To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Secret service and espionage.
Journal articles on the topic 'Secret service and espionage'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Secret service and espionage.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Kim, Byeong jun. "A study on the organizations and duty of Korean and British Intelligence agencies." Korean Association of Public Safety and Criminal Justice 32, no. 3 (September 30, 2023): 103–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.21181/kjpc.2023.32.3.103.
Full textAbstract:
This study aims to find the cause of problems such as political intervention and human rights violations related to the National Intelligence Service in Korea. To this end, the organization and duty of Korean and British intelligence agencies were analyzed using literature review research methods. As a result of the analysis, the study identified that the problems related to the National Intelligence Service were caused by the obscurity of the regulation - ‘domestic security information’ - under the National Intelligence Service Act and the abuse of investigative power during intelligence activities.
British intelligence agencies collect, analyze, and exploit foreign and domestic intelligence and military intelligence, and perform espionage and counter-espionage. The role of the Security Service(MI5) is to protect national security from threats such as terrorism and espionage and to gather secret intelligence on threats to national security. The Secret Intelligence Service(MI6) works secretly overseas to gather intelligence, which is referred to as espionage.
The controversy related to the National Intelligence Service is expected to be reduced due to the revision of the National Intelligence Service Act in 2020. In addition to this, the study proposes to separate the National Intelligence Service into each agency according to its roles of counter-espionage and foreign espionage.
2
Smith, Michael M. "The Mexican Secret Service in the United States, 1910-1920." Americas 59, no. 1 (July 2002): 65–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tam.2002.0091.
Full textAbstract:
Throughout the era of the Mexican Revolution, the United States provided sanctuary for thousands of political exiles who opposed the regimes of Porfirio Díaz, Francisco Madero, Victoriano Huerta, and Venustiano Carranza. Persecuted enemies of Don Porfirio and losers in the bloody war of factions that followed the ouster of the old regime continued their struggle for power from bases of operation north of the international boundary in such places as San Francisco, Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio, New Orleans, and New York. As a consequence, Mexican regimes were compelled not only to combat their enemies on domestic battlefields but also to wage more subtle campaigns against their adversaries north of the Río Bravo. The weapons in this shadowy war included general intelligence gathering, surveillance, espionage, counter-espionage, and propaganda; the agency most responsible for these activities was the Mexican Secret Service.
3
Bobylov, Yu. "Does Russia Need Establishing Foreign Economic Intelligence Service?" Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 4 (April 20, 2003): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-4-123-134.
Full textAbstract:
The increasing role of foreign intelligence and industrial espionage in order to improve competitiveness of Russian business is noted in the article. In the author's view, Russia's WTO accession requires application of protective secret managing technologies. The establishment of a new Russian special service - the intelligence unit in the structure of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is proposed which will be able to perform important functions under conditions of Russia's growing integration in the world economy.
4
Świerczek, Marek. "Working methods of the Russian secret services in the light of the Oleg Kulinich case." Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 15, no. 29 (December 6, 2023): 291–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.031.18773.
Full textAbstract:
The author analyses the case of the detention of Ukrainian Security Service officer Oleg Kulinich on suspicion of espionage for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. On the basis of the analysis of the tasks posed to this Russian agent, he concludes that the modus operandi of Russian counterintelligence is diametrically opposed to the methods of Western services. The main difference is the shifting of the centre of gravity of operational activities from reconnaissance-information work to attempts at agentic seizure of control over enemy institutions, mainly civilian and military special services, and the realisation of intelligence infiltration by people with the same habitus as recruitment candidates. Drawing on the achievements of cognitive psychology and research in recent history, the author demonstrates that the Russian services have been using and refining these methods for more than 100 years.
5
Leșcu, Artur. "The Russian Empire’s Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services – General Considerations." Romanian Military Thinking 2024, no. 1 (March 30, 2024): 222–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2024.1.13.
Full textAbstract:
The Russian Empire was based, since the early years of the nineteenth century, mainly on military force, in the composition of which an important role was played by the accumulation of information on opponents and the fight against foreign espionage inside the country. Despite the central role attributed to these secret services, the Russian Empire did not have a specialized body in the field of military espionage. In this context, based on a vast and new Russian historiographical material, accumulated as a result of research by the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova, the author presents, by the method of analysis of historical documents, a perspective of the genesis, activity and results obtained by the Russian intelligence and counter-espionage services of the tsarist period.
6
Latkowska, Iwona. "Soviet espionage and anti-state activity in Corps District Command V Krakow in the interwar period. Selected examples." Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Humanistyczno-Przyrodniczego im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie. Zeszyty Historyczne 19 (2021): 157–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.16926/zh.2021.19.08.
Full textAbstract:
The article attempts to present and analyze examples of espionage and anti-state activities, inspired by the services of the USSR and illegal communist environments. The area of their activity was limited to the territory of the District Command No. V Kraków, i.e. the provinces of Kraków, Silesia and parts of Kielce one, which also were under the supervision of the Independent Information Office, that was part of its structure. It was its duties that included regular inspections in garrisons or military units, observations of people suspected of espionage and, finally, liquidation of scandals with help of its own agent apparatus, police or gendarmerie. The article focuses on the efforts of Polish secret services and the security authorities cooperating with them in combating secret Soviet crime against the Republic of Poland.
7
Makarov, A. V., N. Yu Gusevskaya, and A. S. Petrov. "Counteraction to High Treason in Russian Legislation of the Second Half of the 19th — Early 20th Centuries." Nauchnyi dialog, no. 1 (January 27, 2021): 337–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.24224/2227-1295-2021-1-337-356.
Full textAbstract:
The problem of improving the criminal liability of the subjects of the Russian Empire at the end of the nineteenth century for espionage and spilling state secrets to a foreign state is considered. The relevance of the study is due to the importance of the problem under study for the effective functioning of the Russian state. The study is based on historical sources of a regulatory and legal nature and is interdisciplinary in nature. Particular attention is paid to the study of legal norms, the identification of the type and amount of punishments for the commission of espionage by Russian citizens and spilling the state secrets to a foreign state. It is indicated that in the second half of the 19th century, the intensity of intelligence of foreign secret services in the territory of the Russian Empire increased. It is noted that more and more often foreign powers involved Russian subjects in the process of obtaining Russian secrets. At the same time, the analysis of the sources made it possible to reveal a sufficient limitation of the institution of counteracting espionage and disclosure of state secrets to foreign states in the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th century. It is proved that it was precisely these phenomena at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries that determined the authorities’ desire to progressively improve legal mechanisms that counteract threats and challenges to national security.
