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Journal articles on the topic 'Reverse Auction Bidding'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Jap, Sandy D., and Ernan Haruvy. "Interorganizational Relationships and Bidding Behavior in Industrial Online Reverse Auctions." Journal of Marketing Research 45, no. 5 (October 2008): 550–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.5.550.

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The authors model (1) the impact of the supplier's relationship propensity before the auction on the supplier's bidding aggressiveness in the auction (in terms of the number of bids it submits, the rate at which the bids are submitted, and the price concessions offered) and (2) the impact of bidding behaviors in the auction on the buyer–supplier relationship after auction through longitudinal survey data from 12 online reverse auctions across various product categories. The results suggest that incumbency, many bidders, and a willingness to make specific investments lead to less aggressive bidding, whereas the total number of bids from competing suppliers increases aggressiveness. In turn, aggressive bidding behavior reduces suppliers' disposition toward developing a relationship with the buyer and sours incumbent satisfaction with the relationship. Finally, auctions that are longer in duration can improve the relationship but may risk bidding competition. Collectively, the results suggest that pricing and relationships are intertwined and traded off against each other in complex ways and that the auction does not operate in isolation of key organizational variables.

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2

Xiang, Jie, Juliang Zhang, T. C. E. Cheng, Jose Maria Sallan, and Guowei Hua. "Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 36, no. 03 (June 2019): 1950013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595919500131.

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Although supply disruption is ubiquitous because of natural or man-made disasters, many firms still use the price-only reverse auction (only the cost is considered) to make purchase decisions. We first study the suppliers’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer’s expected revenue under the first- and second-price price-only reverse auctions when the suppliers are unreliable and have private information on their costs and disruption probabilities. We show that the two auctions are equivalent and not efficient. Then we propose two easily implementable reverse auctions, namely the first-price and second-price format announced penalty reverse auction (APRA), and show that the “revenue equivalence principle” holds, i.e., the two auctions generate the same ex ante expected profit to the buyer. We further show that the two reverse auctions are efficient and “truth telling” is the suppliers’ dominant strategy in the second-price format APRA. We conduct numerical studies to assess the impacts of some parameters on the bidding strategies, the buyer’s profit and social profit.

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3

Ma, Benjiang, Zhongmin Zhou, Muhammad Farhan Bashir, and Yuanji Huang. "A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 37, no. 06 (September 15, 2020): 2050032. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595920500323.

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Multi-attribute reverse auction has many advantages for the buyer with the multi-dimensional attribute requirements. However, it is hard to design an optimal auction mechanism for the scenario in practice. Therefore, this paper presents a method transforming multi-attribute auction into single-attribute auction by bidding in deposit. The analysis indicates that our method can reduce not only the transaction risk caused by the supplier’s bid abandonment but also the operating cost and complexity of the multi-attribute auction. Besides, our method meets the incentive compatibility and participation constraint conditions by promising that the highest bidding supplier is the winner in the Auction and can obtain higher expected profits than traditional auctions for the buyer.

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Nichols, John. "Reverse Auction Bidding: Studying Player Behavior." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 144, no. 1 (January 2018): 04017095. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001409.

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5

Man Chan, Mandel Wai, Dickson K. W. Chiu, and Ada Chi Wai Chung. "Developing Forward and Reverse e-Auction with Alert Support in a Web Service Environment." International Journal of Systems and Service-Oriented Engineering 5, no. 2 (April 2015): 73–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijssoe.2015040105.

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Auction is a common competitive business-to-business (B2B) procurement procedure for supplying products and services, which are solicited, received, and evaluated. Currently, most auction portals support only forward auctions with interactive Web portals, while large companies usually construct their own reverse auction Websites. To provide a unified and more comprehensive solution, the authors develop an E-Auction System (EAS) to provide both forward and reverse auction support in a Web services environment. Buyer and sellers can post their requests via automated Web services for better Enterprise Information System (EIS) integration. Alternatively, they can manually browse the portal with a browser to post requests or submit their bid prices. Their EAS also provides an auction-matching function that automatically matches forward and reverse auction records to help completing business processes effectively. Further, their EAS's CRM system can capture and analyze user bidding behavior and posting to provide personalized Webpages. Besides, alert services provide notification of auction and bid statuses to customers for efficiency.

