Journal articles: 'Robert Nozick'

1

Gendler, T. S. "Robert Nozick." Philosophical Review 112, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 106–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-1-106.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Sahd, Luiz Felipe Netto de Andrade e. Silva. "O ESTADO MÍNIMO DE ROBERT NOZICK." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 31, no. 100 (May 20, 2010): 225. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v31n100p225-238/2004.

Full text

Abstract:

O presente artigo tem como objetivo reconstruir argumentos centrais desenvolvidos por Robert Nozick, acerca das posições extremas que não diferenciam Estado-providência e Estado totalitário na política dos libertarianos norte-americanos, isto é, sobre as afinidades percebidas por Nozick com as teses desta corrente de pensamento, embora se afastando num ponto essencial: a questão do Estado. Ao contrário da teoria anarquista, o Estado mínimo é preferível ao estado de natureza, tal como John Locke o descreve. De fato, o estado de natureza expõe, segundo Nozick, os indivíduos a todo tipo de violência que nenhum “sistema de proteção privado” bastaria para evitar. O remédio para as violações dos contratos consiste na criação de um sistema de proteção público dotado oficialmente do monopólio do uso da força.Abstract: The present article aims at reconstructing Robert Nozick’s central arguments about the extreme positions held by North American libertarians who do not distinguish between Welfare State and Totalitarian State. Despite divergences on a pivotal question, that of the State, there are some affinities between Nozick and this current of thought. Contrary to the anarchist theory, the Minimal State is preferable to the state of nature as described by John Locke. According to Nozick, the state of nature exposes individuals to all kinds of violence from which no “private assurance system” whatsoever can protect them. The remedy for the breach of contracts resides in the creation of a public system of protection that officially holds the monopoly of the use of force.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Boaheng, Paul, and Wesley Cooper. "Robert Nozick, Libertarian?" South African Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 3 (January 2011): 257–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v30i3.69575.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Uszkai, Radu. "Robert Nozick’s Evolutionist Turn in Ethics." Balkan Journal of Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2018): 115–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bjp201810213.

Full text

Abstract:

The purpose of the present study is that of examining what I call Robert Nozick’s “evolutionist turn” in ethics. More specifically, my aim is to provide an answer to the following question: what type of ethical theory does Robert Nozick sketch in his last book, Invariances? My first objective will be that of delineating the philosophical framework which will accommodate my future discussion, highlighting the distinction between the metaphysical and scientific approaches to ethics as proposed by Ken Binmore, but also Emanuel Socaciu's taxonomy of ethical theories, which stems from the particular way in which moral philosophers tackle the nature of ethical norms and moral motivation. I then set forth to show that, in the philosophical framework previously described, Robert Nozick's approach from Anarchy, State, and Utopia should be seen as a metaphysical one. The last and most important part of my study aims to show how Nozick's “evolutionist turn” took place and developed, from his perspective on rationality in The Nature of Rationality, to his ethical theory advanced in Invariances.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Stout, Jeffrey. "Philosophical Explanations. Robert Nozick." Journal of Religion 65, no. 1 (January 1985): 133–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/487200.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Lillehammer, H. "Socratic Puzzles. Robert Nozick." Mind 110, no. 439 (July 1, 2001): 802–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/110.439.802.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Persson, Zngmar. "Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations." Theoria 47, no. 3 (February 11, 2008): 160–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00477.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Asquin, Nicholas. "Nozick, Entitlement Theory and the Justification for Maximizing Individual Freedoms." Political Science Undergraduate Review 1, no. 1 (October 15, 2015): 7–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/psur4.

Full text

Abstract:

The purpose of this paper was, in explaining Robert Nozick’s ‘Entitlement theory’, to argue whether his ideas of ‘just acquisition’ and ‘self-ownership’ provided sufficient justification for maximizing individual freedom. In this paper I examined the key principles of Entitlement theory Nozick uses, in conjuncture to his concepts of ‘self-ownership and ‘just acquisition’, to justify his conception of freedom. I performed this by exploring the implications of these principles and the extent to which they are logically coherent with the rest of his theory after first laying out the definitions of the terms Nozick uses as a foundation. Although I found that Nozick provides a couple of compelling cases that support his theory, Entitlement theory in general falls short of complete justification for maximized personal freedoms due to unaddressed problems with his concepts of ‘self-ownership’ and ‘just acquisition’. Namely, that the extent which to these concepts apply eventually create situations in which the natural execution of Nozick’s acquisition and transfer rights can impede on the rights of others, undermining his theory.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Bracho Fuenmayor, Pedro Luis. "Justicia desde la óptica de John Rawls y Robert Nozick: una perspectiva comparada." Cuestiones Políticas 39, no. 70 (October 10, 2021): 44–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3970.02.