8
Leșcu, Artur. "Serviciile de spionaj și contraspionaj ale Imperiului Rus – de la origini până la Primul Război Mondial. Aspecte generale." Gândirea Militară Românească 2024, no. 1 (March 30, 2024): 228–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/gmr.2024.1.13.
Full textAbstract:
The Russian Empire was based, since the early years of the nineteenth century, mainly on military force, in the composition of which an important role was played by the accumulation of information on opponents and the fight against foreign espionage inside the country. Despite the central role attributed to these secret services, the Russian Empire did not have a specialized body in the field of military espionage. In this context, based on a vast and new Russian historiographical material, accumulated as a result of research by the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova, the author presents, by the method of analysis of historical documents, a perspective of the genesis, activity and results obtained by the Russian intelligence and counter-espionage services of the tsarist period.
9
Vlasenko, V. M., and Е. А. Murashko. "COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICE (based on Hnat Porokhivsky’s archive-investigative case materials)." Sums'ka Starovyna (Ancient Sumy Land), no. 56 (2020): 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/starovyna.2020.56.2.
Full textAbstract:
The lack of the scientific literature concerning the Intelligence Service of Romania (Special Information Service) is stated. Only some references to the activities of the Intelligence Service of Romania on the territory of Ukraine are mentioned in the isolated publications. The authors used the documents and materials from Hnat Porokhivsky’s archive-investigative case which is kept in the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine. The materials mentioned above are representative and fill the gap in the issue concerning the structure of the Special Information Service of Romania and provide a certain indication about its composition. The fact that Hnat Porokhivsky was a colonel of the UNR Army and the leader of the Ukrainian military emigration in Romania is mentioned. Hnat Porokhivsky’s main biographical milestones, his socio-political and military activities are covered. His organizational skills, professional knowledge in the sphere of secret service, and counterespionage were used by the Intelligence Service of Romania. Not being a citizen of Romania, he made a valuable contribution to the process of the Romanian secret service development. The Special Information Service had a complicated multi-stage structure with the an extensive network of intelligence centers, sub-centers, rezidenturas, agents, and support divisions on the territories of both Romania and the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II. Different intelligence units of the Special Information Service of Romania operated on the occupied territories of Ukraine from 1941 to 1944. The central authorities and regional offices heads’ and staff members’ surnames (sometimes pseudonyms) are specified. From the authors’ point of view, the most promising studies are those ones of the Intelligence Service of Romania espionage, counterespionage and propagandistic activities, Ukrainian and Russian immigrants’ participation in this process, and Special Information Service cooperation with secret services of Germany and Japan. Keywords: intelligence (secret) service, Hnat Porokhivsky, rezidentura, Romania, Special Information Service, Ukrainian emigration, center.
10
Li, Wei. "The Security Service for Chinese Central Leaders." China Quarterly 143 (September 1995): 814–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100001506x.
Full textAbstract:
National leaders need security protection against political assassinations, espionage, terrorism and many other dangers, and therefore almost every country has a specialized organization to provide such protection. In the United States, the President is protected by the Secret Service of the Treasury Department, and in the Soviet Union, the Kremlin denizens were guarded by the Ninth Directorate of the KGB. The Chinese security system for the top leadership, consisting mainly of the Central Security Bureau in Zhongnanhai, is however distinctive in several respects. Institutionally it has a peculiarly complex set of arrangements which result in some puzzling divisions of responsibilities. It also relies heavily on a military detachment, Unit 8341. Above all, the Chinese central security apparatus can, and does, play a more active and indispensable political role than is common in other countries.
11
Revesz, Bela. "Draft for Understanding the Historical Background of Changes in the Ideological Language and Communication of Secret Services in 20th Century’s Hungary." International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique 33, no. 3 (August 11, 2020): 855–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09759-w.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjective, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, subcultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, memorandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of the secret services. A remarkable feature of this bureaucratic language is the evolving nature of, certain “keywords” as important signifiers of historical transformation. Thus, the changes in the language of the secret services depends at least as much on the internal changes of the secret services as on the transformation in the external political-social environment. In spite of the confusion of Hungarian secret services in the revolutions of 1918–1919 and the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, in the early 1920’s became a stable system. Between the two World Wars, the Hungarian State Police directed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as MIA), the Military Intelligence and Counter-Espionage directed by the Ministry of Defence (hereinafter referred to as MoD), and the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie directed by both of the Ministries had their own operational service. This structure existed unchanged until 1945. Simultaneously with the forward advance of the soviet troops, government began to re-establish the former system of the secret services in the eastern part of the country. After WWII, in 1946, the “State-protection Department” as political police became independent from the police. However, from the beginning, they remained under the control of the Communist Party. After 1950, the State Security Authority provided special services for the MIA and the Military Political Directorate of the MoD. After quashing the revolution in 1956, in the spring of 1957, the MIA Political Investigation Department was established which—with slight modifications—kept the structure created during the “state protection era”. The MIA III. The State-Protection General Directorate was established in 1962. The reorganization was finalized in the middle of the 1960’s, which resulted in the new system, which—with the structure of Directorates—became the ultimate structure of the state secret police until the abolishment of the MIA General Directorate III in January 1990. These organizational transformations were largely the result of exogenous historical-political changes. Moreover, each new period had a major impact on the organizational communication, language use and vocabulary of the secret services. This study seeks to interpret these historical transformations.
12
Pech, Yann. "Le Service spécial d'information diplomatique la guerre secrète de la République espagnole engagée en territoire français (1936-1939)." Revue Historique des Armées 239, no. 2 (2005): 94–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rharm.2005.5713.
Full textAbstract:
The Secret Diplomatie Intelligence Service : the Spanish Republic's secret war on French soil (1936-39) : " Paris - our war's silent front" ; Alongside the fratricidal war that set Republicans and Nationalists at each others throats in the Iberian penin¬ sula from 1936 to 1939 , there was another hidden , theatre of operations that mobilised some of the actors caught up in the wider drama. It was France that formed the main 'silent front' of the civil war -her soil being the scene for the deployment by the Spanish republicans of a considerable espionage effort. At first the product of private initiatives, the formation of an intelligence network led, later in the Spanish Civil War, to the setting up of an official framework by the Loyalist authorities, at least in theory -for the internecine struggles that ripped apart the Republican camp and undermined its government (including the numerous reorganisations of its secret service) pushed a network with a potential that was under-estimated by the Republican political leadership over the preci¬ pice. In reality, Spanish Republican intelligence produced meagre results because it most often went unexploited and was thus rarely acted upon -and in no case was it capable of changing the outcome of the war.
