Academic literature on the topic 'Russian Reconnaissance operations'
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Journal articles on the topic "Russian Reconnaissance operations"
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Hatsenko, S., S. Mordvinov, O. Mudrenko, and V. Heorhiiev. "SUBSTANTIATION OF METHODS OF SEARCH FOR THE DIVERSION AND INTELLIGENCE GROUPS OF THE OPPONENT AND ILLEGAL WEAPON FORMATIONS." Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy, no. 17 (August 31, 2022): 176–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2022.17.176-186.
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The implementation of the measures of the joint forces operation to contain and repulse Russian armed aggression in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the national security of Ukraine provides a set of multifaceted political, diplomatic, economic, technological, ideological and military measures. Of decisive importance among them are political measures aimed at creating favorable conditions for the state, eliminating existing and potential threats, and localizing them. The experience of conducting combat operations in the Joint Forces operation, namely, the performance of tasks by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces in stabilization operations while strengthening the protection of the state border, isolating the armed conflict, combating enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups and illegal armed formations, indicates that that the classical ways of performing tasks are not rational. In preparation for and during active combat operations in order to destabilize the situation, sabotage mobilization measures and the operational deployment of troops, isolate the battlefield, complicate maneuver, disrupt command and control of troops and weapons, rear services, etc. the enemy will carry out large-scale sabotage, reconnaissance and other subversive actions in the zone of responsibility of operational formations (formations). At the same time, illegal armed formations will be organized and operate, which will be involved in carrying out destabilization actions. The article considers a calculation method for searching for enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups and illegal armed formations in a given area, taking into account the peculiarities of modern armed conflicts and the forces and means involved (used) in this process. Keywords: search, sabotage and reconnaissance group, illegal armed formation of mathematical expectation, probability of an event.
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Иванов, Святослав, and Svyatoslav Ivanov. "Intention and plan for operational search operation." Vestnik of the St. Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia 2019, no. 3 (October 15, 2019): 136–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.35750/2071-8284-2019-3-136-143.
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The article is devoted to the problem of planning operational search operations conducted by the operational units of the internal affairs agencies, and is based on the analysis of the practical activities of the police (militia) and counterintelligence agencies of Russia, some works of domestic and foreign researchers and the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On operational search activities”. The availability of a single plan and intention is recognized as mandatory features of operational-search operations, along with coordination of all operational-search measures and other supportive tactical methods of action envisaged by them for the purpose, time and place (objects). The content of the plan and intention, their relationship, dependence on the purpose and scale of the operation, and the assessment by the manager and the operational officer of the general and specific operational situation are considered. It was stated that there is an insufficient normative entrenchment of the issues of physical detention of suspects, ambushes and other supportive tactical methods of action. Based on the personal experience of the author, some practical recommendations are given on the use of operational combinations, operational games, the use of tactical principles, including the principle of surprise that is mandatory for arranging and conducting operations, conducting reconnaissance, applying operational masking, etc.
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Golovanova, Elena. "SPECIAL VOCABULARY OF THE MILITARY SPHERE IN TODAY'S COMMUNICATIVE SPACE." Linguistics & Education 4, no. 2 (June 28, 2024): 37–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.17021/2712-9519-2024-2-37-45.
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The article analyzes lexical units of a terminological and non-thermological nature associated with the military sphere and actively used in the modern communicative space in connection with Russia's special military operation. The author focuses on the typological composition and thematic classification of these units, some features of their formation and functioning are considered. It is shown that not only terms are in demand, but also oral professional units (professionalism and professional jargon). When analyzing non-verbal designations of a phraseological nature, a clear differentiation of units characterizing the methods of military operations of the Russian armed forces and the Armed Forces of Ukraine was found; from other thematic groups, the names of technical means of reconnaissance, deterrence and destruction of the enemy, as well as the names of spatial objects associated with military operations, are meaningfully presented.
