

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Odious debts are debts incurred by a government without either popular consent or a legitimate public purpose. There is a debate within academic circles as to whether the successor government to a regime that incurred odious debts has the right to repudiate repayment. In the real world, however, repudiation is not currently an option granted legitimacy by either global capital markets or the legal systems of creditor states. There are, thus, compelling reasons to reform the law of odious debts to allow for such repudiation in strictly limited circumstances. Beyond the moral problem of requiring the formerly captive citizens of a tyrant to repay their oppressor's personal debts, the burden of odious-debt servicing can perpetuate the cycle of state failure, which has direct national security consequences. In addition, a properly designed odious debt reform could function as an alternative punitive mechanism to trade sanctions with fewer harmful implications for the general population of the targeted state. Classical proponents of odious debt reform advocate for recognition of a legal rule under which successor governments could challenge the validity of debts incurred by prior regimes against the odious debt legal standard in a judicial-style forum. I make the case for an alternative “Due Diligence Model” of reform that provides far greater ex ante certainty for lenders, both as to which debts might be classified as odious debts and what steps the lender must take to protect its investments from subsequent invalidation. The Due Diligence Model also solves certain time-consistency problems inherent to the Classical Model.
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2

Lester, V. Markham. "The Effect of Southern State Bond Repudiation and British Debt Collection Efforts on Anglo-American Relations, 1840–1940." Journal of British Studies 52, no. 2 (April 2013): 415–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2013.58.

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AbstractBritish officials' largely negative impression of the United States caused by America's intransigence in allowing renegotiation of Britain's First World War debts must be viewed against a backdrop of a longstanding debtor-creditor relationship between the two nations. Since the mid-nineteenth century, British creditors, largely through the efforts of the London-based Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, vigorously yet unsuccessfully attempted to collect large debts on repudiated American state bonds. This article provides greater understanding of this history and shows that the nineteenth-century debt controversy might well have been avoided to the economic benefit of the British and particularly the American South.
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3

Gallen, James. "Odious Debt and Jus Post Bellum." Journal of World Investment & Trade 16, no. 4 (July 11, 2015): 666–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22119000-01604005.

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Odious debt concerns the repudiation and cancellation of debt accrued by a State for ‘odious’ purposes. This article argues that odious debt can play a role in jus post bellum in lessening the financial burden placed on States who experience conflict and generate a clear standard for investors who seek to enforce a State’s obligations to repay its debts and other financial obligations after conflict. This article highlights several challenges inhibiting the translation of the proposal of odious debt into an international legal principle. It offers a conception of odious debt that seeks to resolve these challenges by aligning with other areas of public international law which operate concurrently. This article considers how international human rights law could give clear meaning to the contested term ‘odious’, how to conceive of the appropriate standard of care for creditors and examines potential institutions for debt resolution and potential incentives of relevant actors.
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4

Alvarez, Sebastian. "A FATAL FLAW: DOMESTIC BANKS AND MEXICO’S INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE 1982 DEBT CRISIS." Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 36, no. 3 (August 30, 2018): 337–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0212610918000113.

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AbstractThe recent European debt crisis has renewed interest as to why debtor countries honour their foreign debts and subscribe to respectively burdensome rescheduling conditions. While the cost of defaulting in a domestic financial system has been recognised as a main motive for repayment, the factors that cause sovereign states to refrain from debt repudiation are not fully understood. This article investigates the reasons behind the repayment decision and weak negotiating position of the Mexican government following the 1982 debt crisis. It shows that leading commercial banks had considerable amounts of external loans in their books, and that Mexican policymakers lacked the foreign exchange access they needed to secure the stability of the domestic banking system. The high exposure of domestic banks to Mexican debt and their heightened dependence on foreign capital worked as mechanisms that allowed international creditors to enforce their claims and deterred Mexico from declaring a unilateral default.
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5

Sheinin, David M. K. "Sovereign Debts - The Debt System: A History of Sovereign Debts and Their Repudiation. By Éric Toussaint. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2019. Chronology. Bibliography. Notes. Index. Pp. x, 283. $13.96 paper." Americas 78, no. 2 (April 2021): 350–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/tam.2021.24.

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6

Bílková, Veronika. "Sovereignty, Property and the Russian Revolution." Journal of the History of International Law 19, no. 2 (May 16, 2017): 147–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718050-19221024.

