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1
Starodubska, Maryna. "Russians and Ukrainians as a Russian Propaganda Narrative." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 3 (2022): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.21.3.03.
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KOMAR, Olena. "SOFT POWER AND PROPAGANDA IN THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 30 (2022): 82–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2022.30.11.
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Soft power and propaganda are two different vectors in the information front of Russia's war against Ukraine. Depending on the target audience, the Russian authorities use narratives aimed at either the external world audience or the domestic one. The purpose of soft power means is to create a positive image of Russia through the promotion of Russian culture, the sacrificial image of Russian intellectuals, blurring the boundaries between the Russian and Ukrainian people through distortion of history, linguistic expansionism. The target audience of Russian soft power is the population of other countries and expats, while the target audience of propaganda is primarily the population of the Russian Federation. The means of propaganda aimed primarily at domestic consumers are more straightforward, harsh and devoid of ethical boundaries. Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the hybridization of soft power and propaganda has taken place, becoming multi-vector and intertwined. The hybridization of instruments of influence reaches the greatest scale in the language question, where propaganda theses about discrimination of Russian speakers and denial of the existence of the Ukrainian language are mixed with soft power theses about the importance of protecting the language of the outstanding Russian culture. The condition of trust in propaganda is acceptance of its correctness and subordination to the moral goal. Therefore, decisions made under the influence of propaganda are not considered as immoral, even when they have grave immoral or inhumane effects. The epistemic basis for the acceptance of propaganda is the substitution of truth with post-truth, and the main symptom is the refusal to check undesirable information, because "not everything is so clear." The article demonstrates the existence of a common ideological basis between soft power and propaganda, reveals the epistemic means of manipulation of both instruments of Russian policy, as well as the hybrid nature of its application. The epistemological analysis of propaganda and soft power allows proving both personal and group responsibility for the acceptance and spread of its narratives.
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Yuskiv, B., and S. Khomych. "THE ROLE OF MEDIA PROPAGANDA IN THE HYBRID WAR." ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, no. 132 (2017): 27–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2017.132.0.27-43.
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The subject of this research is one of the most pressing problems of today’s Ukraine – military conflict with Russia, also known as “hybrid war”. Among the specific features of this war is the usage of non-military, especially propaganda means along with the military ones. The aim of the research was to analyze possible connections between the Russian backed separatist forces, as well as Russian special operation forces on Ukrainian East, and the Russian media propaganda. It was proved that separatists’ activities are more influenced by Russian propaganda, than by international activities aimed at peaceful resolving of the conflict. As a result, the reversed regression model was created, which can prove direct connection between the number of firefights and specific propaganda phrases used by Russian “Russia Today” propaganda channel. The model can be used to predict occurrence and the number of firefights by analyzing the propaganda content according to the key words.
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Jacuch, Andrzej. "Czech-Russian Relations. Russian Disinformation Campaign." Polish Political Science Yearbook 51 (December 31, 2022): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202250.
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After the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Czech Republic became fully aware of the threats posed by the Kremlin despite President Zeman has denied the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and has criticised the EU sanctions against Russia. Czechia belongs to the group of countries through which Russia influences the EU, to gradually and deliberately erode its structures. Russia exerts a strong influence on the Czech Republic by non-military means, including disinformation and propaganda, the activities of secret services, and penetration of its economy and specifically its energy sector. The article aims to answer the question about the role of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the context of Russian influence in the Czech Republic. The role of Russian disinformation and propaganda and how Russia influences Czechia is extensively analysed. The main hypothesis is that Russia treats the Czech Republic as a key state for espionage and disinformation activities and as a zone of influence, undermining the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the role of NATO and the EU.
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Yezhova, Anna. "Between Reality and Manipulation: Russian media and propaganda from the perspective of residents of the occupied Zaporizhzhia region." Com.press 7, no. 1 (July 25, 2024): 22–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.51480/compress.2024.7-1.702.
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This research investigates the perspectives and responses of residents in the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine towards Russian media and propaganda. The study's primary objective is to gain insight into residents' perceptions of Russian media and the methods they have devised to discern authentic information from propaganda. It explores how these residents view Russian media and the tactics they utilize to discriminate between trustworthy information and propaganda. It underscores the importance of media literacy and the need for effective countermeasures to combat propaganda's influence on residents' information independence.
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Polovyi, Mykola. "Exploitation of the Right to Freedom of Expression for Promoting Pro-Russian Propaganda in Hybrid War." Politeja 18, no. 2(71) (August 5, 2021): 171–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.18.2021.71.09.
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The paper is devoted to the process and results of an analysis of abusing the right to freedom of expression for promoting pro-Russian propaganda in hybrid war against Ukraine at the present stage. It is shown that due to the peculiarities of the political situation in modern Ukraine, pro-Russian propaganda is most common in social networks. The study is conducted on the data from a weekly monitoring of pro-Russian propaganda in the Facebook public groups (‘publics’) of the Odessa region of Ukraine. Effective typology of propaganda messages in social networks is created and described. Its connection with the Lasswell’s test is grounded. General characteristics of pro-Russian propaganda promotion under the guise of implementing the right to freedom of expression in the Facebook publics of the Odessa region in the first quarter of 2021 are described. It has been found that the common tone of contemporary pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine is becoming increasingly ‘soft’. The main group of contemporary pro- Russian propaganda messages are about the ‘shared past’ of Ukraine and Russia during the Soviet era, shared nostalgia for the ‘brave past world.’ ‘Soft’ promotion of the Russian information agenda and indicating Russian or Ukrainian pro-Russian media as a familiar source of information is the second huge group of propaganda texts. It is noted that both most popular ‘patterns’ of the propaganda can be considered propaganda only in the context of Russia’s undeclared war against Ukraine.
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Kozłowski, Grzegorz. "Polityka dezinformacyjna Rosji wobec Estonii." Sprawy Międzynarodowe 72, no. 4 (August 21, 2020): 107–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.35757/sm.2019.72.4.02.
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Russian activities in the area of information war are very dynamic. They have internal legal, political and military background, constituting an important element of today’s war theatre. Disinformation is directed not only to the global or regional powers, which would undermine the position of the Russian Federation, but also to the neighboring countries, including the Baltic States. It has a specific narrative vis-à-vis individual states, emphasizing historical propaganda and building messages which should be easily absorbed mostly by Russian speaking minorities, which seem to be a sensitive and “easy” target in these terms.Russian disinformation policy faces in Estonia natural barriers. They stem from political (consensus among the parties on pro-European and pro-transatlantic policies), historical (negative experiences with Russia’s and the Soviet Union policy) and economic (limited presence of Russian capital) factors. They key issue for analyzing an effectivity of Russian propaganda in Estonia is demographic structure. Amongst 25% of Russian speaking minority in this country, there is a fraction of citizens (mostly Russians) which are sensitive to Kremlin propaganda. However, the vast majority of Estonian society seems to be impregnated from Moscow’s propaganda. Thus we can state that the disinformation activities of Russia has in Estonia a limited significance.
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Vashchenko, Nataliia. "The Main Narratives of Russian Propoganda as Impact-Generating Issues in Terms of Consciental War of Russia Against Ukraine." Scientific notes of the Institute of Journalism, no. 1 (76) (2020): 180–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2522-1272.2020.76.15.
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The objective of the study is to identify the main narratives of Russian propaganda as impact-generating issues in the Ukrainian media space in terms of consciental war of Russia against Ukraine. The methods of theoretical and methodological analysis and generalization substantiate how intensive and massive penetration of Russian narratives is implemented in the media segment of Russia and post-Soviet countries, in particular Ukraine. The narratives of the modern and histor-ical Russian propaganda are analyzed. It is shown that Russian propaganda consists of: 1) the veiled propaganda targeted at the population of Ukraine, which is close to the Ukrainian worldview in the system of coordinates, or which has an uncertain position (this type of propa-ganda aims to undermine the legitimacy and public support of the Ukrainian authorities); 2) The overt propaganda targeted mainly at the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, which is in the system of coordinates close to the Russian worldview in the system of coordinates, or which has an uncertain position. Russian propaganda uses the narratives that manipulate using strong emo-tions. The narratives of the modern Russian propaganda – “Crimes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Minsk Arrangements” and “Ukraine – “Failed State” as well as the narratives of the historical Russian propaganda “All Ukrainian Nationalists were Fascists” and “Ukraine Forgot about the Victory over Nazism” are determined by the method of induction, deduction and generalization. These narratives are formed by virtual mythical facts, contain the concepts with powerful impact-generating potential and are the warfare by which it is implemented ma-nipulation of strong emotions and consciental impact on the recipients in order to shift their identities.
