Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act'

The general principle in criminal law is that a person is liable when committing a criminal offence. This may include an offence a person has facilitated or procured. Vicarious liability, a principle borrowed from civil law, is an exception to the general rule in that it allows for a person to be held liable for the criminal acts of another. Legal persons have no physical existence and do not have hands and brains like natural persons. A legal person acts through its directors, employees, members or representatives. The corporation, being distinct and separate from its agents, is held liable for the acts or omissions of its representatives. This liability exists even though the corporate body never acted. International recognition of corporate criminal liability can be based on vicarious liability, identification or aggregation. All these forms of liability are derived from the human actus and mens rea. The identification theory provides for the liability of the corporate body, when someone who is identified with it, acted during the course of his employment when committing the offence. Those acts are treated as the acts of the corporate body. The identification theory is normally applied where mens rea is a requirement of the offence. The Aggregation theory provides for criminal liability of the corporation based on the conduct of a group of members of the company taken collectively. This theory is applied effectively where it is difficult to prove that a single person within the company is responsible for the commission of the offence. In South Africa corporate criminal liability developed from vicarious liability. It is regulated by section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This liability is based on the special relationship between the director or servant and the corporate body. Corporations act through its agents. The agent can be a director, servant or a third person instructed by either of them. In terms of section 332(1) it is possible that the corporate body can be held liable even where the agent acted beyond the scope of his employment. The latter can be argued is an extension of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability, can be argued, is too broad, because the intention of the agent is imputed to the corporate body, without the enquiry of fault by the corporate body. This offends the general principles of substantive criminal law. Generally, liability in criminal law accrues to someone who committed the offence with the required state of mind. The constitutionality of section 332(1) Act 51 of 1977 is questioned. The question is asked whether it is desirable to punish a legal person for the behaviour of its representatives or employees. Criminal law purports to control the behaviour of individuals to be in line with the interest and values of society. There is doubt whether the same goal can be achieved with the prosecution of corporate bodies. Prosecution of corporate bodies results in stigma to the corporation, which results in suffering a loss of reputation. Some authors argue that civil remedies can control the activities of corporate bodies more effectively. This argument, however, fails to address the issue that criminal law concerns the harm inflicted by human beings, hence the need to regulate human conduct. Corporate criminal liability attempts to address the harm inflicted by corporate bodies. It regulates pollution, health, safety and business. This liability is firmly established around the world but requires further development and modern refinement in South Africa.
Abstract

“It has been said that the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice- once by the offender and once by the criminal justice system.”1 South Africa’s rape shield provision is contained in section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act.2 The purpose of its enactment is to protect a complainant in a sexual offence matter from secondary victimisation during the trial as far as possible, by restricting the type of evidence that is admissible and the circumstances under which such evidence can be found to be admissible. This rationale has come under attack for its effect on the fair trial rights of the accused. There has been no challenge to the constitutionality of section 227 before a court yet. However, there are numerous rumblings of discontent at the consequences of a provision that restricts evidence that could be necessary to prevent a wrongful conviction. This paper seeks to consider the constitutional debates surrounding section 227 and to determine whether, to the extent that they may prove to be constitutionally problematic, the potential constitutional challenges are justifiable under a limitations analysis. It is impossible to engage with the constitutionality of section 227 without first discussing the rationale behind rape shield laws in general. The structure of the paper is therefore as follows: firstly, the history and purpose of rape shield laws will be investigated, and secondly, the history of section 227 under South African law will be discussed.

Thesis ( LLM.) --University of Limpopo, 2019
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that a child’s best interests should be of primary consideration in any matter concerning him or her. Contrary to this value, and thereby excluding protection of child victims, section 154(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 simply focusses on anonymity protection of child offenders and witness involved in criminal proceedings. It currently expressly prohibits the publication of the identities of child offenders and witnesses when the media makes publications on the relevant criminal proceedings. However, this protection terminates once such child offenders and witnesses attain majority, therefore arbitrarily stripping them of the identity protection. As a result, media houses are not only at liberty to publish on criminal proceedings identifying child victims, but also to expose the identities of child offenders and witnesses upon attaining majority. Such publications have proved to impede on children’s rights, as well as to contribute to the psychological challenges faced by the children whenever they are exposed to the criminal justice system. In this study the constitutional validity of section 154(3) is investigated and it is argued that it is unconstitutional in all respects. The section contradicts the specific right afforded to all children in the Bill of Rights, as well as other ancillary rights, which ought to ensure the progressive realisation of the protection afforded in terms of section 154(3). It is recommended, firstly, that section 154(3) be declared unconstitutional, and be amended to include child victims within the ambit of its protection. Secondly, the protection should extend beyond the age of 18, in respect of all children involved in criminal proceedings.
National Research Foundation