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Popov, Aleksey Vladimirovich, and Olga Dmitrievna Fedotova. "Training of lower officers in the Russian system of military aviators' training of the late 19th – early 20th century." KANT 38, no. 1 (March 2021): 321–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.24923/2222-243x.2021-38.67.
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The article analyzes the issues of training military aeronauts in the late 19th – early 20th century in Russia. It is shown that the emergence of new technical means providing ascent into the airspace has opened up new possibilities for conducting military operations, as evidenced by the experience of using aeronautics abroad. The Russian command did not immediately realize the possibilities of conducting reconnaissance and conducting artillery fire on the enemy, which led to a lag in the development of aeronautics and aeronautics, as well as in training personnel for flight support. The article shows that for the training of officers and lower ranks in the Russian army, special units were created in which the lower ranks were taught special subjects that guarantee the production of safe flights due to their technical support.
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Savchuk, Oleg, Vladimir Kreytor, and Oleg Troyanov. "ON A POSSIBLE RADIATION ACCIDENT ON A NUCLEAR-POWERED ICEBREAKER AND ORGANIZATION OF SAFETY OF RESCUERS OF EMERCOM OF RUSSIA DURING LIQUIDATION OF ITS CONSEQUENCES." Problems of risk management in the technosphere 2023, no. 3 (September 28, 2023): 181–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.61260/1998-8990-2023-3-181-188.
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Based on the analysis of the presence of radiation hazardous facilities in the Arctic regions of the Russian Federation, the problem of ensuring environmental safety in connection with the disposal of spent nuclear fuel of nuclear icebreakers is considered. Due to the growing number of Russian nuclear icebreakers in the Arctic, the specifics of their use, storage conditions for accumulating radioactive waste on ships serving them, there is a risk of accidents during loading and unloading operations with spent nuclear fuel. A hypothetical model of an accident with the depressurization of a container with solid radioactive waste is considered, and recommendations are given on the organization of radiation reconnaissance and ensuring the safety of personnel of EMERCOM of Russia participating in the elimination of the consequences of radiation pollution, attention is paid to the specifics of decontamination.
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Butuzov, V., D. Kovtoniuk, and I. Luhovskyi. "SPECIFIC FEATURES OF ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCTING OF PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE BY INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE DURING PARTICIPATION IN COUNTERING ARMED AGGRESSION." STATE SECURITY 1, no. 1 (2023): 13–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.33405/2786-8613/2023/1/1/288257.
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The article examines the peculiarities of organization and conduct of personal intelligence by the defense forces of Ukraine based on the analysis of experience in performing reconnaissance tasks during the repulsion of full-scale armed aggression by the russian federation. It clarifies the list of main tasks of personal intelligence in modern conditions and discusses the problematic issues related to the collection of intelligence information from the local population. It describes general approaches to obtaining information through the analysis of social media and monitoring services used for this purpose. Furthermore, it outlines the ways to further develop the capabilities of personal intelligence within the National Guard of Ukraine. Personal intelligence, in this article, refers to a complex of measures and actions carried out by designated units using methods of acquiring information from human resources (sources) in order to provide intelligence information to military command (staff) for the purpose of preparing and conducting combat (special) operations by military units (subunits) of the defense forces of Ukraine. It provides detailed information that helps confirm or refute intelligence information, enables obtaining answers to specific questions, and increases the reliability of information used by defense management authorities for decision-making. Conducting personal intelligence through obtaining information from the local population is one of the effective methods of collecting intelligence information in dynamic combat situations. This approach involves interacting with individuals residing in territories occupied by the enemy or having access to valuable information concerning enemy actions, population attitudes, significant events, and other intelligence-relevant aspects. In addition to obtaining information from the local population, gathering intelligence from open sources is a particular tool that helps collect valuable data for the effective execution of reconnaissance tasks by intelligence units within the National Guard of Ukraine formations. The acquisition of intelligence information from the local population and open sources is an integral component of reconnaissance activities. These processes assist reconnaissance units in having a comprehensive understanding of the situation, ensuring the timeliness and accuracy of intelligence information, thereby contributing to the successful accomplishment of tasks and ensuring national security by the National Guard of Ukraine formations. The experience of organizing and conducting personal intelligence activities to provide reconnaissance support for operations of the defense forces in countering the aggression of the russian federation allows drawing conclusions that intelligence from open sources, including the actions of the population regarding documenting and disseminating information about enemy activities, significantly contributes to enhancing the capabilities of reconnaissance support for defense operations in repelling armed aggression.