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HORUN, O. "Countering enemy media-propaganda in the conditions of the legal regime of martіal law in Ukraine." INFORMATION AND LAW, no. 1(44) (March 28, 2023): 116–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.37750/2616-6798.2023.1(44).287772.
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The threats in the information sphere spread by the Russian Federation are considered. The mechanisms of the functioning of Russian propaganda as a component of the information policy of the aggressor state are revealed. Attention is focused on the thematic narratives of pro-Russian telegram channels and the rhetoric of pro-Russian propagandists. The experience of the EU and the USA in combating Russian propaganda is summarized. The content and directions of Russian propaganda on a global scale regarding the anti-Ukrainian information campaign are detailed. The goal and task of the propaganda activity of the Russian Federation in the information war against Ukraine is defined. The ideological basis of the motivation of the Russians in the war against Ukraine and the peculiarities of the tactics of the information support of the Russian media propaganda are revealed. The tasks of the Security Service of Ukraine in the information sphere have been defined, in particular with regard to countering Russian propaganda. The results of the work of the special service in the indicated direction are summarized. Amendments to domestic legislationaimed at canceling licenses and registrations of media related to the Russian Federation are outlined. The directions of improvement of the Security Service of Ukraine in order to block the spread of Russian destructive propaganda activities aimed at the detriment of state interests in the mass media and in the domestic information space are detailed.
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Petrenko, Svitlana, and Valeriya Babelnik. "Monitoring the propaganda methods of the third reich in the info space of Ukraine and Russia." Integrated communications 15, no. 1 (2023): 86–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.28925/2524-2644.2023.1511.
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The article presents the main propaganda methods of the Third Reich, which became relevant during the Russian-Ukrainian war. The relevance of the article is due to the aggravation of the information confrontation that is taking place in the Ukrainian and Russian media spaces against the background of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine. In order to have advantages in this war, it is necessary to carefully study the enemy’s methods of information aggression. It is also important for solving the problem of de-occupation of the consciousness of the residents of ORDLO, who are under the massive informational and propaganda influence of Russia. The subject of the research is the propaganda methods of the Third Reich and their application in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Ukrainian and foreign researchers partially covered this topic. The works of H. Pocheptsov, D. Welch, and J. Kershaw made it possible to identify the main mechanisms of conducting information warfare, which is characteristic of Ukraine and Russia, and became the main source for identifying the characteristic features of Nazi propaganda. The goal is to identify dangerous information and propaganda trends in the information space of Ukraine and Russia. For this purpose, a number of scientific tasks were performed using methods of analysis, including comparative, synthesis, generalization, and monitoring. The theoretical sources revealing the propaganda methodology of the Third Reich, its characteristics, and its peculiarities have been studied. Monitoring of propaganda methods in the information environment of Ukraine and Russia during the war and a comparative analysis of them with the propaganda methods of the Third Reich was carried out. As a result of the analysis of the works of Ukrainian and foreign researchers, the main mechanisms of conducting information warfare peculiar to Ukraine and Russia were analyzed, and the characteristic features of Nazi propaganda and its methods were singled out. Attention was drawn to the importance of art and culture in promoting propaganda narratives. On the basis of theoretical sources and empirical studies, the cult of personality as a method of propaganda is considered. As a result of the monitoring of the Ukrainian and Russian mass media, information and propaganda trends in the info space of Ukraine and Russia were revealed, which are described in this article. The research shows that the Russian Federation uses the same mechanisms and interpretations and produces the same meanings as the Nazis. Ukrainian mass media, even if they resort to the propaganda tools of the Third Reich, use them to produce opposite narratives. The study confirms that the Russian information space is harmful to the consciousness, intelligence, and moral values of the recipients.
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Labuda, Marta. "Współczesna propaganda rosyjska a wojna w Ukrainie." Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie 37, no. 1 (2023): 78–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ksm20230104.
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The article is an attempt to analyze contemporary Russian propaganda through the prism of the war in Ukraine. The purpose of the research is to assess the effectiveness of contemporary Russian propaganda in this area. The research was based on a qualitative methodology with the use of a source analysis strategy. Research showed the contemporary Russian propaganda has a significant impact on the perception of the war in Ukraine among Russians – although its effectiveness is showing a decrease.
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Owsiński, Piotr A. "Propaganda und Manipulation in der Sprache Anhand der offiziellen Stellungnahmen des Russischen Aussenministeriums." Politeja 20, no. 6(87) (December 20, 2023): 69–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.20.2023.87.04.
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THE PROPAGANDA AND LINGUISTIC MANIPULATION IN THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICS ON THE BASIS OF THE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN OFFICE ABOUT THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE (2022) Persuasion, disinformation, manipulation, censorship, which are elements of propaganda, can be regarded as central terms of the language of politics, especially during conflict situations and wars. The question of interest is in what ways the specific language techniques are used by the Russian Foreign Affairs Department for the purposes of propaganda in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The paper analyzes the official statements of Maria Zakharova, the Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation that are available on the web page of the Embassy of Russia in Berlin. The following examinations are confronted with the well-documented nature of the persuasive language in Nazi propaganda before and during World War II. The aim of such analysis is to examine in what ways and to what extent the specific propaganda techniques they are used to justify the war that Russia has started by invading Ukraine.
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Grabina, Ganna. "The Influence of Russian Propaganda on the EU’s Interstate Relations With the Eastern European Countries (Case of Poland-Ukraine)." Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej, no. 14 (December 31, 2020): 113–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/rie.2020.14.7.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of the influence of Russian propaganda on relations between the European Union member states and its eastern neighbors in the case of Poland and Ukraine. The analysis is related to an issue that can be formulated as the following research question: how exactly does propaganda affect domestic and foreign policy processes in countries? A multidisciplinary approach to the study of the impact of political propaganda enabled the use of such methods as: systemic, institutional, structural-functional, content analysis, and descriptive. The article gives definition and main characteristics of the concept of propaganda in political context. Special attention is paid to reasons for the successful use of propaganda by Russia in fanning the conflict in Ukraine, which is presented in the article. The complex of means and methods used in Russia’s information policy to influence Western countries is denoted. The author presents the main narratives of Russian propaganda, and identifies the features of its pressure on interstate relations between Ukraine and Poland by analysing articles in pro-Russian periodicals of Poland and Ukraine. Conclusions are drawn on the need for strong international resistance to Russian propaganda, and to define the shortcomings of the system for countering Russian information aggression in general and propaganda in particular.
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Kovalenko, A. B., and R. O. Zui. "PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES IN UKRAINIANS' CONSCIOUSNESS DURING THE FULL-SCALE INVASION OF RUSSIA." Ukrainian Psychological Journal, no. 2 (18) (2022): 68–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/upj.2022.2(18).4.
