Journal articles: 'Rwandan Patriotic Front'

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Jessee, Erin, and Sarah E. Watkins. "Good Kings, Bloody Tyrants, and Everything In Between: Representations of the Monarchy in Post-Genocide Rwanda." History in Africa 41 (April 23, 2014): 35–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hia.2014.7.

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AbstractSince assuming power after the 1994 genocide, President Paul Kagame and his political party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, have struggled to unite Rwanda’s citizens using, among other initiatives, a simplified version of Rwandan history to diminish the ethnic tensions that made the 1994 genocide possible. As a result, Rwanda’s history has become highly politicized, with vastly divergent versions of the nation’s past narrated in private settings, where it is more politically appropriate for Rwandans to share their experiences. This paper focuses on divergent representations of Rwandan monarchical figures – often unnamed – whom the narrators imbue with values according to their individual political affiliations, lived experiences, and identity. These narratives are indicative of the broader ways that modern Rwandans narrate their experiences of history in response to Rwanda’s current official history, as well as previous official histories. Careful analysis reveals much about the current political climate in post-genocide Rwanda: most notably, that Rwandans continue to see their nation’s past through vastly different lenses, demonstrating the enormous challenges facing the Rwandan government as it seeks to reconcile its population using current methods. It also highlights the ongoing need on the part of historians to approach contemporary sources critically, informed by sources produced and debated in the pre-genocide period.

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Reed, Wm Cyrus. "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front." Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 3 (September 1996): 479–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00055567.

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In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its armed wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA),1 entered Kigali after routing the former régime and putting an end to months of genocide in which upwards of 500,000 had lost their lives. By August, another one to two million had fled from Rwanda. All in all, nearly half of the population had been killed, displaced inside the country, or was in exile.

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Megwalu, Amaka, and Neophytos Loizides. "Dilemmas of Justice and Reconciliation: Rwandans and the Gacaca Courts." African Journal of International and Comparative Law 18, no. 1 (March 2010): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e0954889009000486.

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Following the 1994 genocide, several justice initiatives were implemented in Rwanda, including a tribunal established by the United Nations, Rwanda's national court system and Gacaca, a ‘traditional’ community-run conflict resolution mechanism adapted to prosecute genocide perpetrators. Since their inception in 2001, the Gacaca courts have been praised for their efficiency and for widening participation, but criticised for lack of due process, trained personnel and attention to atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). To evaluate these criticisms, we present preliminary findings from a survey of 227 Rwandans and analyse their attitudes towards Gacaca in relation to demographic characteristics such as education, residence and loss of relatives during the genocide.

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Reed, Wm Cyrus. "The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Politics and Development in Rwanda." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995): 48–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0047160700502030.

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The past twelve months have witnessed the devastation of Rwanda. More than one half million people were murdered by the Rwandan army and the associated civilian militias, while over two million people fled the country after the death of former President Juvenal Habyarimana. The Rwandan Patriotic Front, which emerged in exile over the past thirty years and now dominates the government in Kigali, faces a dilemma: how does it consolidate its position amongst its core supporters, many of whom grew up in exile and recently returned to Rwanda, while at the same time gain the confidence of the domestic population, many of whom have recently fled? Resolving this dilemma is the central task for the regime, and is critical to the future political and economic development of the country.In spite of its stated desire to create a broad-based government, the core of RPF support lies on a perilously narrow base, located as much outside of the country as inside. Domestically, the country is in ruins. The exodus of refugees resulted in the collapse of production and of the state.

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Reed, Wm Cyrus. "The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Politics and Development in Rwanda." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995): 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1166507.

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Tembo, Nick Mdika. "Writing ‘Parrhesia’, Narrating ‘the Other Rwandan Genocide’." Matatu 48, no. 2 (2016): 418–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18757421-04802011.