13
Zverev, V. O., and O. G. Polovnikov. "Secret Agents of the Russian Gendarmerie in the Fight against Espionage at the Beginning of the First World War." Modern History of Russia 10, no. 4 (2020): 892–901. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2020.405.
Full textAbstract:
The article discusses the limited intelligence capabilities of the gendarmerie departments of the Warsaw Governor General (Lomzinska, Warsaw, Kielce, Lublin, and Radom provinces) in the fight against German and Austrian spies in the second half of 1914 and the first half of 1915. One reason for the secret police’s lack of readiness is the reluctance of the gendarmerie-police authorities to organize counter-response work on an appropriate basis. The rare, fragmentary, and not always valuable information received by agents of the investigating authorities did not allow the gendarmes to organize full-scale and successful operational work on a subordinate territory to identify hidden enemies of the state. The low potential, and, in some cases, the complete uselessness of secret service personnel for the interests of the military wanted list led to the fact that most politically disloyal persons were accidentally identified by other special services. In most cases, spies were detected either due to information from army intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, or due to the vigilance of military personnel of the advanced units of the Russian army. The authors conclude that the gendarmerie departments were unable to organize a systematic operational escort of military personnel of the Russian armies deployed in the Warsaw Military District. Despite the fact that the duty of the gendarmerie police included not only criminal procedures, but also operational searches, there was no qualified identification of spies with the help of secret officers.
14
Umunç, Himmet. "On her Majesty's Secret Service: Marlowe and Turkey*." Belleten 70, no. 259 (December 1, 2006): 903–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.37879/belleten.2006.903.
Full textAbstract:
Since the early 1990s, there has been a great deal of serious in-depth research on the Elizabethan dramatist Christopher Marlowe (1564-1593), whereby his historically admitted career and connection with Shakespeare have been revisited, and consequently a comprehensive controversy among Marlowe students has risen with regards to a wide range of issues including his involvement in Elizabeth's secret service. Historically, it is true that, while he was a student at Cambridge from 1580 to 1587, he was secretly recruited to become an agent and, thus, from 1583 onwards, was sent abroad on secret missions; hence, his frequent and prolonged absences from his studies at the university. His espionage activities and their geographies have always been a mystery except his visits to France and, perhaps, to other Catholic countries. In this context, if one recalls that the first diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Elizabeth's England were officially established in 1583 when William Harborne was appointed the first English ambassador to the Ottoman court, it was also of vital importance for Elizabeth's government to secure the Ottoman support and alliance against the growing Spanish and Catholic threat. Therefore, Harborne's appointment was a timely political and diplomatic manoeuvre, and evidently a close watch on Ottoman politics and international relations came to the fore as a serious and vitally important exigency. Indeed, besides the regular staff of Harborne's embassy, three "gentlemen," who may have been assigned special missions, also accompanied him. Could one of them be Marlowe? It is hard to be specific and certain in the absence of documented evidence. However, given the Turkish contents and references of Marlowe's Tamburlaine the Great and The Jew of Malta, one can argue that he was fully familiar with Turkey and Turkish history and that some of the names and material in these plays seem to indicate his first-hand knowledge in this respect. So, through reference to some historical facts and a close textual study of the Turkish material in these two plays, this article is an attempt to demonstrate Marlowe's direct connection with Turkey and, thus, to argue that he must have visited this country in his capacity as Elizabeth's secret agent.
15
Zhang, Lisa Lindkvist, and Prem Poddar. "Espionage, Intrigue, and Politics: Kalimpong Chung Hwa School as International Playhouse." China and Asia 3, no. 1 (September 29, 2021): 35–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589465x-030103.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article examines the ways in which Kalimpong, living up to its moniker as a “nest of spies,” was a site where local and international intrigues played out, especially at the local Chinese Chung Hwa School. It examines the period between the 1940s and early 1960s, when Kalimpong, on account of its strategic location, was home to “foreign Kautilyas” of different intelligence services. The Chung Hwa School came to play a part in this game as it provided cover/camouflage for Chinese secret agents. The secret services run by the British colonial state—and later the Indian state—suspected it to be a platform for intelligence gathering. A close reading of the archives uncovers the circuit of suspicion and misgiving surrounding the school. This article analyses these narratives and the ways in which, through the enmeshment of espionage, the Indian Intelligence Bureau, the local Chinese, and “China” were constituted in Kalimpong’s (under)world. The school also emerges as tangled in transnational and international machinations epitomizing People’s Republic of China–Republic of India relations and Guomindang–Chinese Communist Party rivalry.
16
Tuluș, Arthur. "The Condition of National Minorities in Eastern Europe in a Secret Cia Report From 1965." Eminak, no. 2(34) (July 1, 2021): 210–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.33782/eminak2021.2(34).529.
Full textAbstract:
In the context of the Cold War, detailed knowledge of the opponent and espionage were fundamental elements in the security policies of the two antagonistic sides. The CIA, the United States’ foreign intelligence service, identified the condition of ethnic minorities as one of the possible vulnerabilities of the Eastern Camp, judging from the perspective of the restrictive policies that Communist states held regarding rights and freedoms. Our study is based on the analysis of a document prepared by the CIA in 1965, a memorandum that took data from the latest official censuses in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and recorded the effects of assimilation policies on national minorities within the Eastern Communist states. The document is all the more interesting as the issue of national minorities rights’ in the Communist world was taboo.
17
Bély, Lucien. "Secret et espionnage militaire au temps de Louis XIV." Revue Historique des Armées 263, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 28–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rha.263.0028.