Full text

Abstract:

In this research the objective was to analyze justice considering the optics of John Rawls and Robert Nozick, from a comparative perspective. A documentary review of the bibliographic material on Rawls' Theory of Justice (1975) and Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (1988) was carried out, also considering the knowledge of different experts on the subject. It is qualitative research of descriptive type, with a methodological design of theoretical, documentary, and diachronic cut. In relation to the data collection technique, the registration or registration of author, documentary and content references was used. As a result, it was possible to establish an analytical comparison referring to some outstanding criteria on the notion of justice, especially in relation to how the ownership and distribution of wealth is assumed, according to both philosophers, the action of the State, for Rawls of great inherence and for Nozick of minimal participation. It can be concluded from this analysis that there are antagonisms between these two philosophers because for Rawls justice is framed in a social egalitarianism, where society is something ideal, abstract, while Nozick assumes it within the thought of conservative liberalism, considering a real and concrete society.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Schaefer, David Lewis. "PROCEDURAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: RAWLS AND NOZICK." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 1 (December 18, 2006): 164–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070070.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper critically assesses the “procedural” accounts of political justice set forth by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). I argue that the areas of agreement between Rawls and Nozick are more significant than their disagreements. Even though Nozick offers trenchant criticisms of Rawls's argument for economic redistribution (the “difference principle”), Nozick's own economic libertarianism is undermined by his “principle of rectification,” which he offers as a possible ground in practice for the application of something like the difference principle. Both Rawls's and Nozick's accounts of justice fail because of their abstraction from human nature as a ground of right. At the same time the libertarianism on which they agree in the non-economic sphere would deprive a free society of its necessary moral underpinning. Rawls and Nozick err, finally, by demanding that the policies pursued by a just society conform to theoretical formulas concocted by philosophy professors, rather than leaving room (as Lockean liberalism does) for the adjustment of policies to particular circumstances based on statesmen's prudential judgment and the consent of the governed. Particularly troubling from the perspective of a citizen seriously concerned with the advancement of justice and freedom is both thinkers' shrill denunciations of existing liberal societies for failing to conform to their particular strictures.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Sládecek, Michal. "Robert Nozick: Utopia in libertarian perspective." Filozofija i drustvo, no. 28 (2005): 163–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid0528163s.

Full text

Abstract:

The author first looks at how the basic tenets of libertarianism, as presented in the opening chapters of Nozick?s ?Anarchy, State and Utopia?, are connected with the idea of community. In the second section Nozick?s own conception of utopia and voluntary associations is discussed. In the closing section various critiques of this libertarian conception are analyzed. Though compatible with social co-operation, Nozick?s position rests on an indeterminate concept of rights and is incapable of explaining adequately the relations of mutual connectedness, i.e. community. Communities are treated as selfsufficient entities in a way that is in line with the communitarian standpoint, but incongruent with the republican model of integration. The latter objection refers especially to the conflict of loyalties to particular associations and to the ?framework community?.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Balera, José Eduardo Ribeiro. "Robert Nozick e sua teoria política: seria uma abordagem razoável para a sociedade contemporânea?" Griot : Revista de Filosofia 12, no. 2 (December 18, 2015): 101–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v12i2.666.

Full text

Abstract:

Para Robert Nozick, é preciso entender se o Estado é necessário e o modo como ele pode ser compreendido sem ofender direitos (como o direito natural de não coerção). O presente trabalho tem por objetivo explorar conceitos elementares da teoria de Robert Nozick para a conformação de uma teoria política razoável. Inicialmente, foi apresentado um panorama da concepção libertária desenvolvida por Nozick, baseado na primeira parte da obra Anarquia, Estado e Utopia (1974), tendo em vista que é um autor de bases teóricas distintas e pouco estudado pela academia. Posteriormente, foram analisados alguns aspectos de sua ideia de sociedade política e de seus integrantes, confrontando com conceitos teóricos do pensador contemporâneo John Rawls. Por fim, algumas características de tese de Nozick foram examinados para entender se seria uma doutrina abrangente e como poderia ser caracterizada como racional e razoável frente a pluralidade de concepções da boa vida

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Orozco Garibay, José Manuel. "Robert Nozick, The examined life: [reseña]." Estudios: filosofía, historia, letras, no. 22 (1990): 123. http://dx.doi.org/10.5347/01856383.0022.000170693.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Morresi, Sergio D. "Robert Nozick e o liberalismo fora do esquadro." Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política, no. 55-56 (2002): 285–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0102-64452002000100014.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Cohen, G. A. "Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality: Part II." Social Philosophy and Policy 3, no. 2 (1986): 77–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500000315.

