Academic literature on the topic 'Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Journal articles on the topic "Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act"
1
Bekink, Mildred. "The Right of child offenders to intermediary assistance in the criminal justice system: A South African perspective." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 24 (June 21, 2021): 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2021/v24i0a8563.
Full textAbstract:
The right of a child offender to participate effectively in criminal proceedings is a fundamental aspects of a right to a fair trial and is guaranteed in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 as well as in international instruments, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. An arguments is made that ensuring that this right is fully realised at domestic level, allowances should be made for child offenders to be included in the provisions of section170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Section 170A makes allowances for the use of an intermediary by witnesses and victims when presenting testimony in criminal proceedings. It is argued that the best interest of the child principles as well as other rights such as the right to dignity and equality enshrined in the Constitution and guaranteed in international instruments warrants the inclusion of child offenders in the enabling legislation. An interpretation and implementation of Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act in line with the Constitution and international instruments that gives recognition to the child offender’s vulnerability and enforces the best interests of the child offender is accordingly advocated
2
Bekink, Mildred. "Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 2 SACR 109 (GNP): Intermediary Appointment Reports and a Child's Right to Privacy Versus the Right of an Accused to Access to Information." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 20 (January 3, 2017): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2017/v20i0a1035.
Full textAbstract:
General consensus exists that the adversarial nature of the South African criminal procedure with its often aggressive cross-examination of a witness, sometimes by an accused himself, will in most cases expose a child to undue mental stress or suffering when having to testify in court. In confirmation of this fact and with a notion to shield child witnesses from the stress or suffering when having to testify in the presence of an accused the function of an intermediary was introduced with the insertion of section 170A into the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In terms of section 170A(1) a court may if it appears to such court that it would expose any witness under the biological or mental age of eighteen years to undue mental stress or suffering if he or she testified at such hearing, appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order for the witness to give evidence through that intermediary. Section 170A(1) contemplates that a child complainant will be assessed prior to testifying in court in order to determine whether the services of an intermediary should be used. If the assessment reveals that the services of an intermediary are needed, then the state must arrange for an intermediary to be available at the commencement of the trail. The aforementioned procedure of section 170A(1) was followed in Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 2 SACR 109 (GP) and is the subject of this discussion.
3
Pienaar, Letitia. "Deciphering the Composition of Section 79- Assessment Panels in the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 20 (January 22, 2018): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2017/v20i0a3062.
Full textAbstract:
Section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides for the appointment of mental health professionals to assess an accused’s fitness to stand trial and/or criminal capacity if the court orders such an enquiry in terms of sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In terms of section 79, one mental health professional must assess an accused charged with a non-violent offence, whereas a panel of such professionals must assess an accused charged with an offence involving serious violence.
The legislative provisions regarding the appointment of mental health professionals to a section 79-assessment panel are not without ambiguity. Section 79(1)(b) read with section 79(13) is problematic. Directives issued by the National Prosecuting Authority in terms of section 79(13) do not aid in clarifying the legal position either. The main point of contention is whether a section 79-assessment panel must consist of a minimum of two or three psychiatrists. This ambiguity creates challenges for presiding officers tasked with appointing section 79-assessment panels. When presiding officers appoint these panels incorrectly, it causes delays in the assessment process and the delivery of justice to the accused and the victim.
The court considered the interplay between section 79(1)(b) and section 79(13) in S v Pedro 2015 1 SACR 41 (WCC). The judgment highlights the need to clarify the position in the Criminal Procedure Act regarding the appointment of section 79-assessment panels. This case provided the impetus for the amendment of section 79 through the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017.
This contribution explores the composition of section 79-assessment panels as provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 79(1)(b) and the seemingly contradictory provisions contained in section 79(13) are discussed. The S v Pedro judgment is discussed with a specific focus on the court’s interpretation of the interplay between these two provisions.
Following the S v Pedro judgment, the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 amended section 79. This contribution explores the clarifying provisions of the Amendment Act regarding the composition of assessment panels
4
Reddy, Managay. "Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act: Is it time for its abolition?" De Jure 51, no. 2 (2018): 251–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2225-7160/2018/v51n2a4.