Full textAbstract:
Louis XIV a le goût du secret et ses grandes entreprises militaires en ont besoin. Cet article montre comment le secret accompagne la pratique politique, en particulier dans le domaine de la guerre et la préparation des opérations militaires. A contrario l’État est avide d’information et il rassemble des renseignements venus de tous les horizons, grâce à l’effort de tous les agents du roi et aux réseaux particuliers qui se mettent au service du souverain. Il faut tenter en effet de deviner les stratégies élaborées par le camp ennemi, mais la collecte d’information se fait aussi à l’échelle d’un front ou bien, très localement, aux environs d’une forteresse. Cet article distingue macro-espionnage ou macro-observation à l’échelle internationale et micro-espionnage ou micro-observation sur le terrain. Les généraux envoient des hommes pour surveiller et comprendre le mouvement des ennemis. Les habitants du pays ou des villages près desquels s’établit une armée peuvent aussi jouer un rôle essentiel pour connaître la topographie précise des alentours. Le talent d’un homme de guerre, du général au moindre commandant de place, tient donc à la qualité de son information. Ainsi, pour chaque bataille, s’opère une forme de dialogue ou de négociation, avec, d’un côté, les instructions et les ordres reçus du roi, souvent très secrets, d’un autre côté, les avis rassemblés sur place, les constatations faites par le général, celui-ci gardant lui-même le secret sur ses dernières résolutions et sur les manœuvres qu’il envisage. L’auteur aborde, à travers l’exemple de Feuquières, la façon que peut avoir un contemporain de Louis XIV de penser l’espionnage et d’évoquer les espions.
18
Świerczek, Marek. "Metody działania rosyjskich służb specjalnych w świetle afery Olega Kulinicza." Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 15, no. 29 (December 6, 2023): 63–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.020.18762.
Full textAbstract:
Autor dokonuje analizy przypadku zatrzymania oficera Służby Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy Olega Kulinicza pod zarzutem szpiegostwa na rzecz Federalnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej. Na podstawie analizy zadań stawianych temu rosyjskiemu agentowi dochodzi do wniosku, że sposób działania rosyjskiego kontrwywiadu diametralnie różni się od metod zachodnich służb. Główną różnicą jest przeniesienie środka ciężkości działań operacyjnych z pracy rozpoznawczo-informacyjnej na próby agenturalnego przejęcia kontroli nad instytucjami przeciwnika, głównie cywilnymi i wojskowymi służbami specjalnymi, oraz na realizację infiltracji wywiadowczej przez ludzi dysponujących tym samym habitusem co kandydaci do werbunku. Korzystając z dorobku psychologii po-znawczej oraz badań z zakresu historii najnowszej, autor udowadnia, że od ponad 100 lat rosyjskie służby wykorzystują i udoskonalają te metody. Working methods of the Russian secret services in the light of the Oleg Kulinich case: The author analyses the case of the detention of Ukrainian Security Service officer Oleg Kulinich on suspicion of espionage for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. On the basis of the analysis of the tasks posed to this Russian agent, he concludes that the modus operandi of Russian counterintelligence is diametrically opposed to the methods of Western services. The main difference is the shifting of the centre of gravity of operational activities from reconnaissance-information work to attempts at agentic seizure of control over enemy institutions, mainly civilian and military special services, and the realisation of intelligence infiltration by people with the same habitus as recruitment candidates. Drawing on the achievements of cognitive psychology and research in recent history, the author demonstrates that the Russian services have been using and refining these methods for more than 100 years.
19
Crossley, Laura. "An Absence of Modesty: The Male/Female Dichotomy inModesty Blaise." Journal of British Cinema and Television 15, no. 3 (July 2018): 357–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2018.0427.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines the figure of Modesty Blaise as an action heroine in the canon of British espionage texts. It argues that the character and her stories offer multiple, liminal spaces for investigating and challenging ideas about gender, nation and class. It also addresses the current landscape of action-adventure films at a time when there are increased calls for more female-centric vehicles and gender-blind casting. While the gender politics of the Modesty Blaise franchise make for fascinating analysis, they are also played out against a backdrop of global politics. This can be seen in the first of the novels – simply entitled Modesty Blaise (1965) – and to some extent in Joseph Losey's loose adaptation of the book in 1966. Modesty's employment by the British secret service coincides with the dismantling of the British Empire, and the negotiation of gender identity that is a recurring theme in the stories intersects with the post-imperial, post-colonial concerns that dominated geopolitics at the time the original texts were released.
20
Johnson, Loch K. "The Spy Power, Technological Innovations, and the Human Dimensions of Intelligence: Recent Presidential Abuse of America’s Secret Agencies." Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 3, no. 3 (January 31, 2021): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v3i3.2495.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of national security intelligence is to provide policy officials with an advantage in the making of effective policy, based on the collection and analysis of accurate information from around the world that can help to illuminate a decision. Foreknowledge is invaluable in the service of a nation’s security; and, in the gathering of useful information, technological innovations in the world of intelligence can result in a stronger shield to protect citizens against the many dangers that lurk across the continents in this uncertain and hostile world. Despite all the marvels of modern espionage tradecraft, the governments that rely on them must still deal with the human side of intelligence activities. Unfortunately, arrogance, shortsightedness, laziness, frenetic schedules, and the corrosive influences of power (among other flaws) often lead policy officials to ignore or warp the advantages they could accrue from advanced intelligence spycraft, if they would only use these sources and methods properly. This article examines some of the problems that imperfect human behavior has created for intelligence in the United States at the highest levels of government over the past two decades.
21
Erdem Ayyıldız, Nilay. "“Who the Hell Are You?”." Acta Neophilologica 56, no. 1-2 (December 8, 2023): 53–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/an.56.1-2.53-65.
Full textAbstract:
Tom Stoppard is an outstanding playwright, embellishing his plays with scientific and philosophical approaches and presenting complicated, mysterious plots to the reader. He bases the plot of his postmodern play, Hapgood (1988), on quantum theory and draws an analogy between Werner Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminism, termed “The Uncertainty Principle”, and international espionage. Thus, he constructs the complicated relationship between the particle and the whole throughout the play to depict the relativistic and deceptive relationship between sex and gender. Focusing on the title character of the play, the present study proposes that the play represents the fluid and indeterminate nature of gender and identity within the context of espionage and indeterminism. Hapgood, who is a mother, a lover and a successful master agent in a man-dominated British secret service, navigates between “masculinity” and “femininity” during a day. Moreover, she metamorphoses into her twin, who is entirely different from her, except for their identical faces, to entrap the mole in the office. The study consults Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity and fluidity to indicate the unpredictable and uncertain nature of ‘gender identity’, which formulates itself through performances in social relations and trespasses the heterosexual matrix. It juxtaposes the Butlerian approach with the Uncertainty Principle in quantum theory pertaining to the confusing relationship between gender, the body and identity. The Butlerian analysis of the play reveals that particularly the modern way of life makes women transgress the Cartesian dichotomies of sex/gender, masculine/feminine and man/woman through the fluidity of their roles even during a single day and makes it difficult to find out who is really who.