Full text

Abstract:

1. The present paper is a continuation of my “Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality,” which began with a description of the political philosophy of Robert Nozick. I contended in that essay that the foundational claim of Nozick's philosophy is the thesis of self-ownership, which says that each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, consequently, that each is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others. To be sure, he may not harm others, and he may, if necessary, be forced not to harm them, but he should never be forced to help them, as people are in fact forced to help others, according to Nozick, by redistributive taxation. (Nozick recognizes that an unhelping person may qualify as unpleasant or even, under certain conditions, as immoral. The self-ownership thesis says that people should be free to live their lives as they choose, but it does not say that how they choose to live them is beyond criticism.)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Waldron, Jeremy. "NOZICK AND LOCKE: FILLING THE SPACE OF RIGHTS." Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 81–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505250504104x.

Full text

Abstract:

Do property entitlements define the moral environment in which rights to well-being are defined, or do rights to well-being define the moral environment in which property entitlements are defined? Robert Nozick argued for the former alternative and he denied that any serious attempt had been made to state the latter alternative (what he called “the ‘reverse’ theory”). I actually think John Locke's approach to property can be seen as an instance of the “reverse” theory. And Nozick's can too, inasmuch as it shares a number of features with the Lockean approach. But my paper is not intended as a criticism of Nozick; on the contrary, it acknowledges the integrity and the importance of his insistence that welfare, property, and justice be integrated into a single theory with clearly established priorities.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Arneson, Richard J. "THE SHAPE OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS: FAIRNESS, PARETO, MODERATION, AND CONSENT." Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 255–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052505041105.

Full text

Abstract:

In chapter four of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick raised interesting questions about whether or not it is ever morally acceptable to act against what are agreed to be an individual's natural moral rights. The pursuit of these questions opens up issues concerning the specific content of these individual rights. This essay explores Nozick's questions by posing examples and using our considered responses to them to specify the shape of individual rights. The exploration provisionally concludes that a conception of individual moral rights quite different from Nozick's looks attractive and merits further development.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Mumy, Gene E. "What Does Nozick's Minimal State Do?" Economics and Philosophy 3, no. 2 (October 1987): 275–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100002923.

Full text

Abstract:

In the first half of the 1970s, two books appeared which have subsequently been regarded as major works in political philosophy: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Economists have devoted a considerable amount of ink to commentary, pro and con, on A Theory of Justice; and it is getting to be a rare public finance textbook that does not, in its discussion of governmental redistribution, describe the Kantian contract made behind the veil of ignorance. On the other hand, while Nozick has not exactly been ignored, economists have not joined the debate over Anarchy, State, and Utopia with the same gusto. When economists have joined the debate, their concern has been, more often than not, with Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice, as is the case with Varian (1975) and Sen (1977). What is largely missing, then, is any economic analysis of the processes that give rise to Nozick's morally legitimate state, which he calls the minimal state, and the characteristics and likely activities of the minimal state within the moral boundaries set by Nozick, his assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Leese, Matthias. "Prevention, knowledge, justice: Robert Nozick and counterterrorism." Critical Studies on Terrorism 10, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 320–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2017.1328853.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Palazzani, Laura. ""Spiegazioni filosofiche" di Robert Nozick: Implicazioni bioetiche." Medicina e Morale 39, no. 6 (December 31, 1990): 1157–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.4081/mem.1990.1154.

Full text

Abstract:

Il presente lavoro si propone di esaminare il pensiero di Robert Nozick (uno degli esponenti della corrente statunitense contemporanea denominata "etica pubblica"), riferendosi all'opera Spiegazioni filosofiche (1981), nella quale l'autore delinea le premesse filosofiche che supportano il suo intervento in ambito giuridico e sociale. La teoria metafisica dell'"autosussunzione riflessiva", la teoria epistemologica del "rintraccio" e la teoria etica della "spinta" e della "attrazione" convergono nell'affermazione soggettivista che sta alla base del relativismo pluralistico morale e del libertarismo politico. L'articolo mira ad evidenziare le implicazioni, implicite ed esplicite, di tali teorie nel dibattito bioetico al fine di riproporre il riferimento al personalismo realista quale autentico fondamento per una proposta in ambito pubblico che tuteli la persona nella sua globalità.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Walker, Nigel. "Nozick's Revenge." Philosophy 70, no. 274 (October 1995): 581–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100065827.