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The article examines propaganda narratives existing in the minds of Ukrainians during the full-scale Russia invasion to the territory of Ukraine. Theoretical generalizations regarding the essence of propaganda and Russia's propaganda in relation to neighbouring countries, in general, and Ukraine, in particular, are presented. Propaganda is a powerful method of influence on modern society and has several inherent substantive and organizational features of its functioning with consciousness manipulation at the core of this process. This means management of the behaviour of an individual, a certain social group, a society or a planetary society by using hidden methods of sociopsychological influence on people's consciousness to ensure private, different from an individual's own, interests of people, social groups, institutions, state and public structures. During the full-scale Russian invasion, propaganda narratives are used to justify the invasion, demonize the enemy and rally support for the military campaign. Using the content analysis of Putin's and Zelensky's speeches, we singled out narratives that were combined into three main ones: 1. Ukraine oppresses the Russian-speaking part of society; Russia and Ukraine are brotherly nations. 2. Ukraine is a puppet of the West (all politics are in the hands of the West); 3. Ukraine is an independent country and Russia is an aggressor. It was found that the most popular propaganda narrative is: “Ukraine is independent and Russia is an aggressor”. Psychological characteristics of three groups of people depending narrative selected by them were presented. Statistically significant correlations between age, educational level and selected narratives were revealed. The respondents aged 18-24 used significantly less often the narratives about Russian-speaking population oppression in Ukraine, compared to people aged 25-45 and 46-60. Older people with full higher education used more often the narrative about Russian-speaking population oppression. Gender differences were found at the trend level: women more often chose the narrative on Ukrainian independence. Respondents who lived abroad more often chose narratives with “Ukraine is a puppet of the West” theme.
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Gerber, Theodore P., and Jane Zavisca. "Does Russian Propaganda Work?" Washington Quarterly 39, no. 2 (April 2, 2016): 79–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2016.1204398.
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Shields, Paul. "Killing Politics Softly." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 54, no. 4 (December 1, 2021): 54–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.4.54.
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Early propaganda studies in authoritarian countries argue that state media works to legitimize the regime through indoctrination and persuasion. However, recent scholarship shows that citizens in authoritarian countries—in states like China, Syria, Russia, and Kazakhstan—can be unconvinced by state propaganda. How, then, does the way in which citizens experience unconvincing propaganda shape their political beliefs? How might unpersuasive propaganda contribute to authoritarian stability? Given the lack of alternative theories of propaganda, this article proposes a new hypothesis based on a reception study that interviewed 24 Russian citizens from Krasnoiarsk Krai after they watched items from Russian state television. The article theorizes that unconvincing state propaganda in Russia can reinforce a preexisting cynical attitude toward politics—an attitude that makes the collective action necessary for bottom-up reform hard to contemplate, let alone organize in an authoritarian context.
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VAVRYK, Petro. "Mapping Growth of the Russian Domestic Propaganda Apparatus on Telegram." Challenges to national defence in contemporary geopolitical situation 2022, no. 1 (October 31, 2022): 227–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.47459/cndcgs.2022.29.
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As a part of Western sanctions against Russia, big social media companies i.e., Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, have been limiting their functionalities available to Russians and suspending and limiting reach of Russian influencers. Many Russian propagandist, aware of the risk of becoming deplatformed, were already looking for social media platforms with less moderation before the February 24th. With many Russians using Telegram as their preferred communicator, Telegram became the natural choice. Russian government, by blocking access to Western social media platforms by Russian users and by directing state influencers to migrate their domestic audiences to Telegram, has accelerated this trend. Despite many advantages, Telegram is limited in ease with which new content and channels can be discovered. Telegram search for channels is based on exact string matching and Telegram has no content search or content recommendation functionality built into it. Telegram’s advertising mechanism is still in its infancy. To enable quick growth of the key state propaganda channels, Russians employed several tactics. They have selected a few existing influencers, such as Vladimir Soloviev, to substitute for the absent search and recommendation engine. Soloviev’s Telegram channels has been heavily advertised on legacy media, starting with TV stations carrying his programs, to serve as an onramp to Telegram. Soloviev has regularly featured reviews of other smaller channels, endorsing, and promoting their pro-conflict content, becoming the missing recommendation engine for Russians. All the above resulted in creating a vast, Telegram-based apparatus of domestic state propaganda. In this paper, we trace the growth of Russian pro-conflict Telegram communities and quantify the impact of centralized endorsement by state influencers on the growth of other smaller, specialized Telegram channels.
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Karpchuk, Nataliia. "THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES." Torun International Studies 1, no. 14 (May 1, 2021): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/tis.2021.002.
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The article seeks to research the propaganda narratives of the Russian Federation in Europe. The Russian Federation has a long “successful” history of creating propaganda narratives since Soviet times. Even today, it spreads national and grand narratives to influence the external and internal audience. The narrative method is used to analyse both the content and the structure of the stories. The author makes the conclusion that the main purpose of Russia’s propaganda narratives is to convince its citizens and the whole world of Russia’s indomitable greatness and power, as well as to demonstrate the degradation of Europe and the West in general. To form the image of an invincible fighter for Christian values, the only outpost of stability, development, security (at least in Europe), Russia promotes a grand narrative, which is disseminated through daily disinformation, fakes and propaganda messages. The article finds out how the EU counteracts these destructive influences, specifically owing to the activity of the EUvsDisinfo site.
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Zaporozhets, O. "“RUSSIAN WORLD” PROPAGANDA AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE." Actual Problems of International Relations, no. 136 (2018): 16–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2018.136.0.16-24.
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The article studies the concept “Russian World” in terms of national security of Ukraine. Based on publications of Ukrainian and Russian experts the author shows that the“Russian World” is aimed to justify Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and in particular its dominance in post-soviet countries. According to this project Russia is a unique country-civilization that, due to its historical, cultural and intellectual potential, goes far beyond the state borders. The Russian geopolitical concept is very dangerous for Ukraine because due to historical manipulations the national identity, sovereignty and integrity of the country are artificially devaluated and completely erased. In Russian propaganda Ukraine is labelled as the artificially created country that cannot be the successor of Kievan Rus, doesn’t have its own statehood traditions, culture, language and other attributes of the true nation. Russia tries to appropriate Ukraine’s historical and cultural heritage because without it the RM is ideological construct based on myths that is unable to contribute to strengthening and extending Russia's influence on the international arena.
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Rotari, Iurie. "The Most Persistent Narratives of the Kremlin’s Propaganda Towards Romania in the First Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War." Res Historica 56 (December 21, 2023): 1119–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/rh.2023.56.1119-1143.
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This article examines how the Russian invasion of Ukraine influenced Kremlin's propaganda against Romania. For one year (24.02.2022 – 24.02.2023), the author followed official statements by Russian politicians and diplomats, material appearing in the most important federal media outlets, and messages released via social media and other marginal propaganda sources. Thus, it was possible to determine the main Russian propaganda narratives against Romania: „Romania seeks to annex parts of Ukraine”; „Romania seeks to annex the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria”; „Romania promotes unreasonable Russophobia”; „Romania is a «Western colony» used by the USA against Russia”, and last but not least, attempts to discredit Romanian aid to Ukraine. In this way, the author determined the image of Romania created by the Russian propaganda machine for its audience, but also the ways in which Moscow uses the distorted image of Romania to influence public opinion in Ukraine and Moldova.
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Taranenko, Anna. "Characteristics of Russian Propaganda in Latin America with Regard to Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: Case of Brazil." Empirio 1, no. 1 (February 5, 2024): 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.18523/3041-1718.2024.1.55-62.
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Russian aggression against Ukraine has become one of the most serious challenges for the international security system. One of the regions where Russian propaganda has been spread widely is Latin America. And one of the countries especially influenced by the Russian disinformation in the region is Brazil. The goal of this article is to define characteristics of the Russian propaganda in Latin America regarding Russian aggression against Ukraine, particularly, look at the case of Brazil, trace features of the Kremlin propaganda in this country at the current stage and outline possible ways of countering this propaganda.It can be concluded that Russian propaganda in Latin American and in Brazil, particularly, has several specific characteristics-it is widespread, long-standing and generally supported. Key current narratives concerning the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine include the nuclear threat, calls for peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia and accusing the West of russofobia. Other false narratives include accusing Ukraine of war crimes and provocations, as well as dangers of further “escalation” of the war. Among reasons for common misconceptions about the Russia-Ukraine war in Brazil one can name a simple lack of information and familiarity with the local politics. This gap is partially the result of Ukraine’s insufficient communication with the Latin American and Brazilian audiences and the countries’ lack of interest in each other for many years.In order to counter Russian propaganda in Latin American and Brazil, in particular, Ukraine should enhance its communication and diplomatic efforts, cooperate with the Ukrainian diaspora in the region and consistently deconstruct Russian disinformation narratives. In the long-term perspective, it is worthwhile increasing opportunities to study the Spanish and Portuguese languages and have respective Regional Studies courses at Ukrainian educational institutions.
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Radina, N. K. "Multimodal Media Tools of Popular Geopolitics: Russian Politics in Foreign Media Cartoons." MGIMO Review of International Relations 15, no. 4 (September 8, 2022): 130–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2022-4-85-130-150.
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The article focuses on the political cartoons about Russia and analyzes the potential of multimodal media texts as the tools of popular geopolitics. The author also employs S. Hall’s concept of propaganda, considering the text of a caricature from semiotic perspective. The integration of the theoretical fields of popular geopolitics and propaganda is substantiated, since political cartoons not only form stereotypes about politics and international relations among media readers, but also perform propaganda functions, broadcasting the point of view of the information platform on Russian politics and Russia. The empirical base of the study embraces 242 political cartoons from Russian-language and English-language foreign media, posted in the public domain on the Internet in 2020-2021, the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. Political cartoons are analyzed with the method of expert evaluation and interdisciplinary classifier for the analysis of political cartoons. The obtained empirical results were subjected to statistical processing, including the identification of correlations. The results demonstrate that in foreign media political cartoons about Russia and Russian politics create two different images of Russia. The first description is typical for English cartoons where Russia appears in the context of international relations, mostly its ties with the United States; and the target character in English cartoon is the Russian president. Englishlanguage cartoons are more often focused on harsh criticism and the use of schematized images. Moderate criticism dominates in Russian-language cartoons of foreign media; the target characters are not only the president, but also other representatives of Russian society. Thematically, Russian-language cartoons are constructed in the context of Russia's internal political problems; the field of education is usually the most intentionally “negative”. According to the study, it is the Russian-language cartoons of foreign media that have the most complex and rich visual code and use Aesopian language. In conclusion, the author highlights the importance of further studies of the tools of popular geopolitics, as well as the need to improve the practice of creating multimodal media texts in the logic of the Russian understanding of geopolitics.
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Hedo, Anna, and Svitlana Liaskovska. "Russian Propaganda During the First World War: Technologies and Forms." Istoriya-History 29, no. 6 (November 20, 2021): 589–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.53656/his2021-6-3-russ.
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The purpose of the article is to analyse the use of political propaganda methods employed by the Russian Empire before and during the First World War, in particular, on the Ukrainian lands, which became a direct theatre of military operations and a field of confrontation between intelligence and counterintelligence services of belligerent powers, which exercised manipulative influence upon great masses of population and implemented special technologies for the formation of public opinion. The research methodology is based on the principles of objectivity, systematicity, dialectics, historicism and interdisciplinarity. The study is grounded on problemchronological, institutional and historical methods, as well as social psychology methods, used in propaganda practices. Scientific novelty: on the basis of printed materials: brochures, First World War periodicals, published posters and woodcuts (lubki prints), as well as memoirs of people, involved in the organization of propaganda campaigns, certain objects, technologies and forms of propaganda, in particular, the involvement of intelligence officers of the Russian Imperial Army in manipulative technologies, were defined. The widespread use of propaganda and counter-propaganda by the states that were the main players of the First World War, became a kind of hallmark of that war. In Russia, unlike other states, there were no special bodies and no such bodies were created later to influence public opinion in their own, hostile or neutral states. The peculiarity of the propaganda of the Russian Empire was the use of mainly constructive (positive) propaganda aimed at neutralizing social conflicts within the state, uniting the population and the authorities and their joint struggle against the enemy. The ideas of Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism were actively applied in the international realm. They were aimed at the unity of the Slavic world under the auspices of Russia as the defender of the Slavic peoples and the Orthodox Christian faith. The use of destructive propaganda technologies was aimed at creating the image of the “enemy” and uniting patriotic forces against it. At the same time, Russia failed to offer Slavic peoples of the empire, in particular Ukrainians, to realize their political aspirations in resolving the national issue; it did not feel a change of mood and did not restructure the content of propaganda rhetoric, which eventually led to its defeat in the information and psychological space.
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Liaskovska, Svіtlana. "Russian propaganda during the First World War: technologies and forms." Bulletin of Mariupol State University. Series: History. Political Studies 10, no. 28-29 (2020): 82–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.34079/2226-2830-2020-10-28-29-82-98.
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The purpose of the article is to analyse the use of political propaganda methods employed by the Russian Empire before and during the First World War, in particular, on the Ukrainian lands, which became a direct theatre of military operations and a field of confrontation between intelligence and counterintelligence services of belligerent powers, which exercised manipulative influence upon great masses of population and implemented special technologies for the formation of public opinion. The research methodology is based on the principles of objectivity, systematicity, dialectics, historicism and interdisciplinarity. The study is grounded on problem-chronological, institutional and historical methods, as well as social psychology methods, used in propaganda practices. Scientific novelty: on the basis of printed materials: brochures, First World War periodicals, published posters and woodcuts (lubki prints), as well as memoirs of people, involved in the organization of propaganda campaigns, certain objects, technologies and forms of propaganda, in particular, the involvement of intelligence officers of the Russian Imperial Army in manipulative technologies, were defined. Conclusions. The widespread use of propaganda and counter-propaganda by the states that were the main players of the First World War, became a kind of hallmark of that war. In Russia, unlike other states, there were no special bodies and no such bodies were created later to influence public opinion in their own, hostile or neutral states. The peculiarity of the propaganda of the Russian Empire was the use of mainly constructive (positive) propaganda aimed at neutralizing social conflicts within the state, uniting the population and the authorities and their joint struggle against the enemy. The ideas of Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism were actively applied in the international realm. They were aimed at the unity of the Slavic world under the auspices of Russia as the defender of the Slavic peoples and the Orthodox Christian faith. The use of destructive propaganda technologies was aimed at creating the image of the “enemy” and uniting patriotic forces against it. At the same time, Russia failed to offer Slavic peoples of the empire, in particular Ukrainians, to realize their political aspirations in resolving the national issue; it did not feel a change of mood and did not restructure the content of propaganda rhetoric, which eventually led to its defeat in the information and psychological space.
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Konduktorova, Nadezhda A. "The role of propaganda in popularizing and preserving the all-Russian cultural identity of compatriots abroad." Izvestiya of Saratov University. Economics. Management. Law 24, no. 2 (May 22, 2024): 219–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1994-2540-2024-24-2-219-225.
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Introduction. As a result of the constitutional reform carried out in 2020, the basic law of the country was supplemented with new norms. They include the provisions of Part 3 of Article 69 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which enshrine guarantees of support for compatriots living abroad. This norm introduces a new category into constitutional legal circulation – “all-Russian cultural identity”, and its preservation is fixed as one of the areas of state activity. Propaganda is interpreted as one of the elements of the mechanism for preserving this identity. The study of all-Russian cultural identity, as well as propaganda in the context of its preservation, is the goal of this work. Theoretical analysis. The term “identity” has been steadily entrenched in domestic legislation and legal science. Its content varies depending on the characteristics of the identity bearer. It has been revealed that the functions of propaganda used to preserve his / her identity depend on the characteristics of the basis for recognizing a person as a compatriot. Еmpirical analysis. The article revealed that neither ethnicity nor citizenship relations are the basis of the nationwide cultural identity of compatriots abroad. The concept under study is based on the cultural (civilizational) code of Russia as a country with a centuries-old statehood, rich history and a multinational people. Propaganda is one of the ways to spread the Russian value and worldview model. Results. The role of propaganda is to form a positive image of the future among compatriots regarding Russia. The upward constitutionalization of relations to support compatriots is due to several factors: the priority of this direction of the Russian national policy; recognition of the identity under study as a legal fact; justification of the new category as confirmation of the civilizational essence of Russia at the constitutional level.