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Silchenko, I. S. "The features of reconnaissance operations of the 3rd brigade of the Russian expeditionary corps on the Western front. December 1916–March 1917." Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 9, no. 2 (2024): 50–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-2-50-56.
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The article analyzes the preparation and conduct of reconnaissance operations in the area of the French commune of Aubérive using the example of two regiments of the 3rd Special Infantry Brigade of the Russian Expeditionary Forces in France. The common and unique features of the French front inherent in the activities of the Russian troops are highlighted. The basis of the research is a set of unpublished sources from the collections of the Russian State Military Historical Archive, the Bakhmetyev Archive of Columbia University (USA), the archive of the Russian Cultural Center (USA). The author notes that, despite the inconsistency of the actions of artillery and infantry, the raids were quite well thought out, this allowed not only to carry out a combat mission, but also to save personnel.
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TĂNASE (MĂXINEANU), Lavinia Elena, and Roxana MANEA (ALEXANDRU). "SNAKE ISLAND – BLACK SEA STRATEGIC AREA." INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERINCE "STRATEGIESXXI" 18, no. 1 (December 6, 2022): 284–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.53477/2971-8813-22-33.
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In this article, we will analyze the strategic importance of the Snake Island for the entire Black Sea area and even the European and NATO countries, which are non-riparian states. Utilizing historical analysis as a research method, we will objectively state the importance of the island throughout history while also pointing out some contemporary elements. In addition, we will focus on the political, military, and economic factors that motivated Russian forces' decision to launch an attack on the first day that hostilities broke out between Ukraine and Russia. For this reason, after Ukraine had already lost both control of the Crimean Peninsula and free access to the Azov Sea, the seizure of Snake Island by Russian forces was most likely planned well in advance, as a tactical operation with strategic implications, for the purpose of cutting off Ukraine’s maritime routes and denying access to all of its sea lines of communication. Another factor of great importance is the island's location, which presents the possibility of basing military assets on the island in order to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations and even pose a threat on the eastern frontier of NATO with the probable deployment of mobile multi-layered missile systems
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Ivanyuk, Sergey. "Pomeranian Campaign (1712–1713): Reconnaissance and Sabotage Activities of the Russian Army." Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, no. 3 (July 2024): 6–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2024.3.1.
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Introduction. During the Great Northern War, the Russian army conducted many military campaigns in various theaters of combat operations. Many research papers have been devoted to the study of these events, but the events in Northern Germany (1712–1713) were not sufficiently disclosed. The article, with the involvement of sources on the history of the so-called “Pomeranian campaign,” including those not yet introduced into scientific circulation, reveals the features of conducting intelligence and sabotage activities of the army of Peter I in the conditions of a small war. Мaterials. The research is based on both published documents and those stored in archives, which allow us to restore the chronology of events and the methods of conducting intelligence and sabotage activities of the Petrovsky troops. Analysis. A comparison of the documentary evidence of the participants of the Pomeranian campaign, as well as research by Danish military historians, made it possible to determine the main methods of conducting reconnaissance and sabotage activities of Peter I’s troops in this theater of operations and to build a chronology of the events of the period 1712–1713, as well as the place and role of tactical intelligence assessment in the overall course of the campaign. Results. Despite the conditionally zero result of the Russian army, it was possible to achieve several significant results in Pomerania, in which the reconnaissance and sabotage activities of its troops played an important role, with the ability to expect the actions of the enemy and to stop threats from his side. Methods and materials. The basis of the source base was made up of documents stored in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, as well