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Ray, Arun Kumar, Mamata Jenamani, and Pratap K. J. Mohapatra. "Bidding decision in multi-attribute reverse auction." International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences 3, no. 3 (2010): 280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijads.2010.036103.

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7

Hanák, Tomáš, Ivan Marović, and Nikša Jajac. "Challenges of Electronic Reverse Auctions in Construction Industry—A Review." Economies 8, no. 1 (February 14, 2020): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies8010013.

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The innovation of construction procurement by means of electronic reverse auctions is a controversial subject of discussion among both researchers and practitioners. This paper consolidates and critically discusses current knowledge concerning the adoption and use of electronic reverse auctions in the light of specific features of the construction industry. A systematic literature review has been employed to select papers indexed in Scopus and Web of Science databases. The findings of the study indicate that studies are addressing especially five main areas, i.e., suitability of electronic reverse auction (eRA) for construction tenders, related drivers and barriers, ethical considerations, savings potential and bidding behavior, and bid distribution. Accordingly, the authors are suggesting three directions in which future research should focus on mutual interaction of electronic reverse auctions and long-term effects on construction project outcomes.

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8

Tayaran, Hojat, and Mehdi Ghazanfari. "A Framework for Online Reverse Auction Based on Market Maker Learning with a Risk-Averse Buyer." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020 (October 6, 2020): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5604246.

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The online reverse auction is considered as a new e-commerce approach to purchasing and procuring goods and materials in the supply chain. With the rapid and ever-expanding development of information technology as well as the increasing usage of the Internet around the world, the use of an online reverse auction method to provide the required items by organizations has increased. Accordingly, in this paper, a new framework for the online reverse auction process is provided that takes both sides of the procurement process, namely, buyer and seller. The proposed process is a multiattribute semisealed multiround online reverse auction. The main feature of the proposed process is that an online market maker facilitates the seller’s bidding process by the estimation of the buyer’s scoring function. For this purpose, a multilayer perceptron neural network was used to estimate the scoring function. In this case, in addition to hiding the buyer’s scoring function, sellers can improve their bids using the estimated scoring function and a nonlinear multiobjective optimization model. The NSGA II algorithm has been used to solve the seller model. To evaluate the proposed model, the auction process is simulated by considering three scoring functions (additive, multiplicative, and risk-aversion) and two types of open and semisealed auctions. The simulation results show that the efficiency of the proposed model is not significantly different from the open auction, and in addition, unlike the open auction, the buyer information was not disclosed.

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Hu, Ying, Yingjie Wang, Yingshu Li, and Xiangrong Tong. "An Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsourcing Based on Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions." Sensors 18, no. 10 (October 14, 2018): 3453. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s18103453.

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In order to avoid malicious competition and select high quality crowd workers to improve the utility of crowdsourcing system, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism based on the combination of reverse auction and multi-attribute auction in mobile crowdsourcing. The proposed online incentive mechanism includes two algorithms. One is the crowd worker selection algorithm based on multi-attribute reverse auction that adopts dynamic threshold to make an online decision for whether accept a crowd worker according to its attributes. Another is the payment determination algorithm which determines payment for a crowd worker based on its reputation and quality of sensing data, that is, a crowd worker can get payment equal to the bidding price before performing task only if his reputation reaches good reputation threshold, otherwise he will get payment based on his data sensing quality. We prove that our proposed online incentive mechanism has the properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget-balance, truthfulness and honesty. Through simulations, the efficiency of our proposed online incentive mechanism is verified which can improve the efficiency, adaptability and trust degree of the mobile crowdsourcing system.

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10

Cheng, Chi-Bin. "Bidding Decision in Reverse Auction Solved by Fuzzy Mathematical Programming and Genetic Algorithm." IFAC Proceedings Volumes 42, no. 19 (2009): 109–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.3182/20090921-3-tr-3005.00021.

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11

Morales-Camargo, Emmanuel, Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein, and Jaime F. Zender. "Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, no. 4 (August 2013): 1271–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000409.

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AbstractAn experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

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Zeng, Xianke, and Yuqiang Feng. "English multi-attribute reverse auction model with the minimum non-monetary attributes bidding values." International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences 7, no. 4 (2014): 405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijads.2014.065222.

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13

Lee, Jin Hyung. "Tradeoff between Default Risk and Efficiency Loss." CESifo Economic Studies 66, no. 1 (November 14, 2019): 91–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifz013.

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Abstract The study characterizes an equilibrium bid function with three bidders in an average bid auction (ABA), where a winning bid is the one closest to an average of all submitted bids, when a cost overrun can occur, and an insolvent winner is penalized. First of all, every bidder bids an identical amount in the absence of the penalty. Meanwhile, when the penalty is charged high enough to prevent all bidders from breaching the contract due to cost overruns, either some bidders bid identically and the rest follow a strictly increasing bidding strategy, or all bidders place an identical bid. Based on the characterization, the ABA is compared to the first price reverse auction (FPA) in terms of a buyer’s benefit. The ABA could be more beneficial to the buyer without any penalty in spite of an insolvent winner’s default. If nobody defaults on his bid due to the high penalty, however, the FPA is good to the buyer. This result partly explains the rationale for the ABA in Italy. (JEL codes: C78, D82)

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14

Alevy, Jonathan E., Oscar Cristi, and Oscar Melo. "Right-to-Choose Auctions: A Field Study of Water Markets in the Limari Valley of Chile." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 39, no. 2 (April 2010): 213–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500007255.

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Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limari Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for market re-design.

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15

Beltrán, Fernando, and Natalia Santamaría. "A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem." Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences 2006 (September 18, 2006): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/jamds/2006/27417.

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One not-so-intuitive result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem, which states that as long as an auction complies with some conditions, it will on average generate the same revenue to an auctioneer as the revenue generated by any other auction that complies with them. Surprisingly, the conditions are not defined on the payment rules to the bidders but on the fact that the bidders do not bid below a reserve value—set by the auctioneer—the winner is the one with the highest bidding and there is a common equilibrium bidding function used by all bidders. In this paper, we verify such result using extensive simulation of a broad range of auctions and focus on the variability or fluctuations of the results around the average. Such fluctuations are observed and measured in two dimensions for each type of auction: as the number of auctions grows and as the number of bidders increases.

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16

Haruvy, Ernan, and Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc. "A Study of Bidding Behavior in Voluntary-Pay Philanthropic Auctions." Journal of Marketing 82, no. 3 (May 2018): 124–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jm.16.0476.

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The authors investigate compliance behavior and revenue implications in winner-pay and voluntary-pay auctions in charity and noncharity settings. In the voluntary-pay format, the seller asks all bidders to pay their own high bid. The authors explore motives and boundary conditions for compliance behavior based on internal and external triggers of social norms. The voluntary-pay format generates higher revenue than the winner-pay format for charity auctions, despite imperfect compliance, but it generates lower revenues in noncharity settings. To characterize bidding strategy, the authors study time to bid, auction choice, and jump bidding and find evidence that bidders in voluntary-pay auctions more commonly use jump bidding and late entry. The findings have important implications for marketing managers, augmenting the growing stream of empirical auction studies and work on corporate social responsibility. Specifically, combining an auction with a charitable cause may result in increased revenues, but managers should ensure that they are accounting for differential compliance rates between auction formats. Even if low-compliance bidders can be identified and screened out, doing so is not advantageous, because noncompliant bidders bid up prices.

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17

Milgrom, Paul. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 3 (August 1, 1989): 3–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.3.3.3.

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The “Winner's Curse,” is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions turned up by modern research into auctions. Another is the theoretical proposition that, for example, a sealed-bid Treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the Treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid. There are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed-bid auction and the Dutch auction. Other results explain the use of standard auctions as the selling schemes that maximize the welfare of the bid–taker, or as schemes that lead to efficient allocations, minimize transaction costs, guard against corruption by the bid-taker's agents, or mitigate the effects of collusion among the bidders. Finally, for some environments, the theory makes sharp, testable predictions about the bids and profits of various classes of bidders. This paper relies mainly on theory to study these issues, but it will also review some experimental evidence and recent empirical studies testing the predictions of the theory.

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Brunner, Christoph, Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, and John O. Ledyard. "An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.1.39.

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This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible package bidding format developed by the FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the laboratory data. When value complementarities are present, package bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences among the combinatorial auction formats both in terms of efficiency and seller revenue, however. Notably, the combinatorial clock provides the highest revenue. The FCC's flexible package bidding format performed worse than the alternatives, which is one of the main reasons why it was not implemented. (JEL D44, H82)

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19

Decarolis, Francesco, Maris Goldmanis, and Antonio Penta. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions." Management Science 66, no. 10 (October 2020): 4433–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3457.

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The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the generalized second-price auction (GSP, used by Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo!) and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction in terms of both revenues and efficiency. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.

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20

Lu, Yixin, Alok Gupta, Wolfgang Ketter, and Eric van Heck. "Information Transparency in Business-to-Business Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure." Management Science 65, no. 9 (September 2019): 4261–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3143.

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One of the central issues in auction design is how much information should be disclosed to bidders. In this paper, we examine bidder's identity disclosure in sequential business-to-business (B2B) auctions. Specifically, we compare two information disclosure policies, one that publicly discloses winners’ identities (the status quo) and an alternative policy that conceals winners’ identities. Using a large-scale field experiment in the Dutch flower auction market, we find that concealing winners’ identities can significantly increase the average winning price and thereby raise the seller’s revenue. We further explore the underlying mechanism that drives the observed effect. The empirical analysis of bidding behavior in these auctions suggests that bidders tend to imitate some of their competitors who have won in previous rounds of auctions and shade their bids accordingly. Concealing winners’ identities can disrupt such imitation heuristic, which in turn mitigates the price-declining trend in sequential rounds. Our findings have important implications for the design of information disclosure policies in B2B auction markets. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

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Lu, Yixin, Alok Gupta, Wolfgang Ketter, and Eric van Heck. "Dynamic Decision Making in Sequential Business-to-Business Auctions: A Structural Econometric Approach." Management Science 65, no. 8 (August 2019): 3853–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3118.

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We develop a dynamic structural model of competitive bidding in multiunit sequential business-to-business auctions. Our model accounts for two notable characteristics of these auctions: (i) bidders have multiple purchase opportunities for the same product, and (ii) winning bidders in each round can acquire multiple units of the same product. We apply the model to bidding data from the world’s largest flower wholesale market at which trades are facilitated through fast-paced, sequential, Dutch auctions. Using a two-step estimation approach, we are able to recover the structural parameters effectively and efficiently. We then conduct policy counterfactuals to evaluate the performance of alternative design choices. The results suggest that the current auction practice still has ample room for improvement. In light of this, we propose an optimization framework that can facilitate auctioneers’ decisions in making the trade-off between revenue maximization and operational efficiency. This paper was accepted by Lorin Hitt, information systems.

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Horlen, Joe, Neil Eldin, and Yashambari Ajinkya. "Reverse Auctions: Controversial Bidding Practice." Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Practice 131, no. 1 (January 2005): 76–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(asce)1052-3928(2005)131:1(76).