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At the end of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, close to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been murdered, and over 1.5 million people were either internally displaced or had fled over the borders into neighbouring countries and beyond for fear of reprisals from the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). This article places Marie Béatrice Umutesi’s Surviving the Slaughter (2004) and Pierre-Claver Ndacyayisenga’s Dying to Live (2012) within the context of post-1994 Rwandan testimonial literature that writes what is feared to be “the other Rwandan genocide,” particularly against those who fled to eastern Zaïre (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). In the two narratives, I argue, Umutesi and Ndacyayisenga destabilise and deconstruct the claim of genocide to create a literature that captures the anxieties of genocide memories in Rwanda. Specifically, Umutesi and Ndacyayisenga deploy a rhetorical narrative form that employs cynicism, bitter humour and a harsh tone to suggest that the suffering of Rwandans must not be seen, or even told, from a single perspective, and that only a balanced engagement with extant issues would lead to genuine reconciliation in Rwanda. To illustrate the ideological purpose at work in the two texts, I reference Michel Foucault’s parrhesia as a framework for understanding how the authors contest genocide memories in Rwanda.

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Denis, Philippe. "The Missionaries of Africa and the Rwandan Genocide." Journal of Religion in Africa 50, no. 1-2 (August 10, 2021): 109–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700666-12340180.

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Abstract On the basis of documentary evidence, this paper examines the position of the Missionaries of Africa, also known as White Fathers, in political and ethnic matters during the buildup to the genocide in Rwanda, the genocide itself, and the postgenocide period. It argues that the Missionaries of Africa responded to the genocide in different ways. Some, especially those who returned to Rwanda after 1994, recognised the errors done by the church and tried to restart their ministry on a new foundation. However, many, particularly in Belgium, the country from where half of them originated, adopted a more defensive attitude. They subscribed, explicitly or not, to the double genocide theory according to which the crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front equalled or even surpassed those of the Rwandan authorities and the militias during the genocide. On the whole, the General Council of the congregation in Rome reacted to the Rwandan situation in a nonpartisan manner.

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Chemouni, Benjamin, and Assumpta Mugiraneza. "Ideology and interests in the Rwandan patriotic front: Singing the struggle in pre-genocide Rwanda." African Affairs 119, no. 474 (June 18, 2019): 115–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adz017.

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Abstract In the study of African Politics, the analysis of political ideologies as a normative engine of political action seems to have receded in favour of a treatment of ideology as the support of actors in their pursuit of material interests. Rwanda is not an exception. The ideology of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has been predominantly analysed as a self-serving strategy geared towards the reinforcement of the party’s power. Such treatment of ideology prevents a full understanding of the RPF. This article argues that ideology should also be conceptualized as a matrix that can reshape material incentives and through which the RPF’s interests have emerged. To do so, the article analyses new sources of material, the songs of mobilization from RPF members and supporters composed before the Front took power during the genocide, to systematically delineate the RPF’s early ideology. The analysis centres on four main themes—Rwandan national unity, the RPF’s depiction of itself, its depiction of its enemy, and its relationship with the international community—and traces their influence on RPF interests in the post-genocide era. It reveals the surprisingly long-lasting power of ideas despite fast-changing material circumstances.

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Kuperman, Alan J. "Provoking genocide: a revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front." Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (March 2004): 61–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1462352042000194719.

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Nsanze, Augustin. "Contributions to the Understanding of Recent History." African Studies Review 45, no. 1 (April 2002): 150–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002020600031619.

