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1
Ross, Wiktor. "Instytucja prezydenta w systemie politycznym Federacji Rosyjskiej." Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego. Studia i Prace, no. 1 (November 1, 2011): 63–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kkessip.2011.1.3.
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This article presents the course that passed the political system of USSR going from the old soviet structure to the modern form of the state. Total economic and political crisis forced the last General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbatchev to seek the new political institutions and were helpful in the process of maintaining socialist character of the state and social relations and, simultaneously, to carry out the changes of the political system which became necessary. These efforts were a failure because of strong resistance, on the one hand, communist nomenklatura and the other hand, the new democratic movement in the Russian Federation conducted by Boris Yeltsin and independent movements in Soviet Republics. After the trial to stop the process of reforming of the state undertaken by communist leaders of USSR during coupé d'etat in August 1991 the initiative passed to the democratic forces in Russia. The fall of the USSR and foundation of the CIS as the platform of the reintegration of Post-Soviet area started the new stage of the political conflict in the Russian Federation. The objective needs occurred in the process of reforming of the economic structures, growing of the protest attitudes, necessity to relief the mood of the local authorities in order to attain their support for the course of modernization, pushed President Yeltsin to concentrate enormous power. The old Soviet Constitution was more comfortable for such political conditions than modern solutions based on the power's division in three branches - Parliament, Government and independent jurisdiction. Contradictions of the Post-Soviet period brought to the deep conflict between President Yeltsin and Supreme Soviet in October 1993. The defeat of the conservative forces in this confrontation meant the end of Soviet system in Russia, however political system that was created on such ground had authoritarian features, which was used all Yeltsin's presidential decade bringing, as a result, the system very far to the principles of the democracy.
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Rivera, David W., and Sharon Werning Rivera. "Yeltsin, Putin, and Clinton: Presidential Leadership and Russian Democratization in Comparative Perspective." Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 3 (August 19, 2009): 591–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592709990880.
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Immediately after coming to power, the Clinton administration declared the consolidation of market and democratic institutions in Russia to be a vital American interest. The administration's central tactic for promoting this outcome was to help Boris Yeltsin remain in power. In a major assault on Clinton's historical legacy, much of the scholarly community maintains that U.S. policy was fundamentally flawed, both morally and strategically. In the view of these analysts, post-Soviet Russia's founding president was an autocratic leader who derailed the country's progress toward democracy. However, this body of research focuses exclusively on the Russian Federation and fails to utilize comparative referents. In contrast, we analyze the experiences of the full population of post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia from 1991 to the present. Whether examined in cross-national or longitudinal perspective, we find that Russian democracy under Yeltsin was, relatively speaking, a success. We conclude that the Clinton administration's policy of support for Yeltsin both served various American foreign policy interests and strengthened the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia, thereby fulfilling the dictates of both real- and idealpolitik. In addition, the relative success of Russia's democratization in the 1990s, the reversal of that pattern in this decade, and the magnitude of the transformation of the polity under Putin all demonstrate the pivotal role played by presidential leadership in Russia's transition.
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SMYTH, REGINA. "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia." Political Theory 30, no. 4 (August 2002): 555–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591702030004003.
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In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia's President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
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Malkidis, T. "Aspects of the Transition Period in Russia and Cyprus (1991-2004)." Journal of Law and Administration 15, no. 4 (January 30, 2020): 28–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2073-8420-2019-4-53-28-38.
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The Russian Federation covers 17.045.000 square kilometres, has a population of 147.000.000 individuals and a national composition of 81,5% Russians, Ukrainians, Tatarians, etc. It shares borders with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, China, and Mongolia and it has shores in the Northern Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The regime of the Russian Federation is presidential democracy and the president is elected every six years by the citizens1. The Federal Assembly is constituted by two bodies, Duma with 450 members, who are elected for a five-year tenure, half of whom in uninominal regions and the rest with proportional representation of parties. The capital of the Russian Federation is Moscow and other important cities are Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Krasnodar, Vladivostok, and Nizhny Novgorod. Administratively, Russia is divided into 85 administrative units.
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Treisman, Daniel. "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia." British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 3 (July 1996): 299–335. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007481.
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In Russia's lingering constitutional crisis, struggles over fiscal politics have taken on a broader institutional significance – at times even threatening to undermine the federal state. This article studies the evolving fiscal relationship between Moscow and the regional governments in the early post-Soviet period. To explain why some regions currently receive large net transfers (subsidies, grants, other benefits) from the centre while others pay large net taxes, net central transfers per capita have been regressed on a range of predictors reflecting social ‘need’, preferences of central politicians (electoral interests, pork barrel allocation, policy objectives) and lobbying capacity of regional governments. The most significant turn out to be three bargaining power variables that signal regional discontent and credible resolve to threaten economic and constitutional order – a low vote for President Yeltsin in the 1991 election, an early declaration of sovereignty and the incidence of strikes in the previous year.