Full text
5
Pitman, D. J. M. "‘POINTING OUT’ and ‘POINTING AT’: SECTION 218 of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT REVISITED." South African Journal on Human Rights 7, no. 1 (January 1991): 70–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02587203.1991.11827827.
Full text
6
Chiswick, Derek, Alexander P. W. Shubsachs, and Steven Novosel. "Reprosecution of patients found unfit to plead: a report of anomalies in procedure in Scotland." Psychiatric Bulletin 14, no. 4 (April 1990): 208–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/pb.14.4.208.
Full textAbstract:
A legal finding of unfitness to plead results in automatic committal of the accused to a mental hospital. In Scotland, if criminal proceedings are under solemn jurisdiction, there is a mandatory order restricting discharge without limit of time and the hospital must be a state hospital unless for special reasons an alternative hospital is appropriate (Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure [Scotland] Act 1975). The mental condition of a person found unfit to plead may subsequently improve such that he may become fit to be tried in the normal way. In England and Wales the Home Secretary has power, under Section 5(4) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, to remit to prison for trial a person found unfit to plead who subsequently recovers. On arrival of such a person in prison the hospital and restriction orders cease to have effect. The Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 does not apply to Scotland; authority to reprosecute unfit defendants in sheriff courts and the High Court rests exclusively with procurators fiscal and the Crown Office respectively. The status of the original hospital and restriction orders in reprosecuted cases is unclear.
7
Kubiak, Rafał. "Criminal liability for performing laboratory diagnostics without necessary authority." Diagnostyka Laboratoryjna 54, no. 3 (September 20, 2018): 185–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.7714.
Full textAbstract:
The laboratory diagnostician’s profession is classified as the so-called professions of public trust. One of their features is limiting access to the profession through, among others, determining specific qualifications, education and skills, verified by appropriate bodies in the legal procedure, and awarded with so-called right to practice. The purpose of this procedure is allowing professional activities to be carried out only by persons who will guarantee their necessary quality. This requirement is particularly important in the case of medical employees, whose activities determine the life and health of patients. The Polish legislator secured the implementation of these requirements by means of the penal code. In art. 71 of the Act on laboratory diagnostics, a prohibited act has been described, which included performing laboratory diagnostic activities by a person who does not possess the authority do so. This is called a halved act, i.e. depending on the degree of social harm, may be considered an offense (section 1) or felony (section 2). This article discusses the terms of criminal liability for this act, including the circumstances qualifying it as a felony, in the form of actions to obtain a financial advantage or misleading as to the possession of authority. It explains who could be the perpetrator of this act and why the protection of criminal law was restricted only to activities performed in the laboratory. Penalties and criminal measures that can be imposed for this act, as well as the procedure for its prosecution, were also indicated. Deficiencies of this regulation and proposals for its amendment are also presented. The argument has been enriched by judicial decisions illustrating the presented theses.
8
Bamgbose, Oludayo John. "Access to Prison Law Libraries as a Precursor to Effective Administration of Justice in Nigeria: Lessons from the United States of America." International Journal of Legal Information 46, no. 2 (July 2018): 110–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jli.2018.24.
Full textAbstract:
A decade after the inauguration of the national working group on the reform of criminal justice administration in Nigeria by the then Attorney General of the Federation, Chief Akin Olujinmi, SAN, Nigeria was presented with a newly signed law—Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA), which was a direct response to the growing call for reforms that would address the plethora of problems confronting the administration of the criminal justice system in Nigeria. The 495-section law harmonized the existing two principal laws: the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), which hitherto governed the administration of criminal justice system across all Federal-owned Courts in Nigeria and the Courts within the Federal Capital Territory. Both CPA and CPC operated for many decades in Nigeria, but had many challenges, hence the urgency for the newcomer— ACJA.
9
De la Harpe, Stephen, and Tharien Van der Walt. "The balancing of conflicting rights in the application of section 49 of The Criminal Procedure Act." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 6, no. 2 (July 10, 2017): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2003/v6i2a2863.