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Jan Vansina's history of the Nyiginya kingdom joins the long list of works, both essays and novels, that have proliferated since the Rwanda Patriotic Front gained power in 1994. The rigorous application of historical criticism distinguishes this from other works that give voice primarily to passions and speculations. Vansina's work is remarkable for the author's ability to bridge past and present by placing himself downstream rather than upstream in the flow of history. This important emphasis on ancient Rwanda contributes to the understanding of today's events. Vansina was ahead of those whose project it was to reread the history of Rwanda, which began in Butare in December 1998. Nonetheless, he emphasizes that it is up to Rwandan historians themselves to compile, on the basis of the facts accepted by everyone, a history that is as impartial as possible and that might offer some guidelines for the future.In 1962, when Vansina was writing L'évolution du royaume rwanda des origines à 1900 (The Evolution of the Rwandan Kingdom from Its Origins to 1900), his work was already marked by a rigorous exploration of historical facts. In Le Rwanda ancien (Ancient Rwanda), he proposes a new chronology of the Nyiginya kingdom, whose foundation he places around the middle of the seventeenth century. In so doing, Vansina definitively separates himself from Alexis Kagame—who situates its beginnings six centuries earlier—and thereby puts to rest the argument of historians and anthropologists, and challenges those politicians who, in the pursuit of legitimacy, have based their ideologies of the Rwandan reconquest and territorial revindication on the writings of Kagame.

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Cantrell, Phillip A. "“We Were a Chosen People”: The East African Revival and Its Return To Post-Genocide Rwanda." Church History 83, no. 2 (May 27, 2014): 422–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009640714000080.

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This article, drawing upon primary field research, analyzes the origins and history of the East African Revival of the 1930s and its ongoing relevance and role in post-genocide Rwanda. Starting as a Holiness-inspired, Anglican movement, the Revival persisted among the Tutsi Diaspora during their exile to refugee camps in Uganda following the 1959 Hutu-led Revolution and has returned with them following the coming to power of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994. The Revival, as it presently experiences a reawakening in the post-genocide church, provides the Tutsi returnees with a spiritual mechanism to explain their plight as refugees and a means by which to heal from decades of suffering. Additionally, a narrative has emerged in which they believe themselves to be a “Chosen People” who found redemption and healing in the refugee camps by embracing the revival spirit. Many Anglican returnees further believe they have been “chosen” to bring healing and reconciliation, through the revivalist tradition, to post-genocide Rwanda. While the return of the Revival tradition in the post-genocide Anglican Church offers potential benefits for Rwanda's reconciliation and recovery, the church must also abandon its apolitical inclinations and challenge the ruling regime in the name of truth, democratization, and justice.

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Pells, Kirrily, Kirsten Pontalti, and Timothy P. Williams. "Promising developments? Children, youth and post-genocide reconstruction under the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)." Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 2 (March 18, 2014): 294–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.892672.

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13

Rodman, Kenneth A. "When Justice Leads, Does Politics Follow?" Journal of International Criminal Justice 17, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 13–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqz002.

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Abstract One of the arguments for international prosecution of criminal violence regardless of political context is the presumed normative pull of global justice, which can stigmatize targeted leaders to both international and domestic audiences, leading to their marginalization. However, the examples most closely associated with this argument — Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (arrest warrants issued in 1995), Slobodan Milošević (arrest warrant unsealed in 1999) and Charles Taylor (arrest warrant unsealed in 2003) — are false positives since they were empowered by a political commitment by powerful states to remove those actors from power. In contrast, when powerful third parties prefer to engage regimes whose leaders are subjected to criminal scrutiny — either because of shared interests or a diplomatic approach to conflict management — the stigmatizing impact of criminalization is limited, as demonstrated by the failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute commanders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the problems the International Criminal Court has encountered in its Darfur and Kenyan investigations. The findings point to the realist limits of the shaming function of international criminal tribunals, whose ability to sideline abusive leaders is dependent on parallel political strategies to achieve the same ends.

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McNamee, Lachlan. "Mass Resettlement and Political Violence." World Politics 70, no. 4 (August 31, 2018): 595–644. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887118000138.