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РАNСНENKO, O. "Institutional support of processes of countering Russian information expansion and propaganda in the modern world." INFORMATION AND LAW, no. 3(38) (September 28, 2021): 28–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.37750/2616-6798.2021.3(38).243797.
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The hybrid information threats distributed by the Russian Federation in modern conditions are considered. The scale of destructive activity and misinformation on the part of the Russian Federation is determined. The mechanisms of spreading Russian propaganda and misinformation are generalized. Modern institutional principles of counteraction to Russian fakes and propaganda are determined. The principles of functioning of the centers of counteraction to the Russian propaganda and disinformation in the USA and some EU countries are outlined. The competence and powers of the Ukraine`s Center for Countering Propaganda and Disinformation have been determined. The directions of improvements of the activities of the domestic Center for Combating Propaganda and Disinformation in the context of Russian information aggression against Ukraine are detailed.
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Romanets, Maryna. "Virtual Warfare: Masculinity, Sexuality, and Propaganda in the Russo-Ukrainian War." East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies 4, no. 1 (March 4, 2017): 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.21226/t26880.
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This paper explores the intersection of sexual and political discourses as a particular aspect of the body politics that Russia has employed, among other strategies, in its massive propaganda offensive during the hybrid warfare against Ukraine.While recognizing sexuality as one of the mainstream concepts in political analysis, the paper draws on sexually explicit imagery and idiom used in Russian social media, and public discursive space in general, as propaganda techniques, and maps their “genealogy” within wider sociocultural and political contexts. Being conceptualized in terms of Russian hegemonic masculinity in relation to subordinated femininity and non-hegemonic masculinities of its adversarial others, these setups reveal how sexuality constitutes uneven and contradictory nexuses of power once being co-opted by Putin’s propaganda machine. It is noteworthy that Russia’s neo-imperial discursive tactics of homologizing sexual and political dominance—when supplemented with the official rhetoric of restituting Russia as a great power, Orthodox Christian fundamentalism as an integral part of Russian unique “state-civilization,” state-sanctioned homophobia, and traditional macho gender ideology—contribute quite effectively to sustaining public support in Russia for aggression against Ukraine in the process of Russian reimperialization of the former Soviet space.
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MARKOVA, N. M. "SOME ASPECTS OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA IN ORTHODOX THEOLOGY OF THE XIX - EARLY XX CENTURIES." Sociopolitical Sciences 13, no. 3 (June 30, 2023): 103–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2223-0092-2023-13-3-103-110.
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The article discusses the relationship between the understanding of such categories as “freedom of religion” and “freedom of religious propaganda” by Orthodox theologians and jurists at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. The Russian legislation of this period of time, protecting the position of the Orthodox Church as “primary and dominant” in the state, limited the possibility of religious propaganda, giving this right only to the Russian Orthodox Church. However, the proclaimed freedom of religion caused a number of discussions regarding the completeness of religious tolerance in Russia and the place of freedom of religious propaganda within the framework of freedom of religion.
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Hodgson, Jayden. "Reenvisioning Russian Propaganda: Media Decentralization and the Use of Social Networks as a Means to Government Continuity." Open Political Science 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 238–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/openps-2021-0022.
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Abstract Abstract: Russia’s social scene has been anything but stable. Through economic turbulence and social unrest by political opposition, Navalny being only the most recent figure in a long list, Russia, under Putin’s leadership, has shown that it can persist when faced with hardship. How does the regime do this? This article argues that its robust propaganda machine is the answer to this question. I provide three arguments to support this thesis. First, I will present how information is produced and disseminated. Second, Russian propaganda, used for branding itself, attempts to influence foreign just as much as domestic audiences. Finally, using private proxies to peddle a positive message on Twitter will be analyzed. Russias propaganda machine threatens liberalism in the West. This article hopes to add to the conversation as first, recognizing the threat, and second, providing information for combatting the regime.
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Starodubska, Maryna. "Excessive Brotherly Love? - 'Fraternity' of Russians and Ukrainians as a Russian Propaganda Narrative." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 3 (2022): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.21.3.33.
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Soloviova, Anna. "Narratives of Russian Propaganda in the Ukrainian Media Space in the Context of Implementation of European Values." Acta de Historia & Politica: Saeculum XXI, no. 08 (June 16, 2024): 31–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.26693/ahpsxxi2024.08.031.
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Russian propaganda significantly influences the Ukrainian media landscape, actively fueling ethnic and political tensions. Through various media channels, it propagates a negative narrative regarding European integration, aiming to instill a sense of threat to national security and cultural identity. Therefore, the promotion and implementation of European values are crucial for Ukraine, as they serve as a strategic defense against Russian propaganda. European principles such as democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech, human rights and tolerance are fundamental for ensuring stability and progress within Ukrainian society. So the purpose of the study is the identification of Russian propaganda narratives in the Ukrainian media space within the context of implementation of European values and providing their typology. This article explores the influence of Russian narratives on the views and perceptions of Ukrainian society regarding European values, as well as possible response strategies of the Ukrainian media to the spread of Russian propaganda narratives are being researched. Furthermore, the data gathered from research on Russian propaganda gives author the opportunity to develop own typology of narratives of Russian propaganda. Also the main tools, themes and motives of Russian propaganda are revealed in the article. In paper it is made an attempt to assess of the influence of Russian narratives on the views and perceptions of Ukrainian society regarding European values and to compare the influence of Russian propaganda at the Ukrainian and European levels. Thus, enhancing the public’s media literacy and implementing the European values within society are vital components of Ukraine’s national security and long-term development, particularly in the context of information warfare. Overlooking the impact of propaganda narratives on the public will result in significant setbacks in communication and information dissemination. Hence, it is imperative to devise strategies to combat such propaganda narratives and foster among the citizens a sense of critical thinking and the importance of verifying information, particularly during times of societal crisis.
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Nina S., Ishchenko, and Zaslavskaja Elena A. "The Image of the Other as a Structural Characteristic of the Cultural Border on the Example of Ukraine and Donbass." Humanitarian Vector 16, no. 2 (April 2021): 124–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.21209/1996-7853-2021-16-2-124-136.
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The article is devoted to the specifics of the cultural frontier of Russian culture. The relevance of the article is due to the strengthening in the post-Soviet period of cultural conflicts on the border of Russian civilization. These conflicts on cultural grounds even lead to military action against the bearers of Russian culture, as has been the case in the Ukrainian war against Donbass since 2014. The article examines the borderland as a zone of intercultural interaction, carries out a cultural analysis of the border between cultures and identities, highlights the structural characteristic of the cultural border ‒ the image of the Other. Based on the conducted cultural analysis, the structure of the cultural space of Ukraine and the Donbass, including the wartime situation since 2014 is investigated. The study of the media content of Ukrainian information projects and similar projects in the LPR is carried out on the basis of an information-analytical methodology. Two permanent Ukrainian media projects of the Internews-Ukraine: Revision of History and Propagandarium, which work intensively in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine creating and broadcasting the image of the Russian as the Other by methods of aggressive anti-Russian propaganda are considered. We also analyze the activity of the Lugansk cultural site “Dandelion”, which has been operating in Lugansk since 2015 and reflects the cultural life of the city and the republic during this period. An analysis of the site’s materials shows that in the republic in wartime conditions, Russian and world culture is preserved and mastered, intensive work is underway to integrate the republics of Donbass into the cultural space of modern Russia, relying on the historical memory of these territories. The article substantiates that Ukrainian culture is currently a borderland culture, since the image of the Other as the Russian dominates its structure and is imposed on the Russians of Ukraine by propaganda methods. At the same time, the culture of modern Donbass is developing as Russian culture in which the image of the Other as a modern Ukrainian, a carrier of anti-Russian identity is formed. Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Donbass, borderland culture, the image of the Other, anti-Russian propaganda
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CHIPRIAN, ALEXANDRA-ANA. "LIMBAJUL PROPAGANDEI ÎN PRESA RUSĂ DIN ZILELE NOASTRE." Slovo 13, no. 1/2023 (December 21, 2023): 95–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.62229/slv13/8.
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This paper is an analysis of the language used by Russian journalists to describe the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, specifically the ongoing full-scale invasion started in February of 2022. In this article we rely on the 1928 study Propaganda, written by the American theorist Edward Bernays, which allows us to reveal a great number of similarities between current uses of propaganda and the way it was instrumentalized in the 20th century. Using the techniques, methods and principles of military propaganda as a basis, we analyzed several articles from a well-known Russian newspaper. The aim of this paper is to help develop an effective methodology to analyze and filter media information.
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Averianova, Nina. "ART AS A TOOL OF PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA UNDER RUSSIAN AGGRESSION." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 23 (2018): 107–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2018.23.17.
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The territorial integrity of Ukraine and peace on its lands, preservation of state sovereignty are the main tasks of the Ukrainian government, society, and all Ukrainians. As for as today the real threats from the Russian Federation remain, the Kremlin's aggressive policy in the hybrid war against our state is aimed at returning Ukraine to the sphere of Russia's influence. For doing this the Russian Federation is using methods that destabilize the internal situation in Ukraine, first of all, it depletes the Ukrainian economy, uses a powerful propaganda arsenal to distort Ukrainian national values and national culture, and misleads the allies of the Ukrainian state. A large-scale propaganda campaign against our country in certain areas of the Ukrainian state made it possible to perceive events in Ukraine through the prism of the views of politicians, scientists and artists of the Russian Federation. In such a situation, it is possible to confront Russian aggression only by using a complex of military, political, economic, informational and socio-humanitarian actions. In these conditions, culture and art are becoming an important means of solving complex social conflicts. Modern technological development has created a wide field for cultural and artistic influences, which has the opportunity to play a stabilizing role in the state. The through the influence on social consciousness can achieve important results in creating of certain ideas, values, spiritual needs as well as stereotypes and patriotic ideals. Such special way of influence on social conscious is art. The art represents significant and value dimension of the national being of the Ukrainians, gives a vision of historical being of the Ukrainian national, reflects spiritual links between a personality and the national, spiritual unity and succession of generation; both imaginative-symbolic and significant attributes of the national values and ideals are characteristic of it. Therefore, the question of restoration of peace, consolidation of Ukrainians, de-occupation of Ukrainian territories is considered in the context of conducting various cultural state measures, in particular artistic ones. That is why such purposeful usage of art in modern conditions the can be a powerful factor of consolidation of Ukrainians.
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Shizhensky, R. V. "Russian Neo-Paganism: Organization and Propaganda." Orthodoxia, no. 3 (September 28, 2023): 41–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.53822/2712-9276-2022-3-41-63.
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The development of modern paganism in Russia as a projection of alternative religiosity, a socio-political and ideological phenomenon has been around for several decades. Arisen at the end of the 1970s as a project of a lonely passionary A. А. Dobrovolsky, it soon acquired the status of a public institution, whose various units (communities, unions and an extra-systemic community of sympathizers that are potential neophytes) constitute a cult environment. During the development of this new religious movement, several independent directions appeared (rodnoverie, Odinism, primitive paganism, Druidism, Wicca, neoshamanism, neotengrism, etc.) with appropriate festive and ritual complexes, mythologies, source bases, ministers, and sacred languages (Newspeak). Currently, we may say that a whole neopagan diasporic community has emerged, claiming to have its own system of upbringing and education, projections of a new “correct” history, and social and structural forms that are parallel to the existing state and public institutions of the Russian Federation. The proposed paper aims to consider the most important concepts of the organization and specifi cs of propaganda that contribute to the successful functioning of Russian variations of neopaganism. The researcher concludes that modern Russian paganism is a constantly updated living worldview system with a well-developed ideology and organizational structure. Its most important element is the fi gure of a charismatic ideologue, who at will constructs both the microcosm and its position among other confessions in the domestic and international arena. It is the community leader who is responsible for the diversity of organizational forms, taking into account external factors (the needs of the fl ock) when modeling the latter. The propaganda of the neopagan diaspora includes a complex of various methods and practices, using the widest range of means, such as specialized printed materials, lecture courses, research activities, opening of educational institutions, religious mimicry, active development of the media space, and international activities.
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Polovyi, Taras. "Пропаганда углубления белорусско-российской интеграции в пророссийских интернет-СМИ Беларуси." Studia Politologiczne, no. 62/2021 (December 18, 2021): 54–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.33896/spolit.2021.62.4.
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The article analyzes the functioning of pro-Russian propaganda Internet media in the Republic of Belarus, which testifies to their purposeful activities designed to promote integration narratives in the country’s information space. It is concluded that the rhetoric used by Russian and pro-Russian Belarusian Internet media is essentially the same and does not differ significantly depending on the considered source of propaganda. It has been determined that the information impact is carried out using a set of identical theses, techniques and formulations that justify the commonality of history, culture and the need for the unity of the Belarusian and Russian peoples. It is noted that the actual identification of Belarusian national interests with Russian interests is used to justify the necessity and inevitability of Belarus’ civilizational choice in favor of Russia.
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Babichev, Oleksandr. "Analysis of Russian Narratives Denying the Genocide of the Ukrainian Nation During the War, 2014-2024." SUMY HISTORICAL AND ARCHIVAL JOURNAL, no. 42 (2024): 45–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/shaj.2024.i42.p.45.
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Russia's information campaign against Ukraine is multifaceted and open to different interpretations. As a rule, the Russian information campaign is flexible and contextualized, and each narrative has its own style that takes into account all its peculiarities. There is no agreed-upon model that can be used to explain the current narrative of Russia's information war against Ukraine. Instead of hiding information, the Russian Federation often "floods" the media, providing a large amount of information about this or that event, skillfully combining it with disinformation. These media campaigns evoke strong emotions, promote a culture of fear and create panic. Each publication has a certain style of journalism. Some publications maintain a balanced point of view and avoid emotionalism. Others incite hatred against Ukrainians and manipulate public opinion, portraying Ukrainians as puppets of the West, traitors, criminals, fascists, extremists, separatists and other "true patriots". This article analyzes the methods of Russian propaganda in Ukraine. In particular, the main narratives of Russian propaganda are the following: Ukraine is a country that never existed; Ukraine needs regime change; there is a "third Maidan"; Ukraine revives fascist and Nazi practices and is Russophobic; the Ukrainian army is a den of criminals, and NATO soldiers fight on the side of the Ukrainian state; The Russian Federation has nothing to do with the "Ukrainian conflict"; Western countries are trying to destroy Ukraine. Russian mass media disseminate propaganda messages prepared by the Kremlin and present them in a mutually agreed upon form. Today, these practices have become particularly acute. The tactics of Russian propaganda consist in focusing on emotions, creating enemies, biased presentation of information and creating theories without empirical basis to "explain" events.
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Marushchak, Anatolii, and Rostyslav Khaba. "The Russian Federation Information Influence (the Czech Republic case study)." Information Security of the Person, Society and State, no. 26 (2019): 6–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.51369/2707-7276-2019-2-1.
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Nowadays the hybrid attacks that use propaganda and fake news and are actively inculcated by the information centers under the control of Russian Federation on the territories of EU countries present serious threat not only to Ukraine in the view of disseminating false information about the events in our country but to the population of EU countries who are the final users of such information as well. On the basis of examples fixed by the European representatives concerning a great number of facts when Russia interfered into the process of elections in France and Germany, hackers attacks on social networks of Great Britain during public discussions and referendum on Brexit, we ascertained that the informational presence of the RF propaganda schemes played the decisive role in choosing the European policy, presaged Brexit and ensured the growth of European populists rating on the eve of the important political processes in a number of countries. The aim of the article is to show the means and methods of Russian information propaganda in EU countries on the example of the Chech Republic. Such methods of Russian information propaganda as strict following the multilingual principle while disseminating the same information to different resources in different countries; active usage of English as a mediator; usage of local internet resources; broadcasting the reiterative stories about the migrants from Arab states, the threat of Islamism for Europe, criticism of Western political elite, military crises in Ukraine; forming the image of Russia as the main opponent of aggressive US policy, the symbol of stability; focusing on the negative news, i.e. on protests, political rows, notorious retirements in EU and Western countries; ignoring the success and achievements etc. have been defined. We came to the conclusion that hybrid war in Ukraine drew attention of not only the European population but of the whole world to political, media and social phenomena that is the information war of Russia vs. Ukraine and in broad aspect – to a modern propaganda of Russia which has already challenged the whole democratic world, with an impact on public opinion formation and views of young people. Key words: hybrid war, misinformation, information influence, information propaganda.