Full textAbstract:
Section 492 of the Criminal Procedure Act3 (hereafter CPA) provides for the use of force during arrest. This provision recently came under the spotlight in the Supreme Court of Appeal4 as well as in the Constitutional Court.5 Section 49 of the CPA is shrouded in controversy, as the proposed amendment (section 7 of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act, 122 of 1998) has not yet been put into operation because of the resistance of the Minister of Safety and Security.
10
Mukhtar, Sohaib, Zinatul Ashiqin Zainol, and Sufian Jusoh. "Review of Trademark and Its Enforcement Procedures of Pakistan under TRIPS and Paris Convention." Economics, Law and Policy 1, no. 2 (June 11, 2018): 122. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/elp.v1n2p122.
Full textAbstract:
<p><em>Enforcement of trademark law has been in evolution for decades in Pakistan. Pakistani laws dealing with trademark and its enforcement procedures are Trade Marks Ordinance 2001, Trade Marks Rules 2004, Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act 2012 and relevant provisions of Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Specific Relief Act 1877. Civil procedure is dealt in Pakistan as per Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and criminal procedure as per Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. This article is qualitative method of research analyses trademark and its enforcement procedures of Pakistan as per relevant trademark laws of Pakistan under the light of relevant provisions of Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Paris Convention. Paris Convention is the first International Convention containing trademark and its enforcement provisions (6-9) as TRIPS is the first International Agreement containing exhaustive provisions on trademark and its enforcement procedures (15-21, 41-61). Part III of TRIPS deals with enforcement of trademark including civil procedure, administrative procedure, provisional measures, border measures and criminal procedure of trademark enforcement. Trademark Registry established under section 9 of Trade Marks Ordinance 2001 and works under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan (IPO-Pakistan) which is a statutory body established under section 3 of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act 2012. The registered trademark owner in Pakistan can avail civil procedure, criminal procedure, administrative procedure as well as provisional and border measures for enforcement of his registered trademark right in Pakistan. TRIPS and Paris Convention have been ratified by Pakistan, but ratification of International Convention and its implementation are two different things. Better enforcement of trademark law may take years to achieve as per relevant provisions of International Conventions therefore designated authorities of Pakistan are required to establish more Trademark Registry branches, more IP Tribunals, appoint and induct more IP experts, examiners in-charge of registration and spread IP awareness throughout Pakistan for betterment of trademark law enforcement in Pakistan.</em><em></em></p>
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act"
1
Dunywa, Mziwonke Samson. "A critical evaluation of section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 OF 1977." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/748.
Full textAbstract:
The general principle in criminal law is that a person is liable when committing a criminal offence. This may include an offence a person has facilitated or procured. Vicarious liability, a principle borrowed from civil law, is an exception to the general rule in that it allows for a person to be held liable for the criminal acts of another. Legal persons have no physical existence and do not have hands and brains like natural persons. A legal person acts through its directors, employees, members or representatives. The corporation, being distinct and separate from its agents, is held liable for the acts or omissions of its representatives. This liability exists even though the corporate body never acted. International recognition of corporate criminal liability can be based on vicarious liability, identification or aggregation. All these forms of liability are derived from the human actus and mens rea. The identification theory provides for the liability of the corporate body, when someone who is identified with it, acted during the course of his employment when committing the offence. Those acts are treated as the acts of the corporate body. The identification theory is normally applied where mens rea is a requirement of the offence. The Aggregation theory provides for criminal liability of the corporation based on the conduct of a group of members of the company taken collectively. This theory is applied effectively where it is difficult to prove that a single person within the company is responsible for the commission of the offence. In South Africa corporate criminal liability developed from vicarious liability. It is regulated by section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This liability is based on the special relationship between the director or servant and the corporate body. Corporations act through its agents. The agent can be a director, servant or a third person instructed by either of them. In terms of section 332(1) it is possible that the corporate body can be held liable even where the agent acted beyond the scope of his employment. The latter can be argued is an extension of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability, can be argued, is too broad, because the intention of the agent is imputed to the corporate body, without the enquiry of fault by the corporate body. This offends the general principles of substantive criminal law. Generally, liability in criminal law accrues to someone who committed the offence with the required state of mind. The constitutionality of section 332(1) Act 51 of 1977 is questioned. The question is asked whether it is desirable to punish a legal person for the behaviour of its representatives or employees. Criminal law purports to control the behaviour of individuals to be in line with the interest and values of society. There is doubt whether the same goal can be achieved with the prosecution of corporate bodies. Prosecution of corporate bodies results in stigma to the corporation, which results in suffering a loss of reputation. Some authors argue that civil remedies can control the activities of corporate bodies more effectively. This argument, however, fails to address the issue that criminal law concerns the harm inflicted by human beings, hence the need to regulate human conduct. Corporate criminal liability attempts to address the harm inflicted by corporate bodies. It regulates pollution, health, safety and business. This liability is firmly established around the world but requires further development and modern refinement in South Africa.Abstract
2
Omar, Jameelah. "Burying the Ghosts of a Complainant’s Sexual Past: The Constitutional Debates Surrounding Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/15571.