as published materials: correspondence between the Most Serene Prince and Peter I, heads of offices and contractors, as well as notes and diaries of eyewitnesses. The study of published and archival sources and the analysis and comparison of the information contained in them make it possible to reveal the role of St. Petersburg governor A.D. Menshikov in the creation of a regularly built-up port city. Analysis. Before the laying of the Kronstadt fortress on October 7, 1723, the settlement on Kotlin had no name. The first stone houses on the southern coast of the island were erected by the forces of the provinces; therefore, they were called “provincial.” After the start of the second regional reform, the completion of the provincial houses was entrusted to Senator M.M. Samarin. The construction of all stone buildings Peter I entrusted to A.D. Menshikov. In 1720, the Office of the Construction of Kotlin Stone Houses was created to conduct work. In connection with the beginning of the construction of the canal (the future Petrovsky Dock), the wooden residential buildings and outbuildings located near the seacoast were demolished or moved inland. At the beginning of 1724, the stone houses in the “bracket” – the sea gates of Kronstadt – were transferred to the associates of the first Russian emperor and naval officers. Results. In historiography, all stone houses built in 1717–1725 on Kotlin are what it is customary to call “provincial.” The buildings begun in 1719 under the leadership of A.D. Menshikov were built on the model of the provincial ones, but they were called “the houses of his royal majesty.” The office of the construction of the Kotlin stone houses carried out work at a faster pace, which was facilitated by the huge administrative resources of the Petersburg governor.
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Kabachinsky, Mykola, and Oleh Ananin. "Combat reserves of the State border service of Ukraine in combat operations in Donbas (spring – summer 2014." Scientific Papers of the Kamianets-Podilskyi National Ivan Ohiienko University. History 40 (July 3, 2023): 221–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.32626/2309-2254.2023-40.221-234.
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The study aim to analysis of the historical experience of the participation of com- bat reserves of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the hostilities in the Ukrainian Donbas in the spring and summer of 2014. Research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, objectivity, comprehensive analysis, and the modern conceptual and categori- cal apparatus used by military history in describing the process of armed struggle. Th e histori- cal and systematic method, as well as the methods of analysis and synthesis, are used. The scientifi c novelty lies in an attempt to systematically study the history of the participation of the combat reserves of the Border Guard Service in the hostilities conducted by the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the spring and summer of 2014 during the counteraction to Russian aggression. Conclusions. The combat reserves of the State Border Guard Service were formed as freelance units with the main goal of strengthening the border guard units that guarded the Ukrainian-Russian state border in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Their service and combat activities in the spring and summer of 2014 can be divided into two stages, each of which diff ered in the socio-political situation and the intensity of hostilities. As the hostilities clearly demonstrated, due to the lack of regular missile and artillery weapons and the necessary amount of armored vehicles, the border guards’ combat reserves were able to fi ght only sabotage and reconnaissance groups and some illegal armed groups of local pro-Russian collabo- rators. As for confronting the regular units of the Russian armed forces by conducting full-scale combat operations against them, the border guards were predictably unprepared.
Books on the topic "Russian Reconnaissance operations"
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Sinit︠s︡kiĭ, A. G. Razvedchikam oshibatʹsi︠a︡ nelʹzi︠a︡. Moskva: Voennoe izd-vo, 1987.
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Krylov, S. A. Zapiski nochnogo fotografa: Frontovye budni aviat͡s︡ionnogo fotogrammetrista. Moskva: S.A. Krylov, 1998.
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Zablotskiĭ, A. N. V prit︠s︡ele FV-189: Poteri blizhnikh razvedchikov FV-189 na sovetsko-germanskom fronte v 1941--1943 godakh : spravochnik. Sankt-Peterburg: Galeia Print, 2006.
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Zoi͡a︡, Voskresenskai͡a︡, and Sharapov Ėduard, eds. Taĭna Zoi Voskresenskoĭ. Moskva: Olma-Press, 1998.
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Voskresenskai͡a, Zoi͡a. Teperʹ i͡a mogu skazatʹ pravdu: Iz vospominaniĭ razvedchit͡sy. Moskva: Izd-vo "Respublika", 1993.