22
Bátonyi, Gábor. "Touching Base: Hungarian Intelligence and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in the 1960s." Slavonic and East European Review 101, no. 2 (April 2023): 313–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/see.2023.a904398.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract: This article deals with a neglected dimension of Cold War history, namely the role of minor Communist secret services in subverting cultural relations with Britain. In particular, the article examines the efforts of Hungarian State Security to penetrate a university centre in London during the 1960s. Drawing on hitherto unexplored archival material, it documents the intensive attempts made to monitor or cultivate individuals at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies — notably the historian Dr László Péter — as part of a wide-ranging and ambitious intelligence offensive on the tenth anniversary of the 1956 Revolution. Paradoxically, this heightened espionage activity took place at a time of enhanced bilateral ties. The historical records analysed here provide new insight into the duplicity of Hungary’s foreign policy, and the hypocrisy of the post-revolutionary regime’s cultural ‘opening’ to the West, during a defining decade.
23
Matiash, Iryna. "German Consulate in Kyiv (1924–1938): Between Diplomacy and Politics." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XXI (2020): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2020-2.
Full textAbstract:
The article covers the activities of the German mission in Kyiv as a cultural, political, and administrative centre of the Ukrainian SSR in 1924–38 in the status of a consulate and consulate-general. The data about the following heads of the consular institution is provided: Siegfried Hey, Werner Stephanie, Rudolf Sommer, Andor Hencke, and Georg-Wilhelm Grosskopf. The legal basis for the establishment of consular relations between the Ukrainian SSR and Germany was the Treaty on Application of the Treaty of Rapallo signed on 16 April 1922 between the RSFSR and Germany to the Allied Republics of the RSFSR. The consular district of the first German mission covered Kyiv, Chernihiv, Podillia, and Volyn governorates. The mission of the consulate was to inform the government about the internal situation in the Ukrainian SSR, promote trade relations and cultural cooperation, and protect the interests of German citizens. The head of the consulate immediately came under close surveillance of the ODPU (United State Political Department) of the Ukrainian SSR on suspicion of conducting intelligence activities as well as collecting information about the economy, industry, and agriculture in the territory of his consular district. Subsequently, the ODPU increasingly introduced its own agents to the staff of foreign missions as service personnel, and NKVD agents in civilian clothing set up surveillance on the consulate’s premises. They accompanied the consul, the consulate staff, and even some visitors on their way out of the premises. Thus, the secret service collected compromising materials that gave grounds for accusing German diplomats of anti-Soviet activities and espionage. The consul’s correspondence was also under control. When A. Hitler came to power in Germany, the information confrontation between the USSR and the Third Reich began, but official diplomatic and consular relations continued. In his reports, the consul in Kyiv recorded the horrors of the Holodomor, the growing process of party ‘purges’, secret executions and suicides, coupled, from January 1937, with daily reprisals against intellectuals and workers in his consular district. The consulate-general in Kyiv ceased its operation in 1938, the official reason being the streamlining of the number of consular offices of the Third Reich and the USSR. Keywords: German Consulate, Werner Stephanie, Rudolph Sommer, Andor Hencke.
24
Lukes, Igor. "The Rudolf Slánský Affair: New Evidence." Slavic Review 58, no. 1 (1999): 160–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2672994.
Full textAbstract:
Rudolf Slánský's arrest in November 1951 by Statni bezpecnost (StB), the Czechoslovak secret police, his Kafkaesque trial a year later, and his execution caused a sensation during the early years of the Cold War. For a full week, the trial could be followed live on the radio in Prague. The transcript of the proceedings was published and widely distributed. Yet the affair remained a mystery. Slánský, until recently the general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), and thirteen of his colleagues, all of them lifelong party members, confessed to crimes of high treason against the Prague government, espionage on behalf of the west, and sabotage of the socialist economy. In tired, monotonous voices, they described their lives as being motivated by their hatred of the CPC and loyalty to such sponsors as the Gestapo, Zionism, western intelligence services, and international capital. In their final speeches, all the defendants demanded that the court impose upon them the death penalty. The judge disappointed only three—they received life sentences. Slánský and ten others were executed in December 1952.
25
Jacuch, Andrzej. "Czech-Russian Relations. Russian Disinformation Campaign." Polish Political Science Yearbook 51 (December 31, 2022): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202250.
Full textAbstract:
After the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Czech Republic became fully aware of the threats posed by the Kremlin despite President Zeman has denied the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and has criticised the EU sanctions against Russia. Czechia belongs to the group of countries through which Russia influences the EU, to gradually and deliberately erode its structures. Russia exerts a strong influence on the Czech Republic by non-military means, including disinformation and propaganda, the activities of secret services, and penetration of its economy and specifically its energy sector. The article aims to answer the question about the role of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the context of Russian influence in the Czech Republic. The role of Russian disinformation and propaganda and how Russia influences Czechia is extensively analysed. The main hypothesis is that Russia treats the Czech Republic as a key state for espionage and disinformation activities and as a zone of influence, undermining the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the role of NATO and the EU.
26
Stan, Lavinia, and Marian Zulean. "Intelligence Sector Reforms in Romania: A Scorecard." Surveillance & Society 16, no. 3 (October 12, 2018): 298–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.24908/ss.v16i3.6880.
Full textAbstract:
Since 1989, reforms have sought to align the Romanian post-communist intelligence community with its counterparts in established democracies. Enacted reluctantly and belatedly at the pressure of civil society actors eager to curb the mass surveillance of communist times and international partners wishing to rein in Romania’s foreign espionage and cut its ties to intelligence services of non-NATO countries, these reforms have revamped legislation on state security, retrained secret agents, and allowed for participation in NATO operations, but paid less attention to oversight and respect for human rights. Drawing on democratization, transitional justice, and security studies, this article evaluates the capacity of the Romanian post-communist intelligence reforms to break with communist security practices of unchecked surveillance and repression and to adopt democratic values of oversight and respect for human rights. We discuss the presence of communist traits after 1989 (seen as continuity) and their absence (seen as discontinuity) by offering a wealth of examples. The article is the first to evaluate security reforms in post-communist Romania in terms of their capacity to not only overhaul the personnel and operations inherited from the Securitate and strengthen oversight by elected officials, but also make intelligence services respectful of basic human rights.
27
Wynn, Antony. "Adrian O’Sullivan. Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services, 1939-45; Adrian O’ Sullivan. Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran). The Success of the Allied Secret Services, 1941-45." Asian Affairs 47, no. 2 (May 3, 2016): 306–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2016.1171616.