Full textAbstract:
“It has been said that the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice- once by the offender and once by the criminal justice system.”1 South Africa’s rape shield provision is contained in section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act.2 The purpose of its enactment is to protect a complainant in a sexual offence matter from secondary victimisation during the trial as far as possible, by restricting the type of evidence that is admissible and the circumstances under which such evidence can be found to be admissible. This rationale has come under attack for its effect on the fair trial rights of the accused. There has been no challenge to the constitutionality of section 227 before a court yet. However, there are numerous rumblings of discontent at the consequences of a provision that restricts evidence that could be necessary to prevent a wrongful conviction. This paper seeks to consider the constitutional debates surrounding section 227 and to determine whether, to the extent that they may prove to be constitutionally problematic, the potential constitutional challenges are justifiable under a limitations analysis. It is impossible to engage with the constitutionality of section 227 without first discussing the rationale behind rape shield laws in general. The structure of the paper is therefore as follows: firstly, the history and purpose of rape shield laws will be investigated, and secondly, the history of section 227 under South African law will be discussed.
3
Letsoalo, Lisbeth Ledile. "The protection of children's identities in the criminal justice system: an analysis on section 154(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977." Thesis, University of Limpopo, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10386/3046.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis ( LLM.) --University of Limpopo, 2019The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that a child’s best interests should be of primary consideration in any matter concerning him or her. Contrary to this value, and thereby excluding protection of child victims, section 154(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 simply focusses on anonymity protection of child offenders and witness involved in criminal proceedings. It currently expressly prohibits the publication of the identities of child offenders and witnesses when the media makes publications on the relevant criminal proceedings. However, this protection terminates once such child offenders and witnesses attain majority, therefore arbitrarily stripping them of the identity protection. As a result, media houses are not only at liberty to publish on criminal proceedings identifying child victims, but also to expose the identities of child offenders and witnesses upon attaining majority. Such publications have proved to impede on children’s rights, as well as to contribute to the psychological challenges faced by the children whenever they are exposed to the criminal justice system. In this study the constitutional validity of section 154(3) is investigated and it is argued that it is unconstitutional in all respects. The section contradicts the specific right afforded to all children in the Bill of Rights, as well as other ancillary rights, which ought to ensure the progressive realisation of the protection afforded in terms of section 154(3). It is recommended, firstly, that section 154(3) be declared unconstitutional, and be amended to include child victims within the ambit of its protection. Secondly, the protection should extend beyond the age of 18, in respect of all children involved in criminal proceedings.
National Research Foundation
4
Janse, van Rensburg Delaney. "A constitutional analysis of the court's (lack of) discretion in terms of Section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/53131.
