Relevant bibliographies by topics / Reverse Auction Bidding

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Reverse Auction Bidding'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Reverse Auction Bidding"

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Jap, Sandy D., and Ernan Haruvy. "Interorganizational Relationships and Bidding Behavior in Industrial Online Reverse Auctions." Journal of Marketing Research 45, no. 5 (October 2008): 550–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.5.550.

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The authors model (1) the impact of the supplier's relationship propensity before the auction on the supplier's bidding aggressiveness in the auction (in terms of the number of bids it submits, the rate at which the bids are submitted, and the price concessions offered) and (2) the impact of bidding behaviors in the auction on the buyer–supplier relationship after auction through longitudinal survey data from 12 online reverse auctions across various product categories. The results suggest that incumbency, many bidders, and a willingness to make specific investments lead to less aggressive bidding, whereas the total number of bids from competing suppliers increases aggressiveness. In turn, aggressive bidding behavior reduces suppliers' disposition toward developing a relationship with the buyer and sours incumbent satisfaction with the relationship. Finally, auctions that are longer in duration can improve the relationship but may risk bidding competition. Collectively, the results suggest that pricing and relationships are intertwined and traded off against each other in complex ways and that the auction does not operate in isolation of key organizational variables.
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Xiang, Jie, Juliang Zhang, T. C. E. Cheng, Jose Maria Sallan, and Guowei Hua. "Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 36, no. 03 (June 2019): 1950013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595919500131.

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Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters, many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disruption probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and “truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA. We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.
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Ma, Benjiang, Zhongmin Zhou, Muhammad Farhan Bashir, and Yuanji Huang. "A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 37, no. 06 (September 15, 2020): 2050032. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595920500323.

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Multi-attribute reverse auction has many advantages for the buyer with the multi-dimensional attribute requirements. However, it is hard to design an optimal auction mechanism for the scenario in practice. Therefore, this paper presents a method transforming multi-attribute auction into single-attribute auction by bidding in deposit. The analysis indicates that our method can reduce not only the transaction risk caused by the supplier’s bid abandonment but also the operating cost and complexity of the multi-attribute auction. Besides, our method meets the incentive compatibility and participation constraint conditions by promising that the highest bidding supplier is the winner in the Auction and can obtain higher expected profits than traditional auctions for the buyer.
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Nichols, John. "Reverse Auction Bidding: Studying Player Behavior." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 144, no. 1 (January 2018): 04017095. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001409.

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Man Chan, Mandel Wai, Dickson K. W. Chiu, and Ada Chi Wai Chung. "Developing Forward and Reverse e-Auction with Alert Support in a Web Service Environment." International Journal of Systems and Service-Oriented Engineering 5, no. 2 (April 2015): 73–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijssoe.2015040105.

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Auction is a common competitive business-to-business (B2B) procurement procedure for supplying products and services, which are solicited, received, and evaluated. Currently, most auction portals support only forward auctions with interactive Web portals, while large companies usually construct their own reverse auction Websites. To provide a unified and more comprehensive solution, the authors develop an E-Auction System (EAS) to provide both forward and reverse auction support in a Web services environment. Buyer and sellers can post their requests via automated Web services for better Enterprise Information System (EIS) integration. Alternatively, they can manually browse the portal with a browser to post requests or submit their bid prices. Their EAS also provides an auction-matching function that automatically matches forward and reverse auction records to help completing business processes effectively. Further, their EAS's CRM system can capture and analyze user bidding behavior and posting to provide personalized Webpages. Besides, alert services provide notification of auction and bid statuses to customers for efficiency.
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Ray, Arun Kumar, Mamata Jenamani, and Pratap K. J. Mohapatra. "Bidding decision in multi-attribute reverse auction." International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences 3, no. 3 (2010): 280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijads.2010.036103.

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Hanák, Tomáš, Ivan Marović, and Nikša Jajac. "Challenges of Electronic Reverse Auctions in Construction Industry—A Review." Economies 8, no. 1 (February 14, 2020): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies8010013.