Full text

Abstract:

When I first came across Robert Nozick′s Philosophical Explanations I was struck by the purity of his justification of punishment. Most latter-day retributivists are crypto-utilitarians, claiming to find some sort of benefit in penalties, even if it is only symbolic. Nozick too sees punishment as symbolic, but not as having any necessary utility. Paradoxically, perhaps, he is one of the few retributivists who insists that it matters what the offender makes of his penalty. Even more interesting is the importance he attaches to the analogy between retribution and revenge. Most retributivists are at pains to distance themselves from vengeance: but not Nozick.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Miklaszewska, Justyna, and Paweł Janowski. "Libertarian Justice." Civitas. Studia z Filozofii Polityki 11 (January 30, 2009): 201–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.35757/civ.2009.11.10.

Full text

Abstract:

An article describes liberal theories of justice presented by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Both of these competing liberal theories, Rawls’s and Nozick’s, share a similar rationalist approach. Both philosophers start out with assumptions about human nature and from there proceed to deduce a theory of justice upon which they in turn base their vision of the perfect liberal State. For Rawls, this is a welfare State, whereas in Nozick’s theory it is a State which does not interfere in economics. On the one hand, a Platonic influence with a utopian mindset can certainly be detected here. On the other hand, contemporary American society is a point of reference for both theories. However, Rawls attempts to bring this perfect, universal model of the State closer to reality and to embody it in a liberal constitutional democracy in which human rights are protected (especially in his later works), whereas Nozick adheres to the general utopian formula. An examination of his theory shows that justice cannot be reconciled with the ideal of a minimal State and that attempts to apply the principles of justice actually reveal the defects of his theoretical approach.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Knowles, Dudley, and Jonathan Wolff. "Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State." Philosophical Quarterly 43, no. 173 (October 1993): 566. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220011.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Lund, Brian. "Robert Nozick and the Politics of Social Welfare." Political Studies 44, no. 1 (March 1996): 115–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00760.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

GRAHAM, KEITH. "Robert Nozick. Property, Justice and the Minimal State." Philosophical Books 34, no. 1 (February 12, 2009): 55–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1993.tb00759.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

van der Veen, Robert J., and Philippe Van Parijs. "Entitlement Theories of Justice: From Nozick to Roemer and Beyond." Economics and Philosophy 1, no. 1 (April 1985): 69–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100001899.

Full text

Abstract:

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick contrasts entitlement theories of justice and “traditional” theories such as Rawls', utilitarianism or egalitarianism, and advocates the former against the latter. What exactly is an entitlement theory (or conception or principle) of justice? Nozick's book offers two distinct characterizations. On the one hand, he explicitly describes “the general outlines of the entitlement theory” as maintaining “that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of injustice (as specified by the first two principles of just acquisition and transfer)” (Nozick, 1974, p. 153). On the other hand, his famous “Wilt Chamberlain” argument against alternative theories is first said to apply to (all) “non-entitlement conceptions” (p. 160), and later to any “end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice” (p. 163) — which amounts to an implicit characterization of an entitlement conception (theory, principle) as a conception of justice which is neither end-state nor patterned.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Silva, Carlos Fernando Cruz da. "Justiça, Integridade e Equidade: Questões Relevantes Sobre a Teoria Política de Robert Nozick." Revista de Teorias da Justiça, da Decisão e da Argumentação Jurídica 2, no. 1 (November 2, 2016): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.26668/indexlawjournals/2525-9644/2016.v2i1.1087.

Full text

Abstract:

O presente trabalho efetua uma análise sobre a teoria política de Robert Nozick a partir de teses defendidas por Ronald Dworkin. O objetivo central deste artigo é investigar a validade ou invalidade dos princípios de justiça propostos por Nozick diante da teoria da integridade. A metodologia utilizada para se construir a hipótese definitiva se baseou, inicialmente, em pesquisa teórica, desenvolvida através do levantamento bibliográfico dos textos dos principais autores envolvidos. Após o levantamento, foi promovida a análise descritiva dos textos e, em sequencia, sua análise crítica. Ao final, é proposta a hipótese definitiva do problema a partir de raciocínio dedutivo.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Feser, Edward. "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION." Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 56–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052505041038.