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Drabkin, A. V. "I︠A︡ poshel by s nim v razvedku": Pravda voĭskovykh razvedchikov. Moskva: I︠A︡uza, 2013.
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Maksimova, M. M. (Margarita Matveevna), ed. Frontovoĭ dnevnik. 2nd ed. Moskva: Nauka, 2005.
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Osborn, Patrick. Operation Pike. Praeger, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9798400693519.
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This groundbreaking study reveals the extent of British military planning against the Soviet Union during the first two years of the Second World War. These plans, formulated on the widespread belief that Soviet Russia was an active and willing partner in Adolf Hitler's war of conquest, were designed to bring the Soviets to their knees and deprive Nazi Germany of vital raw materials, especially oil. Churchill himself was one of the leading proponents of action that would have led to an Anglo-Soviet conflict even as the war with Germany raged on. Utilizing many never-before published documents, Osborn challenges conventional wisdom that Allied hopes were pinned on a Soviet entry into the war against Germany and proposes instead that, had the Nazis not successfully invaded France in May 1940, the Allies might well have launched their own offensive against the Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet rumblings began shortly after the Red Army seized eastern Poland in September 1939, and became more strident after Joseph Stalin invaded Finland later that year. Truly serious planning did not take place, however, until after Stalin's disastrous war with Finland ended in March 1940. Immediately following the abrupt end of that conflict the Red Army sent substantial reinforcements to the Black Sea region, the area most threatened by Allied attack. In March-April 1940, the British undertook secret reconnaissance flights to obtain photographs of important targets inside the Soviet Union. The swift collapse of France in May 1940 insured that British bombers were not launched against these targets, but suspicion lingered between Britain and the USSR throughout the war, contributing to Stalin's refusal to believe Winston Churchill's warnings that Hitler was preparing to invade the USSR in 1941.
Book chapters on the topic "Russian Reconnaissance operations"
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Tsvizhba, Larisa I. "Report of the Captain of the General Staff Count Pavel Ippolitovich Kutaysov." In Abkhazia in Russian Literature of the 19th — 20th Centuries: in 3 vols. Vol. 2, 135–59. A.M. Gorky Institute of World Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/arl-2023-2-135-159.
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The Russian State Military Historical Archive contains the “Case of the reconnaissance carried out by the General Staff Captain, Count Kutaisov of the lands of the Dzhigets and part of the lands of the Ubykhs adjacent to the eastern coast of the Black Sea and of the inspection of roads running in this part of the region,” which contains two documents. This is a memo about the societies — Dzhiget and Ubykh, and a description of the roads from Gagra towards Gelendzhik. Kutaisov’s materials do not have an exact date, although it is known that he collected information and wrote it down between 1860 and the beginning of 1864. Kutaisov in his materials gives detailed information about the societies of the studied region, about influential and noble families, indicating their status in society, places of their settlement, indicating the boundaries and indicating the number of households in each of them, about the complex political situation with Russia. The description of the road from Gagra to the former Navaginsky fortification (the mouth of the Sochi River) should be considered from the point of view of strategic importance. In it, Kutaisov notes how one or another settlement can be occupied, which roads are convenient for troops to pass, which roads require development for the passage of military detachments to mountain communities, where danger is expected. This speaks of preparations for active military operations by detachments that were preparing to march from different points towards the mountain communities of Pskhu, Akhchipshu in order to finally bring them into submission, which will happen on May 21, 1864.
Conference papers on the topic "Russian Reconnaissance operations"
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Daniel, Dr, and Dr William. "Applicable Lessons Learned from AHIP/OH-58D and LHX/RAH-66 Development Programs for the Army's FARA Open Systems Aircraft." In Vertical Flight Society 76th Annual Forum & Technology Display. The Vertical Flight Society, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4050/f-0076-2020-16264.