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The article introduces two traditions of conceptualizing the relationship between sovereignty and property which have been present in legal and political doctrine and in international law. One tradition sees the two concepts as separated, the other as interrelated. The article then shows that the Soviet approach to sovereignty and property, which manifested itself in certain measures adopted after the 1917 Russian Revolution (the abolition of private property, the repudiation of tsarist debts) and which was largely informed by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, falls under the second tradition. Finally, the article discusses how the Soviet approach to sovereignty and property sought to affect international law and to what extent it has managed, or failed, to do so.
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7

González-López, Felipe. "SOCIETY AGAINST MARKETS. THE COMMODIFICATION OF MONEY AND THE REPUDIATION OF DEBT." Sociologia & Antropologia 11, no. 1 (April 2021): 97–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/2238-38752021v1114.

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Abstract From anti-debt movements in Mexico, Spain, Poland, Croatia, and Chile to the Occupy movements in the United States, Israel and Canada, organizations repudiating both debt and the centrality of financial markets have proliferated worldwide. In this article, I draw on Polanyi’s work in order to frame the financialization of society and different forms of debt repudiation as a double movement, characterized as a second wave of the commodification of money and the attempts by society to protect itself from the advancement of finance. Relying on a secondary literature and my own ethnographic research on debtors’ movements, I explore the commonalities and differences between diverse forms of repudiating debt through collective action at both national and international level.
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8

Worrall, Tim. "Debt with potential repudiation." European Economic Review 34, no. 5 (July 1990): 1099–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(90)90025-t.

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9

Cohen, Daniel, and Jeffrey Sachs. "Growth and external debt under risk of debt repudiation." European Economic Review 30, no. 3 (June 1986): 529–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(86)90007-3.

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10

Jeske, Karsten. "Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation." Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 3 (June 2006): 576–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/503755.

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11

Kirsch, Florian, and Ronald Rühmkorf. "Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation." Economic Theory 64, no. 4 (December 28, 2015): 777–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0945-0.

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12

Gale, Douglas, and Martin Hellwig. "Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt." International Economic Review 30, no. 1 (February 1989): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2526545.

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13

Gunter, Frank R. "Thomas Jefferson on the repudiation of public debt." Constitutional Political Economy 2, no. 3 (September 1991): 283–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02393133.

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14

Gersovitz, Mark. "A Review of Michael Tomz's Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries." Journal of Economic Literature 47, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 475–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.2.475.

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Repudiation and expropriation pose obstacles to the international mobility of capital and thereby to efficient international allocation of resources. Tomz discusses the determinants of lending in the face of the threat of repudiation. Using history, he argues that debtor countries have sought a reputation for compliance with loan agreements to access future loans and that military or trade sanctions have been unimportant in sustaining lending. He discusses when and why banks have been more active as lenders relative to bondholders. This article situates Tomz's concerns in the broad themes of thought on obstacles to capital mobility and evaluates his arguments.
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15

WILLIAMSON, JOHN. "THE OUTLOOK FOR DEBT RELIEF OR REPUDIATION IN LATIN AMERICA." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2, no. 1 (1986): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/2.1.1-a.

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16

KENEN, PETER B. "DEBT BUYBACKS AND FORGIVENESS IN A MODEL WITH VOLUNTARY REPUDIATION." International Economic Journal 5, no. 1 (April 1, 1991): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10168739100080001.

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17

Ishikawa, Tomoko. "The Rise of the Notion of Illegitimate Debt: a Comment on “Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern Finance” by Odette Lienau." Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium 6, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): 189–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ael-2015-0003.

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Abstract “Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern Finance” by Odette Lienau convincingly challenges the notion that the norm of debt continuity is a “stable and inevitable market principle” by providing a thorough analysis of the historical and political contexts surrounding this norm. The author’s approach which goes beyond the “market narrative” on the norm of debt continuity provides significant insights into the difficult issues of debt repudiation. This approach reveals the politically and historically variable nature of the norm of debt continuity. As such, the author demonstrates the openness and the possible development of sovereign debt practices towards accepting a more flexible and non-statist approach to sovereign debt management.
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18

Madakufamba, Munetsi. "NGOs warn rich nations to accelerate debt cancellation or face repudiation." Review of African Political Economy 28, no. 87 (March 2001): 122–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056240108704514.