Section 77(6)(a) deprives a judicial officer of his or her judicial discretion to consider the accused person s personal circumstances. If an accused person is not fit to stand trial and the court finds that, the accused committed a serious offence as contemplated in section 77(6)(a)(i) of the CPA then the court is obliged, automatically and in every case, to order that the accused to be detained in a psychiatric hospital or prison. If the court finds that the accused committed a less serious offence than one contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she did not committed any offence then the court is obliged, automatically and in every case to, in terms of section 77(6)(a)(ii), order that the accused be institutionalised as an involuntary mental health care user. In the case of De Vos No and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2015 1 SACR 18 (WCC) it was held that this deprivation amounts to the infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused persons, inter alia, to equality, dignity, freedom and security of the person as well as certain constitutional rights of children. Griesel J ordered that words be read-in to temporarily remedy this situation. The Constitutional Court did not confirm this order but did confirm that certain aspects of section 77(6) are unconstitutional and need to be addressed.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
Procedural Law
LLM
Unrestricted

Magister Legum - LLM
In South Africa, as in most jurisdictions, the presumption of innocence is a guaranteed constitutional right. The rationale of the presumption lies in the protection which it offers, since a person charged with a criminal offence stands to lose dearly in personal liberty, in social life and psychological well-being. The presumption is, therefore, a pivotal element of a culture of democracy and human rights. This study is prompted by the realisation that the presumption of innocence, which ought to constitute one of the most fundamental rights in any criminal justice system, is being eroded steadily in South Africa. In this regard, a significant area of concern is the current bail laws which, in my estimation, make a big dent into the right to be presumed innocent. The bail laws are part of government’s policies directed at fighting crime. However, the pre-occupation with crime control measures threatens to reverse the hard-won rights of the accused and threatens to undermine individual liberty. Also, these measures are incompatible with the constitutional commitment to a culture of human rights.

In South Africa, as in most jurisdictions which profess to be based on an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, the right against compelled self-incrimination is a guaranteed Constitutional right. This study is prompted by the realization that the right against self-incrimination is being undermined and eroded by an aspect of South Africa’s bail laws. The current study addresses the constitutional validity of section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in so far as it allows for the admission of incriminating evidence at trial, in contravention of the accused’s right against self-incrimination, which incriminatory evidence was tendered by the applicant during a bail application in circumstances where the applicant was compelled to prove that he would be acquitted at trial where reliance is placed on a weak State’s case in proving exceptional circumstances in compliance with section 60(11)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Whilst section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is undoubtedly aimed at combatting crime, the pre-occupation with crime control measures threatens to undermine individual liberty and poses a threat to our Constitutional project of building a human rights culture. I advance an argument which supports the view that section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is unconstitutional, in the above context, in that it infringes upon the accused’s right against compelled self-incrimination at trial and does not amount to a justifiable limitation on the rights of an accused in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. I also advance an alternative legal remedy aimed at fulfilling the initial mischief which Section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was designed to prevent in order to bring the section in line with the Constitution and a rights-based society.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2017.
Procedural Law
LLM
Unrestricted

‘A critical analysis of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 - ‘The shoot to kill debate’ sought to investigate the rationale and necessity behind the call for yet another amendment of section 49, that purports to clarify the rules under which police are allowed to use their firearms. Bold statements emerged from South Africa’s leaders and several politicians, urging the police to ‘shoot to kill’, and may have the effect of threatening the country’s young and vulnerable constitutional democracy. The research comprised an historical overview of section 49, encompassing the use of force pre- and post- Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 1998, followed by an overview of the current section 49. On the face of it, section 49 violates some constitutionally protected rights, among which are the right to life, to freedom and security, against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and to a fair trial, which includes the right to be presumed innocent. The ‘new’ section 49 however, withstood Constitutional muster as set out in Re: S v Walters&another. The research proceeded to contrast the current section 49, against the common law defence of private defence. A private individual invoking the defence of private defence is weighed against the law enforcement official invoking the defence under section 49. It is argued that the level of proof in the latter is higher as opposed to the former, resulting in the contention that the law enforcement officer is unfairly discriminated against. The reverse onus, whereby the onus is shifted onto the arrestor, is further canvassed. In an endeavour to interpret the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, the researcher considered international instruments such as the Canadian Constitution, where the use of force in effecting an arrest is regarded as legitimate, under certain conditions. In concluding the research it was established that the voiceferous calls, for the police to be able to ‘shoot to kill’, is both unnecessary and irresponsible. Section 49 has survived constitutional scrutiny. The use of force when effecting an arrest is sanctioned, provided that it is in line with the constitutional provisions where the sanctity of human life is respected and emphasized. The police do not need more powers to use deadly force because they already have all the powers that they need! There is a lack of knowledge and understanding by the leaders on the application and interpretation of section 49. Proper and effective training of police in Criminal Procedure and Criminal Law, specifically in the interpretation and understanding of section 49, with proper guidelines to limit the potentially excessive scope of section 49, is identified. The training should also include the mind set that ‘shooting to kill’, should not be taken lightly, should be limited and confined to what is reasonable and proportional in the circumstances and should only be exercised as a last resort A fully capacitated and well resourced police force will also empower and enable police officials.
Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011.
Public Law
unrestricted

