Academic literature on the topic 'Sani Abacha'

As Recent Demilitarization And Democratic Trends World-Wide have shown, the exit of a dictator of the calibre of Abacha (1993–98) in Nigeria may foster a strong desire among successors for transition to a more democratic order. As in Chile after General Augusto Pinochet, and in Spain after Franco, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, who succeeded General Sani Abacha, presided in Nigeria over a programme of transition to civilian rule. This culminated in the election of General Olusegun Obasanjo (retired) in February 1999, and his subsequent official take-over of government in May 1999. However, since new democracies often revert to dictatorships, the new government faces daunting challenges in Nigeria's search for democracy and political stability.

Abstract While Nigeria was under President Sani Abacha’s dictatorship, the democratic system was toppled in Sierra Leone by rebels but Abacha reversed the trend. The reasons for the largely unilateral and hasty decision to restore democracy in Sierra Leone by the Abacha regime remain controversial. Wide skepticism and condemnation greeted the decision to commit Nigerian troops, money and materials to a foreign operation at the expense of Nigeria’s fragile economy. The Nigeria Armed Forces consequently became the instrument for the pursuant of an aggressive foreign policy. The Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) hastily deployed to Sierra Leone just as it had previously done in Liberia amidst various operational and logistical problems. In terms of interests, Nigeria’s attempt to restore democracy in Sierra Leone was perceived to be contradictory both at home and abroad since Abacha’s regime itself was undemocratic and facing international isolation. The view that the Force was being used by the Abacha regime to pursue its own economic and political interest dampened the enthusiasm of regional and international organizations to provide financial and logistic support. Either way, the argument of this paper is that Nigeria’s unilateral military action in Sierra Leone was a reflection of her desire to score a quick military victory outside an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub regional security legal framework but it failed woefully.

Nigeria has had three programs of transition from military to civil rule in the last 13 years. Despite the enormous resources wasted on the first two programs, by Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, democracy remains a mirage in Nigeria. The demise of the two programs was not just a monumental failure on the part of the two leaders; it also vividly demonstrates the military’s inability to effect a lasting transition to civil rule. In addition, the utter failure of both programs has exposed the political brinkmanship to which the military is prepared to go to subvert democracy. Babangida’s brazen annulment of the June 1993 presidential election and Abacha’s repressive, dictatorial, and corrupt governing style brought Nigeria closer to the edge of the precipice than any other crisis since the civil war of the 1960s.

In only four years, Nigeria has experienced two successive transition-to-civil-rule programs. The first, implemented with shocking inconsistency by the regime of General Sani Abacha, came to an abrupt anticlimax with the late despot’s unexpected death. The second appears to have been, judging by the country’s recent political history, unusually successful, culminating in the election of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) aspirant, General Olusegun Obasanjo, as presidentelect. While various reasons have been adduced for the apparent failure of one and the relative success of the other, political analysts in the country seem to agree that the main reason has to do with the fact that the programs differed profoundly in terms of motives, methodologies, and even ends.

Gen. Sani Abacha took over from Chief Ernest Shonekan's interim government which was formed when Gen Ibrahim Babangida "stepped aside". On assumption of office, Abacha was faced with the imminent disintegration of the country caused by the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election, widely believed to have been won by the late businessman, Chief M. K. O. Abiola. Also, threatening the administration was the activities of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) both at home and abroad. The main objective of this study was to find out how the press covered Nigeria's foreign policy within 1993-1998. The study involved content analysis, historical and case study designs. The instrument for data collection included content analysis of newspaper contents library material related to the subject matter. The sampling technique used for the study is the purposive sampling, involving all the newspaper stories, features, opinion articles on the subject matter. The population included all newspaper stories published on Abacha’s regime within the period of 1993-1998. A total sampling size of 56 news stories, articles and features were selected purposively through the constructed weeks based on two days interval. Four national newspapers, namely, The Guardian, This Day, the Vanguard and the Post Express were used. From the findings of the study we concluded that press reports on the examined foreign policy did not make much impact on the outcome of these foreign policy issues since the military regime in power never wanted opposition or criticisms. Therefore, the regime went ahead to Isolate itself from main stream international politics and the press was helpless due to the fear of being gagged or proscribed as was the practice of the Abacha's administration. However, the press assumed a patriotic posture in her support for the regime's approach to Bakassi Peninsula dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun. Also the issue of peace keeping in the sub-region got the strong approval of the Nigerian press, even when a cross section of Nigerian citizens were skeptical about the regime interventionist policy in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

The end of the cold war has made democratization, and its barest essential component elections, imperative for all nondemocratic forms of government. This is to be expected, given the dismal failure of the socialist alternative even in the first socialist country, the former Soviet Union. The United States, which is not only the foremost democracy in the world but also the only superpower, has been in the vanguard of democracy salesmanship. Africa, the continent with the least democratic space, has not been left out, as witnessed by President Bill Clinton’s unprecedented tour of the continent in March 1998. Understandably, Nigeria, arguably the most important country in Africa, was left out of the tour, since it was then under the obnoxious, undemocratic, and oppressive military regime of the late General Sani Abacha.

The end of the cold war has made democratization, and its barest essential component elections, imperative for all nondemocratic forms of government. This is to be expected, given the dismal failure of the socialist alternative even in the first socialist country, the former Soviet Union. The United States, which is not only the foremost democracy in the world but also the only superpower, has been in the vanguard of democracy salesmanship. Africa, the continent with the least democratic space, has not been left out, as witnessed by President Bill Clinton’s unprecedented tour of the continent in March 1998.Understandably, Nigeria, arguably the most important country in Africa, was left out of the tour, since it was then under the obnoxious, undemocratic, and oppressive military regime of the late General Sani Abacha.

The return of the generals to power following the coup d'état of November 1993 has posed fundamental challenges to the survival of the nation. On the one hand, it has brought out the worst in Nigerian politics: repression, intimidation, violence, corruption, betrayals, and the manipulation of primordial loyalties. On the other hand, it has exposed the nature and extent of the Nigerian political rot, and provided the still weak and fledgling civil society with added strength and legitimacy. Could the resurgence of military rule in Nigeria have been predicted? Could anyone have foreseen that General Sani Abacha would become such an all-powerful President? Was it possible to anticipate the popular protests and bloody confrontations which culminated in the hanging of nine environmental activists in November 1995? What is the way forward for the contending political communities?1

Modeled after the U.S. presidency, the office of the president of Nigeria is easily the most powerful position in the land. The president is both the chief of state and the head of government. The authority of the nation’s chief executive expanded greatly during the patrimonial regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha. Indeed, not only was power concentrated in the hands of these despots, its exercise was also marked by massive corruption, brazen nepotism, and sustained brutality. Against this background, it was perhaps natural that the presidential election of February 27, 1999, would excite keen interest among the Nigerian populace, elite groups, ethnoregional blocs, and the international community. This article highlights some of the ethnoregional forces and elite interests that influenced the election and examines their possible implications for the sustenance of democracy and good governance in Nigeria.