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This article examines the relationship between mass resettlement and political conflict. The author theorizes that states can use mass resettlement to extend control over contested frontiers. Settlers whose land rights are politically contested will disproportionately participate in violence to defend the incumbent regime. The theory is tested using data on resettlement and violence in postcolonial Rwanda. The author shows that the Hutu revolutionary regime resettled some 450,000 Hutus after independence to frontier and Tutsi-dominated areas to defend itself against external Tutsi militias. The author contends that the invasion of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the 1990s threatened the Hutu settler population because the RPF sought the repatriation of Tutsis onto redistributed land and that consequent land insecurity incentivized violence against Tutsis in 1994. The article identifies the positive effect of resettlement on locality violence during the genocide via a geographic regression discontinuity design. A process tracing of one notoriously violent resettled commune supports the theorized causal sequence. In light of these findings, the author suggests that research should refocus on the way that conflict shapes ethnic demography and that, to understand participation in state-sponsored violence, scholars should attend to the threat posed by regime change to individual livelihoods.

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15

Longman, Timothy. "Twenty Years after Leave None to Tell the Story, What Do We Now Know about the Genocide of the Tutsi In Rwanda?" Journal of Humanitarian Affairs 2, no. 2 (September 1, 2020): 40–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.7227/jha.042.

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In 1999, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) published an extensive account of genocide in Rwanda, Leave None to Tell the Story. Based on interviews and archival work conducted by a team of researchers and written primarily by Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell was quickly recognised as the definitive account of the 1994 genocide. In the ensuing two decades, however, much additional research has added to our understanding of the 1994 violence. In this paper, I assess Leave None to Tell the Story in light of the research conducted since its publication, focusing in particular on three major challenges to the analysis. First, research into the organisation of the genocide disputes the degree to which it was planned in advance. Second, micro-level research into the motivations of those who participated disputes the influence of ideology on the genocide. Third, research has provided increasing evidence and details of violence perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). I contend that despite these correctives, much of the analysis continues to hold up, such as the role of national figures in promoting genocide at the local level, the impact of the dynamics of local power struggles on the violence, and the patterns of violence, including the effort after the initial massacres to implicate a wide portion of the population. Finally, as a member of the team that researched and helped write Leave None to Tell, I reflect on the value of this rare sort of research project that engages human rights organisations in an academic research project.

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"Paul Kagame and Rwanda: power, genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front." Choice Reviews Online 42, no. 08 (April 1, 2005): 42–4883. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.42-4883.

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Davey, Christopher P. "A Soldier’s Journey: Banyamulenge Narratives of Genocide." Journal of Interpersonal Violence, January 24, 2020, 088626051990028. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260519900281.

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This article adds to debates in genocide studies on identity by analyzing Congolese Tutsi, or Banyamulenge, soldier narratives. It discusses this group’s identities and agency through the lens of the militarized generation of the 1990s. A conception of narrative identity is proposed that captures physical and relational networks as well as experiences of genocide. It examines fieldwork interviews conducted among former Banyamulenge soldiers and participants in the Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) and Rwandan Patriotic Army/Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPA/RPF). This narrative analysis uses open thematic coding to trace emplotment around three core themes: insecurity, marginalization, and destructive crises. In these narratives, genocide is conceptually utilized as a relational and discursive concept, and, therefore, permits an assessment of how participants understood and utilized the term. Doing so demonstrates the layering of victim and perpetrator identities, making a case for fluid identities in exposure to and with experiences of genocide. In the particular case of the Banyamulenge soldiers, they were active agents in the conflicts and events addressed in this article. Actors in genocide are agentic and engaged in the formation of fluid identity.

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Marukyan, Armen. "COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STAGES AND METHODS OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TUTSI GENOCIDE IN RWANDA." BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES, December 2021, 88–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.52837/27382702-2021-34.2-06.