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Kopaliani, Karlo, and Zurab Kvetenadze. "2007 Munich Conference and Contours of the New World Order." Works of Georgian Technical University, no. 2(520) (June 25, 2021): 114–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.36073/1512-0996-2021-2-114-126.
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The International Security Conference held in Munich in February 2007 laid the foundation for the formation of the new world order. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, everyone thought that Russia would choose the way for pro-Western democratic development. In the first stage, it seemed that the Russian Federation was making a choice in favor of the free world. However, the weakness of both the state and style of oligarchic governance showed that the conclusion was premature. Although civil society was developing in Russia and after some time it could achieve concrete successes, the Russian political leadership under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin was unable to solve the acute problems facing the state. The strengthening of the Russian state is linked to the coming to power of Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin. As a result of effective counterterrorism operations, the authority of Russian president has increased significantly. Putin aimed to change pro-Western orientations to Eurasian. We think, it was a natural occurrence for Russia, but it would inevitably lead to a confrontation with the West. The 2007 Munich International Security Conference is a clear example, where the Russian president strongly criticized the existence of a unipolar world and initiated foundation of a new phase of confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic space.
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Baghdasaryan, Vardan, Pavel Baldin, and Sergey Resnyansky. "Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to federal assembly as source for studying historical policy of Russia." E3S Web of Conferences 210 (2020): 18114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202021018114.
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The purpose of this study is to reconstruct the historical representation of the highest state power in today's Russia (President's level) by considering the texts of presidential messages to the Federal Assembly. Content analysis, both semantic and quantitative, has been applied as a key research method. There were investigated the fragments of messages containing an appeal to events, phenomena, personalities of the past and the historical process as a whole. The results of the study make it possible to confirm the fact that there has been a paradigm shift in the perception of history at the highest state level of Russia, which consists in the transition from a liberal version of the modernization theory to a nationally conservative approach close to the theory of civilizations. Three Presidents of the Russian Federation - B.N. Yeltsin, D.A. Medvedev and V.V. Putin, despite the coinciding positions on a number of issues on coverage of the past, presented diverse visions to the historical process in the texts of their messages. The integration of the current policy into the general outline of history distinguished all the messages, making it possible to talk about preserving the tradition of historiosophical reflection on state activity in the Russian Federation, despite different versions of historiosophy. The transformation of historical policy in Russia is an indicator of the ideological inversion of the Russian state as a whole, the transition from a liberal to a nationally conservative pattern. The attitude of the state officials towards the history reveals the potential for the use of value-and-semantic guidelines of current policy as a means of reconstruction.
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Каримов, М., M. Karimov, А. Рустамов, and A. Rustamov. "Digital Support for Adaptation of Foreign Trainers within the Framework of the Project «BUDDYSYSTEM»: Case of the Ural Federal University Named after First President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin." Management of the Personnel and Intellectual Resources in Russia 8, no. 3 (August 19, 2019): 62–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/article_5d1db832d54f11.46237722.
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The problem of adaptation of foreign students to the Russian educational environment is becoming increasingly important due to the increase in the number of foreign students in higher education institutions of Russia. The Internet support of the adaptation system on the basis of specially created for it support systems — “buddysystems” — begins particular importance in this process. The article describes the author’s system of work with newly arriving students, undergraduates, graduate students for their comprehensive adaptation at the Ural Federal University named after the fi rst President of Russia B. N.Yeltsin, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation. One of the key elements is the using of digital technologies for successful communication with foreign students. Analysis of the project “BUDDYSYSTEMURFU” shows its multiplicativity and the possibility of implementation in the universities of the country.
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Bakina, Elena A. "The essence and specificity of the Eurasian doctrine of Askar Akayev." RUDN Journal of World History 12, no. 4 (December 15, 2020): 372–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8127-2020-12-4-372-379.
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The article discusses the Eurasian doctrine of Askar Akayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan in 1991-2005. This is a very little studied problem in Russian historiography. Meanwhile, A. Akayev developed and largely implemented in practice a harmonious philosophical and political concept. This article is intended to fill this gap. The place of Russia in the geopolitical concept of A. Akayev deserves special attention, which emphasizes the importance and central role of Russia in Eurasian integration, which never acted as a colonial power, but was a center of attraction for the multinational people of the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation.