Full text
28
Grażyna Kędzierska and Zbigniew Siemak. "Political crime in lubelskie voivodship in interwar Poland." Archives of Criminology, no. XXXIV (January 1, 2012): 603–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.7420/ak2012o.
Full textAbstract:
In the system of security organs of the Second Polish Republic fight with crime described as political belonged to the duties of National Police. The department of political Police was a secret specialized internal service of the National Police designed most of all to invigilate almost the whole of the political and social life of the country as well as to persecute perpetrators of crimes against the state, with particular focus on persons suspected of acts of subversion. Between the wars the political police underwent a complex reorganization four times each time under a different name: Defensywa Polityczna, Służba Informacyjna, Policja Poli-tyczna i Służba Śledcza (respectively: Political Defence, Information Service, Political Police, and Investigation Service) and with specialised units for fight with various forms of political crime. Illegal political activity, form the point of view of law then, was divided into activity against the state and espionage for other countries. Until 1926 political service in lubelskie voivodship conducted full operational observation of factions and political movements of communist character, of ethnic minorities, and of radical peasant activists. Political movements of bourgeois character were not of interest to political counterintelligence, still they were under discreet operational observation. After the May Coup in Poland, interest of the political police, apart from communists and national minorities, was extended also to the whole legal opposition against the government. Political police in lubelskie voivodship was occupied with revealing social tensions, antigovernment moods, subversive actions, and actions against the state (in particular those by communists and nationalists form national minorities), observation of legal political formations and parties, but also of trade unions and members of parliament. Until 1934 the police statistics included, for example, high treason, rebellion and resistance against the government, desertion, and other crimes against military power and the state. After 1934 the police statistics included high treason (articles 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 of contemporary criminal code), insult to the government or its institution (art. 125, 127), individual and group resistance (art. 129, 131, and 169 in relation to art. 129), insult and assault of an official (art. 132, 133, and para. 4 of art. 256), insult to the nation and the state (art. 152, 153), incitement to crime (art. 154, 155, 156, 157, 158), incitement to crime (art. 165 – 167), riots (art. 163, 163). “Incitement to crime” in lubelskie voivodship was carried out mainly by offenders’ by “dis-playing flags and banners” of anti-state and subversive content (26,5 % of national overall) and “spreading communist pamphlets and appeals” (16,5%). Such acts as “high treason” (7,9%), “insult to the government or its institution” (6,9%), “group resistance” (11%) were above national average.
29
Labutina, Tatyana. "British Intelligence Ambassadors at the Court of Anna Ioannovna." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 3 (2022): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640020235-6.
Full textAbstract:
In the first third of the eighteenth century, relations between Russia and Britain remained strained. Although Russia, under Empress Anna Ioannovna (1730–1740), welcomed Britain, restoring the diplomatic relations it had severed under Peter I and concluding a trade treaty favourable to the British in 1734, official London continued to pursue a policy far from friendly towards the Russian Empire. The intelligence activities of the British official diplomats at the Imperial Court were a vivid illustration of this. King George II of Great Britain, when he sent his ambassadors to their destination, urged them to gather information on everything they would see in Russia. He specifically listed those the diplomats were to focus on: the Russian Empress, her ministers and other high-ranking officials, as well as courtiers and favourites. The British authorities were particularly interested in the state of the nation's armed forces. On their return home, the ambassadors were expected to give a detailed account of everything they had seen and heard at Court. Drawing on an analysis of the ambassadors' diplomatic correspondence with the British Secretary of State, as well as some of their essays, the author examines the problem of British ambassadors' intelligence activities at the court of Anna Ioannovna. As it turns out, the ambassadors collected information on the high-ranking dignitaries close to the Tsarina, their predilections and weaknesses; on the alignment of political powers at court, as well as on the state of the army and navy. Attention is drawn to the fact that the informants of diplomats were often not only Britons in Russian service, but more often high-ranking officials themselves, ready to defend British interests for the sake of monetary rewards or gifts. Few of them realised that by revealing secret information to British ambassadors, they were committing a high crime and harming their homeland. The history of British espionage in Russia in the first third of the eighteenth century, which has not previously been the subject of a special study in historical scholarship, reveals the real purpose of British diplomacy, namely to study the potential enemy, as it viewed the Russian Empire at that time.
30
Зверев, В. О. "Counterspies and circumstantial evidence in Myasoedov Case (from unpublished archival documents)." Вестник Рязанского государственного университета имени С.А. Есенина, no. 4(81) (December 27, 2023): 7–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.37724/rsu.2023.81.4.001.
Full textAbstract:
В статье даются независимые общие характеристики и частично освещаются личностные и деловые качества сотрудников контрразведки, осуществлявших оперативное и следственное сопровождение дела жандармского подполковника С. Н. Мясоедова, который до наступления и с начала Первой мировой войны подозревался в сотрудничестве с германской разведкой. Делается вывод о высоком уровне профессионализма контрразведчиков, главным слагаемым которого был накопленный опыт борьбы с иностранным шпионажем в губерниях Привислинского края в условиях мира. Представлены неизвестные ранее результаты военно-розыскной деятельности петроградского охранного отделения и контрразведки. Предварительным следствием, а позже и судом были учтены такие добытые ими косвенные улики, как связь Мясоедова с проститутками Столбиной и Магеровской, собиравшими для него в высших военных и политических кругах Петрограда важные сведения, а также с немецким бароном Э. В. Ганом, который был дискредитирован содействием немецкому шпиону фон Брюммеру. Введенные в научный оборот документы, содержащие упоминания о косвенных доказательствах вины Мясоедова, позволили усомниться в его непричастности к шпионажу и прийти к заключению о перспективности дальнейших архивных поисков и научных изысканий по этой проблеме. The article covers the objective general characteristics and some personal traits and professional qualities of the counterintelligence officers who participated in operational and investigative support of gendarme officer S. N. Myasoedov’s case. Ht was suspected of collaboration with the German intelligence service during the early part of the First World War. We come to the conclusion that the high level of the counterspies’ proficiency was mainly due to their experience gained in fighting foreign espionage in Vistula Land (Kingdom of Poland) in the previous peaceful decades. The paper refers to previously unknown results of military investigative activities of the Petrograd secret police and counterintelligence, and circumstantial evidence that they found. During the pre-trial investigation and the trial such circumstantial evidence as the connection between Myasoedov and prostitutes Stolbina and Magerovskaya who gathered important information for him in the Petrograd highest military and political circles and Myasoedov’s connection with German baron E. V. Hahn who was compromised by his assistance to the German spy von Brümmer. The documents now introduced into historical discourse contain references to circumstantial evidence of Myasoedov’s guilt and cast doubt on his innocence. Yet further archival work may bring historians to more definitive conclusions about the issue.