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The Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program is much bigger than the two ambitious high speed helicopters that Bell and Sikorsky will now get more than $1 billion to build. At least five other major moving pieces must come together on time to turn the final aircraft, whoever makes it, into a working weapon: - a new Improved Turbine Engine built by GE; - helicopter-launched mini-drones called Air Launched Effects (ALE); - a new Long-Range Precision Munition (LRPM), with the Israeli Spike-NLOS as the initial version; - an Integrated Missile Launcher (IML) to launch both the missile and the drones; - and the underlying electronic framework of standards and interfaces to plug it all together, the Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA). *Recently, FARA has added a 20mm Gatling Gun being developed by The Advanced Rotorcraft Armament and Protection System (ARAPS) program team at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Center (CCDC) Armaments Center The Army is "not just focused on the air vehicle, but focused on the weapon system," said Brig. Gen. Walter Rugen, Future Vertical Lift director at Army Futures Command, in a call this morning with reporters. [1] While some have questioned the viability of fielding the FARA in ten years, e.g. by 2028, others have offered reasons on why the plan for a next-gen recon aircraft needs to be accelerated. Who knows how much money will be available to the Army for sustaining its aviation fleet as budget walls close in over the next several years? Trilliondollar deficits have a way of impinging on defense budgets. What is proposed, though, is that the Army compress its development schedule for a new armed recon rotorcraft so that our soldiers begin to be better equipped against the likes of Russia and China somewhere around 2025, rather than after 2030. A whole lot can happen in ten years. We don't need another Army development program to be overtaken by events. (2) However, since the FARA will likely be in service for a half-century or more, it makes sense to conduct rigorous analysis up front to ensure that what is fielded has the capabilities to provide the most value for the warfighter and the taxpayer. Prior to spending billions of dollars and decades producing the FARA aircraft, it is prudent to spend the time to determine what the right solutions should be. Many projects fail when the initial requirements are not well thought out and the ramifications are not clearly understood. To solve the tension between these conflicting desires, designers need to iterate the design sensitivities with operational analysis to show the pros and cons of each attribute, alone and in concert, but ultimately the Army must prioritize its requirements and potentially make hard trade-off decisions.(3) The major objective of this paper is provide a methodology for the necessary understanding of the push and pull of technology readiness and application through trade studies and operational analysis early to avoid disappointments and to minimize FARA slippages and cost increases. This will be accomplished by reviewing Lessons Learned from the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the LHX/RAH-66 Comanche development programs. While the authors were directly involved in these programs as Army Aviation engineers, managers and senior executives, the major emphasis for this paper will be to address how the government-industry teams brought these programs successfully through initial development. Fortunately, for the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Development Program there are excellent documentation of the government-industry team participation in References 4 and 5. While the authors strongly endorse the lessons learned in these documents, they will have a few of their own. For the LHX/RAH66 Comanche Development Program there is considerably less documentation; however, the authors will provide Army and their lessons learned. It is hoped that this paper and the referenced documents will be read, and the lessons learned by both government and industry involved in the FARA development program.
Reports on the topic "Russian Reconnaissance operations"
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Raju, Nivedita, and Tytti Erästö. The Role of Space Systems in Nuclear Deterrence. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.55163/nwlc4997.
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This paper is the first of two exploring nuclear escalation risks in connection with the space domain, with a focus on China, Russia and the United States. Space systems are used for multiple civilian and military purposes, including missions related to nuclear deterrence. Consequently, real and perceived military operations targeting space systems may create pathways to nuclear escalation. China, Russia and the USA possess both nuclear weapons and counterspace capabilities and are at risk of being drawn into war with each other through regional conflicts and great power competition. These states have integrated space systems into their nuclear deterrence practices to varying degrees for missile early warning, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and navigation. These space systems can be vulnerable to attack or interference through counterspace capabilities, including direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, directed-energy weapons, electronic interference and cyber operations. Each of the three states’ space systems has varying strategic value. Each system is also vulnerable to the known counterspace capabilities of the others. Assessment of these varying values and vulnerabilities lays the ground for further analysis on escalation pathways and risk-reduction measures