Full text

Abstract:

Critics of Robert Nozick's libertarian political theory often allege that the theory in general and its account of property rights in particular lack sufficient foundations. A key difficulty is thought to lie in his account of how portions of the world which no one yet owns can justly come to be initially acquired. But the difficulty is illusory, because (contrary to what both Nozick and his critics assume) the concept of justice does not meaningfully apply to initial acquisition in the first place. Moreover, the principle of self-ownership provides a solid foundation for Nozick's libertarianism, and when seen in the light of that principle and its full implications, the standard purported examples of injustices in acquisition are revealed to be nothing of the kind.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

COOPER, WESLEY. "Nozick, Ramsey, and Symbolic Utility." Utilitas 20, no. 3 (September 2008): 301–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820808003166.

Full text

Abstract:

I explore a connection between Robert Nozick's account of decision value/symbolic utility in The Nature of Rationality1 and F. P. Ramsey's discussion of ethically neutral propositions in his 1926 essay ‘Truth and Probability’,2 a discussion that Brian Skyrms in Choice and Chance3 credits with disclosing deeper foundations for expected utility than the celebrated Theory of Games and Economic Behavior4 of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Ramsey's recognition of ethically non-neutral propositions is essential to his foundational work, and the similarity of these propositions to symbolic utility helps make the case that the latter belongs to the apparatus that constructs expected utility, rather than being reducible to it or being part of a proposal that can be cheerfully ignored. I conclude that decision value replaces expected utility as the central idea in (normative) decision theory. Expected utility becomes an approximation that is good enough when symbolic utility is not at stake.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

McKerlie, Dennis. "Rights and Risk." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (June 1986): 239–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1986.10717117.

Full text

Abstract:

Robert Nozick has suggested that risky actions are a problem for a moral view based on rights. We ordinarily think that some actions are too dangerous to be permissible, taking into account both the harm risked and the degree of the risk. Other actions, although they run some risk of serious harm, are thought permissible. The problem is to draw this distinction in a principled way by looking to rights.I think that Nozick's argument about risk can be answered but a different argument has convinced me that the rights view cannot handle risk in a satisfactory way. The inability is a function of the basic nature of the view.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Brown, Robert. "Recent Australian Work in Philosophy." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 3 (September 1988): 545–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10717190.

Full text

Abstract:

In the chapter entitled ‘Philosophy and the Meaning of Life’ in Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations there is an admonitory passage with many applications. ‘It is a puzzle,’ says Nozick, ‘how so many people, including intellectuals and academics devote enormous energy to work in which nothing of themselves or their important goals shines forth, not even in the way their work is presented. If they were struck down, their children upon growing up and examining their work would never know why they had done it, would never know who it was that did it. They work that way and sometimes live that way, too’ (1981, 578).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Magni-Berton, Raul, and Diego Ríos. "Why do academics oppose the market? A test of Nozick’s hypothesis." Current Sociology 67, no. 6 (November 26, 2018): 856–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011392118812934.

Full text

Abstract:

In this article, the authors explore why academics tend to oppose the market. To this intent the article uses normative political theory as an explanatory mechanism, starting with a conjecture originally suggested by Robert Nozick. Academics are over-represented amongst the best students of their cohort. School achievement engenders high expectations about future economic prospects. Yet markets are only contingently sensitive to school achievement. This misalignment between schools and markets is perceived by academics – and arguably by intellectuals in general – as morally unacceptable. To test this explanation, the article uses an online questionnaire with close to 1500 French academic respondents. The data resulting from this investigation lend support to Nozick’s hypothesis.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Floriani, Lara Bonemer Rocha, and Marcia Carla Pereira Ribeiro. "Para além da abstração da posição original: uma proposição a partir de Nozick e Sandel." Trans/Form/Ação 41, no. 4 (December 2018): 91–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41n4.06.p91.

Full text

Abstract:

Resumo: O presente artigo tem como objetivo propor uma hipótese para superação das críticas feitas por Robert Nozick e Michael Sandel à teoria da justiça de John Rawls, no que concerne à necessidade de se considerar aspectos históricos e práticos, na formulação de princípios na posição original. Para tanto, é preciso analisar inicialmente as correntes filosóficas do liberalismo, do libertarianismo e do comunitarismo, a fim de fundar as bases necessárias ao desenvolvimento do estudo. Na sequência, será apresentada a teoria da justiça de John Raws, seguida das críticas formuladas pelo libertário Robert Nozick, no que se refere à necessidade de se levar em conta o princípio histórico. Nozick comprova, por meio do exemplo de Wilt Chamberlain, como aspectos históricos podem alterar as estruturas pré-estabelecidas pelas teorias de estado final. Após, serão examinados os apontamentos feitos por Michael Sandel, especialmente no que concerne ao individualismo metodológico. Sandel também chama a atenção para o fato de que, para garantir efetividade aos princípios, é preciso que os indivíduos se utilizem de sua experiência e das particularidades da comunidade e de seus integrantes. Ao final, será sugerida uma proposta de superação das críticas dirigidas a Rawls, mediante a relativização da abstração da posição original.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