31
Goldstein, Erik. "The Foreign Office and political intelligence 1918–1920." Review of International Studies 14, no. 4 (October 1988): 275–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500113154.
Full textAbstract:
In 1918 Harold Nicolson in discussing the problem of political intelligence observed that ‘any forecast of diplomatic development must inevitably deal, not with concentric forces, but with eccentric tendencies; such data as are available emerge only from a mass of heterogeneous phenomena, mutually conflicting, mutually overlapping, and striving each towards some distinct and often incompatible solution’. At the time Nicolson was writing the Foreign Office was embarking upon an early attempt to assist diplomacy through analysing these eccentric tendencies and coordinating the information emanating from the heterogeneous phenomena of foreign affairs. The vehicle for this experiment was the Political Intelligence Department (P.I.D.), and its experience contains elements common to intelligence activity throughout this century: the need for co-ordination which in turn leads to a struggle for control of the co-ordinating body, the suspicion aroused in traditional departments by any group involved in intelligence work, the pressure of the Treasury to cut costs even at the expense of useful intelligence operations, and the struggle between the prime minister's office and the Foreign Office for the control of policy. Since the turn of the century there had been a growing awareness of the need for foreign intelligence, a development which finally resulted in the creation of an espionage service in 1909 (the ancestor of the Secret Intelligence Service). This department, however, concentrated on military related intelligence. During the First World War it became evident, particularly to Lord Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, that while there were numerous sources of political intelligence, no systematic method had been established for collecting and collating this information, verifying it against collateral sources, and synthesizing the result in succinct reports which would be of value to the policy-makers. Military intelligence was clearly the preserve of the Admiralty and the War Office, and the Foreign Office decided to establish that political intelligence fell within its purview. In the process of establishing Foreign Office primacy in this sphere, Hardinge had to fend off attempts by Lord Beaverbrook who as Minister of Information tried to use his personal political clout to control such intelligence. This was, however, only one of several bureaucratic difficulties, the P.I.D. was forced to struggle with. Finally in 1920 the P.I.D. was closed through a combination of financial and bureaucratic pressures. During its brief existence, though, it was able to prove the utility of a centralized body concerned with political intelligence. In some ways it presaged the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.), which in a more sophisticated and elaborate way is meant, to achieve the same ends.
32
Dubuisson, Michel. "Renseignement, espionnage et services secrets dans l’armée romaine." Ktèma : civilisations de l'Orient, de la Grèce et de Rome antiques 21, no. 1 (1996): 305–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ktema.1996.2176.
Full text
33
Mortimer, Armine Kotin. "Sollers's Le Secret, Espionage and Autofiction." L'Esprit Créateur 42, no. 4 (2002): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/esp.2010.0301.
Full text
34
Pacini, Carl J., Raymond Placid, and Christine Wright‐Isak. "Fighting economic espionage with state trade secret laws." International Journal of Law and Management 50, no. 3 (May 16, 2008): 121–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17542430810877454.
Full text
35
Ukasyah, Syifa Surya, Rully Putri Nirmala Puji, Jefri Rieski Triyanto, Guruh Prasetyo, and Bambang Soepeno. "Soviet Union Spionage Arrest In Indonesia 1982." JURNAL HISTORICA 7, no. 2 (December 5, 2023): 307. http://dx.doi.org/10.19184/jh.v7i2.41679.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of this study is to analyze the events of the Soviet Union's espionage arrest in Indonesia in 1982. The formulation of the problem in this research is (1) The Soviet Union's Efforts to Steal Indonesian Maritime Data, (2) The Process of the Soviet Union's Intelligence Arrests for Espionage in Indonesia, and (3) the Settlement of the Soviet Union's Espionage Case in Indonesia in 1982. The method used is historical methodology which includes five selection steps including topics, heuristics, source criticism, interpretation and historiography. The Soviet Union's espionage arrest occurred in 1982 which was carried out by a task force codenamed Pantai, a joint effort between the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) and a task force led by Brigadier General M.I Sutaryo. The cause of the Soviet Union's espionage arrest was an attempt to steal Indonesia's secret deep data regarding the condition, content and depth of the sea in the Lombok Strait and the Natuna Islands. The perpetrators of Soviet espionage who were caught by the Beach task force named Sergei Egorov and Alexander Finenko. The case settlement process was carried out by giving persona non-grata status and closing the Soviet Union's Aeroflot airline operating in Indonesia.
Keywords: Espionage Arrest, Soviet Union Espionage, Data Theft
36
Bricco, Elisa. "Armine Kotin Mortimer, Sollers’s «Le Secret», Espionage and Autofiction." Studi Francesi, no. 142 (XLVIII | I) (July 1, 2004): 224. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/studifrancesi.41276.
Full text
37
Mashingaidze, Sivave. "Corporate espionage masquerading as business intelligence in local banks: A descriptive cross-sectional research." Corporate Ownership and Control 12, no. 4 (2015): 653–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i4c6p5.
Full textAbstract:
Information can make the difference between success and failure or profit and loss in the business world. If a trade secret is stolen, then the competitive playing field is leveled or worse, tipped in favor of the competitor. To complicate the problem even more, trade secrets are not only being sought after by a company’s competitors, but from foreign nations as well. They are hoping to use stolen corporate information to increase that nation’s competitive edge in the global marketplace. This article looked at corporate espionage, how it’s done, how it masquerades as business intelligence. Some solutions to reduce the risk of espionage were given. The methodology used was a descriptive cross-sectional research approach. The results found were that many banks and companies disguise corporate espionage as business intelligence and hack or steal other companies’ information.
38
Antier, Chantal. "Espionnage et espionnes de la Grande Guerre." Revue Historique des Armées 247, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 42–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rha.247.0042.
Full textAbstract:
L’espionnage, sujet controversé pendant la Grande Guerre, a eu un succès considérable dans les années 1930. Actuellement, les témoignages des espions et des services secrets, même s’ils ne sont pas tous véridiques, permettent, en complétant par les archives, de mieux comprendre l’importance du renseignement pendant la Grande Guerre, l’organisation de l’espionnage chez les alliés, le recrutement des espions, la surveillance des agissements de l’ennemi, la découverte d’un nouveau rôle de la femme passant des travaux à l’arrière à l’espionnage en territoire occupé ou dans les milieux interlopes. L’espionnage comme le contre-espionnage mis en place par les alliés, s’ils ont été considérés par certains belligérants comme une affaire immorale et difficile à utiliser, ont permis de protéger les pays en guerre et d’agir sur la stratégie des états-majors. Conscients de l’importance de leur rôle, d’anciens espions entreront dans la Résistance à la Seconde Guerre mondiale.