Full textAbstract:
Section 77(6)(a) deprives a judicial officer of his or her judicial discretion to consider the accused person s personal circumstances. If an accused person is not fit to stand trial and the court finds that, the accused committed a serious offence as contemplated in section 77(6)(a)(i) of the CPA then the court is obliged, automatically and in every case, to order that the accused to be detained in a psychiatric hospital or prison. If the court finds that the accused committed a less serious offence than one contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she did not committed any offence then the court is obliged, automatically and in every case to, in terms of section 77(6)(a)(ii), order that the accused be institutionalised as an involuntary mental health care user.
In the case of De Vos No and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 1 SACR 18 (WCC) it was held that this deprivation amounts to the infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused persons, inter alia, to equality, dignity, freedom and security of the person as well as certain constitutional rights of children. Griesel J ordered that words be read-in to temporarily remedy this situation. The Constitutional Court did not confirm this order but did confirm that certain aspects of section 77(6) are unconstitutional and need to be addressed.Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
Procedural Law
LLM
Unrestricted
5
Matshoba, Mzwandile Reuben. "Bail and the presumption of innocence: a critical analysis of section 60(1-1) of the criminal procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended." Thesis, UWC, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/3073.
Full textAbstract:
Magister Legum - LLMIn South Africa, as in most jurisdictions, the presumption of innocence is a guaranteed constitutional right. The rationale of the presumption lies in the protection which it offers, since a person charged with a criminal offence stands to lose dearly in personal liberty, in social life and psychological well-being. The presumption is, therefore, a pivotal element of a culture of democracy and human rights. This study is prompted by the realisation that the presumption of innocence, which ought to constitute one of the most fundamental rights in any criminal justice system, is being eroded steadily in South Africa. In this regard, a significant area of concern is the current bail laws which, in my estimation, make a big dent into the right to be presumed innocent. The bail laws are part of government’s policies directed at fighting crime. However, the pre-occupation with crime control measures threatens to reverse the hard-won rights of the accused and threatens to undermine individual liberty. Also, these measures are incompatible with the constitutional commitment to a culture of human rights.
6
Ebrahim, Suleiman. "The constitutionality of section 60 (11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997 where an applicant for bail relies on a weak state's case during a section 60(11)(a) application." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/65645.
Full textAbstract:
In South Africa, as in most jurisdictions which profess to be based on an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, the right against compelled self-incrimination is a guaranteed Constitutional right. This study is prompted by the realization that the right against self-incrimination is being undermined and eroded by an aspect of South Africa’s bail laws. The current study addresses the constitutional validity of section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in so far as it allows for the admission of incriminating evidence at trial, in contravention of the accused’s right against self-incrimination, which incriminatory evidence was tendered by the applicant during a bail application in circumstances where the applicant was compelled to prove that he would be acquitted at trial where reliance is placed on a weak State’s case in proving exceptional circumstances in compliance with section 60(11)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Whilst section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is undoubtedly aimed at combatting crime, the pre-occupation with crime control measures threatens to undermine individual liberty and poses a threat to our Constitutional project of building a human rights culture. I advance an argument which supports the view that section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is unconstitutional, in the above context, in that it infringes upon the accused’s right against compelled self-incrimination at trial and does not amount to a justifiable limitation on the rights of an accused in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. I also advance an alternative legal remedy aimed at fulfilling the initial mischief which Section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was designed to prevent in order to bring the section in line with the Constitution and a rights-based society.Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2017.
Procedural Law
LLM
Unrestricted
7
Sami-Kistnan, Karthigesi. "A critical analysis of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 "The shoot to kill debate"." Diss., 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/25186.