McKenna, Edward, Maurice Wade, and Diane Zannoni. "Keynes, Rawls, Uncertainty, and the Liberal Theory of the State." Economics and Philosophy 4, no. 2 (October 1988): 221–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100001061.

Full text

Abstract:

What role, if any, should the government perform in a society? Two very different answers to this question have been provided by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. For Rawls, the government plays an important role in ensuring that the principles of justice are realized in the workings of society. For Nozick (1974), the role of government is limited to that of providing protection. The debate over these two views has led to the questioning of the entire liberal doctrine, a questioning that has taken place not only within intellectual circles, but also within the society at large.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Diggins, John Patrick. "SIDNEY HOOK, ROBERT NOZICK, AND THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM." Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 200–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052505041087.

Full text

Abstract:

Diggins observes in this essay that, while Nozick and Hook shared a passion for freedom and for understanding liberty in all its complexities, the two philosophers, one a libertarian and the other a democratic socialist, occupied different worlds when it came to how they viewed property and power. Nozick believed that freedom and justice depended upon a minimal state that would be severely restricted in its exercise of power. Sidney Hook never renounced his conviction, born of his early attraction to Marxism, that truly dangerous power is wielded not principally by government but by private individuals of great material wealth: by industrialists. Diggins examines the divergent views of these two seminal thinkers on such issues as human rights, private property, democracy, and judicial review. The differences are profound, yet they shared a common interest in the life of the mind and in exploring such hoary philosophical topics as free will versus determinism and the grounding of moral values.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Ryan, Alan. "Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State.Jonathan Wolff." Ethics 103, no. 1 (October 1992): 154–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293477.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Blitz, Marc. "The Right to an Artificial Reality? Freedom of Thought and the Fiction of Philip K. Dick." Michigan Technology Law Review, no. 27.2 (2021): 377. http://dx.doi.org/10.36645/mtlr.27.2.right.

Full text

Abstract:

n Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the philosopher Robert Nozick describes what he calls an “Experience Machine.” In essence, it produces a form of virtual reality (VR). People can use it to immerse themselves in a custom-designed dream: They have the experience of climbing a mountain, reading a book, or conversing with a friend when they are actually lying isolated in a tank with electrodes feeding perceptions into their brain. Nozick describes the Experience Machine as part of a philosophical thought experiment—one designed to show that a valuable life consists of more than mental states, like those we receive in this machine. As Nozick says, “we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.” An 80-year sequence of experiences generated by the machine would not be of equivalent value to the lifetime of the identical set of experiences we derive from interactions with real people (who are not illusions, but have minds of their own), and with a physical universe that lies outside of us. On the contrary, says Nozick, a solipsistic life in the Experience Machine is a deeply impoverished one.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Ottonicar, Flávio Gabriel Capinzaiki. "O equívoco de Robert Nozick ao interpretar a questão da propriedade em Locke." Griot : Revista de Filosofia 20, no. 3 (October 20, 2020): 145–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v20i3.1843.

Full text

Abstract:

Em Anarquia, Estado e Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick defende um Estado mínimo ao qual não deve ser dado o direito de redistribuir a propriedade que já foi distribuída pelos individuos. Nozick se apoia na ideia de estado de natureza tal como Locke propôs no Segundo Tratado Sobre o Governo (1689), aproveitando, inclusive, a maneira de Locke fundamentar a propriedade privada. Locke explicou o direito natural à propriedade por meio do trabalho para superar uma crítica que Robert Filmer havia dirigido a Hugo Grotius anos antes. Grotuis considerava haver, originalmente, um direito comum à posse dos bens e defendia que a propriedade privada surgiu a partir de um contrato entre os indivíduos. Filmer colocou em dúvida que um contrato para dividir a propriedade pudesse ter sido firmado entre todos ao mesmo tempo. Locke também defendia a propriedade privada a partir da propriedade comum, mas precisava superar a objeção que Filmer havia dirigido a Grotius. Nesse sentido surge a ideia de trabalho como fundamentador da propriedade privada, pois é o trabalho que a legitima em vez do contrato. Nozick, apesar de uma longa análise sobre a teoria da aquisição de Locke, em que discorre, inclusive, sobre o papel do trabalho no surgimento da propriedade privada, afirma que Locke pensava os bens naturais originalmente sem dono, quando, na verdade, para Locke eles eram propriedade comum a todos. O propósito do presente texto é elencar e avaliar algumas possíveis consequências desse pequeno equívoco interpretativo.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Wall, Edmund. "The Interpersonal Aspects of Coercive Threats and Offers." Dialogue 41, no. 4 (2002): 681–702. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300005461.