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Siegień, Wojciech. "“Uncle Vova, we are with you!” The use of childhood semantics in Russian political propaganda." Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji 55, no. 2 (December 12, 2022): 7–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.26881/pwe.2022.55.01.
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The presented article focuses on the analysis of the semantic field of childhood in the propaganda of Soviet and modern Russia. Using a semantic analysis inspired by the works of A. Wierzbicka and J. Lakoff, the author analyses the historical semantic sources of propaganda and the use of the category of childhood in them. An example of an analysed propaganda product is the song “Uncle Vova, we are with you!” published online in 2017. The analysis proves that the semantics of the Russian propaganda message is based on patterns from previous eras with an invariant element – World War II, which is a kind of myth about the beginning of the Russian world. The war in Ukraine today additionally updates the meanings related to the armed conflict and patriotism. The analysis shows that childhood implies patriotism that invokes military meanings and is deeply immersed in the historical context of the war.
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Hanley, Hans W. A., Deepak Kumar, and Zakir Durumeric. "Happenstance: Utilizing Semantic Search to Track Russian State Media Narratives about the Russo-Ukrainian War on Reddit." Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media 17 (June 2, 2023): 327–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v17i1.22149.
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In the buildup to and in the weeks following the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian state media outlets output torrents of misleading and outright false information. In this work, we study this coordinated information campaign in order to understand the most prominent state media narratives touted by the Russian government to English-speaking audiences. To do this, we first perform sentence-level topic analysis using the large-language model MPNet on articles published by ten different pro-Russian propaganda websites including the new Russian “fact-checking” website waronfakes.com. Within this ecosystem, we show that smaller websites like katehon.com were highly effective at publishing topics that were later echoed by other Russian sites. After analyzing this set of Russian information narratives, we then analyze their correspondence with narratives and topics of discussion on r/Russia and 10 other political subreddits. Using MPNet and a semantic search algorithm, we map these subreddits’ comments to the set of topics extracted from our set of Russian websites, finding that 39.6% of r/Russia comments corresponded to narratives from pro-Russian propaganda websites compared to 8.86% on r/politics.
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Mylchenko, Larуsa. "The Russian influence through mass media as a significant factor of hybrid war against Ukraine." Вісник Книжкової палати, no. 10 (October 28, 2021): 8–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.36273/2076-9555.2021.10(303).8-16.
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The article provides an analytical review of domestic and foreign media, considers their impact on various target audiences in the context of a hybrid war against Ukraine. The activity of Russia in the implementation of destructive strategic communications and disorienting influence on the Ukrainian and international community is analysed on the examples of specific narratives.
The use of a systematic and comprehensive approach by the Russian Federation to the information presentation in the information environment remains an effective mean of conducting a hybrid aggression both against Ukraine and against other states, which this country considers as a threat to itself. One of the main components of the target audience for such resources is, first of all, the Russian society, and Moscow's main task is to legitimize Russia's foreign policy and enlist the support of the government's actions among its own citizens. To do this, Russian propaganda uses narratives depicting Ukraine and other countries in a distorted light.
Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine consists of two aspects: kinetic (direct physical actions, such as warfare in the form of shelling, provocative actions with weapons and direct hostilities) and non-kinetic, which includes information warfare in the form of propaganda through the media.
In the case of strengthening the kinetic aspect, non-kinetic methods and measures are intensified, namely the information war, which consists of the spread of fakes, manipulative narratives and propaganda discourses.
The main reason is an intent of the Russian Federation to influence on the target audience in order to prepare the target audience emotionally for the change of its own model of societal behaviour.
The article deals with the analysis of one aspect of the non-kinetic method of warfare — dissemination of media propaganda narratives by the aggressor country, the Russian Federation. Currently, actions of the Russian Federation concerning escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine in military terms are directly connected to efforts of the Russian Federation in media.
The analysis of Russian mass media shows, that narratives haven't change its meaning. Moreover, the narratives are supplemented by new messages, which strengthen them and also change their priority. In particular, it happens when newsworthy events within our country allow propagandists to provide information that will strengthen one or another Kremlin narrative. When such newsworthy events do not exist, they will be are created by spreading false information (fakes).
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Oliinyk, O. V., and L. I. Lyasota. "Problem of measurement of efficiency of propaganda (on the example of using of the index of effectiveness of the russian propaganda in Ukraine)." Науково-теоретичний альманах "Грані" 21, no. 4 (May 2, 2018): 40–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/171855.
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The article analyzes the possible effects of propaganda and justifies the possibility of empirical evaluation of its effectiveness. There are described main trends in the depending of approving the principal Russian propaganda theses by different categories of the population of Ukraine, based on the results of recent studies of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology and Ukrainian Institite for Social Research named after O. Yaremenko. A critical analysis of measuring the effectiveness of propaganda methodics, identifying areas for further improvement are made.The article presents the analysis of the experience of Ukrainian sociologists connected with the research of Russian propaganda in Ukraine in the period from 2015 to 2018. The authors focus their attention on the theoretical approaches to the definition of propaganda, effects of propaganda and methodological possibilities of measuring it in empirical research. Relying on the latest statistical data, the authors determine the specificity of effectiveness of Russian propaganda in Ukraine and factors influencing its effectiveness. They also pay attention to the main difficulties of the study of propaganda.It is done the analysis of possible effects of propaganda, namely the group of general criteria (such criteria also include knowledge, beliefs, actions) and the group of specific criteria (psychological, cognitive, and behavioral effects). Based on the results of the latest researches of the Kiev International Institute of sociology and the Ukrainian Institite for Social Research named after O. Yaremenko, the authors pointed out the main trends of suportance the main points of Russian propaganda by different categories of the population of Ukraine, including the dependence on the region of residence, national and linguistic identification and level of the respondents’ income. It is noted that there is an urgent need to strengthen the system of counteraction to the Russian propaganda (especially from the Ukrainian media, as well as public authorities). The article raises methodological problem of the possibility of studying the effectiveness of Russian propaganda in principle. Using the results of the discussion of the index of effectiveness of Russian propaganda (RRS), which was developed by the staff of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology in 2015, in the professional community of sociologists, the authors undertook a critical analysis of the methods of measuring the effectiveness of propaganda and the possibility of empirical evaluation of its effectiveness. As a result, it is identified areas for further improvement of the methodology of measuring the effectiveness of propaganda, namely: an increased study of the behavioral effects of propaganda, conducting regular measurements to allow comparisons, the development of comprehensive studies of the manifestations of the results of the propaganda of various methods (including psychological testing, involvement in the experiment several control groups, etc.).
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Dudek-Waligóra, Gabriela. "Kategoria wroga w dyskursie rosyjskiej władzy (na przykładzie orędzia W. W. Putina z 24 lutego 2022 roku)." Studia Wschodniosłowiańskie 23 (2023): 151–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/sw.2023.23.09.