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Bagdasaryan, Vardan E., Pavel P. Baldin, and Sergey I. Resnyansky. "Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly as a Source of Studying the Historical Policy of Russia." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History 66, no. 2 (2021): 421–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu02.2021.206.
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The purpose of this study is to reconstruct the historical representation of the highest state power in modern Russia (the level of the president) by examining the texts of the presidential messages to the Federal Assembly from 1994 to 2020. As a key research method, content analysis, both semantic and quantitative, was applied. Fragments of messages containing an appeal to events, phenomena, personalities of the past and the historical process as a whole have been examined. The quantitative analysis has revealed the number of usages of the word “history” and the total textual quantity of historical references in the messages. The thinkers of the past quoted by the Presidents associated with various ideological connotations have been considered as a special indicative position. The generalized content analysis data is accumulated in the table in the article, which has the potential for further independent use in studying the dynamics of power discourse in Russia. The results of the study enable to confirm the fact of the paradigm shift in the perception of history at the highest state level in Russia lying in the transition from the liberal version of the theory of modernization to a nationally conservative approach similar to the theory of civilizations. Three Presidents of the Russian Federation — B. N. Yeltsin, D. A. Medvedev and V. V. Putin — despite the coincidence of positions on several issues of interpreting the past, presented different visions of the historical process in the texts of the messages. The integration of the current policy into the general outline of history is characteristic of all the messages, which points to the preservation of the tradition of historiosophical perception of the state activity in the Russian Federation, in spite of different versions of historiosophy. The transformation of historical politics in Russia is an indicator of the ideological inversion of the Russian state as a whole, the transition from a liberal to a nationally conservative model. The attitude of the authorities to the history reveals the potential of using axiological vectors of the current policy as a means of reconstruction.
11
DUNCAN, PETER J. S. "CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST." Historical Journal 48, no. 1 (March 2005): 277–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x04004303.
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This is a review of recent English-language scholarship on the development of Russian identity since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The first part examines literature on the economic and political changes in the Russian Federation, revealing how scholars became more sceptical about the possibility of Russia building a Western-type liberal democracy. The second part investigates approaches to the study of Russian national identity. The experience of empire, in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, gave Russians a weak sense of nationhood; ethnic Russians identified with the multi-national Soviet Union. Seeking legitimacy for the new state, President El'tsin sought to create a civic identity focused on the multi-national Russian Federation. The Communist and nationalist opposition continued to promote an imperial identity, focused on restoring the USSR or creating some other formation including the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics. The final section discusses accounts of the two Chechen wars, which scholars see as continuing Russia's imperial policy and harming relations with Russia's Muslim population. President Putin's co-operation with the West against ‘terrorism’ has not led the West to accept Russia as one of its own, due to increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism.
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Delong, Marek. "The Concept of Russian Federation Foreign and Security Policy by Eugene Primakov." Internal Security 12, no. 1 (July 22, 2020): 307–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.3205.
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The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of Russian foreign and security policy by Eugene Primakov, one of the most eminent Russian politicians of the twentieth century. The article applies research methods and techniques appropriate to science about politics. These include a comparative analysis and a method of historical analysis that enabled the presentation of political events and factors shaping the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Primakov to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The goals and assumptions of foreign and security policy have undergone a thorough redefinition, related to the tendencies noticeable in Russia in 1993–1995. Before, foreign policy had been dominated by neoliberal and Euro-Atlantic options, whose representative was predominantly Primakov’s predecessor as the minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev. After the fall of Sergei Kirijenka’s government, Primakov assumed the office of Prime Minister on September 11, 1998 and held it until May 12, 1999. It was a cabinet of political compromise, which was supposed to facilitate agreement with the opposition and the continuation of reforms, although not on the same principles as before. Primakov criticized his predecessors for the wrong political line, the lack of effectiveness of the stabilization policy, which resulted in a fall in production. He stressed that his government did not give up market reform, but called for the state’s participation to be increased. Yevgeny Primakov claimed that Russia should strive to formulate a multipolar system of international relations that truly reflects the multifaceted nature of the present world with the diversity of its interests. Primakov exerted a huge influence on the Russian foreign and security policy of Putin’s day. His political line was carried out by his successors, and above all Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov. The main directions and assumptions of his concepts are still repeated in official documents articulating the Russian doctrine of security and defense, and nothing indicates that this state of affairs has changed, and this in turn carries the threat of destabilization in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Kuok, Hung Nguyen. "COOPERATION OF RUSSIA WITH VIETNAM." SCIENTIFIC REVIEW. SERIES 1. ECONOMICS AND LAW, no. 1-2 (2020): 108–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.26653/2076-4650-2020-1-2-09.