Full text

Abstract:

RésuméJe défends ici une conception interpersonnelle des menaces et des offers coercitives, centrée sur les intentions de ceux quifont de telles menaces ou de telles offres. Je critique, ce faisant, un groupe de conceptions fort influentes, appelées «baseline accounts». Robert Nozick, qui adopte une approche de ce genre, incorpore à son analyse des menaces coercitives des éléments non moraux aussi bien que des éléments moraux. Les approches de Daniel Lyons et de David Zimmerman peuvent être vues, à certains égards, comme des améliorations par rapport à celle de Nozick. On essaiera de montrer, cependant, qu'aucune de ces approches ne fournit une analyse adéquate des menaces et des offres coercitives.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Salinas, Alejandra M. "La rectificación de la injusticia en Nozick: debates e implicaciones para los reclamos territoriales indígenas." Co-herencia 9, no. 16 (July 2012): 119–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.9.16.5.

Full text

Abstract:

Robert Nozick formula el principio de rectificación de las injusticias históricas y defiende la posibilidad de una redistribución del ingreso al servicio de ese principio. En primer lugar y en el marco de su teoría política, examino aquí su idea de rectificación y luego evalúo algunas de las críticas formuladas a esa idea. En segundo lugar abordo las implicancias del principio de rectificación para los reclamos territoriales indígenas. Planteo que la rectificación así entendida no exigiría defender un modelo redistributivo, y que una propuesta más compatible con el respeto de los derechos de propiedad que Nozick defiende sería la asignación de tierras o bienes fiscales a los pueblos originarios.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Henley, Kenneth. "Hume’s “Wilt Chamberlain Argument” and taxation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42, S1 (February 2012): 148–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2012.972143.

Full text

Abstract:

Robert Nozick addresses the idea of egalitarian redistribution in an argument standardly considered original: the “Wilt Chamberlain Argument”. However, this argument (without reference to Wilt Chamberlain) is found in David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, first published in 1751. Placing this argument within a Humean and Hayekian, rather than a Lockean or Kantian, perspective radically changes its import for issues of economic justice. Rather than vindicating the radical individualism of Nozick and other libertarians, applied to our circumstances using Hume's conventionalist and evolutionary account of justice, Hume's Wilt Chamberlain argument vindicates moderate redistribution constrained by the rule of general laws and the goal of fostering innovation and industriousness.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Guerrieri, Victoria. "LA TEORÍA LIBERTARIA DE JUSTICIA DE ROBERT NOZICK. REFLEXIONES A PARTIR DEL PRINCIPIO DE ADQUISICIÓN INICIAL JUSTA." Momba'etéva 1 (November 4, 2020): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.30972/mom.104537.

Full text

Abstract:

<p>El presente trabajo estudia la teoría libertaria de justicia de Robert Nozick a partir del análisis del “principio de adquisición inicial justa” postulado en dicha teoría y su relación con sus definiciones sobre el Estado Mínimo. El análisis advierte que se producen tensiones y contradicciones que parecieran ser insalvables.</p>

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Guerrieri, Victoria. "LA TEORÍA LIBERTARIA DE JUSTICIA DE ROBERT NOZICK. REFLEXIONES A PARTIR DEL PRINCIPIO DE ADQUISICIÓN INICIAL JUSTA." Momba'etéva 1, no. 1 (November 4, 2020): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.30972/mom.114537.

Full text

Abstract:

<p>El presente trabajo estudia la teoría libertaria de justicia de Robert Nozick a partir del análisis del “principio de adquisición inicial justa” postulado en dicha teoría y su relación con sus definiciones sobre el Estado Mínimo. El análisis advierte que se producen tensiones y contradicciones que parecieran ser insalvables.</p>

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Ogleznev, Vitaly V., and Veronika S. Klochikhina. "Intellectual property and social justice: Robert Nozick versus John Rawls." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya, no. 4(36) (December 1, 2016): 385–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/36/38.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Tebble, Adam James. "The tables turned: Wilt Chamberlain versus Robert Nozick on rectification." Economics and Philosophy 17, no. 1 (April 2001): 89–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267101000165.