Full textAbstract:
‘A critical analysis of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 - ‘The shoot to kill debate’ sought to investigate the rationale and necessity behind the call for yet another amendment of section 49, that purports to clarify the rules under which police are allowed to use their firearms. Bold statements emerged from South Africa’s leaders and several politicians, urging the police to ‘shoot to kill’, and may have the effect of threatening the country’s young and vulnerable constitutional democracy. The research comprised an historical overview of section 49, encompassing the use of force pre- and post- Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 1998, followed by an overview of the current section 49. On the face of it, section 49 violates some constitutionally protected rights, among which are the right to life, to freedom and security, against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and to a fair trial, which includes the right to be presumed innocent. The ‘new’ section 49 however, withstood Constitutional muster as set out in Re: S v Walters&another. The research proceeded to contrast the current section 49, against the common law defence of private defence. A private individual invoking the defence of private defence is weighed against the law enforcement official invoking the defence under section 49. It is argued that the level of proof in the latter is higher as opposed to the former, resulting in the contention that the law enforcement officer is unfairly discriminated against. The reverse onus, whereby the onus is shifted onto the arrestor, is further canvassed. In an endeavour to interpret the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, the researcher considered international instruments such as the Canadian Constitution, where the use of force in effecting an arrest is regarded as legitimate, under certain conditions. In concluding the research it was established that the voiceferous calls, for the police to be able to ‘shoot to kill’, is both unnecessary and irresponsible. Section 49 has survived constitutional scrutiny. The use of force when effecting an arrest is sanctioned, provided that it is in line with the constitutional provisions where the sanctity of human life is respected and emphasized. The police do not need more powers to use deadly force because they already have all the powers that they need! There is a lack of knowledge and understanding by the leaders on the application and interpretation of section 49. Proper and effective training of police in Criminal Procedure and Criminal Law, specifically in the interpretation and understanding of section 49, with proper guidelines to limit the potentially excessive scope of section 49, is identified. The training should also include the mind set that ‘shooting to kill’, should not be taken lightly, should be limited and confined to what is reasonable and proportional in the circumstances and should only be exercised as a last resort A fully capacitated and well resourced police force will also empower and enable police officials.Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011.
Public Law
unrestricted
8
De, Chermont Charles Roblou Louis. "A Critical discussion of Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988." Diss., 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/17952.
Full textAbstract:
A brief analysis of South African Law relating to intoxication as a defence prior to
1988 is given. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the
statutory crime created by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of
1988. Various points of criticism against the wording of section 1 (1) as well as the
problems with regard to its application in practice are set out. In conclusion a draft
for a new, more effective wording for section 1 (1) is givenCriminal & Procedural Law
LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)
9
Dzinotyiweyi, Tafaranazvo. "Corporate criminal liability in South Africa: why section 332 of the criminal procedure act may not be most effective way to regulate corporate crimes in South Africa." Thesis, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/10539/27774.
Full textAbstract:
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
of Laws by Coursework and Research Report at the University of the
Witwatersrand, JohannesburgWith the upsurge of corporate activity in the world many countries have incorporated ways in which to regulate corporate crimes. That has been achieved through ‘corporate criminal liability’. Companies are juristic persons, therefore criminal liability cannot be attached to a company through its direct conduct. Unlike natural persons, companies can only be found criminally liable through the conduct of their agents; through the concept of vicarious liability. With all jurisdictions in the world governing corporate crimes through vicarious liability, there are different approaches that have been incorporated in regulating corporate criminal liability. The United States of America uses a system known as the principle of aggregation while the UK uses the doctrine of identification. With South Africa using the basics of vicarious liability and with potential problems being rooted in the constitutionality of the legislation governing corporate criminal liability, it is possible that section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act is not the most effective approach to regulating corporate criminal liability
MT 2019
10
Mare, Ruan. "The constitutional validity of section 78(1B) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 with regard to section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996." Diss., 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/27927.
Full textAbstract:
This study evaluates the constitutionality of section 78(1B) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA), which places the burden of proving criminal capacity on the party who raises the issue, against section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CRSA). In a legal system such as ours, that has a high regard for equality, any form of unequal treatment must be scrutinised, assessed and, if found to be unjust, rooted out. Even more so where the unequal treatment affects a marginalised minority group such as the mentally disabled. This study weighs section 78(1B) against section 9(1) of the CRSA. It also weighs the section against section 9(3) of the CRSA. Attempts are made to justify possible infringements according to section 36 of the CRSA. An appropriate remedy is then ascertained. This study also provides the historical development of section 78(1B) of the CPA – both in the common law and statute. This study furthermore provides original guidelines and principles in assessing expert evidence where criminal capacity is placed in dispute due to a mental illness or defect of the accused. The main findings are that section 78(1B) infringes on both section 9(1) and section 9(3), that it cannot be justified in terms of section 36 of the CRSA and that the appropriate remedy is the striking out of the whole section from the CPA. CopyrightDissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Public Law
unrestricted
Books on the topic "Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act"
1
Tasmania. Office of Law Reform Commissioner. Section 408 of the Criminal Code Act 1924. [Hobart: The Commission], 1989.