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Russia is developing cooperation with Vietnam in the format of a comprehensive strategic partnership and in conditions of mutual understanding and trust of the heads of state. Military and economic cooperation began in 1946 during the first Indochina war, strengthened and expanded in 1966-1973. during the Second Indochina war. Vietnam received tremendous help in rebuilding the national economy and industrialization from the USSR until its collapse in 1991. Restructuring in post-Soviet Russia affected the sharp reduction in military assistance and economic relations with Vietnam. In the XXI century, the rapid development of Russian-Vietnamese cooperation began as part of the RF’s strategy for the “return to Asia” brand. Tasks. Explore the current trends in relations between Russia and Vietnam in the face of global instability, new threats and challenges of the XXI century. Methodology. The use of scientific methods of cognition and study of factors affecting interstate relations. Results. The results of military-technical cooperation and trade are analyzed. Personal participation of the President of the Russian Federation in the restoration of a comprehensive strategic partnership. Conclusions. Vietnam, relying on Russia, successfully solves economic problems and has a reliable military shield to repel any aggression in the turbulent and explosive atmosphere of confrontation with China due to the military conflict in the South China Sea.
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Kirillova, Natalia B. "Is a Dialogue of Cultures Possible in the Era of Globalization and Digitalization?" Observatory of Culture 17, no. 6 (February 10, 2021): 576–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.25281/2072-3156-2020-17-6-576-581.
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The article presents an analysis of the materials of the International Scientific Conference “Dialogue of Cultures in the Era of Globalization and Digitalization” held in Yekaterinburg on the basis of the Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin. The conference was attended by representatives of universities and cultural institutions of five countries: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, Hungary, the Republic of India, and the People’s Republic of China. The Russian Federation was represented by both the Central District and the regions of the Far East, Siberia and the Urals, as well as a number of autonomous republics: Buryatia, Mordovia, Sakha-Yakutia, and the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug. The number of conference participants, despite the difficult situation of the pandemic in which we all found ourselves, was indicative — 78 people, including 38 doctors of science and 25 candidates of science representing various humanities disciplines, ten university teachers, three postgraduate students and two independent participants.The conference materials were divided into four sections in accordance with the statement of scientific problems: 1. “Sociocultural Issues and State Cultural Policy in the Era of Globalization”, 2. “Issues of Preservation and Representation of Cultural Heritage of Different Peoples”, 3. “The Internet as a Space for Dialogue and Polylogue of Cultures. New Media Technologies”, 4. “Education and Creativity in the Era of the Digital Revolution”. The conference was attended by many famous scientists — representatives of the humanities of leading Russian universities.All the materials and speeches of the scientific conference show that it resulted in proof that only culture and intercultural dialogue in the era of chaos and contradictions of the globalized world can neutralize international conflicts and lead the world to harmony and mutual understanding.
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Zor’kin, V. D., and Iu D. Rudkin. "18. On the Correspondence to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the Actions and Decisions of President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin Associated with His Address to the Citizens of Russia of 20 March 1993." Statutes and Decisions 30, no. 4 (July 1994): 86–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10610014.1994.11502069.
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Popov, Nikolai P. "Socio-Political Views of the Russian Population. Report. Preliminary Results of a Sociological Study of the Russian Population’s Socio-Political Views, Commissioned by the Analytical Department of the President of the Russian Federation. August 1995." Sociological Journal 26, no. 1 (2020): 141–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.19181/socjour.2020.26.1.7057.
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The report analyzes the public opinion on the main socio-economic and political issues at the end of the fourth year of Boris Yeltsin’s presidential term, on the eve of the Duma elections in December 1995 and the presidential elections in 1996. The poll’s data show the growing discontent of the population with the state of affairs in the country, the economic crisis, their own impoverishment, and the inability of the authorities to solve the country’s main problems. At the same time, a growing number of people lost interest in politics, lost confidence the political and economic reforms will lead to the country’s revival, democratization, and the ability to choose the best people for positions of power. Two thirds of the people said that they have become worse off than at the start of radical reforms ten years ago, while the main responsibility for the plight of the people and the country lies within the current government, which had no idea where the country’s economy was going, and had no program for overcoming the crisis. 75% believed that the government lives by its own interests; they do not care about the people. Market reforms initiated by Boris Yeltsin spurred mass negative assessments: our life before the reforms was better and more prosperous; the people were deceived, they were promised market socialism, and were drawn into the construction of capitalism; reforms were based on robbing the people, only speculators, swindlers, and officials had benefited from them. Regretting the dismantling of socialism, the population had lost belief that the ideas of socialism and communism were able to unite society again. As such an idea, the majority suggested reviving Russia as a powerful state, while calling for following a special, Russian path which implies a “strong hand” in power. The majority believed that the President and the government had already exhausted their opportunities to put an end to the crisis in Russia, and that they should be replaced with new people. The assessment of the President’s performance reached its lowest point during his administration – only 6% expressed their approval and 71% disapproved. The war in Chechnya seriously harmed the President’s popularity. More than 80% expressed negative assessments on the Kremlin’s Chechnya policies.