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In genocide studies, for a more comprehensive, objective study of genocide committed against victim groups, the method of comparative analysis is used, which allows to identify both similarities and features between different examples of this crime. In the framework of the article, a comparative analysis of the stages and methods of the Armenian-Tutsi genocides was made. The choice of the Rwandan genocide as a subject of comparison with the Armenian Genocide is due to the fact that, unlike the organizers of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire, who were convicted by Turkish military tribunals, the organizers of the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda were prosecuted by the International Tribunal, created by the UN Security Council in 1994. Revealing the similarities between the stages and methods of committing two identical crimes will provide an opportunity to reveal the precedent of condemning the Rwandan Genocide in the International Tribunal and the possibilities of applying it to the Armenian Genocide case in the future in an international court. As a result of the comparative analysis of the stages of the two genocides, the methods of implementation, in addition to many similarities, significant differences were registered, from which we have separated the following: 1. In order to end the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish authorities chose the period of World War II, when influential world politicians were engaged in hostilities on different fronts of the war and they would not be able to intervene and prevent its implementation, while the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda took place during the civil war that broke out in this country. 2. If the Russian Caucasus Army was an obstacle to the criminal policy of genocide of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, which during the hostilities on the RussianTurkish front with the support of Armenian volunteer units occupied the provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis in Western Armenia, as well as Trabzon. The complete extermination of the Tutsis in Rwanda was halted by the advance of their military formation, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RWF), which managed to enter the capital, Kigali, to end the Houthi regime's criminal policy against the Tutsis. Unlike the RSF, the Armenian volunteer detachments in the Russian Caucasus Army did not act independently, they were not a military force capable of stopping the genocidal policy of the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian population. 3. The presence of the Russian Caucasus Army in some parts of Western Armenia, which was to some extent a guarantee of security for the genocidal Armenian population, as well as the Russian-Turkish front line, only temporarily stopped the continuation of the criminal policy of the Turkish authorities towards Armenians. During the revolutionary upheavals in Russia in 1917, the Russian Caucasian army was demoralized and disbanded, after which the Turkish authorities were able to continue the policy of the Armenian Genocide not only in the territories of Western Armenia formerly controlled by Russian troops, but also in Eastern Armenia and the Caucasus. The same can be said about Cilicia, when after the departure of the French troops, the Kemalists had the opportunity to continue the policy of genocide against the Armenians of Cilicia.

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"Judi Rever 著『In Praise of Blood: Crimes by the Rwandan Patriotic Front』Random House Canada, 2018年, 277頁, ＄33.95." Journal of African Studies 2018, no. 94 (December 31, 2018): 85–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.11619/africa.2018.94_85.

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"PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT." Refugee Survey Quarterly 13, no. 2-3 (1994): 179–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rsq/13.2-3.179.

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Verschave, François-Xavier. "Politique Africaine de la France: arrêtons le massacre." Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees, October 1, 1994, 18–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21831.

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The Rwandese genocide dramatically reveals the senseless nature of French policy in Africa-determined by personal relationships, speculation, and corruption. As the "reserved domain" of the French President for the past 35 years, French policy on the African continent has been dominated by personal relationships between the French President and his African counterparts, the military lobby, the francophone lobby (Fachoda Syndrome), and some French enterprises (EL Bouygues, Bolloré), all of which have escaped from an democratic control. Hence in Rwanda, France armed, financed, and trained a regime that exhibited Nazi-like features with its guard presidential, militia, hatred ropaganda (Radio Mille Collines), pogroms throughout 1992, and finally the genocide of April 1994. Since the coming into power of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)-perceived as pro-Anglo- Saxon because of its link with Uganda-France has multiplied its efforts to fill the (pro-French) vacuum left in the region, by calling upon the Zairean dictator Mobutu to "stabilize" the region, and by selling the usual military "package" (arms and training) to the Sudanese regime. [The author is calling upon] the French population and the international community to mobilize against the present French policy in Africa, and identifies three French organizations that are currently lobbying for a human, pro-democratic and non-secretive French policy in Africa.

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"PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS." Refugee Survey Quarterly 13, no. 2-3 (1994): 188–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rsq/13.2-3.188.

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"DECLARATION ADOPTED BY THE REGIONAL SUMMIT ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT." Refugee Survey Quarterly 13, no. 2-3 (1994): 184–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rsq/13.2-3.184.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Rwandan Patriotic Front'

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