Find full text
2
New South Wales. Law Reform Commission. Review of section 409B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Sydney: New South Wales. Law Reform Commission, 1998.
Find full text
3
Commission, New South Wales Law Reform. Review of section 409B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Sydney: The Commission, 1997.
Find full text
4
Code of practice issued under Section 377 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. London: TSO, 2003.
Find full text
5
Plotnikoff, Joyce. A publication arising from section 57 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. London: Security Group, 1998.
Find full text
6
Act, NACRO Working Group on Sentences made under Section 53 of the 1933 Children and Young Persons. Grave crimes, grave doubts: Report of the NACRO Working Group on Sentences made under Section 53 of the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act. London: National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, 1988.
Find full text
7
Parliament, Great Britain, and Great Britain. Lord Chancellor's Dept., eds. Double jeopardy and prosecution appeals: Report on two references under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965. London: Stationery Office, 2001.
Find full text
8
Criminal law: Corroboration of evidence in criminal trials : report on a reference under section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965. London: H.M.S.O., 1991.
Find full text
9
US GOVERNMENT. Laws concerning the Access Board: Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, section 502 of the Rehabilition Act of 1973, section 504 of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990. Washington, DC (1331 F St., N.W., Washington 20004-1111): The Board, 1994.
Find full text
10
Canada. Bill: An act to render operative the Carillon and Grenville section of the Montreal and Bytown Railway. [Toronto: J. Lovell, 2001.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act"
1
Whish, Richard, and David Bailey. "10. Competition Act 1998 and the cartel offence: public enforcement and procedure." In Competition Law. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law-ocl/9780198779063.003.0010.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter describes the system of public enforcement under the Competition Act 1998. Reinforced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act 2013, the Competition Act provides a set of procedural rules of investigation for the enforcement of the Chapter I and II prohibitions. After a section on complaints, it considers the extent to which it may be possible to receive guidance from the Competition and Markets Authority (‘the CMA’) on the application of the Act. It then deals in turn with enforcement of the Competition Act 1998, the criminal cartel offence and company director disqualification. This is followed by an overview of the concurrency provisions, stating that the CMA works hand-in-hand with the sectoral regulators. The final two sections discuss the appeal mechanism under the Competition Act and the possibility of Article 267 references to the Court of Justice.
2
Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "8. Issues in the course of trial." In Evidence Concentrate. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198803867.003.0008.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter examines a number of procedural matters in criminal trials. It first explains suspect evidence and the erosion of the rules on corroboration under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. It then considers the Turnbull direction on identification and Lucas direction on lies by the defendant and the procedures for identification in Code D of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. It continues with a review of some aspects of examination and cross examination, including the witness’s use of memory refreshing documents under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the admissibility of inconsistent statements of the witness under the Criminal Procedure Act 1865, and the rule of finality on collateral questions addressed to a witness. The chapter also examines the rules on cross examination of complainants in sexual cases on previous sexual history and the case law under section 41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
3
Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "9. Opinion evidence." In Evidence Concentrate. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198803867.003.0009.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter, which focuses on opinion evidence in criminal and civil cases in the UK, explains the rule on the admissibility of opinion, including expert opinion, as well as notice and disclosure in criminal cases under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014. The criteria for the admissibility of expert evidence, the responsibilities of expert witnesses, and the approach of the courts to new areas of expertise are examined in detail. It also considers the presentation of expert evidence, including the use of court-appointed experts, in civil cases under the Civil Procedure Rules, and, finally, examines the ultimate issue rule, which has been abolished by section 33(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972.