Full text

Abstract:

Recently the demand for rectification of past injustices has become an increasingly important issue. Each of the last three decades has witnessed democratization processes in the Mediterranean basin, Latin America, in Central and Eastern Europe and in Africa where debates have arisen over rectification of past wrongs which naturally include the unjust expropriation of property. Most recently, moreover, the idea of land restitution to indigenous people, particularly in Australia, Canada and Zimbabwe, has become a prominent, if not always equanimous, part of those countries' domestic political agendas. The difficulties associated with satisfying such demands have been discussed with particular regard to the framing of new post-Communist constitutions in eastern and central Europe by, among others, Jon Elster and Claus Offe. Yet, not only in the field of public policy has the issue of rectification become important. Perhaps because of these developments, there has been a resurgence of interest in rectification in political philosophy as is shown by a forthcoming collection of essays on the subject edited by Elster.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Wetherick, Norman. "Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World, by Robert Nozick." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 35, no. 2 (January 2004): 220–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2004.11007441.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Fonseca, Maria Fernanda Soares, and Maria da Luz Alves Ferreira. "AS TEORIAS DA JUSTIÇA: UM CONTRAPONTO ENTRE AS CONCEPÇÕES DE JOHN RAWLS E ROBERT NOZICK." Revista Eletrônica do Curso de Direito da UFSM 11, no. 2 (August 30, 2016): 601. http://dx.doi.org/10.5902/1981369421015.

Full text

Abstract:

Este artigo possui o escopo de apresentar e analisar as teorias da Justiça propostas nas obras “Uma teoria da Justiça” de John Rawls e “Anarquia, Estado e Utopia” de Robert Nozick, fazendo um contraponto entre os conceitos e aplicabilidade das teorias propostas por esses dois grandes autores. Nozick e Rawls são filósofos norte-americanos com inquestionável legado na Filosofia Política contemporânea, os quais, em suas obras, debatem e apresentam seus conceitos e compreensões acerca das teorias da Justiça e sua aplicação nas sociedades democráticas contemporâneas, contrapondo-se um com o outro. Para desenvolvimento do artigo foi utilizada como metodologia pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, ou seja, trata-se de uma análise da concepção de justiça nos dois autores supracitados, no âmbito da filosofia política, objetivando realizar um contraponto entre as duas teorias e relacionando com as expressões da questão social no Brasil na contemporaneidade.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Simmons, A. John. "CONSENT THEORY FOR LIBERTARIANS." Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 330–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052505041130.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper argues that libertarian political philosophers, including Robert Nozick, have erred in neglecting the problem of political obligation and that they ought to embrace an actual consent theory of political obligation and state legitimacy. It argues as well that if they followed this recommendation, their position on the subject would be correct. I identify the tension in libertarian (and especially Nozick's) thought between its minimalist and its consensualist strains and argue that, on libertarianism's own terms, the consensualist strain ought to prevail. I then describe the form of the consent theory that I recommend to libertarians. The paper concludes with an extended defense of this form of consent theory against contemporary liberal-egalitarian criticisms of it (both explicit and implicit), including those of Dworkin, Rawls, and their followers.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Dieterlen, Paulette, Mark Rollins, Luis Salazar, and Rodolfo De la Torre. "Presentación de Anarquía, Estado y utopía de Robert Nozick." Revista de filosofía DIÁNOIA 34, no. 34 (September 9, 1988): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704913e.1988.34.681.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Mack, Eric. "PREROGATIVES, RESTRICTIONS, AND RIGHTS." Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 357–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052505041142.

Full text

Abstract:

I offer a defense of the moral side-constraints to which Robert Nozick appeals in Anarchy, State and Utopia but for which he fails to provide a sustained justification. I identify a line of anti-consequentialist argumentation which is present in Nozick and which, in the terminology of Samuel Scheffler, moves first to affirm a personal prerogative which allows the individual not to sacrifice herself for the sake of the best overall outcome and second moves on to affirm restrictions (i.e., moral side-constraints) which prohibit the individual from suppressing others' exercise of their personal prerogatives even if that suppression would serve the overall good. I argue that one ought to follow this line of anti-consequentialist argumentation all the way to the affirmation of restrictions by showing that the rationale for the adoption of the personal prerogative is not satisfied unless the accompanying restrictions are adopted as well.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Journal articles on the topic 'Robert Nozick'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles