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1
Clemm von Hohenberg, Bernhard, and Paul C. Bauer. "Horseshoe Patterns: Visualizing Partisan Media Trust in Germany." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 7 (January 2021): 237802312110287. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23780231211028786.
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A trusted media is crucial for a politically informed citizenry, yet media trust has become fragile in many Western countries. An underexplored aspect is the link between media (dis)trust and populism. The authors visualize media trust across news outlets and partisanship in Germany, for both mainstream and “alternative” news sources. For each source, average trust is grouped by partisanship and sorted from left to right, allowing within-source comparisons. The authors find an intriguing horseshoe pattern for mainstream media sources, for which voters of both populist left-wing and right-wing parties express lower levels of trust. The underlying distribution of individual responses reveals that voters of the right-wing populist party are especially likely to “not at all” trust the mainstream outlets that otherwise enjoy high levels of trust. The media trust gap between populist and centrist voters disappears for alternative sources, for which trust is generally low.
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Bosilkov, Ivo. "Media populism in Macedonia: Right-wing populist style in the coverage of the “migrant crisis”." Central European Journal of Communication 12, no. 2 (July 30, 2019): 206–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1899-5101.12.2(23).6.
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The communicative style used to exclude immigrants from the idea of “the people” is the scope through which right-wing media populism is measured in a case study of Macedonia, a post-communist country on the Balkan migrant route. Quantitative content analysis of articles from four Macedonian right-wing partisan news outlets N = 409, demonstrates a clear change in tone in coverage of migration, marked by an increase of populism as the “migrant crisis” intensified. Logistic regression confirms that incivility, as a proxy for the intensity of partisan bias, is a significant predictor of populism, and opinion pieces have a significantly stronger populist tendency than news reports. The findings show that online news outlets, however, are not more populist than traditional print media.
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Schroeder, Ralph. "Digital Media and the Entrenchment of Right-Wing Populist Agendas." Social Media + Society 5, no. 4 (October 2019): 205630511988532. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2056305119885328.
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Since Brexit and the election of President Donald Trump, news media around the world have given extensive coverage to the issue of disinformation and polarization. This article argues that while the negative effects of social media have dominated the discussion, these effects do not address how right-wing populists have been able to successfully and legitimately use digital media to circumvent traditional media. The article uses the United States and Sweden as case studies about how digital media have helped to achieve electoral success and shift the political direction in both countries—though in quite different ways. It also argues that the sources of right-wing populism go beyond the hitherto dominant left–right political divide, capturing anti-elite sentiment, and promoting exclusionary nationalism. The dominance of the issue of media manipulation has obscured the shift whereby the relation between the media and politics has become more fluid and antagonistic, which fits the populist agenda. This shift requires a rethinking of political communication that includes both the social forces that give rise to populism and the alternative digital channels that entrench them, with implications for the prospects of the role of media in politics in the two countries and beyond.
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Wirz, Dominique Stefanie, Martin Wettstein, Anne Schulz, Nicole Ernst, Christian Schemer, and Werner Wirth. "How populist crisis rhetoric affects voters in Switzerland." Studies in Communication Sciences 19, no. 1 (December 3, 2019): 69–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.24434/j.scoms.2019.01.006.
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Right-wing populism has a long tradition in Switzerland. Nevertheless, only little is known about how populist messages in the media contribute to the success of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and to the acceptance of the party’s anti-immigration policies. In this study, we combine data from a large media content analysis (including newspapers and TV news shows) with data from a panel-survey in order to address this research gap. Thereby we differentiate between effects driven by the content and the form of right-wing populist communication. While right-wing populist content depicts immigrants and the political elite as a threat to the Swiss people, populist style evokes the sense of a crisis by emotionalizing and dramatizing the message. Populist style is therefore assumed to increase the persuasiveness of populist claims. The results of this study suggest that this is the case only for some voters, while it backfires for others.
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Wodak, Ruth, and Michał Krzyżanowski. "Right-wing populism in Europe & USA." Right-Wing Populism in Europe & USA 16, no. 4 (September 13, 2017): 471–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz.
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Abstract In recent years and months, new information about the rise of right-wing populist parties (RWPs) in Europe and the USA has dominated the news and caused an election scare among mainstream institutions and politicians. The unpredictable successes of populists (e.g. Donald Trump in the USA in 2016) have by now transformed anxieties into legitimate apprehension and fear. This Special Issue addresses the recent sudden upsurge of right-wing populism. It responds to many recent challenges and a variety of 'discursive shifts' and wider dynamics of media and public discourses that have taken place as a result of the upswing of right-wing populism (RWP) across Europe and beyond. We examine not only the nature or the state-of-the-art of contemporary RWP but also point to its ontology within and beyond the field of politics and argue that the rise and success of RWP is certainly not a recent or a momentary phenomenon.
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Schulze, Heidi. "Who Uses Right-Wing Alternative Online Media? An Exploration of Audience Characteristics." Politics and Governance 8, no. 3 (July 17, 2020): 6–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i3.2925.
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Accompanying the success of the radical right and right-wing populist movements, right-wing alternative online media have recently gained prominence and, to some extent, influence on public discourse and elections. The existing scholarship so far focuses primarily on the role of content and social media distribution and pays little attention to the audiences of right-wing alternative media, especially at a cross-national level and in the European context. The present paper addresses this gap by exploring the characteristics of the audiences of right-wing alternative online media. Based on a secondary data analysis of the 2019 Reuters Digital News Survey, this article presents a cross-national analysis of right-wing alternative media use in Northern and Central Europe. The results indicate a comparatively high prevalence of right-wing alternative online media in Sweden, whereas in Germany, Austria, and Finland, these news websites seem to be far less popular. With regard to audience characteristics, the strongest predictors of right-wing alternative online media use are political interest and a critical stance towards immigration, accompanied by a skeptical assessment of news quality, in general, and distrust, especially in public service broadcasting media. Additionally, the use of social media as a primary news source increases the likelihood of right-wing alternative news consumption. This corroborates the high relevance of social media platforms as distributors and multipliers of right-wing alternative news content. The findings suggest that right-wing alternative online media should not be underestimated as a peripheral phenomenon, but rather have to be considered influential factors for center-right to radical right-leaning politics and audiences in public discourse, with a high mobilizing and polarizing potential.
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Kalsnes, Bente. "Examining the populist communication logic: Strategic use of social media in populist political parties in Norway and Sweden." Central European Journal of Communication 12, no. 2 (July 30, 2019): 187–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1899-5101.12.2(23).5.
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Previous research has demonstrated that right-wing populist parties are particularly successful in gaining engagement and interaction on social media, but less is known about how rightwing populist parties use social media strategically, both in relation to voters and news media. By focusing on two Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, this paper addresses the strategic use of social media within the Sweden Democrats and the Progress Party based on three different data sets: interviews, content analysis of Facebook posts, and engagement data from the parties’ Facebook pages. This study finds that the two populist parties basically follow up their social media strategy in practice, and the Sweden Democrats are more closely following a populist communication logic in their Facebook posts. The article argues that right-wing populist parties’ social media strategy and communication style must be understood in relation to their position in the political system and the parties’ different phases in the life cycle model of populist parties.
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Hameleers, Michael. "Populist Disinformation: Exploring Intersections between Online Populism and Disinformation in the US and the Netherlands." Politics and Governance 8, no. 1 (March 5, 2020): 146–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2478.
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The discursive construction of a populist divide between the ‘good’ people and ‘corrupt’ elites can conceptually be linked to disinformation. More specifically, (right-wing) populists are not only attributing blame to the political elites, but increasingly vent anti-media sentiments in which the mainstream press is scapegoated for not representing the people. In an era of post-truth relativism, ‘fake news’ is increasingly politicized and used as a label to delegitimize political opponents or the press. To better understand the affinity between disinformation and populism, this article conceptualizes two relationships between these concepts: (1) blame attributions to the dishonest media as part of the corrupt elites that mislead the people; and (2) the expression of populist boundaries in a people-centric, anti-expert, and evidence-free way. The results of a comparative qualitative content analysis in the US and Netherlands indicate that the political leaders Donald Trump and Geert Wilders blame legacy media in populist ways by regarding them as part of the corrupt and lying establishment. Compared to left-wing populist and mainstream politicians, these politicians are the most central players in the discursive construction of populist disinformation. Both politicians bypassed empirical evidence and expert knowledge whilst prioritizing the people’s truth and common sense at the center stage of honesty and reality. These expressions resonated with public opinion on Facebook, although citizens were more likely to frame mis- and disinformation in terms of ideological cleavages. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the role of populist discourse in a post-factual era.
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Koller, Veronika, and Marlene Miglbauer. "What Drives the Right-Wing Populist Vote? Topics, Motivations and Representations in an Online Vox Pop with Voters for the Alternative für Deutschland." Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik 67, no. 3 (September 25, 2019): 283–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zaa-2019-0024.
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Abstract In a recent study (Miglbauer, Marlene and Veronika Koller (2019). “‘The British People have Spoken’: Voter Motivations and Identities in Vox Pops on the British EU Referendum.” Veronika Koller, Susanne Kopf and Marlene Miglbauer, eds. Discourses of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge, 86–103.), we investigated vox pops (short for ‘vox populi,’ i.e. ‘voice of the people’) with self-declared Leave voters in the run-up to the 2016 British EU referendum. The study presented here complements this research with a comparative perspective, exploring the motivations expressed by voters for the German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). On the day of the 2017 general election, the German news website Zeit online (ZON) invited its readers to say why they voted AfD. Although the AfD voter profile and the ZON readership profile are noticeably different, the question elicited 468 replies numbering a total of around 59,000 words, which we compiled into a corpus. Working with corpus analysis software AntConc 3.4.1w, we first prised out topics and motivations by analysing this collection of online vox pops for word frequencies as well as collocates and concordances for selected lexical units, before manually grouping the different lexemes into ten topics. In a second step, we manually analysed the data for social actor representation (van Leeuwen, Theo (2008). Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) and appraisal (Martin, James R. and Peter R. R. White (2005). Appraisal in English. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.). The results of the analysis show that next to previously documented motivations for right-wing populist votes – e.g. in-group bias and rejection of the Other as morally deficient (Heinisch, Reinhard (2008). “Austria: The Structure and Agency of Austrian Populism.” Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, eds. Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 67–83.) –, the group of AfD voters represented in the written vox pop have specific additional reasons, namely a focus on German chancellor Merkel as an ‘anti-hero’ and a belief of being victimised by the media. An additional, unexpected finding was that a number of posters to the dedicated comment forum explicitly distance themselves from perceived stereotypes of right-wing populist voters. Our findings therefore also problematise previously identified characteristics of right-wing populist discourse as anti-elitist and anti-intellectual (Wodak, Ruth (2015b). The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean. Los Angeles: SAGE.) and call into question the support from workers, and associated fears of wage pressure and competition for welfare benefits, as one of the main factors in the success of right-wing populism (Oesch, Daniel (2008). “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland.” International Political Science Review 29.3, 349–373.).
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Jutel, Olivier. "American populism, Glenn Beck and affective media production." International Journal of Cultural Studies 21, no. 4 (January 9, 2017): 375–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1367877916688273.
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This article examines the centrality of affective media production to contemporary American populism with a case study of the right-wing broadcaster Glenn Beck. The rise of far-right media and Donald Trump in social media spaces demonstrates the convergence of the economic and political logic of affect. In soliciting the affective and collaborative labour of users, affective media necessarily deploys discourses of social transformation, autonomy and critical knowingness. Beck’s show exemplifies this logic with Beck functioning as a leader of the Tea Party movement who perform ‘free labour’ for Fox News and Beck’s own media empire, while experiencing this as a form of revolutionary education. Where this audience movement speaks to the political ontology of affective media is in the return of a fetishistic ‘symbolic efficiency’. In foreshadowing Trump, Beck articulates an antagonistic division of the social with a populist community of jouissance and individuation both threatened and constituted by the rapacious enemy.
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Larsson, Anders Olof. "Right-wingers on the rise online: Insights from the 2018 Swedish elections." New Media & Society 22, no. 12 (November 15, 2019): 2108–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444819887700.
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Political elections see several actors rise to the fore in order to influence and inform voters. Increasingly, such processes take place on social media like Facebook, where media outlets and politicians alike utilize seek promote their respective agenda. Given the recent rise of so-called hyperpartisan media—often described as purveyors of “fake news”—and populist right-wing parties across a series of western contexts, this study details the degree to which these novel actors succeed in overtaking their more mainstream or indeed established competitors when it comes to audience engagement on the mentioned platform. Focusing on the one-month period leading up to the 2018 Swedish national elections, the study finds that right-wing actors across the media and the political sector are more successful in engaging their Facebook followers than their competitors. As audience engagement is a key factor for social media success, the study closes by providing a discussion on the repercussions for professionals within the media and the political sector.
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Plenković, Mateja. "Use of Daily News Portals, Some Individual Features, and Acceptance of Populism among Students of the University of Zagreb." Drustvena istrazivanja 29, no. 4 (November 30, 2020): 511–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5559/di.29.4.01.
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The purpose of the paper is to fulfil the findings on populism in the context of Croatian society, with an emphasis on the acceptance of populism among young people as bearers of the future social development. Media, as a form of public opinion, are among the most important sources of relevant insights for the study of the rise of populism. The paper pays special attention to the relationship between the use of daily news portals, and the acceptance of populism. The study was conducted on a two-stage non-probabilistic sample of 1189 students of the University of Zagreb, in order to determine the relationships between students' preferences in general, left-wing and right-wing populism, their habits of using daily news portals, and some individual characteristics. The results show that there is a low but significant correlation between the use of most portals, and the preference for general, left- -wing and right-wing populism among students. The correlation between the education of parents with student preferences of left-wing and right-wing populism was found, as well as differences in these preferences with respect to some sociodemographic characteristics, level of study, study orientation, political orientation, religiosity and trust in institutions.
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Pérez-Curiel, Concha. "Trend towards extreme right-wing populism on Twitter. An analysis of the influence on leaders, media and users." Communication & Society 33, no. 2 (April 20, 2020): 175–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/003.33.2.175-192.
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The advance of populism in Europe and the positioning of this type of politics on the Web are both facts substantiated by scientific research. In this connection, a platform like Twitter serves as a stage for dissemination, interaction, mobilisation and building the personality of influencer/leaders and as a strategic tool for the selection of issues and for propaganda and fake news. The main objective is to know the impact that this communication model has on both digital users and the media, particularly in electoral processes. To this end, a quantitative-qualitative comparative content analysis, which studies the issue frame and the game frame, is performed on the personal Twitter accounts of Marine Le Pen (@MLP_officiel), the leader of Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Matteo Salvini (@matteosalvinimi), the leader of Liga Norte (LN) in Italy, and Santiago Abascal (@Santi_ABASCAL), the leader of Vox in Spain. In the context of the European elections held on the 26 May 2019, a sample of 2,187 tweets, user metrics (‘likes,’ retweets and comments) and their reproduction in the digital newspapers @lemondefr, @repubblica and @el_país are analysed. The initial results evince a strategic use of online tools, with a media and public response that reproduces the populist discourse of the far-right, to the point of making it go viral.
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Bell, Katherine M. "“This is Not Who We Are:” Progressive Media and Post-Race in the New Era of Overt Racism." Communication, Culture and Critique 12, no. 1 (February 26, 2019): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ccc/tcz005.
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Abstract This analysis explores how a liberal mainstream news outlet—MSNBC—grapples with the overt racism of the current right-wing populist presidential administration in the United States. With a plethora of “good” conservatives and its stable of liberal pundits, the cable network has painted the president as mentally ill or declining, an incompetent purveyor of chaos. In perpetuating a mantra of “this is not who we are” in coverage of overt racism, MSNBC pivots to a more comfortable mainstream space of post-race, an ideological stance that places racism as a fringe anomaly. The post-race pivot belies the country’s ongoing racist legacy, and potentially lulls viewers toward acceptance of official antiracisms that serve hegemonic interests. Thus, the news coverage of the current presidency plays a role in forestalling a meaningful reckoning with the country’s ongoing history of institutional and everyday racism.
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Roberts, Jeremy C. "The Populist Radical Right in the US: New Media and the 2018 Arizona Senate Primary." Politics and Governance 8, no. 1 (March 5, 2020): 111–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2508.
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This article analyzes the appeal of populist radical right (PRR) politics in the US after the election of Donald Trump. Specifically, I seek to explain how new media helps politicians representing the PRR secure support in Republican primaries. Using an online survey of 1052 Arizona Republicans in the lead-up to the August 2018 Senate primary, I evaluate support for three candidates: Rep. Martha McSally, former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, and Kelli Ward, a physician. The findings highlight a bifurcation in the drivers for support of PRR candidacies: Skepticism of immigration drives the Arpaio vote, while use of social media news and belief in party convergence mobilize Ward’s support. The results demonstrate that support for PRR politicians in the Arizona primary is concentrated in two groups, anti-immigrant and anti-establishment, and that the anti-establishment voters are more likely to access news on social media. These findings indicate that social media news consumption does shape voter perceptions about mainstream parties favorably for the PRR.
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Bantimaroudis, Philemon, and Theodora A. Maniou. "Populist news and the Greek television industry: The case of SYRIZA–ANEL." Journal of Greek Media & Culture 6, no. 2 (October 1, 2020): 179–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/jgmc_00012_1.
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This article examines significant changes in the television news industry, from 2015 until 2019, a period characterized by a severe financial crisis that swept throughout the country, bringing to the forefront of the Greek public sphere, new political voices of both the right and the left. Using secondary data to examine media ownership patterns, we adopted a political economic approach to highlight the ways in which television news have adopted a populist outlook that has its origins in similar practices in the 1980s political and media contexts, while reviewing and assessing long-term interactions between media (television) industries and the political system.
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Bornschier, Simon. "Why a right-wing populist party emerged in France but not in Germany: cleavages and actors in the formation of a new cultural divide." European Political Science Review 4, no. 1 (June 14, 2011): 121–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773911000117.
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This article analyzes why, despite similar transformations in the dimensions structuring political space since the late 1980s, extreme right-wing populist parties have emerged in some West European countries, but not in others. Two factors may affect the fortunes of these parties. First, if electorates remain firmly entrenched in older cleavages, new parties will find it difficult to establish themselves. Second, the positions of the established actors with respect to the new cultural divide that the extreme populist right mobilizes may be crucial. This article systematizes the various explanations regarding the impact of mainstream party positions on the electoral fortunes of the extreme right, and develops two new hypotheses that differentiate between the conditions that favor the entry of the extreme right, and its subsequent success. The various hypotheses are then tested in an empirical analysis of election campaigns in France and Germany, combining data on party positions as reflected in the news media with mass-level surveys. The results show that the diverging behavior of the established parties, rather than the strength of the traditional state-market cleavage, explains the differences between these two countries. More specifically, the differing strategy of the mainstream left in the two contexts has allowed the Front National to anchor itself in the French party system, whereas similar parties have not achieved a breakthrough in Germany.
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Baugut, Philip, and Katharina Neumann. "Online news media and propaganda influence on radicalized individuals: Findings from interviews with Islamist prisoners and former Islamists." New Media & Society 22, no. 8 (October 10, 2019): 1437–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444819879423.
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This study is the first to explore the twin influences of online propaganda and news media on Islamists. We conducted 44 in-depth interviews with cognitively and behaviorally radicalized Islamist prisoners in Austria as well as former Islamists in Germany and Austria. We found that online propaganda and news media had interdependent influences on Islamists’ rejections of non-Muslims and Western politics, as well as on their willingness to use violence and commit suicide. Cognitively radicalized individuals were influenced by propaganda that blamed non-Muslims for opposing Islam; this was reinforced by online mainstream news reports of right-wing populism and extremism that propagandists selectively distributed via social media. Among behaviorally radicalized individuals, exposure to propaganda and news reports depicting Muslim war victims contributed to the radicalized individuals’ willingness to use violence. Moreover, propaganda and media reports that extensively personalized perpetrators of violence strengthened radicalized individuals’ motivations to imitate the use of violence.
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Bos, Linda, Jonas M. Lefevere, Roos Thijssen, and Penelope Sheets. "The impact of mediated party issue strategies on electoral support." Party Politics 23, no. 6 (January 14, 2016): 760–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068815626603.
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Based on agenda-setting, priming and issue ownership theory, we know that issue ownership and party visibility in the news can be used as strategies to affect electoral support. Thus far, it is, however, unclear whether these effects are independent or work interactively. This study aims to fill this gap. We focus on the Partij voor de Vrijheid, the prominent Dutch right-wing populist party, and draw upon an experimental design in which we exposed a sample of Dutch voters ( N = 600) to media coverage on one of four issues – an owned issue, an unowned issue, an issue owned by another party and a contested issue – featuring either a party cue or not. The results indicate that the impact of issue coverage is moderated by party cues: attention to owned issues and unowned issues increases support only when party cues are present. Attention to contested and trespassing issues does not increase support.
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Almodt, Rémi. "Populists on Social Media. A Qualitative Analysis of European Right-Wing Parties, Movements and News Sites on Facebook." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Ephemerides 63, no. 1 (June 28, 2019): 5–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbeph.2019.1.01.
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Wirz, Dominique S., Martin Wettstein, Anne Schulz, Philipp Müller, Christian Schemer, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, and Werner Wirth. "The Effects of Right-Wing Populist Communication on Emotions and Cognitions toward Immigrants." International Journal of Press/Politics 23, no. 4 (August 2, 2018): 496–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161218788956.
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The persuasiveness of right-wing populist communication has become a widely discussed topic; it is often assumed that such messages might foster anti-immigrant attitudes among citizens. The present study explores the effects of the different components of right-wing populist communication—anti-immigrant messages, populist content, and populist style—on attitudes toward immigrants. By combining a media content analysis ( N = 605 articles) with a panel survey ( N = 1,968) in metropolitan areas of four Western European countries (France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), this study analyzes how citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants are influenced by the right-wing populist communication with which they are confronted in their individual media diet. The results show that anti-immigrant statements in the media lead to more negative cognitions toward immigrants, while populist content leads to more negative emotions. The study, thus, demonstrates that not only anti-immigrant rhetoric but also populism as a thin-centered ideology influence citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants on top of pre-existing attitudes.
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de Jonge, Léonie. "The Populist Radical Right and the Media in the Benelux: Friend or Foe?" International Journal of Press/Politics 24, no. 2 (December 29, 2018): 189–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161218821098.
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Although most scholars acknowledge that the media play an instrumental role in furthering or limiting the spread of populism, the exact nature of the relationship between right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) and the media remains poorly understood. This article analyzes the various ways in which the media choose to deal with RWPPs in the Benelux region (i.e., Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Using evidence from interviews with media practitioners ( n = 46), the findings suggest that in the absence of a credible right-wing populist challenger, media practitioners in Luxembourg and Wallonia adhere to strict demarcation, whereas the Dutch and Flemish media have become gradually more accommodative to RWPPs. This study makes two contributions to the field. First, it systematically theorizes the different ways in which the media can approach the populist radical right. Second, it provides illustrative, comparative evidence about the rationale for why some media provide space for RWPPs while others deny it, thereby illuminating the under-researched topic of societal responses to the populist radical right.
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Marker, Silas. "Populist Mediation of the Pandemic." Populism 3, no. 2 (September 25, 2020): 288–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25888072-bja10011.
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Abstract The potential impact of right-wing populist media on society is a matter of growing importance. This paper examines the discourse of the three Danish right-wing populist media Den Korte Avis, NewsSpeek and 24Nyt during the corona crisis in 2020. Using the post-structuralist theoretical framework and discursive approach to populism of Ernesto Laclau, it finds that despite some differences, all three of them articulate Muslim immigrants as a particular problem demanding particular attention in the corona crisis; they accuse the so-called mainstream media of lying or keeping secrets about the crisis, thereby positioning themselves as mediums of the truth; and they accuse the international institutions of lying and utilizing the corona crisis for their own globalist aims.
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Murphy, Justin, and Daniel Devine. "Does Media Coverage Drive Public Support for UKIP or Does Public Support for UKIP Drive Media Coverage?" British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (July 31, 2018): 893–910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123418000145.
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AbstractPrevious research suggests media attention may increase support for populist right-wing parties, but extant evidence is mostly limited to proportional representation systems in which such an effect would be most likely. At the same time, in the United Kingdom’s first-past-the-post system, an ongoing political and regulatory debate revolves around whether the media give disproportionate coverage to the populist right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP). This study uses a mixed-methods research design to investigate the causal dynamics of UKIP support and media coverage as an especially valuable case. Vector autoregression, using monthly, aggregate time-series data from January 2004 to April 2017, provides new evidence consistent with a model in which media coverage drives party support, but not vice versa. The article identifies key periods in which stagnating or declining support for UKIP is followed by increases in media coverage and subsequent increases in public support. The findings show that media coverage may drive public support for right-wing populist parties in a substantively non-trivial fashion that is irreducible to previous levels of public support, even in a national institutional environment least supportive of such an effect. The findings have implications for political debates in the UK and potentially other liberal democracies.
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Sheets, Penelope, Linda Bos, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. "Media Cues and Citizen Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 28, no. 3 (July 8, 2015): 307–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edv014.
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Bos, Linda, Wouter van der Brug, and Claes de Vreese. "How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders." Political Communication 28, no. 2 (April 28, 2011): 182–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2011.564605.
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Boulianne, Shelley, Karolina Koc-Michalska, and Bruce Bimber. "Right-wing populism, social media and echo chambers in Western democracies." New Media & Society 22, no. 4 (April 2020): 683–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444819893983.
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Many observers are concerned that echo chamber effects in digital media are contributing to the polarization of publics and, in some places, to the rise of right-wing populism. This study employs survey data collected in France, the United Kingdom and the United States (1500 respondents in each country) from April to May 2017. Overall, we do not find evidence that online/social media explain support for right-wing populist candidates and parties. Instead, in the United States, use of online media decreases support for right-wing populism. Looking specifically at echo chamber measures, we find offline discussion with those who are similar in race, ethnicity and class positively correlates with support for populist candidates and parties in the United Kingdom and France. The findings challenge claims about the role of social media and the rise of populism.
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Norocel, Ov Cristian, Tuija Saresma, Tuuli Lähdesmäki, and Maria Ruotsalainen. "Discursive Constructions of White Nordic Masculinities in Right-wing Populist Media." Men and Masculinities 23, no. 3-4 (June 4, 2018): 425–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1097184x18780459.
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Using superordinate intersectionality as a theoretical framework, this article explores notions of men and masculinities within right wing populism. It is attentive to how the right-wing populist media in Finland and Sweden construct white Nordic masculinities through discursive interactions across several axes of difference: gender (masculinities); sexuality (heterosexuality); social class (elites); and race (whitenesses). Employing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as methodological approach, we show how the discursive constructions of white Nordic masculinities are context contingent, rendering them subject to constant reinterpretation and repositioning, at times privileging some axes of social structuring over others. By drawing out the subtle similarities and discrete differences embedded in the discursive constructions of right-wing populist media, our approach gives a more fine-grained understanding of the nuance to men and masculinities in the study of right wing populism. By focusing on the European Nordic semi-periphery, our comparative analysis makes an original contribution, not only to the masculinities literature in general, but also to the growing scholarship concerned with the `crisis of masculinity' in the wider context of neoliberal globalizing tendencies.
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Šešić, Milena Dragićević, and Mirjana Nikolić. "The Mediatization and Culturalization of Populist Political Communication." Cultural Management: Science and Education 4, no. 1 (June 25, 2020): 73–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.30819/cmse.4-1.04.
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Researching the impact of populist political communication on media, art, and the cultural sphere in Serbia, the authors investigate various different phenomena that are rising under the pretext of market liberalisation and identity politics. Deregulation of media may have brought “independence” from power, but also complete market-dependence. In the cultural sphere, pressures on the arts from right-wing populism have lead to extreme nationalism in Serbian media and cultural practices while simulta-neously seeing a commercialisation of programming. “National discussions” regarding the status of real-ity show programmes on commercial television and accusations of anti-patriotism against most promi-nent Serbian artists have been lead by right-wing populists. At the same time, this research takes into account several forms of left-wing populism, mostly developed within the independent scene.
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Haller, Andr, Kristoffer Holt, and Renaud de La Brosse. "The other alternatives: Political right-wing alternative media." Journal of Alternative & Community Media 4, no. 1 (April 1, 2019): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/joacm_00039_2.
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This special issue of the Journal of Alternative and Community Media presents five articles that examine right-wing alternative media from different countries and contexts: Brazil, the United States, Germany and Finland. They focus on different aspects of a phenomenon that has come to the forefront of public debate in recent years, due to the many apparently successful alternative media enterprises that can be characterised as conservative, libertarian, populist or far to extreme right wing on a political scale. While there has been much (and often heated) public debate about this, researchers tend to lag behind when it comes to new trends, and a transient and rapidly changing media landscape. The articles in this special issue are therefore especially valuable, since they all provide empirically grounded perspectives on specific cases that illustrate different parts of a large puzzle that is in much need of illumination. This special issue is of use not just to communication research, but also to the public debate on disinformation on the internet.
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Sigachev, Maxim I., Ernest S. Sleptsov, and Eduard V. Fadeev. "New Right-Wing Populism: Tendencies and Prospects on the Example of Some European States (Italy, France, Germany, Austria)." RUDN Journal of Political Science 22, no. 3 (December 15, 2020): 458–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-1438-2020-22-3-458-474.
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The article reveals the relationship between the political crises that affected the European Union from 2015 to 2020, and the growing sympathy of voters for populist-Eurosceptic parties. Particular attention is paid to the political situation in Austria, where in 2017-2019. The government included right-wing populists, as well as the results of the European Parliament elections in May 2019, which testify to the strengthening of the position of a new populism, especially the right-wing one, represented by the Eurosceptics group Identity and Democracy. The purpose of the article is to analyze the current state of the right-wing populist parties and to describe the current patterns of their development in terms of political prospects and the impact on the internal politics of the EU member states. The following research questions are formulated: 1. Has the influence of right-wing populist parties intensified or waned during the migration crisis? 2. Do right-wing populists constitute a coherent pan-European political force? 3. What is the specificity of Italian, Austrian and German right-wing populists?. To answer these questions, a quantitative (first of all, thematic literature and publications in the media) and quantitative analysis (dynamics of relevant statistical information was evaluated). As a result of the study, the authors come to the following conclusions: 1. The entry of the Austrian right-wing populists (APS) into a coalition with S. Kurtz in 2017-2019. - This is part of the regular fluctuations in the balance of power between the three political camps inside Austria, and not a sharp turnaround in established political models (right turn). 2. The German right-wing populists, on the contrary, despite local and really sudden successes (AdG), are in systemic isolation. 3. In Italy, right-wing populists have made significant progress, but the prospects for their unity with other European new right-wingers remain controversial. 4. With some caution, it can be stated that the period 2017-2019, was successful for right-wing populists. The recognition of the right-wing populist parties, their media coverage and presence in government has increased markedly. The perception of the importance of migration themes and cultural identity has increased in comparison with the first half of the 2010s. Moreover, in 2020. this trend is beginning to decline, the themes of culture and migration are gradually giving way to topics of safety, health and the environment.
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Crofts, Stephen. "Hansonism, Right-Wing Populism and the Media." Queensland Review 5, no. 2 (December 1998): 7–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s132181660000101x.
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AbstractThis essay aims to explicate the conditions enabling Hansonism. Politically, it argues that the party's exploitation of cynicism about mainstream politics and deepening economic and social divisions have been enabled by the Howard government's zealous pursuit of neo-liberal politics, its dismantling of Labor's welfare safety net, its wedge politics, its cynical reneging on election promises, and its attacks on the fourth estate, not to mention his endorsement of Hanson's freedom of speech'. In terms of the media, the essay argues that Hansonism's protest vote is based on a ‘plague o’ both your houses'. The allied populist prejudices of several radio talkback hosts have drawn their strength from television's virtual displacement of political debate in its posture as voice of the people, its actual address to viewers as domestic, atomised consumers and the increasing populism of vernacular genres such as lifestyle programs and sitcoms. Examples include the most popular Australian film of the Howard-Hanson era, The Castle.We live in the most polyglot and hybrid moment of human history […] Apostles of purity are the most dangerous people in the world. (Salman Rushdie 1994)People who can accept their own contradictions do not kill people. (Ariel Dorfman 1998)The media are […] so much more effective in disseminating information simultaneously to large groups of people that they not only supplement the political and educational systems but in some respects supplant them, because of their enormous power. (Anthony Wedgewood Benn 1972)
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Baugut, Philip, and Katharina Neumann. "How Right-Wing Extremists Use and Perceive News Media." Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 96, no. 3 (November 20, 2018): 696–720. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077699018803080.
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We investigate how right-wing extremists use, perceive, and try to provoke news media coverage. Findings from qualitative interviews with former leaders of right-wing extremist groups in Germany, who served as key informants, show that reports on right-wing extremism are used and trigger feelings of being personally affected. Consequently, right-wing extremists show hostile-media and third-person perceptions. These perceptions influence both emotions and behaviors among right-wing extremists, for example, they cause right-wing leaders to strategically monitor news media to exploit them for political goals. Our findings are presented along with a model and are accompanied by a discussion of the implications for responsible journalism.
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Aleknonis, Gintaras, and Renata Matkevičienė. "Populism in Lithuania: Defining the Research Tradition." Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2016): 26–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2016-0002.
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Abstract The research on populism and populist political communication in Lithuania is rather limited, regardless of the fact that populist movements and politicians are influential on national and local political levels; they also receive sufficient support from a significant share of the population. Because the Western European research tradition is concentrated on the challenges of right-wing populism, Lithuanian political scientists distinguish right-wing populism as more significant in comparison to left-wing populism. Although Lithuanian researchers note, that in the balance of the left-right wing populists, Lithuania stands out with the majority of left-wing populists, in comparison to the popularity and number of right-wing populists in neighbouring countries. Despite the interest of scholars in various fields of policy research in Lithuania, there is still a lack of research on populist political communication, and what interest does exist is mostly concentrated on analysis of practical issues within the political arena, e.g. the study of the processes of political elections. The analysis of populist political communication in Lithuania revealed that populism is a relatively oft-mentioned topic in Lithuanian scientific discourse, but in most cases remains on the margins of other research. The theoretical work presents the assumptions based on the analysis of the political situation in Lithuania and examples from other countries. The empirical research of populism is scarce, and in most cases based on content analysis of political documents and media reports.
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Kreis, Ramona. "The “Tweet Politics” of President Trump." Right-Wing Populism in Europe & USA 16, no. 4 (June 12, 2017): 607–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17032.kre.
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Abstract This study explores how U.S. President Donald Trump employs Twitter as a strategic instrument of power politics to disseminate his right-wing populist discourse. Applying the discourse-historical approach to critical discourse analysis, this article analyzes the meaning and function of Trump’s discursive strategies on Twitter. The data consists of over 200 tweets collected from his personal account between his inauguration on January 20, 2017 and his first address to Congress on February 28, 2017. The findings show how Trump uses an informal, direct, and provoking communication style to construct and reinforce the concept of a homogeneous people and a homeland threatened by the dangerous other. Moreover, Trump employs positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation to further his agenda via social media. This study demonstrates how his top-down use of Twitter may lead to the normalization of right-wing populist discourses, and thus aims to contribute to the understanding of right-wing populist discourse online.
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Polli, Chiara, and Carlo Berti. "Framing right-wing populist satire: The case-study of Ghisberto’s cartoons in Italy." Punctum. International Journal of Semiotics 06, no. 02 (March 1, 2021): 29–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.18680/hss.2020.0020.
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Abstract Over the last few years, right-wing populism has increased its popularity and political weight, successfully merging with Euro-scepticism, nationalism, xenophobia, religious symbolism, and aggressive forms of conservatism (e.g., anti-feminism, homophobia, and, in general, patriarchal politics). Several studies have focused on the communication strategies of contemporary populism, examining the latter’s use of traditional and new media. So far, however, little attention has been paid to the role and language of right-wing populist satire. Our study draws on the ideational approach to populism to explore how right-wing populism is expressed in satirical cartoons. This approach perceives populism as a thin-centered ideology, based on a Manichean division between ‘good people’ and ‘evil elites,’ which regularly combines with other ideological components (e.g., nationalism, Euroscepticism, xenophobia). Our analysis focuses on the Italian cartoonist Ghisberto, known for his provocative and frequently controversial work. We examine a sample of Ghisberto’s vignettes using multimodal analysis tools and Greimas’s notion of isotopy. The aim is to investigate how right-wing populist satire constructs its different targets (the EU, left-wingers, migrants, NGOs, women, etc.) and how populist ideology exploits cartoons’ communicative resources and power.
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Holtz-Bacha, Christina. "The kiss of death. Public service media under right-wing populist attack." European Journal of Communication 36, no. 3 (February 1, 2021): 221–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0267323121991334.
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With the surge of populism in Europe, public service broadcasting has come under increased pressure. The established media are considered part of the corrupt elite not serving the interests of the people. The public service media, for which pluralism is at the core of their remit, are a particular thorn in the side of the populists. Therefore, they attack the financial basis of public service, which is supposed to guarantee their independence. The populist attacks on the traditional broadcasting corporations meet with the interests of neoliberal politics and of those political actors who want to evade public scrutiny and democratic control and do no longer feel committed to democratic accountability. The assaults on the public service media are thus an assault on freedom of the media and further increase the pressure on the democratic system.
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Tuomola, Salla. "Who are you, the people?" Nordicom Review 42, s1 (March 1, 2021): 51–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nor-2021-0006.
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Abstract One of the cornerstones of right-wing populist websites is their challenge to traditional mainstream media to give voice to “the people”. In Finland, one of the best known of these websites is MV-lehti [WTF-Magazine], which claims to exist for this reason. In this article, I investigate how MV-lehti constructs the people, in particular in texts about refugees. I approach the research data by using the concepts of right-wing populist rhetoric. The results show that, in MV-lehti, the people is a constructed and politicised concept reflecting ideas of ethnonationalism and antidemocratic values, illustrating the connection between uncivility, racism, and populism.
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McKnight, David. "Henry Mayer Lecture 2012: The Market Populism of Rupert Murdoch." Media International Australia 144, no. 1 (August 2012): 5–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1329878x1214400103.
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Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation is the most powerful media organisation in the world. Murdoch's commercial success is obvious, but less well understood is his successful pursuit of political goals, using his news media. Murdoch himself is probably the most influential Australian of all time. He says the recent News of the World hacking scandal went ‘went against everything [he stands] for’. But how true is this? He sees himself as an anti-establishment rebel, yet his influence in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States makes him part of a global elite. He has become one of the key promoters of neo-liberal ideology of small government and deregulation over the past 30 years. The basis of his philosophy was expressed by one of his former editors, David Montgomery, who said ‘Rupert has contempt for the rules. Contempt even for governments.’ Murdoch is also a devotee of the neo-conservative wing of the US Republican Party. The possibility of exercising power through ownership of the news media has been little studied in recent years, but Murdoch's role in English-speaking countries over the last 30 years shows that perhaps we need to look again at such media theories.
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Omar, Abdulfattah, Wafya Ibrahim Hamouda, and Mohammed Aldawsari. "A Discourse-Historical Approach to Populism in the Right-Wing Discourse on Immigration." International Journal of English Linguistics 10, no. 3 (March 21, 2020): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijel.v10n3p151.
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This study is concerned with investigating the implications of the new nationalist and populist discourse of the far right-wing movements to immigration in different Arab countries, with a focus on Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. For this purpose, the study is based on a corpus of different genres, including political speeches, newspaper articles, as well as social media posts and comics. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is used in order to explore speakers’ ideologies and how rhetoric and discursive strategies are employed to influence public opinion and persuade citizens about certain views and policies and even prompt them to take the desired action. Results indicate that the new nationalist and populist discourse adopted by different politicians and far right-wing parties and movements have negative impact on the rights of migrants and refugees in Arab countries. Migrants and refugees are used as scapegoats for political gains. They are blamed for all social, economic, and political challenges and crises these countries are suffering today. Right-wing movements are embedding some hidden ideologies in their political discourse that are related to the hate and rejection of migrants and refugees. It can also be concluded that the increasing popularity of anti-immigration movements and radical right-wing political leaders hint at the influence of the nationalist and populist discourse on the public opinion in their countries. Populist discourse has led to fear and rejection of the “Other”, and even to racist acts and xenophobia.
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Salmela, Mikko, and Christian von Scheve. "Emotional roots of right-wing political populism." Social Science Information 56, no. 4 (October 12, 2017): 567–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018417734419.
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The rise of the radical populist right has been linked to fundamental socioeconomic changes fueled by globalization and economic deregulation. Yet, socioeconomic factors can hardly fully explain the rise of the new right. We suggest that emotional processes that affect people’s identities provide an additional explanation for the current popularity of the new radical right, not only among low- and medium-skilled workers, but also among the middle classes whose insecurities manifest as fears of not being able to live up to salient social identities and their constitutive values, and as shame about this actual or anticipated inability. This link between fear and shame is particularly salient in contemporary capitalist societies where responsibility for success and failure is increasingly individualized, and failure is stigmatized through unemployment, receiving welfare benefits, or labor migration. Under these conditions, we identify two psychological mechanisms behind the rise of the new populist right. The first mechanism of ressentiment explains how negative emotions – fear and insecurity, in particular – transform through repressed shame into anger, resentment and hatred towards perceived ‘enemies’ of the self and associated social groups, such as refugees, immigrants, the long-term unemployed, political and cultural elites, and the ‘mainstream’ media. The second mechanism relates to the emotional distancing from social identities that inflict shame and other negative emotions, and instead promotes seeking meaning and self-esteem from aspects of identity perceived to be stable and to some extent exclusive, such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, language and traditional gender roles.
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Trenwith, Lynne A. "REVIEW: Noted: Right-wing rhetoric makes the unpalatable normal." Pacific Journalism Review 23, no. 1 (July 21, 2017): 279. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v23i1.317.
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The Politics of Fear. What right wing populist discourses mean, by Ruth Wodak. London: Sage, 2015. 256 pages. ISBN 978-1- 4462-470-0-6AS WE observe political events unfolding in the United States, the Brexit vote in the UK, the discourse around Korea, the French elections and the rhetoric of European nations, Wodak’s book provides a timely insight into the discourse of right wing populism and why it is successful. In each of the eight chapters, Wodak provides campaign materials, images, online data, television interviews and news stories.
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Gür-Şeker, Derya. "Zur sprachlichen und visuellen Konstruktion rechter Diskursgemeinschaften in Social Media. Von PEGIDA zur Identitären Bewegung." Lublin Studies in Modern Languages and Literature 45, no. 2 (July 6, 2021): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/lsmll.2021.45.2.119-131.
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<p>The article examines how right-wing discourse communities are linguistically and visually constituted in social media in the context of flight, migration and Islam. The PEGIDA Facebook Corpus covering user comments (2014–2015), the PolRrA Corpus containing right-wing populist speeches (2016–2017) and the Instagram Corpus of the hashtag #identitäre (2019–2020) with postings and user comments are the data basis. Thus the corpus consists of different language-based and multimodal entities. The aim is to show how right-wing discourse communities in Germany are constituted by <em>us</em>-<em>you</em> relations, naming practices and visual patterns across time, platform and organization.</p><p> </p>
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Rao, Pratishtha. "Wing Populism: Capturing the Globe." Journal of South Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (August 15, 2020): 79–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.33687/jsas.008.02.3009.
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This article is an attempt to explore the reasons for the recent trend of the rise of rightwing populism in the whole world. The origin of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ dates back to the French Revolution and the seating arrangements. The term ‘right’ was soon understood to mean reactionary or monarchist, and the term ‘left’ implied revolutionary or egalitarian sympathies. While populism is an idea of grouping people against ‘the elites. Both right ideology and populism are based on the segregation of society in two sections. When right wing political ideology merges with populist ideology, it is termed as “Right wing populism”. Right wing populists generally converge on issues like opposing immigration, nativism, protectionism etc. This ideology is gaining popularity rapidly in the present world order. The reasons are many, like social media, print and electronic media, civil society, economic instability, and charismatic leadership. Along with this the article also tries to find out the connection of hatred and human nature with the rise of right-wing populism. It focuses on how when hatred at the international level is justified it gives away for hatred at the domestic level as well which results in the cause and effect of right-wing populism.
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Roth, Silke. "Introduction: Contemporary Counter-Movements in the Age of Brexit and Trump." Sociological Research Online 23, no. 2 (April 17, 2018): 496–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1360780418768828.
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Brexit and the election of President Trump in the United States are the result of the rise of far-right populist movements which can be observed in Europe, North America, and other regions of the world. Whereas populism itself is one response to neoliberalism, globalization, and austerity measures, the election of Trump, in particular, has caused a new wave of protest. To a far lesser extent, on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the European Union in March 2017, people in the UK and many European countries participated in a March for Europe. These demonstrations represent counter-movements to the growing presence of right-wing, anti-immigrant, racist, nationalist, sexist, homophobic, anti-semitic and anti-Muslim movements throughout Europe and the United States. This rapid response issue surveys right-wing populist and left-liberal counter-movements which represent different responses to neoliberalism, globalization, austerity, and to each other. Social movements reflect and contribute to social change and need to be understood from an intersectional perspective. Networked media play an important role for both populist movements from the right and progressive counter-movements.
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Eberl, Jakob-Moritz. "Lying press: Three levels of perceived media bias and their relationship with political preferences." Communications 44, no. 1 (March 14, 2019): 5–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/commun-2018-0002.
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Abstract In the context of decreasing media trust as well as the rise of populist movements in many Western Democracies, this study sets out to revisit the relationship between political preferences and perceived media bias. It investigates perceived bias of the entire media system, the perceived bias of individual outlets as well as perceived beneficiaries of this favorable coverage. Analyses are based on an online survey in Austria in 2015 (n ~ 1,679) and compare citizens’ perceived biases towards eight newspapers and television outlets. Results show that media system bias in Austria is strongly related to right-wing but not to left-wing extremism. Furthermore, there are not only differences between single outlets but also between media genres, as particularly tabloids are less afflicted by right-wing perceptions of bias. Finally, there is evidence of hostile media perceptions irrespective of actual media exposure.
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Ylä-Anttila, Tuukka. "Social Media and the Emergence, Establishment and Transformation of the Right-Wing Populist Finns Party." Populism 3, no. 1 (February 3, 2020): 121–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02021043.
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Abstract This paper assesses the significance of social media for the Finns Party and the related anti-immigration movement from 2007 to the present day, in light of theories on the relationship of populism and social media. These include people-centrism, disenfranchisement, homophily, the attention economy, media elitism, and (lack of) communicative resources. Tracing the historical trajectory of the Finnish anti-immigration movement and the Finns Party, I argue that the Finnish case is an example of a movement being born online and using social media to build a political identity and strategically gain influence through a party, eventually transforming it from the inside out—rather than the party strategically using social media for its purposes, as is sometimes assumed in party-centric literature. While acknowledging the continued importance of parties, research on contemporary populist movements must take into account the political engagement of citizens facilitated by online media.
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Govil, Nitin, and Anirban Kapil Baishya. "The Bully in the Pulpit: Autocracy, Digital Social Media, and Right-wing Populist Technoculture." Communication, Culture and Critique 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 67–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ccc/tcx001.
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Berning, Carl C., Marcel Lubbers, and Elmar Schlueter. "Media Attention and Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Sympathy: Longitudinal Evidence From The Netherlands." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 31, no. 1 (February 14, 2018): 93–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edy001.
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Conrad, Maximilian. "Post-Truth Politics, Digital Media, and the Politicization of the Global Compact for Migration." Politics and Governance 9, no. 3 (August 27, 2021): 301–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.3985.
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The debate over the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in late 2018 showcases the crucial role of digital and, in particular, social media as vehicles of disinformation that populist actors can exploit in an effort to create resentment and fear in the public sphere. While mainstream political actors and legacy media initially did not address the issue, right-wing populist actors claimed ownership by framing (presumably <em>obligatory</em>) mass immigration as a matter of social, cultural, economic, and not least political risk, and created an image of political and cultural elites conspiring to keep the issue out of the public sphere. Initially advanced via digital and social media, such frames resonated sufficiently strongly in civil society to politicize the GCM in various national public spheres. In this article, these dynamics are explored by comparing the politicization of the GCM in three EU member states, namely Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Using a process-tracing design, the article (a) identifies the key actors in the process, (b) analyzes how the issue emerged in social and other digital media and travelled from digital media into mainstream mass media discourse, and finally (c) draws comparative conclusions from the three analyzed cases. Particular emphasis is placed on the frames used by right-wing populist actors, how these frames resonated in the wider public sphere and thereby generated communicative power against the GCM, ultimately forcing the issue onto the agenda of national public spheres and political institutions.