A brief analysis of South African Law relating to intoxication as a defence prior to 1988 is given. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the statutory crime created by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988. Various points of criticism against the wording of section 1 (1) as well as the problems with regard to its application in practice are set out. In conclusion a draft for a new, more effective wording for section 1 (1) is given
Criminal & Procedural Law
LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws by Coursework and Research Report at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
With the upsurge of corporate activity in the world many countries have incorporated ways in which to regulate corporate crimes. That has been achieved through ‘corporate criminal liability’. Companies are juristic persons, therefore criminal liability cannot be attached to a company through its direct conduct. Unlike natural persons, companies can only be found criminally liable through the conduct of their agents; through the concept of vicarious liability. With all jurisdictions in the world governing corporate crimes through vicarious liability, there are different approaches that have been incorporated in regulating corporate criminal liability. The United States of America uses a system known as the principle of aggregation while the UK uses the doctrine of identification. With South Africa using the basics of vicarious liability and with potential problems being rooted in the constitutionality of the legislation governing corporate criminal liability, it is possible that section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act is not the most effective approach to regulating corporate criminal liability
MT 2019

This study evaluates the constitutionality of section 78(1B) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA), which places the burden of proving criminal capacity on the party who raises the issue, against section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CRSA). In a legal system such as ours, that has a high regard for equality, any form of unequal treatment must be scrutinised, assessed and, if found to be unjust, rooted out. Even more so where the unequal treatment affects a marginalised minority group such as the mentally disabled. This study weighs section 78(1B) against section 9(1) of the CRSA. It also weighs the section against section 9(3) of the CRSA. Attempts are made to justify possible infringements according to section 36 of the CRSA. An appropriate remedy is then ascertained. This study also provides the historical development of section 78(1B) of the CPA – both in the common law and statute. This study furthermore provides original guidelines and principles in assessing expert evidence where criminal capacity is placed in dispute due to a mental illness or defect of the accused. The main findings are that section 78(1B) infringes on both section 9(1) and section 9(3), that it cannot be justified in terms of section 36 of the CRSA and that the appropriate remedy is the striking out of the whole section from the CPA. Copyright
Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Public Law
unrestricted

Crime victims once played a prominent role in the criminal justice system. Historically, victims who sought to bring their wrongdoers to justice conducted their own investigations and argued their own cases or employed others to do so. As time passed, 
a distinction was drawn between offences against the social order and disputes between individuals. Crime control became a function of government and the state increased its responsibility for the investigation and punishment of criminal conduct. Gradually, the victim was removed from the proceedings and relegated to serving as a witness for the state. The assumption was that the state, whilst representing the interests of society, would represent the interests of the victim also. This fallacy provided the foundation for a criminal justice which, until recently, encourage victim exclusion. In recent years, there has been a clear trend towards re-introducing the right of victims to participate in the criminal justice process. This international trend has been labelled the &bdquo
return of the victim‟. In South Africa, the Constitution and, in particular, the Bill of Rights contained therein underscore the move towards procedural rights for victims of crime. Moreover, the South African government has taken significant legislative steps to ensure that victims have formal rights in criminal justice proceedings. However, to date, comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of whether or not victims should be allowed a meaningful role in the process of plea and sentence negotiations. One of the aims of this study is to determine whether victims‟ rights are properly understood, defined and implemented within the criminal justice system. In particular, this study aims to clarify the rights of victims who find themselves affiliated with a specific stage of criminal prosecution, namely, negotiated justice. 
 