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Cherkasov, P. "IMEMO in Early 1990s (continued)." World Economy and International Relations, no. 8 (2015): 101–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-8-101-110.
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The article analyzes IMEMO activities in 1992–1993, when in Russia, under the influence of both radical economic reforms and drastic weakening of the central government, a deep political crisis emerged and gained a dangerous traction, fraught with the death of a young democracy and even the collapse of the state. Under these conditions, along with economic issues, the politological research came to the fore in IMEMO – the analysis of the country's new political system, the definition of its development vector. The Center of Socio-economic and Socio-political Research of IMEMO headed by German Germanovich Diligenskii played the major role in this work. Analysts of the Center prepared a number of recommendations for public authorities concerning the creation and development of a new democratic political system in Russia. IMEMO experts paid the utmost attention to the nature of the political crisis that arose in the post-Soviet Russia in late 1991, and the ways to overcome it. In January 1993, the results of the study were presented to the discussion at the Academic Council. It was agreed that one of the main causes of the political crisis in the country was the social tensions worsening, as a consequence of the “shocking therapy” conducted by the government of Gaidar in 1992. In the discussion on the political outlook German Diligenskii, rejecting the possibility of the old command-administrative system restoration, substantiated a probability of transformation of the "market democracy" not yet established in Russia into the "authoritarian monopoly or monopoly-bureaucratic system". Noting the disunity of democratic forces, weakness of the entrepreneurial class, largely dependent on the state, Diligenskii formulated a program for uniting all adherents of “arket democracy” under the slogan of "social liberalism", which would take into account Russian specifics. Consolidation of democracy and market economy in Russia is impossible without preservation of the state territorial integrity and consolidation of the central government, with a clear division of functions and powers of its constituent branches. Monopolization (usurpation) of all power by one of the branches – legislative or executive – should not be allowed. The victory of any of them in any case would mean the defeat of democracy. Such was, in general terms, the position of IMEMO in the face of the 1992–1993 political crisis. Acknowledgement. The publication was prepared as part of the President of Russian Federation grant to support the leading scientifi c schools NSh-6452.2014.6.
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Cherkasov, P. "IMEMO in early 1990s (continued)." World Economy and International Relations, no. 9 (2015): 105–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-9-105-117.
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The article describes the debate on foreign policy of the post-Soviet Russia, which took place at the Academic Council of IMEMO in 1992–1994. What are the national interests of the Russian young democracy? What should be Russian foreign policy in the new geopolitical situation, after the collapse of the USSR? To what extent the transformation of socio-political system in Russia changed the nature of its foreign policy? What should be its principles and priorities after the end of the Cold War? All these and other questions were in the focus of IMEMO experts immediately after the collapse of the communist regime in 1991. From the outset, the discussions were marked by different approaches to the issues. Some experts put forward as a priority the relations with the U.S. and the West in general, some put Europe in the first place, and others  - the Commonwealth of Independent States, which brought together some of the former Soviet republics. But all IMEMO experts in general agreed on the negative evaluation of the new Russian foreign policy quality: the default of a senior management for clear understanding of strategic and tactical foreign policy goals, low professional level of those who were called to form and implement foreign policy, the absence of a single center for decision-making, the lack of coordination between various authorities involved in the development of a foreign policy strategy  - Presidential Administration, Security Council, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Parliament, etc. As mentioned in the discussions, the initial stage of idealistic notions and expectations of the West prevalent in Russian society and in the new ruling elite circles after the fall of the Soviet regime was soon replaced by disappointment and even irritation towards the West. Both of these trends were equally dangerous to the interests of the Russian foreign policy, which was in great need of a pragmatic, professional understanding of realities. This policy had to achieve two main objectives  - full integration of Russia into the world community of developed democracies, and protection of its own national interests within this community. One should have been inextricably linked with the other. Academic understanding of national interests in the field of foreign, defense and economic policies, the development of specific proposals and recommendations on these issues for the state leadership has become one of priorities for IMEMO analysts. Acknowledgements. The publication was prepared as part of the President of Russian Federation grant to support the leading scientific schools NSh-6452.2014.6.