39
Woodcock, J. A. "Secret Service." British Dental Journal 180, no. 1 (January 1996): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sj.bdj.4808958.
Full text
40
HADLEY, SUZANNE W. "Secret Service." Nature 351, no. 6325 (May 1991): 340. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/351340c0.
Full text
41
Funk, Arthur Layton. "Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (review)." Journal of Military History 67, no. 3 (2003): 975–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0219.
Full text
42
Wu, Shiyu. "The Extraterritorial Application of Chinese Trade Secret Criminal Law: With the Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act of the US." Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (July 6, 2022): 20–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/ehss.v1i.624.
Full textAbstract:
Intellectual property, especially trade secret, is very important to countries nowadays. China’s relatively slow development of trade secrets protection under criminal law system failed to give extraterritorial effects to its rules and little research has paid attention to this important issue. Therefore, with two approaches implemented, comparative research and case study, this article aims to investigate the necessity for construction of extraterritorial application of Chinese trade secret criminal law and further provide suggestions through the analysis of The Economic Espionage Act of the US.
43
Ellmers, Stephen. "REVIEW: Riveting National Press Club tales of espionage." Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa 25, no. 1&2 (July 31, 2019): 295–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v25i1.491.
Full textAbstract:
Bureau of Spies: The secret connections between espionage and journalism in Washington, by Steven T. Usdin. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 2018. 360pp. ISBN 9781633884762.DON’T be fooled by Bureau of Spies’ provocative title. Steven Usdin’s careful and considered account of how foreign and domestic agitators have manipulated the American media and subverted that country’s democracy is thoroughly researched and extremely well written. It contains riveting descriptions of America First’s Nazi propaganda efforts as well as the extent of Russian intelligence’s attempts to hoodwink US delegates and voters. However, the setting for these seismic events is in the 20th Century rather than the 21st.
44
Kearns, Oliver. "Forget what you hear: Careless Talk, espionage and ways of listening in on the British secret state." Review of International Studies 48, no. 2 (November 18, 2021): 301–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210521000589.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractAs the covert and clandestine practices of states multiplied in the twentieth century, so did these practices’ footprint in public life. This footprint is not just visual and material but sonic and aural, sounding the ‘secret state’ into being and suggesting ways of ‘listening in’ on it. Using multisensory methodology, this article examines Careless Talk Costs Lives, a UK Second World War propaganda campaign instructing citizens on how to practice discreet speech and listening in defence against ‘fifth columnist’ spies. This campaign reproduced the British secret state in the everyday: it represented sensitive operations as weaving in and out of citizens’ lives through imprudent chatter about ‘hush-hush’ activities and sounds you shouldn't overhear. The paradox at the campaign's heart – of revealing to people the kind of things they shouldn't say or listen to – made the secret state and its international operations a public phenomenon. Secret sounds therefore became entangled within productions of social difference, from class inequalities to German racialisation. Sound and listening, however, are unwieldy phenomena. This sonic life of the secret state risked undermining political legitimacy, while turning public space and idyllic environments into deceptive soundscapes – for international espionage, it seemed, sounded like ordinary life.
45
Ettinger, David. "Sources: Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage." Reference & User Services Quarterly 51, no. 1 (September 1, 2011): 82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/rusq.51n1.82.
Full text
46
Greenberg, Daniel S. "Science's secret service." Nature 441, no. 7090 (May 2006): 156–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/441156a.
Full text
47
Prajakta, Harne, Mishra Munish K, and Sodhi G.S. "Examination of Invisible Writing Liquid Composition and Their Decoders." Journal of Forensic Chemistry and Toxicology 4, no. 2 (December 15, 2018): 77–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.21088/jfct.2454.9363.4218.1.
Full textAbstract:
From the earlier times of espionage, invisible ink is considered to be an assured and significant device of cryptography. Even though the use of invisible ink has now been almost entirely taken over by technical cryptography or steganography, its history still remains exceptionally fascinating, and today researchers are trying to find out readily available compositions which can inscribe secretly and their respective decoders. The art of secret writing was probably proposed to create any written text indecipherable to a reader who could read the same only after applying certain decoding process to make the writing legible. Though, the methods of secret writing are abundant but this paper principally emphases on the application of commonly available items which could act as a secret ink and similarly other commonly available items which could be applied as their respective decoders.
48
Hong, Seong-Sam. "A Study on The Industrial Espionage Cases and Trade Secret Protection Strategy." Korean Police Studies Review 21, no. 4 (December 31, 2022): 303–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.38084/2022.21.4.14.
Full text
49
Kolpakov, P. A., and R. A. Arslanov. "Counterintelligence Activities of Gendarmerie Railway Police before and during World War I." Nauchnyi dialog 12, no. 10 (December 23, 2023): 360–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.24224/2227-1295-2023-12-10-360-377.
Full textAbstract:
The article analyzes the role of the gendarmerie railway police in the system of counterintelligence agencies in the Russian Empire before and during World War I. Based on documentary materials, the goals of enemy espionage on railways are revealed. Measures taken by the gendarmerie to restrict photography of railway infrastructure are examined. Through analysis of secret correspondence between gendarmerie leaders and railway department heads, categories of individuals most actively recruited by German and Austro-Hungarian intelligence for espionage are identified: prisoners of war, foreign nationals not involved in combat, and children. The organization of surveillance of foreign officials’ railway transport movements within the Russian Empire is also explored. The conclusion is drawn that the gendarmerie railway police’s ability to carry out counterintelligence tasks was complicated by their simultaneous duties as general and political police, as well as the scale of the infrastructure they were tasked with protecting.
50
Fabre, Cécile. "Reply to Critics." Ethics & International Affairs 37, no. 2 (2023): 193–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679423000175.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractA normative defense of espionage and counterintelligence activities in the service of foreign policy goals must show at least two things. First, it must show which foreign policy goals, if any, provide a justification for such activities. Second, it must provide an account of the means that intelligence agencies are morally permitted, indeed morally obliged, to use during those activities. I first discuss Ross Bellaby's probing critique of my defense of economic espionage. I then turn to the other four essays, which consider the ethics of the means by which espionage and counterintelligence activities are conducted.