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The subject of research in this article is the figure of the enemy, which is identified in numerous studies as one of the basic components of the world of propaganda, including communist propaganda. The aim of the analysis is to characterize the language exponents of the category of enemy in V. V. Putin’s message and to indicate their functions in the contemporary discourse of the Russian authorities. It should be emphasized that we treat the discourse of the Russian authorities as modern newspeak, that is, as a contemporary variant of the communist propa ganda discourse used by the political elite of today’s authoritarian Russia. In the examined message, two types of enemies were distinguished: real, i.e. actually existing in the world around us, to which the United States belongs, along with its allies from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and invented enemies, i.e. ones that are a kind of creation of Russian propaganda. These created enemies include neo-Nazis allegedly supported by the NATO organization, who supposedly form the current government in Kiev. They are portrayed as posing the most se rious threat to the Russian Federation. The category of enemy serves V. V. Putin for officially explaining to the Russian people the reasons for beginning the socalled “special military operation” in Ukraine, which is supposed to be “self-defence against threats to Russia”.
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Aleksieieva, Daria, Maksym Bulyk, and Iryna Gridina. "Propaganda on the temporarily occupied territories Donetsk and Luhansk regions: institutional and organizational mensuration." Bulletin of Mariupol State University. Series: History. Political Studies 10, no. 28-29 (2020): 143–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.34079/2226-2830-2020-10-28-29-143-153.
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The Russian propaganda war against Ukraine is an example of information warfare, which is a reflection of a wide range of non-military instruments that are used to exert pressure and influence over the behavior of the countries. With a skillful combination of disinformation, malicious attacks on large-scale information and communication systems, combined with psychological pressure, it is more dangerous than traditional weapons systems The article deals with the psychological aspect of information warfare, the leading component is the propaganda. Smartened and supplemented with new technologies, it is actively and masterly used by the Russian Federation to manipulate the mass consciousness of the international community, its own population, citizens of Ukraine, the occupied population of the occupied territories. The ideological fundamental theses of Russian propaganda are the "Donbass mythologeme" with the thesis about "civil conflict"; the project of "Novorossiya", which denies the historical belonging of Donbass to Ukraine and the separateness of Donbass, together to justify the "fight against Ukrainian fascism" for the independence of the region and its further integration into Russia. Propaganda tools are a mixture of militarized Russian and Soviet content and symbols in the public sphere, education, youth upbringing, leisure activities, and the like. The brainwashing of the population is based on a centralized information space management system. The main role in its construction is played by the Russian Federation in order to legitimize the occupation policy of the Russian authorities, to create the illusion of independence of decisions and actions of the occupation administration; an extensive media system. The goal of the mental alienation of the population of the temporarily occupied territories from Ukraine is achieved in various ways: the militarization of consciousness, the education of the Soviet Donbas identity, the imposition of historical myths, the creation of a quasi-held attributive simulacrum, and the like. Total control over information resources and communication means provides unlimited opportunities for the occupation administration to carry out propaganda actions, and the length of time makes the task of counter-propaganda extremely difficult.
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Oates, Sarah. "Russian Media in the Digital Age: Propaganda Rewired." Russian Politics 1, no. 4 (December 30, 2016): 398–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00104004.
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This article reflects on the role of media in the Russian Federation through the concept of “rewired propaganda.” The approach highlights how the Russian regime copes with challenges to its information hegemony in the digital age. The study employs two critical case studies to examine the Russian political communication sphere: the 2011–12 election protests and the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by a Russian missile in 2014. The article argues that a key vector of analysis is understanding strategic narrative as the critical measurement of media control. The findings suggests that it is not so much who owns or controls the media that is key to understanding information control; rather, it is knowing who is constructing and disseminating the most compelling national narrative that holds the key to power in Russia. This focus on rewired propaganda and recasting of the debate will permit an analysis of the role of the media in the post-Soviet state even as the overall media environment has shifted with the advent of the digital age. On balance, the two case studies demonstrate that Russian elites have continued to adapt to growing challenges, showing an ability to use many facets of communication to consolidate an information dominance over citizens.
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Malysheva, Elena, and Olga Rogaleva. "Russian Political Propaganda Media Discourse: Definition of the Concept, Structure and Boundaries, Characteristics of Subjects." Theoretical and Practical Issues of Journalism 12, no. 3 (September 30, 2023): 544–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2308-6203.2023.12(3).544-561.
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The relevance of this article is due to the practice of broadcasting ideas about the basic political and ideological constants of the state and power, which is widespread in modern Russian political propaganda media discourse. The article presents an overview of the research on propaganda, political propaganda, its properties, methods. The study revealed the theoretical heterogeneity of the concept of "political propaganda", general signs and patterns of this phenomenon. The research task is to summarize the results of the scientific discussion, offer our own definition of the political propaganda discourse of the mass media and describe its structure. The author developed the definition of the political propaganda discourse of the mass media. In modern Russian mass media, there is a clear polarization of the discourse under study: it seems possible to single out state and opposition subdiscourses, or varieties, of political propaganda media discourse. The article presents an analysis of the field structure of the Russian political propaganda discourse using the example of the characteristics of the subjective and genre-format organization of one of its varieties — the state political propaganda media discourse. The authors carried out zoning and systematization of the media activities of the subjects of the state propaganda media discourse. The study found that the role of "pivot", core texts for this variety is played by texts created by the subjects of political communication and broadcast in the media. The totality of multi-genre and multi-format media products of professional journalists and representatives of the cultural elite of Russia, distributed through various media channels, constitutes the near-core zone of this discourse. On the periphery media texts are created by non-professional journalists and users. The content-thematic principle becomes unifying for the political propaganda discourse of mass media: it is a single ideological system with a characteristic set of concepts, values, and assessments. The article outlines the vectors for further study of this phenomenon.
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Dergacheva, Alexandra Cheveleva. "Why is Russian Domestic War Propaganda so Effective?" Global Journal of Cultural Studies 1 (December 19, 2022): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/2817-2310.2022.01.01.
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This article provides a review of possible causes of the effectiveness of the Russian domestic propaganda campaigns launched in connection with the war in Ukraine and aimed at the domestic consumer, as well as their discussion in academic research and analytical publications. Currently, this phenomenon is much discussed in the oppositional Russian-speaking, Ukrainian, and world media. Nevertheless, the number of short journalistic pieces devoted to specific aspects of this effectiveness significantly prevails over detailed analytical articles or holistic academic studies. The present research aims to partially fill this gap. The article defines the main groups of reasons for the effectiveness of Russian domestic propaganda, identified both in modern studies and in earlier works, and also traces the relationship between these groups. It discusses the organizational and technical prerequisites (the possibility of total control of the media, including access to information via the Internet), cultural issues (the unique situation in Russia, which has developed as a result of its transgenerational traumas), and "political technology" (political manipulation and persuasion) methods. In conclusion, the author makes some suggestions (and assumptions) about further possibilities for studying the phenomenon of Russian domestic propaganda and discusses its social significance.
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Diachuk, Liudmyla. "Manipulation of lexical choice aspects in the creation of stereotypes and ideas in Russian propaganda." Revista Amazonia Investiga 14, no. 75 (March 30, 2024): 173–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.34069/ai/2024.75.03.15.
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The aim of the research is to analyse the mechanisms of manipulation of lexical choice aspects in the creation of mass stereotypes and ideas in Russian propaganda (based on examples of the analysis of Russian mass media and blogs). The research employed the methods of quantitative, comparative, and statistical analysis. In the course of the study, results were obtained in the form of a count of lexical units used in five sources of Russian propaganda and an assessment of their meaning. The results give reason to draw a conclusion about the use of certain lexical choices (euphemisms, emotionally charged vocabulary, slogans, hate speech, historical myths and falsifications) by Russian propaganda to redefine military realities and justify the war crimes of the Russian occupation army. The academic novelty of the study is the selected various academic sources to illustrate the imperial thinking of Russian mass media correspondents. Prospects. Further research may diversify the materials for the lexical analysis of the mechanisms of Russian propaganda in mass media.
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Aleksandr Mineyev. "EU AT WAR WITH RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA." Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, The 68, no. 047 (November 21, 2016): 18–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21557/dsp.48075832.
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Yuskiv, Khrystyna. "NARRATIVES OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA IN UKRAINE." Visnyk of the Lviv University, no. 30 (2020): 226–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.30970/pps.2020.30.31.
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