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19

ZAGONARI, FABIO. "Tropical deforestation: debt-for-nature versus debt-for-development swaps." Environment and Development Economics 3, no. 3 (July 1998): 267–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x98000163.

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In this paper I analyze the forest and debt dynamics in a less developed country (LDC), where the former is a renewable resource and the latter's increase results from the interests to be paid on the current debt minus the balance of trade surplus. Agricultural and industrial goods are produced, and whereas the former requires the converted forest as an input, the latter does not. It transpires that the stock of debt is likely to increase infinitely without repudiation, whereas the stock of forest is likely to oscillate around an equilibrium level. Within this framework, I compare the effectiveness and enforceability of the debt-for-nature and the debt-for-development swaps with respect to tropical deforestation and debt burden issues. Some empirical evidence confirming the theoretical results is provided.
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20

Bonin, Hubert. "Hope Spring Eternal. French Bondholders and the Repudiation of Russian Sovereign Debt." Revue française d'histoire économique N° 9-10, no. 1 (2018): 283. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rfhe.009.0283.

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21

Haynes, Mike. "Hope springs eternal: French bondholders and the repudiation of Russian Sovereign debt." Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 102–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/25739638.2020.1807737.

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22

Demetrius, F. Joseph, Edward J. Tregurtha, and Scott B. MacDonald. "A Brave New World: Debt, Default and Democracy in Latin America." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 2 (1986): 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/165771.

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Plunging Petroleum Prices have elevated Mexico into the position of de facto leadership of Latin American, and perhaps of other, debtor nations in their negotiations with international creditors. Once regarded as a model debtor, Mexico has emerged as forceful spokesman for debt relief. Although Mexican authorities often couch their statements concerning foreign debt repayments in conciliatory, and even contradictory, terms, the underlying fact is that Mexico's demand for some debt relief is tantamount to an unspoken repudiation of a portion of its $96 billion foreign debt. If Mexico, the world's second largest debtor, succeeds in wresting debt relief from its lenders, then it must be recognized that debtor-creditor relationships have undergone a fundamental change: political realities, not contract law, ultimately determine how debt is to be repaid, if at all. Mexico, more by circumstance than by choice, has led debtors and creditors alike into a brave new world.
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23

Comín, Francisco. "Default, rescheduling and inflation: public debt crises in Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries." Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 30, no. 3 (December 2012): 353–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0212610912000134.

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AbstractThis article provides a historical overview of the factors leading up to debt crises and the default mechanisms used by governments to solve them, ranging from repudiation and restructuring to inflation tax and financial repression. The paper also analyses the Spanish governments’ graduation to responsible public debt management under democracy and the last debt crisis starting in 2010. After analysing the evolution of the outstanding public debt, budget deficits, the Spanish economy's ability to borrow, the central government's debt affordability and the profile of public debt, the article concludes that the Spanish case confirms the main hypotheses of concerning international debt crises: short-term borrowing enhanced the risk of a debt crisis; insolvency problems arose when governments were unwilling or unable to repay debt; debt crises took place after large capital inflows; most outright defaults ended up being partial defaults; public debt level became unsustainable when it rose above 60-90 per cent of GDP; default trough inflation became commonplace when fiat money displaced coinage; financial repression was used as a subtle type of debt restructuring; and defaults endangered the creditworthiness of the Spanish Finance Ministry and forced disciplined fiscal policies.
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24

Wells, John, and Dougals Wills. "Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation: The Jacobite Threat to England's Institutions and Economic Growth." Journal of Economic History 60, no. 2 (June 2000): 418–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002205070002516x.

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This study provides an empirical test of North and Weingast's theory of British capital-market development after the Glorious Revolution. The evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that institutional innovation in the 1690s led to the dramatic growth in London capital markets, and that threats to these institutions caused financial turmoil. We also find the economic motivation for these innovations to be consistent with the work of Ekelund and Tollison.
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25

Dove, John A. "Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America." Constitutional Political Economy 23, no. 1 (December 2, 2011): 66–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-011-9114-z.

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26

Reis, Ricardo. "The Mystique Surrounding the Central Bank's Balance Sheet, Applied to the European Crisis." American Economic Review 103, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 135–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.3.135.

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A central bank's resource constraint bounds the dividends it can distribute by the present value of seignorage, which is a modest share of GDP. This is in spite of the mystique behind a central bank's balance sheet. Moreover, the statutes of the Federal Reserve or the ECB make it difficult for it to redistribute resources across regions. In a simple model of sovereign default, where multiple equilibria arise if debt repudiation lowers fiscal surpluses, the central bank may help to select one equilibrium. The central bank's main lever over fundamentals is to raise inflation, but otherwise the balance sheet gives it little leeway.
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27

Herman, Barry. "A Role for Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt: A Review Essay on Odette Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt, 2014." Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium 6, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): 219–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ael-2015-0017.

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Abstract The book under review seems especially relevant to the intergovernmental policy dialogues that have recently focused on how creditors and a borrowing government should vet sovereign borrowing, and how to hold the lender and borrower accountable for their decisions. The book seeks to specify under what circumstances, if any, there are limits to the legal obligation to repay a sovereign loan. While repayment is always required except in cases of sovereign insolvency when it is just not possible, there have been exceptions to absolute repayment obligation in practice and in legal theory. This review builds on the author’s analysis of determinants of illegitimacy (which would remove the obligation to repay) in order to examine why governments in fact repay their loans, why the loss of access to credit makes repudiation of odious loans rare, and how if enforcing the obligation to repay were restricted to “responsible” lending and borrowing under internationally agreed terms, it could advance socially and environmentally sustainable development, while maintaining normal financial market activity of sovereigns. Finally, complementing a loan-by-loan approach, this paper calls for an internationally concerted process for more effectively and fairly resolving sovereign insolvencies.
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28

Bienen, Henry S., and Mark Gersovitz. "Economic stabilization, conditionality, and political stability." International Organization 39, no. 4 (1985): 729–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027089.

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IMF conditionality is seldom so important that it dominates all other considerations for political stability. IMF stabilization programs often shift benefits from one group to another. They expose elites to charges of selling the sovereignty of their countries. The imposition of IMF conditions, particularly subsidy cuts, may lead to sharp outbreaks of civil disorder. Nonetheless, the IMF provides resources that make adjustment easier and thus may lessen the chances of political instability for a country. IMF programs are seldom implemented fully as negotiated, and the penalties for partial compliance are not great. Debtor countries have more flexibility in imposing austerity measures, and the economic constraints are less binding than often assumed. The very availability of alternatives to IMF programs results in internal divisions because some favor debt repudiation and others oppose it. Groups now contend over solutions to the debt problems of their countries.
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29

Sawyer, Benjamin. "Kim Oosterlinck. Hope Springs Eternal: French Bondholders and the Repudiation of Russian Debt. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016. xiv + 244 pp. ISBN 978-0-300-19091-5, $85.00 (cloth)." Enterprise & Society 20, no. 4 (January 14, 2019): 1092–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eso.2018.72.

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30

Summerhill, William R. "Kim Oosterlinck, trans. Anthony Bulger, Hope springs eternal: French bondholders and the repudiation of Russian sovereign debt (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016. Pp. xvi+244. 4 figs. 7 tabs. ISBN 9780300190915 Hbk. £55/$85)." Economic History Review 70, no. 3 (July 12, 2017): 1031–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12590.

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31

"The Debt System: A History of Sovereign Debts and Their Repudiation." Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 49, no. 5 (August 28, 2020): 474–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094306120946391a.

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32

Jeske, Karsten. "Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286158.

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33

Noll, Franklin. "Repudiation! The Crisis of United States Civil War Debt, 1865-1870." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2196409.

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34

Mansell, Wade, and Karen Openshaw. "Suturing the Open Veins of Ecuador: Debt, Default and Democracy." Law and Development Review 2, no. 1 (January 8, 2009). http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1943-3867.1038.

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In 2008 the Ecuadorian government received a report on the legitimacy of the country's sovereign debt from an international audit commission appointed by Ecuador's current president, Rafael Correa. This concluded that much of the debt was tainted by illegality and illegitimacy and consequently did not merit repayment. Citing the report's findings as justification, the government stopped making interest payments on certain of the country's bonds, but, rather than repudiating them altogether, engineered a successful buyback at a large discount. Having thus reduced Ecuador's external commercial debt burden by about a third, the government is now planning to address multilateral and bilateral loans also adjudged unlawful by the commission.This article examines the robust approach adopted by the Correa administration to tackling Ecuador's public debts, placing it in the context of the country's troubled economic history and contrasting it with previous defaults and debt workouts which largely worked to Ecuador's disadvantage. In doing so, it considers the use which the government has made of the increasingly prominent concepts of odious and illegitimate debt as a means of combating the indebtedness of the South. The conclusion reached is that, regardless of the final position suggested by international law, the realities of international relations are likely to limit the practicality of legal remedies. Nevertheless, the case of Ecuador provides a new chapter in the continuing academic debate regarding unlawful debt.These, of course, are the legal aspects of Ecuador's endeavours to curtail expenditure desperately needed for other purposes. Underlying the legal implications is the reality of an impoverished nation called upon to continue to service or redeem 'debt' that brought no obvious benefit to the overwhelming majority of its people. Debt repayment has promoted impoverishment and also, if indirectly, facilitated devastating environmental degradation.
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35

"Document: The Manila Declaration. Statement of the Asia—Pacific People's Conference on Peace and Development." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 14, no. 3 (July 1989): 371–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/030437548901400308.

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Over 200 peace and nuclear disarmament activists from 18 countries assembled in Manila, Philippines from January 10–14, 1989 to participate in the Asia-Pacific Peoples Conference for Peace and Development. Sponsored by the Australian Anti-Bases Coalition campaign and the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific-Philippine Forum, in conjunction with grassroots multi-sectoral and issue-oriented groups in the Philippines, the conference seeks to promote a regional approach to nuclear disarmament, demilitarization, the elimination of foreign military bases, peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result of this conference, the Asia-Pacific People's Forum on Peace and Development, a transnational coalition of organizations and individuals committed to a“nuclear free and independent Asia and Pacific region,” was organized. As a truly broad people's movement, the Forum has declared its support, among others, of the“total dismantling of all nuclear arms and foreign military and intelligence bases in our region,” the“full support for the inherent rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral domains, and to their self-determination and preservation of their cultural heritage,” the“elimination of all discrimination based on race, gender, class, and religion,” the“full implementation of all international conventions on human rights, disarmament, peace, and development, throughout the region,” and“ending the use of foreign debt as the major vehicle of economic intervention and domination in the region, and repudiating “Third World’ debt. Demanding a new, just, and equitable economic order.” In light of the journal's commitment to peace, economic well being, social justice and ecological balance, we are publishing these documents for our readership's information and reflection. Additional information about the Forum may be obtained from Asia-Pacific People's Forum on Peace and Development, 5 Road 13th, Quezon City, Philippines, or 1314 14th Street, #5, N. W., Washington, DC 20005, USA.
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36

Thornton, Mark. "Real Austerity." REVISTA PROCESOS DE MERCADO, March 8, 2021, 269–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.52195/pm.v10i1.209.

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Austerity has been hotly debated as either an elixir or a poison for tough economic times. But what is austerity? Real austerity means that the government and its employees have less money at their disposal. For the economists at the International Monetary Fund, «austerity» may mean spending cuts, but it also means increasing taxes on the beleaguered public in order to, at all costs, repay the government’s corrupt creditors. Keynesian economists reject all forms of austerity. They promote the «borrow and spend» approach that is supposedly scientific and is gentle on the people: paycheck insurance for the unemployed, bailouts for failing businesses, and stimulus packages for everyone else. Austrian School economists reject both the Keynesian stimulus approach and the IMF-style high-tax, pro-bankster «Austerian» approach. Although «Austrians» are often lumped in with «Auste-rians,» Austrian School economists support real austerity. This involves cutting government budgets, salaries, employee benefits, retirement benefits, and taxes. It also involves selling government assets and even repudiating government debt. Despite all the hoopla in countries like Greece, there is no real austerity except in the countries of eastern Europe. For example, Latvia is Europe’s most austere country and also has its fastest growing economy. Estonia implemented an austerity policy that depended largely on cuts in government salaries. There simply is no austerity in most of western Europe or the U.S. As Professor Philipp Bagus explains, «the problem of Europe (and the United States) is not too much but too little austerity—or its complete absence.»
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