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The innovation of construction procurement by means of electronic reverse auctions is a controversial subject of discussion among both researchers and practitioners. This paper consolidates and critically discusses current knowledge concerning the adoption and use of electronic reverse auctions in the light of specific features of the construction industry. A systematic literature review has been employed to select papers indexed in Scopus and Web of Science databases. The findings of the study indicate that studies are addressing especially five main areas, i.e., suitability of electronic reverse auction (eRA) for construction tenders, related drivers and barriers, ethical considerations, savings potential and bidding behavior, and bid distribution. Accordingly, the authors are suggesting three directions in which future research should focus on mutual interaction of electronic reverse auctions and long-term effects on construction project outcomes.
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Tayaran, Hojat, and Mehdi Ghazanfari. "A Framework for Online Reverse Auction Based on Market Maker Learning with a Risk-Averse Buyer." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020 (October 6, 2020): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5604246.

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The online reverse auction is considered as a new e-commerce approach to purchasing and procuring goods and materials in the supply chain. With the rapid and ever-expanding development of information technology as well as the increasing usage of the Internet around the world, the use of an online reverse auction method to provide the required items by organizations has increased. Accordingly, in this paper, a new framework for the online reverse auction process is provided that takes both sides of the procurement process, namely, buyer and seller. The proposed process is a multiattribute semisealed multiround online reverse auction. The main feature of the proposed process is that an online market maker facilitates the seller’s bidding process by the estimation of the buyer’s scoring function. For this purpose, a multilayer perceptron neural network was used to estimate the scoring function. In this case, in addition to hiding the buyer’s scoring function, sellers can improve their bids using the estimated scoring function and a nonlinear multiobjective optimization model. The NSGA II algorithm has been used to solve the seller model. To evaluate the proposed model, the auction process is simulated by considering three scoring functions (additive, multiplicative, and risk-aversion) and two types of open and semisealed auctions. The simulation results show that the efficiency of the proposed model is not significantly different from the open auction, and in addition, unlike the open auction, the buyer information was not disclosed.
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Hu, Ying, Yingjie Wang, Yingshu Li, and Xiangrong Tong. "An Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsourcing Based on Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions." Sensors 18, no. 10 (October 14, 2018): 3453. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18103453.

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In order to avoid malicious competition and select high quality crowd workers to improve the utility of crowdsourcing system, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism based on the combination of reverse auction and multi-attribute auction in mobile crowdsourcing. The proposed online incentive mechanism includes two algorithms. One is the crowd worker selection algorithm based on multi-attribute reverse auction that adopts dynamic threshold to make an online decision for whether accept a crowd worker according to its attributes. Another is the payment determination algorithm which determines payment for a crowd worker based on its reputation and quality of sensing data, that is, a crowd worker can get payment equal to the bidding price before performing task only if his reputation reaches good reputation threshold, otherwise he will get payment based on his data sensing quality. We prove that our proposed online incentive mechanism has the properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget-balance, truthfulness and honesty. Through simulations, the efficiency of our proposed online incentive mechanism is verified which can improve the efficiency, adaptability and trust degree of the mobile crowdsourcing system.
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Cheng, Chi-Bin. "Bidding Decision in Reverse Auction Solved by Fuzzy Mathematical Programming and Genetic Algorithm." IFAC Proceedings Volumes 42, no. 19 (2009): 109–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.3182/20090921-3-tr-3005.00021.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Reverse Auction Bidding"

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Mubark, Athmar. "Computer Science Optimization Of Reverse auction : Reverse Auction." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för datavetenskap (DV), 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-68140.

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Many people still confused and misunderstand the differences between auction types: In fact, we have only two major types of auctions which are the forward auction and Reverse auction[22]. In a forward auction a single seller offers an item for sale with many competitive buyers driving the price upward: In a Reverse Auction, a single buyer wants to purchase a service or an item from many sellers, they drive the price downward: There are many differences between these type of auction: Including the progress of the auctions; winner selection criterion and other factors: The Reverse Auction nowadays is one of the most preferred types of online auctions: It gains popularity rapidly because of representing the buyers' side and helps him to drive prices down in contrary with the forward auction or traditional auction. The aim of this study is to identify the most common types of the Reverse auctions and compare them to one another to determine when should be used by a buyer and propose the most efficient implementation model for some types: The results of this study are: achieve a written report and a small demonstrator model on how to implement English Auction and Second-Sealed bid Auction.
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Lacerda, Luiz Carlos Neiva. "Uma análise da variabilidade dos preços adjudicados em pregões eletrônicos na Administração Pública Federal." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9931.