4
Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "9. Opinion evidence." In Evidence Concentrate, 174–91. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198840633.003.0009.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter, which focuses on opinion evidence in criminal and civil cases in the UK, explains the rule on the admissibility of opinion, including expert opinion, as well as notice and disclosure in criminal cases under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014. The criteria for the admissibility of expert evidence, the responsibilities of expert witnesses, and the approach of the courts to new areas of expertise are examined in detail. It also considers the presentation of expert evidence, including the use of court-appointed experts, in civil cases under the Civil Procedure Rules, and, finally, examines the ultimate issue rule, which has been abolished by section 33(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972.
5
Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "3. Confessions and the defendant’s silence." In Evidence Concentrate. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198803867.003.0003.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter focuses on confessions and on the defendant’s pre-trial silence. It explains how a defendant may be convicted on the evidence of a confession alone. It analyses the definition of a confession as specified in section 82(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and how a confession proffered by the prosecution or by a co-defendant may be excluded by rule under PACE. The chapter also considers the preservation of the common law discretion to exclude confession evidence as well as the procedure for police interrogation of suspects under PACE. It concludes with an examination of how the jury at trial may draw an inference of guilt under sections 34, 36, and 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
6
Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "3. Confessions and the defendant’s silence." In Evidence Concentrate, 37–60. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198840633.003.0003.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter focuses on confessions and on the defendant’s pre-trial silence. It explains how a defendant may be convicted on the evidence of a confession alone. It analyses the definition of a confession as specified in section 82(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and how a confession proffered by the prosecution or by a co-defendant may be excluded by rule under PACE. The chapter also considers the preservation of the common law discretion to exclude confession evidence as well as the procedure for police interrogation of suspects under PACE. It concludes with an examination of how the jury at trial may draw an inference of guilt under sections 34, 36, and 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
7
Nason, Sarah. "Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review in the United Kingdom." In Judicial Review of Administration in Europe, 82–86. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867609.003.0016.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter focuses on administrative procedure and judicial review in the United Kingdom. Initially, it should be stressed that administrative law is different across the UK due to devolution. The UK Supreme Court generally acts as a final court of harmonizing case-law principles. As the UK constitution is uncodified, the existence of constitutional provisions concerning judicial review remains somewhat controversial, but the necessity of judicial review is thought to be required by the rule of law. The scope of judicial review is generally governed by judicial precedent. Under section 84 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, the High Court must refuse to grant a remedy 'if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred'. In general, there is no right on judicial review to claim damages for losses caused by unlawful administrative actions. It is usually only possible to receive damages in judicial review claims if there is another established cause of action, separate to the ground for judicial review.
8
Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "4. Improperly obtained evidence other than confessions." In Evidence Concentrate. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198803867.003.0004.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter focuses on evidence that is relevant but improperly obtained and thus may be excluded by judicial discretion. It looks at the exclusionary discretion contained within section 78 of the UK’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and explains how common law and statutory exclusionary discretion may be exercised in relation to other areas of evidence, such as character evidence and hearsay evidence, other than confessions. The chapter also looks at the most common areas of exclusion, other than confession evidence, including breach or evasion of legislation such as PACE and the Codes of Practice. It also reviews when a stay of prosecution might be the appropriate procedure. Finally, it discusses the relevant principles of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that are enshrined in section 78 of PACE.
9
Spencer, Maureen, and John Spencer. "4. Improperly obtained evidence other than confessions." In Evidence Concentrate, 61–78. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198840633.003.0004.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter focuses on evidence that is relevant but improperly obtained and thus may be excluded by judicial discretion. It looks at the exclusionary discretion contained within section 78 of the UK’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and explains how common law and statutory exclusionary discretion may be exercised in relation to other areas of evidence, such as character evidence and hearsay evidence, other than confessions. The chapter also looks at the most common areas of exclusion, other than confession evidence, including breach or evasion of legislation such as PACE and the Codes of Practice. It also reviews when a stay of prosecution might be the appropriate procedure. Finally, it discusses the relevant principles of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that are enshrined in section 78 of PACE.