 
 

It is common knowledge that owing to their particular vulnerability children worldwide falls prey to physical and/or sexual violence in the home and/or community or witness criminal acts. Consequently children are called upon to testify in a court of law to cruelties or acts of violence. As a result of their developmental shortcomings and immaturity, children find the criminal justice system extremely intimidating and challenging. The importance of realising a justice system that not only affords an accused person the right to a fair trial but also protects and safeguards the rights of the child victims of and witnesses to the crime is thus indisputable. The purpose of this research was therefore to assist the South African criminal justice system in its on-going challenge to find a balance between the right of the accused person to a fair trial and the protection and safeguarding of the rights of child victims and child witnesses. The protection and safeguarding of the rights of child victims and child witnesses in terms of the South African Constitution, applicable domestic law and international instruments relating thereto were extensively discussed and shortcomings identified. Possible solutions to ensure that child witnesses and child victims are adequately protected and supported during the trial stage of the criminal process were advanced. Particular emphasis was placed on the role of an intermediary in assisting child victims and child witnesses during the court process. Comparative research on the protection of child victims and child witnesses in the criminal justice systems of New Zealand and Namibia were also conducted. Conclusions drawn from comparative studies were used to recommend appropriate changes to the current system. It is submitted that the adequate protection and safeguarding of the rights of child victims and child witnesses are dependent not only on sound legal principles but also on governmental and other involved stakeholders’ commitment toward the realisation of these rights. In order to give proper effect to the protection and safeguarding of child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights, it is proposed that the recommendations made throughout this study should be adopted and implemented. In this regard the role of an intermediary is crucial and the use of intermediaries should be promoted.
Private Law
LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans
Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg word bespreek. Hierdie verweer is van onlangse oorsprong en verskil van die verwere van ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid as gevolg van jeugdigheid en geestesongesteldheid soos in artikel 78(1) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 uiteengesit word. Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid dek gevalle waar dit deur faktore soos emosionele spanning veroorsaak is. Hierdie verweer staan ook as die algemene ontoerekeningsvatbaarheidsverweer bekend. In 'n aantal beslissings, soos onder andere, S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) en S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A), word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid wei in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg bestaansreg het. Ten einde met 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid te slaag, is die blote ipse dixit van die beskuldigde onvoldoende. 'n Behoorlike grondslag vir die verweer moet gele word. Die bewyslas in die geval van 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid word bespreek.
The defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity in the South African criminal law is discussed. It is a relatively new defence and should be distinguished from the defences such as youth and mental illness set out in section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This defence covers cases in which criminal capacity is excluded by factors such as intoxication and emotional stress. It is also known as a general defence of criminal incapacity. In a number of cases, inter alia in S v Arnold 1985(3) SA 256 (C); S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) and S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1 097 (A) the conclusion is reached that the defence, non-pathological criminal incapacity, does have a right of existence in the South African criminal law. In order to successfully raise the defence on non-pathological criminal incapacity, the mere ipse dixit of the accused is insufficient. A proper foundation for the defence must be laid. The onus of proof is discussed.
Criminal & Procedural Law
LL. M.

This Doctoral thesis entitled the Constitutionality of Employers' Investigative Procedures and Disciplinary Hearing Processes with Specific Reference to Dismissal of Employees on the Basis of Criminal Misconducts in South Africa, focusses on individual labour law principles of fair labour practices entrenched in section 23(1) of the Constitution. The thesis deals with fairness in situation where an employee who is suspected of committing a criminal act is investigated and subsequently goes through a disciplinary hearing for dismissal. It determines the extent to which an employee’s criminal guilt is decided before dismissal. As such, the thesis is based upon South African judicial interpretation of the right to fair dismissal. In the process the thesis examines the application of principles informing the employer’s duty to provide fair reason concerning the dismissal of employees criminal suspects. In examining if employers observe constitutional transformative objective when conducting criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings - the thesis reviews the extent to which the employer respects constitutional rationales of equity based on the principles of natural justice. These natural justice principles are the basis upon which section 23(1) fairness is founded. Section 23 (1) is implemented through the LRA provisions. The thesis then concludes that, only one principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem is respected within employer flexibility-based fairness while the other principle - nemo judex in propria sua causa is ignored. It is this denial that causes serious procedural challenges in the quest for equity intended in section 23(1) fair labour practices. It is upon these foundational equity concerns that this thesis opposes the flexibility in employer’s criminal investigations and disciplinary hearing processes entrenched in item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 of the LRA fair procedure for dismissal of employees suspected of criminal acts. The thesis interlinks labour law and criminal law to advocate for the missing constitutionally justiciable fairness for employees who have committed criminal misconducts. It argues that the current judicial interpretation of labour law fairness is based upon the principle of flexibility underlying dismissals, asserting that fairness based on flexibility breeds informal procedural processes which exempt employers from observing crucial constitutional fairness principles expressed through proportionality-based prescripts. The thesis concludes that the practice of including the right against self-incrimination in employment law, done in other common law countries be introduced into the South African labour law through section 39 of the Constitution so that the identified procedural challenges are regulated.
Mercantile Law
LL.D.