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The transparency subject in which Brazilian Public Administration is concerned, has been more and more debated as well as developed. And the portal ComprasNET has been part of it. Most of the 60 billion reais spent in investments and in different expenses, 22 billion were realized by means of ComprasNET in the reverse auction model. This dissertation main purpose is to analyse price variation concerning a single item, in this case the A4 75gr paper. And also check statistically whether there is any price variation among the several reverse auctions made by the Federal Public Administration. In case of positive answer, this work main purpose is to identify the administrative procedures which may have caused such discrepancies. After this study, suggestions will be presented to change those administrative procedures as well as to reduce the amount paid in such reverse auctions. The recommendations will not only be based on the available legislation but also on decisions and agreements made by TCU, AGU and many other departments of the Federal Public Administration. So finally, this work will try to make it clear to our society, to show it how the tax paid by its citizens has been spent.
O tema transparência na administração pública Brasileira esta cada vez mais em foco e o portal de compras ComprasNET faz parte dos portais de transparência do Governo Federal. Em 2011, dos quase 60 bilhões de reais gastos em investimentos e despesas diversas, 22 bilhões foram realizados por meio do ComprasNET na modalidade pregão eletrônico. Esta dissertação visa analisar a variabilidade de preços para um item específico de material, no caso o papel A4 75 gr, verificando estatisticamente se existe variabilidade de preços nas diversas licitações realizadas pelos órgãos da Administração Pública Federal. Em caso afirmativo, o trabalho visa identificar os procedimentos administrativos que podem ter causado tal divergência. A partir daí, foram apresentadas sugestões para alteração desses procedimentos administrativos, visando a redução do valor pago nos pregões eletrônicos. As recomendações foram baseadas na legislação em vigor e em decisões e acórdãos do TCU, AGU e demais órgãos da Administração Pública Federal. Dessa forma, este trabalho vai de encontro aos anseios da sociedade em ter uma melhor aplicação dos recursos públicos arrecadados por meio de impostos e taxas pagos pela população.
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Galland, Lopez Michel 1973. "Bidding strategies in reverse auctions for the automotive industry procurement." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9299.

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Thesis (M.Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2000.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-51).
The Information Era has brought along a myriad of revolutionary changes. The Internet in particular has given new forms to old paradigms. It is quite a challenge for companies to decide which of all these options best suit their business model and their strategies, hopefully one that also provides them with a competitive edge. One of these new alternatives is online auctions used as a procurement tool. And because of their novelty, it is still unclear whether they are a flawless method of decreasing costs. Although there are many issues concerning this topic, the one addressed here is how the bidders' behavior during the auction (the strategy used to place their bids) affects the outcome, for them as well as for the company setting up the event; and how managers on both sides can maximize the benefits. The basis for the study was a recent auction conducted by autoparts maker Visteon for the procurement of a plastic hose. On the supplier side, the results show that those companies that had a target price before entering the auction, would obtain the most benefits (less sacrifice in profits), since Visteon did not award the projects solely based on price. On the buyer side, having a rich mixture of bidders (diverse in size, location, quality concern for example) enables a more dynamic process (lower prices).
by Michel Galland Lopez.
M.Eng.
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Wilenius, Jim. "Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-102960.

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This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of computer science, optimization and economics. A combinatorial auction is an auction where many items are sold simultaneously and where bidders may submit indivisible combinatorial bids on groups of items. It is commonly believed that good solutions to the allocation problem can be achieved by allowing combinatorial bidding. Determining who wins in a combinatorial auction is fundamentally different from a traditional single-item auction because we are faced with a hard and potentially intractable optimization problem. Also, unless we are limited to truthful mechanisms, game theoretic analysis of the strategic behavior of bidders is still an open problem. We have chosen primarily to study the first-price combinatorial auction, a natural auction widely used in practice. Theoretical analysis of this type of auction is difficult and little has been done previously. In this thesis we investigate and discuss three fundamental questions with significant practical implications for combinatorial auctions. First, because the number of possible bids grows exponentially with the number of items, limitations on the number of bids are typically required. This gives rise to a problem since bidders are unlikely to choose the "correct" bids that make up the globally optimal solution. We provide evidence that an expressive and compact bidding language can be more important than finding the optimal solution. Second, given a first-price (sealed-bid) combinatorial auction, the question of equilibrium bidding strategies remains an open problem. We propose a heuristic for finding such strategies and also present feasible strategies. And finally, is a first-price combinatorial auction worth pursuing compared to the simpler simultaneous (single-item) auction? We prove, through a model capturing many fundamental properties of multiple items scenarios with synergies, that the first-price combinatorial auction produces higher revenue than simultaneous single-item auctions. We provide bounds on revenue, given a significantly more general model, in contrast to previous work.
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Zhong, Fang. "Empirical analyses of online procurement auctions - business value, bidding behavior, learning and incumbent effect." Diss., Atlanta, Ga. : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/19765.

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Thesis (Ph.D)--Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008.
Committee Chair: Wu, D.J.; Committee Member: Keskinocak, Pinar; Committee Member: Narasimhan, Sridhar; Committee Member: Toktay, Beril; Committee Member: Zhang, Han.
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Wolf, Jürgen [Verfasser], Martin [Akademischer Betreuer] Bichler, and Florian von [Akademischer Betreuer] Wangenheim. "Efficiency, Auctioneer Revenue, and Bidding Behavior in the Combinatorial Clock Auction - An Analysis in the Context of European Spectrum Auctions / Jürgen Wolf. Gutachter: Florian von Wangenheim. Betreuer: Martin Bichler." München : Universitätsbibliothek der TU München, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1030099855/34.

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Baradel, Evandro Meira. "Licitação como instrumento de política pública de desenvolvimento regional." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9241.

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This dissertation shows that the bidding issue can be used as a regional development public policy instrument. The biddings in the state of São Paulo are based on a public policy that requires procedures of territorial decentralization. The decree that regulates this policy is focused mainly on giving a favored and simplified treatment to micro and small businesses. On the issue of decentralization the São Paulo government presents innovation in relation to federal legislation dealing with the subject. The decentralization phenomenon can contribute to increase the amount of winning companies that belong to particular region where the biddings producing 'regional economic growth'. However, here we adopt the hypothesis that this differential has not been effective. To verify it, we conducted a case study focused on two units of the University of São Paulo, both located in countryside. Analyzed the presence and electronic (reverse auctions) bidding procedures. The comparative analysis was still supplemented by a questionnaire given to civil servants of the procurement area of various units of this University. The result obtained in this paper shows that the effect of promoting regional development has not been achieved in both cases studied. It concludes that we must go a long way in the discussion about the use of governmental purchasing power as a potential inducer of regional development, which invariably suffers from legal changes. It’s also necessary to adopt complementary public policies.
Esta dissertação aborda a questão das licitações e como elas podem ser usadas como instrumento de política pública de desenvolvimento regional. As licitações do estado de São Paulo são orientadas sob uma política pública que exige procedimentos licitatórios que considerem a descentralização territorial. O decreto que regulamenta tal política tem como principal enfoque o tratamento simplificado e favorecido a micro e pequenas empresas, sendo que o aspecto da descentralização inova em relação à legislação federal que aborda o assunto. O fenômeno descentralizador pode contribuir para o aumento da quantidade de empresas vencedoras pertencentes a uma determinada região na qual ocorrem às licitações, podendo desta forma produzir 'crescimento econômico regional'. Contudo, adota-se aqui a hipótese de que esse diferencial não tem surtido efeito. Para verificar tal hipótese, realizou-se um estudo de caso centrado em duas unidades da Universidade de São Paulo, ambas localizadas no interior do estado. Foram analisadas as licitações realizadas de maneira presencial e eletrônica (pregões). A análise comparativa ainda foi complementada por um questionário submetido aos servidores da área de licitação das diversas unidades desta Universidade. O resultado obtido neste trabalho indica que o efeito de promoção do desenvolvimento regional não ocorreu em ambos os casos estudados. Conclui-se, ainda, que é preciso avançar muito na discussão acerca da utilização do poder de compra do Estado como potencial indutor de desenvolvimento regional. Esta atuação estatal invariavelmente deverá sofrer mudanças legais, sendo necessária, também, a adoção de outras políticas públicas complementares.
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Fernandes, Ciro Campos Christo. "Política de compras e contratações: trajetória e mudanças na administração pública federal brasileira." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/7950.

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The thesis analyses political change in public procurement policy of Brazilian federal administration describing in a systematic way the six cases in which legal rules and procedures suffered substantial changes affecting general laws or statutes: the centralization of purchases in Vargas period, in two decisive moments (1931 and 1940); the revision of rules for bidding by Decree-law 200, in the context of president Castello Branco administrative reform; the enactment of a statute for biddings (Decree-law 2.300 ) in José Sarney government; the congressional approval of a general bidding law directed to fight corruption and collusion in public contracts (Law 8.666, of 1993 ); the frustrated attempt of a new bidding law aligned with the managerial public management reform of Fernando Henrique Cardoso government and the creation of reverse auction (pregão) as a new modality for bids, in 2000. The research focuses the political process of problem formulation, specification of solutions and decision-making, applying John Kingdon`s model to unfold the flows of political process, problems and solutions in each specific historical context. The six cases are described and compared by means of structured narratives and their analysis is supported on theoretical model categories to elucidate how the process of change is developed and which are the relevant actors, ideas, models and political events that explain their circumstances and result.
A tese analisa as mudanças da política de compras e contratações da administração pública federal brasileira descrevendo de forma sistemática os seis casos nos quais as regras e procedimentos sofrem alteração substancial, na forma de leis gerais ou estatutos: a centralização das compras no período Vargas, em dois momentos decisivos (1931 e 1940); a revisão das regras de licitação pelo Decreto-lei n. 200, no contexto da reforma administrativa do governo Castello Branco; a edição de um estatuto das licitações (o Decreto-lei n 2.300) no governo Sarney; a aprovação no Legislativo de uma lei de licitações voltada para o combate à corrupção e ao direcionamento dos contratos públicos (Lei 8.666); a tentativa frustrada de uma nova lei alinhada com a reforma gerencial do primeiro governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso e a criação do pregão como nova modalidade de licitação, em 2000. A pesquisa focaliza o processo político de formulação dos problemas, especificação de soluções e tomada de decisão, com base no modelo de John Kingdon, desdobrando a análise em fluxos do processo político, dos problemas emergentes e das soluções, em cada contexto histórico específico. Os seis casos são descritos por meio de narrativas estruturadas e comparados a partir das categorias do modelo teórico para elucidar como se desenvolveu o processo de mudança, quais os atores relevantes, idéias, modelos e eventos políticos que explicam suas circunstâncias e resultado.
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Zhou, Xun. "Reverse Auction Bidding - Multiple Group Study." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2012-08-11498.

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Reverse Auction Bidding is a recently developed auction method. In this form of bidding process, the roles of the bidders and the owner are interchanged in terms of the form of the economic transaction. The owner's objective is to drive the unit rates down and the bidder's objective is to maintain an acceptable profit level. A study into Reverse Auction Bidding commenced at Texas A&M University in 2004 and continues to this time, with this the eighteenth study in the series. This study is the second multi-group study in the research. In this study, a multiple group comparison was made between different numbers of bidders, with Games One, Two and Three having three, four and ten bidders respectively. All participants were faculty and students from the Department of Construction Science. The critical requirement for the participants is that they should have no prior experience using the Reverse Auction Bidding system. The eighteen studies have concentrated on new players, with future studies planned for repeat participants. A number of the recent case studies have shown personality has an impact on the performance of the bidders. However, this work was not controlled for personality, as the research objective was to determine the impact of a different number of bidders in a game. The Keirsey Temperament Sorter test was completed by all participants so that the results could be understood in terms of personality impact on the level of return to each participant. The results showed the number of bidders has a significant impact on the individual returns confirming the earlier work on varying the number of bidders. An increase in the number of bidders was shown to lead to a more competitive economic environment, which given usual economic circumstances lead to a reduction in the number of firms interested in bidding, for the self-evident economic reasons. This work points to the need to investigate a bidding group size of five or six, which is likely to be the self-constrained upper limit in a real economic system. Some interesting observations on the personality types suggest that further work is required in this area.
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Yuan, Shu. "Reverse Auction Bidding - Bid Arrivals Analysis." Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151385.

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Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) is a recently developed procurement method that can be used by the construction industry. The technique is different from a traditional auction system, since RAB system uses a bidding activity method that is completed anonymously by pre-qualified bidders during a fixed auction time. The basic premise for the auction is that the current best auction price is available for viewing during the whole auction process by both bidders and owner. The apparent incentive is for noncompetitive bidders to lower the price. There are however controlling factor beyond the reach of owners, such as market demand, lending restrictions, stakeholder expectations and risk tolerance levels, that impact on price levels. However, owners continue to attempt to drive down prices using this technique. A study into the mechanics of RAB was launched at Texas A&M University in 2004. This ongoing study of RAB continues to this time with eighteen case studies. This nineteenth study looks at the time series bid data from some of the prior work. Nine case studies were selected from the previous case studies. These nine studies provided untainted data with 6674 RAB bid arrivals by prior investigator actions. This study concerns the statistical process of bid arrivals with time. The hypothesis to be tested is that the RAB bid arrivals timing can be modeled with a statistical process. The analysis reviewed the fit for several types of distribution, including Gaussian and Poissionian. The best fit was modeled by non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The first conclusion from the analysis is that RAB bid arrivals follows a Poisson process, termed non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The second conclusion is that the controlling Poissionian process has a square root factor. The NHPP model for RAB provides a tool for future studies of RAB in real time. Future work is suggested on the inter-time periods for the bidding.
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Books on the topic "Reverse Auction Bidding"

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Back, Kerry E. Information, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241148.003.0024.

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The chapter describes some asymmetric information models of liquidity. In these models, trades move prices because of the possibility that the trades are based on information not known to the market. A strategic trader is one who takes into consideration that her trades move prices. The chapter describes the Glosten‐Milgrom model of the bidask spread, the Kyle model of market depth, the Glosten model of limit‐order markets, and models of auctions. Except for the auction models, prices are set in these models by uninformed market makers who face adverse selection from informed traders. In the auction models, prices are set by informed individuals bidding against one another. The winner’s curse, the revenue equivalence theorem, and related aspects of auctions are explained.
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Fund, International Monetary, ed. Auction format matters: Evidence on bidding behavior and seller revenue. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, 1995.

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Book chapters on the topic "Reverse Auction Bidding"

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Pan, Xiang-lin, and Xu-hua Lv. "The Optimal Bidding Strategies Research on Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Mechanism." In Proceedings of 2013 4th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI2013), 217–23. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40060-5_21.

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Bichler, Martin, Pasha Shabalin, and Jürgen Wolf. "Efficiency, Auctioneer Revenue, and Bidding Behavior in the Combinatorial Clock Auction." In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 38–39. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_10.

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"Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences." In Putting Auction Theory to Work, 98–156. Cambridge University Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511813825.008.

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Conference papers on the topic "Reverse Auction Bidding"

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Da-yong, Hu, and Feng Yu-qiang. "Research on post-bidding bundle strategy for online reverse auction." In 2010 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2010.5719784.

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Chen, Deyan, and Dingwei Wang. "The analysis of bidding strategies in multi-attribute reverse auction with risk-averse suppliers." In 2017 29th Chinese Control And Decision Conference (CCDC). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ccdc.2017.7979106.

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Koirala, Ravi Chandra, Keshav Dahal, Santiago Matalonga, and Rameshwar Rijal. "A Supply Chain Model with Blockchain-Enabled Reverse Auction Bidding Process for Transparency and Efficiency." In 2019 13th International Conference on Software, Knowledge, Information Management and Applications (SKIMA). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/skima47702.2019.8982476.

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Zong-you, Hong, and Wang Ding-Wei. "Bidding strategies in sealed-bid reverse multi-attribute auctions." In 2011 23rd Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ccdc.2011.5968482.

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Mao, Weichao, Zhenzhe Zheng, Fan Wu, and Guihai Chen. "Online Pricing for Revenue Maximization with Unknown Time Discounting Valuations." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/61.

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Online pricing mechanisms have been widely applied to resource allocation in multi-agent systems. However, most of the existing online pricing mechanisms assume buyers have fixed valuations over the time horizon, which cannot capture the dynamic nature of valuation in emerging applications. In this paper, we study the problem of revenue maximization in online auctions with unknown time discounting valuations, and model it as non-stationary multi-armed bandit optimization. We design an online pricing mechanism, namely Biased-UCB, based on unique features of the discounting valuations. We use competitive analysis to theoretically evaluate the performance guarantee of our pricing mechanism, and derive the competitive ratio. Numerical results show that our design achieves good performance in terms of revenue maximization on a real-world bidding dataset.
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"SAFE REVERSE AUCTIONS PROTOCOL - Adding Treatment Against Collusive Shill Bidding and Sniping Attacks." In International Conference on Security and Cryptography. SciTePress - Science and and Technology Publications, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0002228902390244.

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Yang, Shuo, Ruiwen Zhao, Fan Wu, Shaojie Tang, Xiaofeng Gao, and Guihai Chen. "Revenue Maximization and Contract Enforcement through Representative Bidding in Ad Auctions." In GLOBECOM 2016 - 2016 IEEE Global Communications Conference. IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2016.7842229.

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Yang, Yingmei. "Game analysis of auction and bidding payment equivalence theorem and the optimal reversed price." In 2013 International Conference of Information Technology and Industrial Engineering. Southampton, UK: WIT Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2495/itie130041.

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