Academic literature on the topic 'Russell, Bertrand, Monism'

Philosophers have substantially considered the key ideas of Neutral Monism, a philosophical view attempting to overcome the Mind/Body problem, as it was initially developed by Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell. Yet similar ideas are also found in some key considerations of a few prominent physicists who developed quantum mechanics, although philosophers have neglected them. We will show that Niels Bohr?s principle of complementarity (of the particle and wave aspects of microphysical phenomena) is a gradually developed and experimentally motivated account very close to Russell?s and Mach?s key ideas on Neutral Monism.

Herein we are not interested in merely using dynamical systems theory, graph theory, information theory, etc., to model the relationship between brain dynamics and networks, and various states and degrees of conscious processes. We are interested in the question of how phenomenal conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related. Any attempt to mathematically and formally model conscious experience and its relationship to physics must begin with some metaphysical assumption in mind about the nature of conscious experience, the nature of matter and the nature of the relationship between them. These days the most prominent metaphysical fixed points are strong emergence or some variant of panpsychism. In this paper we will detail another distinct metaphysical starting point known as neutral monism. In particular, we will focus on a variant of the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than starting with physics as fundamental, as both strong emergence and panpsychism do in their own way, our goal is to suggest how one might derive fundamental physics from neutral monism. Thus, starting with two axioms grounded in our characterization of neutral monism, we will sketch out a derivation of and explanation for some key features of relativity and quantum mechanics that suggest a unity between those two theories that is generally unappreciated. Our mode of explanation throughout will be of the principle as opposed to constructive variety in something like Einstein’s sense of those terms. We will argue throughout that a bias towards property dualism and a bias toward reductive dynamical and constructive explanation lead to the hard problem and the explanatory gap in consciousness studies, and lead to serious unresolved problems in fundamental physics, such as the measurement problem and the mystery of entanglement in quantum mechanics and lack of progress in producing an empirically well-grounded theory of quantum gravity. We hope to show that given our take on neutral monism and all that follows from it, the aforementioned problems can be satisfactorily resolved leaving us with a far more intuitive and commonsense model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.

Příspěvek kriticky reaguje na pojednání o russelliánském monismu v monografii Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? Tomáše Hříbka. Podle Hříbka russelliánský monismus, přístup k fenomenálnímu vědomí inspirovaný vhledy Bertranda Russella, nepředstavuje skutečnou alternativu vůči materialismu, dualismu a idealismu. Autor příspěvku argumentuje, že russelliánský monismus naopak lze pokládat za svébytné metafyzické stanovisko, jež se navíc vyhýbá hlavním úskalím těchto tradičních přístupů. Nejprve odpovídá na námitku, že fundamentální jsoucna neutrálního monismu jsou ve skutečnosti mentalistická, a tedy nikoli neutrální.V souvislosti s neutrálním monismem rovněž poukazuje na problémy Hříbkovy definice fyzikalismu v duchu via negativa. Autor dále vysvětluje, proč na rozdíl od dualismu nepředstavuje pro russelliánský monismus vážnou obtíž kauzální uzávěra fyzična, a upozorňuje, že russelliánský monismus dokáže lépe než materialismus odpovědět na výzvy, jako jsou argument z myslitelnosti a argument z poznání. Ačkoli tedy russelliánský monismus má s materialismem, dualismem a idealismem jistě styčné plochy, daří se mu vyhnout nejvážnějším obtížím těchto směrů, a máme proto dobrý důvod chápat jej jako svébytný a slibný přístup k fenomenálnímu vědomí.

<p>El presente trabajo investigativo plantea un análisis sobre el problema mente- cerebro desde la Teoría del doble aspecto, o más exactamente, desde la Teoría del monismo neutral planteada por Bertrand Russell. Este análisis presenta la armonización de dos tendencias que pueden parecer aparentemente contradictorias; una en el campo de la psicología, y la otra, en el de la física. Para Russell el tema de la relación de la materia con lo que existe, y en general, la interpretación en términos de lo que existe, no es simplemente competencia de la física, además de ésta disciplina se requiere los aportes de la fisiología, la psicología y la filosofía. De la misma manera, siguiendo los planteamientos del mencionado autor, se aborda críticamente el tema del progreso de las ciencias naturales en una posible alianza con la filosofía, no sin antes, desarrollar algunos aspectos relacionados con el progreso técnico y la ética.</p>

This introduction lays out the direction of the book on the whole by discussing the movie palace, Ben Schlanger, modernism, and new cinema histories. Schlanger’s life and career are briefly introduced, and the importance of using archival materials and the Better Theatres section of Motion Picture Herald for documenting Schlanger’s theory of theater design is explained. From such writings, one can gather that Schlanger’s ideal theaters would be places of both bodily passivity and contemplation, yet also of immersion in the sense that the local environment and fellow viewers would fall away in service of the screen. Furthermore, the term “neutral” is examined via Bertrand Russell and neutral monism; in addition, the introduction explores the neutral and neutralization’s connections to the apparatus. All of these strands are connected via a modern approach to spectatorship explicated by Schlanger in his theaters.