Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Seapower'

It was a year of decisions that heralded the pre-dreadnought era, perhaps the least understood chapter of modern naval history. In March 1889, the Salisbury ministry officially endorsed what later became the Naval Defence Act, which in its final form authorised the largest shipbuilding programme of its kind in the nineteenth century. When it was finally completed five years later, the Royal Navy would have a new fleet based around 10 battleships, 42 cruisers and 18 torpedo gunboats, all of the latest design and at a cost of £21,500,000. Then, in December 1889, the Harrison administration sought legislative approval to adopt a forward offensive naval strategy, complete with a fleet of battleships and armoured cruisers in an unprecedented shift in American naval policy. This strategic rationale provided the intellectual framework to transform the United States into a modern seapower. The purpose of this comparative study is to revisit the decisions of 1889, with the benefit of underutilised archival sources and an innovative research methodology recently embraced by the naval historical community. Whereas prior accounts of these decisions generally assess their historical significance in terms of the naval construction that ensued in the pre-dreadnought era, this thesis focuses instead on the pervasive influence of strategic ideas and how strongly they affected the personalities, institutions and events that shaped the respective outcomes in both London and Washington. That strategic ideas shared among naval officers can be decisive in this regard is the underlying tenet behind the cultural approach to historical naval analysis, which is introduced here to highlight the impact of organisational cultures upon the strategic and force structure choices of military organisations.

British estimates of Soviet seapower from 1930 to 1950 covered three main phases. These were primarily characterised by pre-war suspicion of Communism and the Soviet Union, enforced wartime naval cooperation from June 1941 until the end of the Second World War and, finally, a shift towards Cold War antagonism.It is argued that the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division was able to collect sufficient data to maintain a credible intelligence picture of the Soviet Navy's order of battle and war-fighting capabilities, thereby allowing informed decision-making in London. In general, the United Kingdom considered that the Red Navy was poorly equipped and trained, and that it posed little threat to British interests. This was borne out by the Soviet Union's poor employment of seapower during the war.Knowledge of the Soviet Navy was always difficult to obtain. However, a major finding of this thesis is that the wartime Anglo-Soviet alliance allowed British naval representativesin the USSR unprecedented access to Russian warships, facilities and commanders. Though the basing of a naval mission in Russia was principally intended to assist in the common fight against Nazi Germany and to promote liaison between the Royal and Soviet Navies, especially with regard to the Arctic convoys, the British also took the opportunity to examine the maritime forces of their long-standing Communist rival at close quarters. It is contended, therefore, that improved intelligence on the Soviet Navy was made possible by wartime naval collaboration. To examine this assertion, relevant naval aspects of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 are covered in detail in the thesis.After 1945, the Red fleets required some time for consolidation before expansion was possible. The Soviet Navy remained an intelligence target, but British wartime assessments largely held good to the end of the decade.

Historically, as a continental power, China was not an active player in maritime security, preferring to focus on coastal defence. However, in recent years, the Chinese government has begun to pursue more policies and measures to safeguard its maritime rights and interests, both in coastal waters and out at sea. Existing research has only analysed China’s maritime policies in limited aspects and restricted timeframes. It has therefore been unable to explain why China has developed its maritime security strategy from a passive and constrained to a proactive and assertive stance. This thesis provides an overview of the development of China’s maritime security strategy from 1978 to 2018, that is, from the era of Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping. The study examines how the strategy throughout these forty years is consistent with theories of international relations. It finds that the reason China’s maritime security strategy used to be more constrained was the lack of national capacity and limited interests in management of maritime issues. These factors also limited discussions around maritime security among domestic players. This constrained strategy is consistent with defensive realism and organization theory. Indeed, China has become more assertive in maritime security affairs since the state has increased its military capacity and assumed growing international responsibility as a rising international power. Increasingly, domestic players have urged the government to invest more resources in maritime security. As a result, China has undertaken more preventive measures to protect its maritime rights and interests. It aims to become a strong sea power. This proactive maritime security strategy is consistent with offensive realism, constructivism and organization theory. Overall, this research concludes that the development of China’s maritime security strategy has been dependent on the country’s national capacity, the maritime security threats it faces and its international responsibilities, as well as the encouragement of particular policies by domestic players. Considering these factors, China will likely continue to develop a more assertive maritime security strategy under Xi Jinping.

In 1890, the American naval officer and scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan formulated as a theory that seapower brings prosperity. This thesis in War Science tests whether Mahan’s theory remains valid in the modern day. A multi-disciplinary approach is taken, wherein a financial event study method is employed for hypothesis testing. Prosperity is the product of many factors that interact in complex systems. Consequently, isolating the positive contribution of seapower is difficult. Its influence is therefore inferred from its absence, in the form of failure to protect shipment of a key commodity. By the logic of the operationalisation, insufficient seapower results in attacks on shipping. Information of attacks is promptly reflected in asset prices on intensively traded financial markets. A negative change in a stock market index represents a reduction in the value of the traded assets. This in turn implies a negative contribution to national prosperity. Specifically, attacks on supertankers are used as empirical data. The ensuing impact is measured in first order effects on oil prices and second order effects on stock market returns. A strong correlation is found between attacks on supertankers and oil price shocks. A sufficiently strong impact is found on stock market returns to allow for arguing that Mahan’s theory retains validity. Given recent developments in major power relations, Mahanian postulates may be more in fashion now than in the previous century. The findings complement previous research on the benefits from seapower, naval presence and maritime security. In addition to general policy implications from exhibiting the significance of seapower, an elaboration on the current security situation’s ramifications for small states. Thereby it situates seapower in its grand strategic context.

From an academic perspective, the discipline of war studies is still underdeveloped. There is a lack of metatheoretical research compared to other social science research, despite the fact that it faces the same ontological and epistemological challenges as other sciences. Furthermore, a lack of understanding different phenomena diminishes precision in language and thus also the ability to stand on the shoulders of giants and contribute to the common body of knowledge. The aim of this study was to contribute to an increased understanding of the phenomenon of sea power in war studies. Hence, this study, based on Hulterström & Widén's philosophical and metatheoretical theory on combat, sought to answer the following questions: (1) How can different views on the phenomenon of sea power in the field of naval theory be categorized? (2) How can different perspectives of the phenomenon of sea power in the field of naval theory be understood? Firstly, the results of the study show that different views on the phenomenon of sea power can be categorized using the three perspectives: Brian Crisher & Mark Souva's view of sea power as a physical perspective, Geoffrey Till’s as a social perspective and Jacob Børresen’s as a human-centered perspective. Secondly, the results of this study show that sea power, like combat, changes character and significance depending on the perspective of a theorist. On the basis of these results, one conclusion is that Hulterström & Widén’s theory is fruitful for the analysis and categorization of phenomena other than combat. Additionally, by conceptualizing different perspectives, the author’s modified analysis tool can be seen as new way to approach the phenomenon of sea power.

Dissertação de Mestrado em Estratégia
Esta investigação assentou na moldura conceptual de cultura estratégica para entender de que modo a China tem incorporado o poder marítimo na prossecução da sua política externa. Visando alcançar a consecução desse objetivo, aplicou-se a metodologia multicase study (ou multiple-case study) em uma abordagem que conjugou a análise da cultura estratégica chinesa com as bases teóricas da Geopolítica em um panorama geohistórico. O cruzamento de matrizes teórico-conceptuais, dirigido pela metodologia de multicase study/multiple-case study, possibilitou traçar um estudo pormenorizado que identificou algumas tendências geohistóricas da relação operacional da cultura estratégica chinesa com o elemento marítimo. A análise geohistórica permitiu compreender que apesar das orientações geográficas da cultura estratégica chinesa serem marcadas por uma regularidade continental, elas expressam-se em diferentes vertentes consoante os constrangimentos e as oportunidades apresentados pelos ambientes externo e interno. Por conseguinte, o crescimento marítimo da República Popular da China e as ambições globais consagradas na Maritime Silk Road são manifestações de uma cultura estratégica emergente voltada para a defesa ativa e para o realismo, assente em interesses estratégicos tangíveis, como a necessidade de desenvolvimento, proteção e segurança das linhas globais de comunicação marítima, o comércio, e a diversificação das opções estratégicas. Essa cultura estratégica nascente foi moldada por um ambiente externo em que as ameaças regionais externas às fronteiras terrestres da China diminuíram consideravelmente após a queda da União Soviética, e os centros económicos e produtivos foram deslocados para a costa marítima. Semelhantemente, as reformas promovidas por Deng Xiaoping impulsionaram a emergência dessa cultura estratégica em desenvolvimento. Entretanto, embora as evidências apontem para uma tendência de crescente construção e adoção do poder marítimo por parte da China nos âmbitos económico, militar e científico, há dados que indicam o sentido contrário, revelando que uma fração significativa dos recursos estratégicos são empregues em uma disposição continental decorrente não apenas da condição geográfica da China, mas da instabilidade interna ao norte e oeste do território e em Hong Kong. Esse constrangimento imposto pelo ambiente interno funciona como uma força limitante da materialização de uma cultura estratégica plenamente marítima.
This research used the conceptual framework of strategic culture to understand how China has been incorporating seapower in the pursuit of its foreign policy. In order to attain this goal, a multicase study/multiple-case study methodology was applied in conformity with an integrated approach that combined the analysis of Chinese strategic culture with the theoretical structure of classical Geopolitics under a geohistorical perspective. The intersection of different conceptual and theoretical frameworks, guided by the multicase study methodology, made it possible to study and identify certain geohistorical trends of the operational nexus between Chinese strategic culture and seapower. The geohistorical analysis allowed us to understand that, even though the Chinese strategic culture is characterized by patterns of a landpower, it can manifest in different ways depending on the constraints and opportunities presented by the domestic and international environments. Consequently, the growing maritime power of the People’s Republic of China and the global ambitions associated with the Maritime Silk Road are expressions of an active defense-based strategic culture, more inclined towards realism. This emergent strategic culture is based on tangible strategic interests, such the need for development, protection and security of the global sea lines of communication, trade, and diversification of the strategic options available. This rising Chinese strategic culture was shaped by an international environment where land threats to Chinese borders decreased considerably after the fall of the Soviet Union, and as a consequence, the productive and economic centers were moved to the southern coast. Similarly, the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping stimulated the rise of this emergent strategic culture. Although the evidence collected this research points towards a growing adoption of seapower by China in the economic, scientific and military dimensions, the data available also indicates that a substantial fraction of strategic assets are employed for land and border security, which results not only of China’s geographical condition, but also the domestic instability in the northwest and in Hong Kong. This domestic constraint limits the materialization of a maritime strategic culture. Therefore, it was possible to verify that Chinese strategic culture operates in a complex and dynamic interaction with other variables, such as geography, science and technology, historical experiences, the domestic and international environments, and the national ideas.
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Fleets have the ability to affect an adversary’s use of the seas for transportation. Nations have in numerous occasions exercised this power in order to ravage their opponent’s trade in times of conflict with the purpose of diminishing their military might. Great naval thinkers like Mahan and Corbett have described this use of seapower during conflicts in great depth but theories regarding the use of seapower to affect a nation’s peacetime economy in order to achieve limited political goals is lacking. This thesis attempts to analyze the use of seapower in the form of economic sanctions to answer the question; “How is seapower exercised in economic sanctions?” in order to remedy this. The results show that seapower is mostly used to halt the inward flow of goods to a nation and general sanctions are more often used than sanctions targeting specific commodities. What these sanctions aim to achieve is often to limit military capacity and to disrupt military aggression. This thesis comes to the conclusions that a force capable of operating anywhere on the globe for an extended period of time is vital for the effectiveness of economic sanctions, seapower is a necessary part of the enforcement of economic sanctions and that naval theory has been too preoccupied with large scale conflicts and neglected the use of seapower to achieve limited political goals with economic measures during times of peace.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
O trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a dimensão do Atlântico Sul na política externa brasileira, considerando como referência teórica os conceitos e práticas da política exterior brasileira, bem como a análise do conceito de Poder Marítimo, na perspectiva de realização de uma Estratégia Marítima. Assim, analisamos o processo de formulação de políticas voltadas para o mar, que ganharam espaço na agenda brasileira a partir da intensificação das discussões internacionais em torno do aproveitamento do espaço marítimo, das quais o Brasil procurou participar ativamente. A partir dessa análise inicial, as resultantes do processo interno foram confrontadas com o contexto geopolítico do Atlântico Sul, em paralelo à presença de outros atores nessa área marítima. Tal embate analítico aponta para o dualismo entre um “Atlântico Sul regional”, consubstanciado na Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul, e um “Atlântico Sul global”, marcado pelo contexto da globalização e das novas ameaças, traduzido em diversas iniciativas, que integram a área marítima sul-atlântica à política global. Assim, a política externa brasileira no Atlântico Sul projeta-se em uma área marítima onde coexistem e se sobrepõem estratégias multifacetadas, contrapondo atores globais com ambições em escala mundial e atores regionais, em que prevalece a influência direta do eixo estratégico formado por potências navais do Atlântico Norte.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the South Atlantic dimension in Brazilian foreign policy, considering as theoretical reference the concepts and practices of Brazilian foreign policy, as well as the analysis of the concept of Seapower and Maritime Strategy. From this perspective, the paper analyzes the process of formulating policies concerned to the sea, which have gained space in the Brazilian agenda as a result of the intensification of international discussions about the use of maritime space, that Brazil has actively sought to participate in. From this initial analysis, those resulting from the internal process were confronted with the geopolitical context of the South Atlantic, in parallel with the presence of other actors present in this maritime area. This analytical clash points to the dualism between a “regional South Atlantic”, embodied in the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, and a “global South Atlantic”, marked by the context of globalization, new threats, and differentiated initiatives that integrate the South Atlantic in the global politics. Thus, the Brazilian foreign policy in the South Atlantic is projected in a maritime area where multi-faceted maritime strategies coexist and overlap, opposing global players with global ambitions and regional actors, in which prevails the influence of the great powers of North Atlantic.
El trabajo tiene por objetivo analizar la dimensión del Atlántico Sur en la política exterior brasileña, considerando como referencia teórica los conceptos y prácticas de la política exterior brasileña, así como el análisis del concepto de Poder Marítimo, en la perspectiva de realización de una Estrategia Marítima. Así, el trabajo analiza el proceso de formulación de políticas orientadas al mar, que ganaron espacio en la agenda brasileña a partir de la intensificación de las discusiones internacionales en torno al aprovechamiento del espacio marítimo, de las cuales Brasil buscó participar activamente. A partir de ese análisis inicial, las resultantes del proceso interno son confrontadas al contexto geopolítico del Atlántico Sur, en paralelo a la presencia de otros actores presentes en esa área marítima. Tal embate analítico apunta al dualismo entre un “Atlántico sur regional”, consubstanciado en la Zona de Paz y Cooperación del Atlántico Sur, y un “Atlántico Sur global”, marcado por el contexto de la globalización y de las nuevas amenazas, traducido en iniciativas diferenciadas, que integran el área marítima sur-atlántica en la política global. La política exterior brasileña en el Atlántico Sur se proyecta en un área marítima donde coexisten y se superponen estrategias marítimas múltiples, contraponiendo actores globales con ambiciones a escala mundial y actores regionales, en que prevalece la influencia directa del eje estratégico formado por potencias navales del Atlántico Norte.

碩士
國立臺灣師範大學
東亞學系
106
This study aims to clarify the motivations and evolution of Japan’s seapower strategy in the Post-War Era by using the seapower theory in order to reply to issues such as “Will Japan keep developing its military power and break the limitation from the article 9 of the constitution?” and “What is the tendency of East Asia’s regional security situation in the foreseeable future?” According to the conclusions of the research, this study suggests that Japan’s concept of modern seapower emerged in the late middle Edo period, grew in the period of the Empire of Japan and resurrected in the Post-War Era mainly due to the effects of “international system” and “economy and trade” despite the once stagnation caused by the failure of WWⅡ. Also, with the pressure and assistance which were given by America in the “New Cold War” (1980s) era, Japan’s seapower has progressively become the power that can no longer be underestimated in the East Asia. On the other hand, the study believes that Japan will continue to chase the seapower strategy which is combined with “sea power” and “sea right/interest” in the future for the purposes of keeping the existence and development of the state in the dynamic international system. By doing so, Japan will gradually break the limitation from the article 9 of the constitution and regain the right of conducting military power.

碩士
國立中興大學
國際政治研究所
96
In accordance with its rapid economic growth since 1980s, China has made a great advancement in its seapower. As a result, it has put an impact on the existing seapowers in the Asian-Pacific region. This research deals with the investigation of China’s seapower development and its challenges to U.S- Japan seapower, through the perspective of power transition theory. The context is divided into four parts: Firstly, the background and current state of seapower development of China is studied. It explains how China has become a country of newly developed seapower; Secondly, the degree of satisfaction of current seapower by China is assessed. Thirdly, China’s challenge to U.S.-Japan seapower by China after it has made a great advancement in its seapower is reported; Lastly, U.S.-Japan reactions to China’s seapower development is discussed. In this study, it has found that China is dissatisfied with the current state of seapower and thus starts to challenge U.S.-Japan seapower status. Accordingly, the U.S. and Japan has employed various actions, such as deterrence, alliance and raising satisfaction, to maintain their status of seapower in Asian-Pacific region.

碩士
國立中興大學
國際政治研究所
98
Since 1990s, the comprehensive national power of China and India, especially on economy, has demonstrated a remarkable progress; therefore, ensuring the sustainable access to energy became a major concern. This trend extends the national interest including economic strength of these two nations, which also boosted the development of sea power. This has led to the competition of sea power between China and India in South Asia. This thesis takes the concepts of security dilemma as the research approach, using the four main conceptual elements, which are “interest,” “intention,” “cognition” and “action” to analyze the fundamental reasons of causing the competition of marine power between China and India in Indian Ocean. In the conclusion, this study finds the reasons trapping China and India into the Spiral Model of Security Dilemma. These two nations regard their own diplomatic and military activities as “defensive”in nature, and interpret the other’s actions as “offensive”. Thus, both countries take the necessary actions to counter the other’s expansion and ensure their own national security. The potential factor that can release China and India from Security Dilemma depends on some varieties, such as the future leadership transition at home, and the perception of leaders from hegemonic powers outside the region.

碩士
國立臺灣大學
政治學研究所
104
In recent years, China’s seapower development and its effects on the region have piqued interest and given rise to debate. This thesis attempts to apply an analytical framework based on John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism to study the effects of China’s regional seapower on East Asia’s relative latent and actual power. Although the United States is the most powerful actor in the region, it is not a permanent presence. Therefore, this thesis will examine not only the relative power dynamic between the United States and China, but will also consider how China’s regional seapower is affecting the relative power dynamic between China and regional states. The first chapter explains the underlying motivation of this work and introduces the methodology and theory to be employed, while the second chapter fully lays out the theoretical basis for this thesis, describing in detail how John J. Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism has been adapted and applied within this research. The third chapter moves on to provide an analysis of the theoretical development directing Chinese seapower development and application. Chapter three reviews the development of China’s seapower theory from 1985 to 2015 and analyzes key concepts underpinning the application of Chinese seapower at the strategic and campaign levels. The fourth chapter explores China’s seapower development since 1985, paying particular attention to anti-surface warfare capabilities. This chapter studies the Chinese sea-based threat to the United States’ forward presence in East Asia and analyzes Chinese seapower’s anti-access and area denial capabilities vis-a-vis the United States. Chapter four concludes with a discussion of Chinese seapower’s ability to establish air and sea control, and to achieve local superiority in relation to regional states. Chapters five and six focus on the peacetime application of Chinese seapower within East Asia. As opposed to the analysis provided in chapter four, the discussion in chapters five and six pertains primarily to the implications of Chinese seapower for relative latent power. As such, these two chapters center on China’s “white hulls” and their use both in preventing other littoral states from exploiting regional resources and in securing living and non-living resources in the East and South China Seas for Chinese exploitation. The seventh chapter draws on the analysis of previous chapters and offers an overall assessment of trends in Chinese seapower development and implications for East Asian relative power. Unlike the preceding chapters, chapter seven identifies current trends and makes long-term projections for regional power based on these trends. Specifically, this chapter explores how China is using and will use seapower to weaken the United States’ relative actual power within East Asia and to strengthen its coercive power with regard to regional states. Chapter seven reaches the conclusion that Chinese seapower’s capability to challenge and weaken the United States’ forward military presence in East Asia continues to grow. As a result of this growth, Chinese seapower is providing—and will continue to provide—China with increased deterrent and coercive power vis-a-vis regional states, particularly the littoral states of the South China Sea. The final chapter of this thesis serves as a brief conclusion. After explaining the primary findings of this work, chapter eight offers possible contributions of this thesis to future academic research, and explores potential avenues for future research.

碩士
國立中正大學
戰略暨國際事務研究所
100
Since the 1990s, due to the rapid upgrading of China's economic development, making its military budget to be stable growth and created favorable conditions for its military modernization. Accompanied by economic development and military modernization, the military power of the PLA Navy grows very quickly. And PLA Navy's strategic policy and practical actions show the trend of progressive expansion of the Sea Power. However, the United States in the Western Pacific Region is the most powerful maritime power, the development of China's Sea Power is bound to impact on the United States. Therefore, the United States has also begun to make strategic adjustments to curb the challenges posed by the development of China's Sea Power in order to maintain its supremacy at sea. Taiwan is located in the center of the first island chain, its strategic position makes its military security be affected by the competition of Sea Power between China and the United States in the Western Pacific. The context is divided into three parts: Firstly, the factors of the development of China’s Sea Power. Such as the background of consciousness of China's Sea Power, the characteristics of PLA’s naval strategy, the intentions and capabilities of the development of China’s Sea Power. Secondly, the United States’ strategic measures for maintain its own maritime advantage. Such as adjustments of military deployment and alliance, and new military strategy. Thirdly, the impact of competition between China and the United States to Taiwan's military security, and the measures which Taiwan should do. In this study, it has found that China continues to use “active defense” to weaken the U.S. naval supremacy in the Western Pacific Region. Accordingly, for response to the challenge from China, the United States increasingly focus on the strength of the synergy of the Navy and Air Forces as well as cooperation with other alliances. However, in the United States system of military cooperation, Taiwan seems to have been marginalized. To reverse this negative trend, Taiwan should ensure its own military security by enhancing the anti-submarine capabilities and the countering forces.

博士
國立政治大學
東亞研究所
106
This paper is dedicated to the study of the PLA’s development of seapower “with Chinese characteristics” and its influence on security in the Asia-Pacific region in the foreseeable future. The research goals include: identifying the tangible ideas of the subjective concept of seapower “with Chinese characteristics”; exploring whether the practices of China’s seapower conform to such a concept; and examining the impact of the PLA’s development of seapower upon regional security. The large volume of works exploring China’s advance in seapower can theoretically be divided into two categories: historical determinism and path dependency. The former argues: China’s development of seapower will make it a challenger to the existing US hegemony; while the latter argues: based on its traditional culture, China’s seapower will stick to the path of peaceful development, and commit to peaceful engagement with the international community for the creation of a harmonious world. The research findings can be summarized as follows: the PLA’s documents on seapower consistently stress peaceful development and commitment to world peace and common development, all typical arguments of path dependency theory. However, in response to America’s “hedging strategy,” “rebalancing strategy,” and “Indo-Pacific strategy” which are all devised to enhance containment for sustaining hegemony by assuring sea control from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean since the 2000s, China articulates “maritime power,” “Chinese Dream,” and “Belt and Road” to guide the PLA’s naval buildup to challenge US domination of Asia-Pacific, suggesting an obliged choice of determinism. Seapower competition and cooperation between China and America is seemingly evoking the “papal meridian” in the late 15th century. Regional peace and stability may ultimately rest upon whether China has the determination and capabilities to challenge the status quo defined by America. Consequently, the development of seapower “with Chinese characteristics” is on the one hand inherently inclined toward pacifist path dependence theory. However, on the other hand, external containment compels the PLA to advance its core sea control capabilities toward historical determinism. The paradoxical combination of pacifism at large and aggressive realism at the core may well depict the helpless truth of the PLA’s seapower “with Chinese characteristics.”