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23

Jiao, Feng. "Bidding Behaviors in eBay Auctions: Secret Reservation Price and Endogenous Entry." Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 3, no. 5 (November 15, 2011): 326–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jebs.v3i5.286.

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This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of secret and public reservation price, the bidders choose the optimal bidding function and the seller selects equilibrium reservation price. This model argues that the choice of secret reservation price is rational for the seller, as they can generate higher revenue in certain conditions. It predicts that, under endogenous entry, secret reservation price leads to higher revenue since it attracts more bidders to the auction. This effect is more noticeable for luxury goods. However, secret and public reservation prices generate identical revenue for the seller if entry is exogenous. Furthermore, the results are supported by numerous recent empirical works.

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Bhargava, Hemant K., Gergely Csapó, and Rudolf Müller. "On Optimal Auctions for Mixing Exclusive and Shared Matching in Platforms." Management Science 66, no. 6 (June 2020): 2653–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3309.

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Platforms create value by matching participants on alternate sides of the marketplace. Although many platforms practice one-to-one matching (e.g., Uber), others can conduct and monetize one-to-many simultaneous matches (e.g., lead-marketing platforms). Both formats involve one dimension of private information, a participant’s valuation for exclusive or shared allocation, respectively. This paper studies the problem of designing an auction format for platforms that mix the modes rather than limit to one and, therefore, involve both dimensions of information. We focus on incentive-compatible auctions (i.e., where truthful bidding is optimal) because of ease of participation and implementation. We formulate the problem to find the revenue-maximizing incentive-compatible auction as a mathematical program. Although hard to solve, the mathematical program leads to heuristic auction designs that are simple to implement, provide good revenue, and have speedy performance, all critical in practice. It also enables creation of upper bounds on the (unknown) optimal auction revenue, which are useful benchmarks for our proposed auction designs. By demonstrating a tight gap for our proposed two-dimensional reserve-price-based mechanism, we prove that it has excellent revenue performance and places low information and computational burden on the platform and participants. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

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25

Abdul Aziz, M. A., Nofri Yenita Dahlan, and S. M. Shokri. "Competitive Bidding Exercise for the First Track Gas-Fired Power Plant in Prai Malaysia; Revenue Assessment for a New Plant." Applied Mechanics and Materials 785 (August 2015): 484–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.785.484.

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Competitive bidding exercise for a new power generation has been introduced in 2011 to bring Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) into competitive electricity market. The competitive bidding process is an auction based mechanism organized by Energy Commission (EC) Malaysia. EC has successfully completed two auctions; 1) international competitive bidding exercise (Track 1) for a new capacity in Prai Penang, Malaysia and 2) restricted tender (Track 2) for the renewal of operating licenses of the first generation Independent Power Producer (IPP) and Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) power plants. The Track 1 has won by Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) for a 1,071 MW CCGT power plant, at a levelised tariff of 34.7 sen/kWh. On the other hand Track 2 has been awarded to Genting Sanyen Power and Segari Energy Ventures for another 10 years extension and TNB Pasir Gudang for another 5 years extension. This paper discusses the competitive bidding exercise implemented in Malaysia for new power plants. It also evaluates the revenues of TNB from the Track 1 bidding exercise. Sensitivity analysis is performed to study the impact of uncertainty in the fuel price, capacity rate financial and fixed and variable operating rate on the revenue of the plant. Result shows that the changes in the fuel price are the largest source of uncertainty for business investment in power plant and biggest variable in determining levelised.

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Roberts, James W., and Andrew Sweeting. "When Should Sellers Use Auctions?" American Economic Review 103, no. 5 (August 1, 2013): 1830–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.5.1830.

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A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency. (JEL D44, L73, Q23)

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Tsung, Chen-Kun, Hann-Jang Ho, and Sing-Ling Lee. "Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2013 (2013): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/206386.

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To realize the specific results in the sponsored search auctions, most advertisers submit particular bid prices. The bidding behaviors with specific purposes are called as the strategic bidding. However, some strategic bidding behaviors will result in negative effects, such as the elimination of the equilibrium and the payment increase for some advertisers. The bidding behaviors with negative results are termed as the vindictive bidding. We survey four strategic bidding behaviors which include a rational bidding and three vindictive bidding strategies. In this paper, we study the relationship between the effects resulted by the vindictive bidding and the valuations of the vindictive advertisers. In our experiments, the search engine provider (SEP) is benefited by all vindictive bidding behaviors, and the increment of the SEP's revenue is proportional to the degree of the vindictiveness. Bidding vindictively without sacrificing the own utility improves the advertiser's utility with high probability. Moreover, we observe that the SEP's revenue is improved by the following situations. First, the vindictive advertiser with low valuation in the keywords with high market value results in more SEP's revenue than that in the keywords with low market value. The second case is to raise the bidding competition between advertisers.

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Che, Yeon-Koo, and Jinwoo Kim. "Bidding with Securities: Comment." American Economic Review 100, no. 4 (September 1, 2010): 1929–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1929.

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Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment, we obtain the opposite results to DKS's by assuming that a higher return requires a higher investment cost. Given this latter assumption, steeper securities are more vulnerable to adverse selection, and may yield lower expected revenue, than flatter ones. (JEL D44)

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Quint, Daniel, and Kenneth Hendricks. "A Theory of Indicative Bidding." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, no. 2 (May 1, 2018): 118–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160290.

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When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids—nonbinding preliminary bids—to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly increasing strategies, with bidders “pooling” over a finite number of bids. The equilibrium helps the seller select high value bidders with higher likelihood, although the highest value bidders are not always selected. When the number of potential bidders is large, revenue and total surplus are both higher than when entry is unrestricted. (JEL D44, D83)

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Liu, Shulin, and Xiaohu Han. "Sequential First-Price Auction with Randomly Arriving Buyers." Journal of Systems Science and Information 6, no. 1 (March 26, 2018): 29–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.21078/jssi-2018-029-06.

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AbstractIn this paper we reanalyze Said’s (2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said (2011). This implies that the well-known “revenue equivalence theorem” holds true for Said’s (2011) dynamic model setting.

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Qian, Xiaohu, Shu-Cherng Fang, Min Huang, Tiantian Nie, and Xingwei Wang. "Bidding Decisions with Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking in Reverse Auctions." Group Decision and Negotiation 28, no. 4 (June 8, 2019): 757–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09624-7.

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Othman, Muhaini, Siti Najiha Shamsudin, Mohd Hafizul Afifi Abdullah, Munirah Mohd Yusof, and Rozlini Mohamed. "iBid: A Competitive Bidding Environment for Multiscale Tailor." JOIV : International Journal on Informatics Visualization 1, no. 4-2 (November 16, 2017): 256. http://dx.doi.org/10.30630/joiv.1.4-2.81.

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Nowadays, various online auction web services are available, allowing people to bid on items to be purchased at a competitive price. The same approach is applicable to allow people to bid on projects on Freelancer website. Here, we present an environment for customers to publish a project online, whereby marketers are able to bid on projects, called the iBid system. The iBid system demonstrates an application of bidding system which is capable of assisting customers find local tailors according to three criteria namely location, type of sewing and cost. Reversed auction mechanism is used where the customer will control the business. The prototyping methodology approach has been used to develop the system running on a PHP server and a MySQL database.

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Riley, John G. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 3 (August 1, 1989): 41–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.3.3.41.

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The first objective of this paper has been to explain why it is that expected seller revenue is the same under very different auction rules. The second objective has been to explain why revenue equivalence no longer holds once the central assumptions of risk aversion and independence of beliefs are modified. The effect of risk aversion is to make a sealed high bid auction more attractive from a seller's viewpoint. The effect of correlated beliefs is to favor open bidding. Which of the two factors dominates under plausible assumptions about risk aversion parameters and about the degree to which beliefs are correlated remains an important open question.

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Feldman, Robert Alan, and Vincent Reinhart. "Auction Format Matters: Evidenceon Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue." IMF Working Papers 95, no. 47 (1995): i. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451846607.001.

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Feldman, Robert A., and Vincent Reinhart. "Auction Format Matters: Evidence on Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue." Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund 43, no. 2 (June 1996): 395. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3867402.

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Bulow, Jeremy, and Paul Klemperer. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?" American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (August 1, 2009): 1544–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1544.

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We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry—precisely because of its inefficiency—it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. (JEL D44, G34, L13)

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Groves, Vivienne. "Charity auctions with multiple goods: Bidding behavior and revenue." Economics Letters 111, no. 2 (May 2011): 166–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.007.

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Kanoria, Yash, and Hamid Nazerzadeh. "Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions." Operations Research 69, no. 2 (March 2021): 509–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2007.

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How can an auctioneer optimize revenue by learning the reserve prices from the bids in the previous auctions? How should the long-term incentives and strategic behavior of the bidders be taken into account? Motivated in part by applications in online advertising, in “Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions,” Kanoria and Nazerzadeh investigate these questions. They show that if a seller attempts to dynamically update a common reserve price using the bidding history, buyers will shade their bids, which can hurt the revenue. However, when there is more than one buyer, using personalized reserve prices, the auctioneer can achieve a near-optimal revenue. In their proposed mechanism, the personal reserve price for each buyer is determined using the historical bids of other buyers.

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Schuster, Ervin G., and Michael J. Niccolucci. "Sealed-bid versus oral-auction timber offerings: implications of imperfect data." Canadian Journal of Forest Research 24, no. 1 (January 1, 1994): 87–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/x94-013.

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The central issue regarding sealed-bidding versus oral-auction timber offerings focuses on the question of revenue generation. On this point, the literature provides no consistent answer. This study measured the difference'in bid price between sealed-bid and oral-auction timber offerings in the Northern Region of the U.S. Forest Service. A two-step estimation process, involving a probit model followed by a linear regression model, was used. That two-step process did not produce the expected results because the timber offering data used did not correspond to quality expectations; specifically, sale method was not always assigned on the basis of offering characteristics. Subsequent analyses indicated that when timber offerings in the Northern Region are randomly assigned a sale method, sealed-bid sales generated about $6 per 103 board ft (1 board ft = 2.4 dm3) more than oral auction sales. When the sale method is based on offering characteristics, oral auction sales produced revenues of about $9 per 103 board ft higher than sealed-bid offerings. Recommendations for handling data quality problems are provided.

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Rockerbie, Duane W. "Revenue Sharing and Collusive Behavior in the Major League Baseball Posting System." Economies 8, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies8030071.

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This paper uses auction theory to explain the unique design of the 1998–2013 posting system agreed to between Major League Baseball and the Japanese Nippon Professional Baseball League that allowed for the transfer of baseball players from Japan to the United States. It has some similarities and many differences from the transfer system used to obtain players in European football. The unique features of the posting system were a compromise between Major League Baseball clubs and Nippon Professional Baseball clubs with the understanding that the former was a collusive group of club owners. Revenue sharing is a method to enforce a system of side payments to collusive bidders. It is then profit-maximizing to have the bidder with the highest net surplus from the player win the auction. Changes to the revenue sharing system used in Major League Baseball reduced the ability of club owners to bid for Japanese players, hence changes to the bidding rules of the posting system coincided at the same time.

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Rockerbie, Duane. "Free Agent Auctions and Revenue Sharing: A Simple Exposition." Journal of Sport Management 23, no. 1 (January 2009): 87–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jsm.23.1.87.

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This article uses a simple approach to address the issue of how revenue sharing in professional sports leagues can affect the allocation of free agent players to teams. To affect the allocation of free agents, the imposition of revenue sharing must alter the ranking of bidding teams in terms of maximum salary offers. Two types of revenue sharing systems are considered: traditional gate revenue sharing and pooled revenue sharing. The article suggests that team rankings for ability to pay are not affected by pooled revenue sharing, however the distribution of player salaries will be affected asymmetrically. Traditional gate revenue sharing can alter the ability to pay rankings for teams, depending upon playing schedules and the closeness of revenues between closely ranked teams. Revenue data for two professional sports leagues provide evidence in favor of the model predictions.

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Zeithammer, Robert. "Soft Floors in Auctions." Management Science 65, no. 9 (September 2019): 4204–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3164.

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Several of the auction-driven exchanges that facilitate programmatic buying of internet display advertising have recently introduced “soft floors” in addition to standard reserve prices (called “hard floors” in the industry). A soft floor is a bid level below which a winning bidder pays his own bid instead of paying the second-highest bid as in a second-price auction most ad exchanges use by default. This paper characterizes soft floors’ revenue-generating potential as a function of the distribution of bidder independent private values. When bidders are symmetric (identically distributed), soft floors have no effect on revenue, because a symmetric equilibrium always exists in strictly monotonic bidding strategies, and standard revenue-equivalence arguments thus apply. The industry often motivates soft floors as tools for extracting additional expected revenue from an occasional high bidder, for example a bidder retargeting the consumer making the impression. Such asymmetries in the distribution of bidder preferences do not automatically make soft floors profitable. This paper presents two examples of tractable modeling assumptions about such occasional high bidders, with one example implying low soft floors always hurt revenues because of strategic bid-shading by the regular bidders, and the other example implying high soft floors can increase revenues by making the regular bidders bid more aggressively. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

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Rhuggenaath, Jason, Reza Refaei Afshar, Alp Akcay, Yingqian Zhang, Uzay Kaymak, Fatih Çolak, and Muratcan Tanyerli. "Maximizing revenue for publishers using header bidding and ad exchange auctions." Operations Research Letters 49, no. 2 (March 2021): 250–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.01.008.

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Wyld, David C. "Current Research On Reverse Auctions: Part I -Understanding The Nature Of Reverse Auctions And The Price And Process Savings Associated With Competitive Bidding." International Journal of Managing Value and Supply Chains 2, no. 3 (September 30, 2011): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/ijmvsc.2011.2302.

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Elfenbein, Daniel W., and Brian McManus. "A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2, no. 2 (May 1, 2010): 28–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.2.2.28.

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To study whether consumers will pay more for products that generate charitable donations, we analyze data from eBay on charity and noncharity auctions of otherwise identical products. Charity prices are 6 percent higher, on average, than noncharity prices. Bids below the closing price are also higher, as are bids by individuals bidding on identical charity and noncharity products. Bidders appear to value charity revenue at least partially as a public good, as they submit bids earlier in charity auctions, stimulating other bidders to bid more aggressively. Our results help explain why firms may pledge charitable donations, green production, or similar activities. (JEL D12, D44, D64, L81, M14, M31)

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YENIYURT, SENGUN, STEVIE WATSON, CRAIG R. CARTER, and CYNTHIA KAY STEVENS. "TO BID OR NOT TO BID: DRIVERS OF BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN ELECTRONIC REVERSE AUCTIONS." Journal of Supply Chain Management 47, no. 1 (January 2011): 60–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-493x.2010.03214.x.

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Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. "First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue." Econometrica 85, no. 1 (2017): 107–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta13958.

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Tenorio, Rafael. "Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-Unit Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis." Review of Economics and Statistics 75, no. 2 (May 1993): 302. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2109436.

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Qian, Xiaohu, Min Huang, Loo Hay Lee, Xingwei Wang, and Shanshan Tang. "Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions." IEEE Access 7 (2019): 68540–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2918362.

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Dodonova, Anna, and Yuri Khoroshilov. "Preemptive bidding in common value takeover auctions: Social surplus and the target’s revenue." North American Journal of Economics and Finance 53 (July 2020): 101208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2020.101208.

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