Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Self-Defence of State'

The thesis is first and foremost the examination of the notion and consequences of ‘state failure’ in international law. The disputes surrounding criteria for creation and recognition of states pertain to efforts to analyse legal and factual issues unravelling throughout the continuing existence of states, as best evidenced by the ‘state failure’ phenomenon. It is argued that although the ‘statehood’ of failed states remains uncontested, their sovereignty is increasingly considered to be dependent on the existence of effective governments. The second part of this thesis focuses on the examinations of the legal consequences of the continuing existence of failed states in the context of jus ad bellum. Since the creation of the United Nations the ability of states to resort to armed force without violating what might be considered as the single most important norm of international law, has been considerably limited. State failure and increasing importance of non-state actors has become a greatly topical issue within recent years in both scholarship and the popular imagination. There have been important legal developments within international law, which have provoked much academic, and in particular, legal commentary. On one level, the thesis contributes to this commentary. Despite the fact that the international community continues to perpetuate a notion of ‘statehood’ which allows the state-centric system of international law to exist, when dealing with practical and political realities of state failure, international law may no longer consider external sovereignty of states as an undeniable entitlement to statehood. Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis is whether the implicit and explicit invocation of the state failure provides sufficient legal basis for the intervention in self-defence against non-state actors in located in failed states. It has been argued that state failure has a profound impact, the extent of which is yet to be fully explored, on the modern landscape of peace and security.

Actualment, l’evolució tecnològica, particularment en el camp del espai cibernètic, ha donat lloc a reptes seriosos per la seguretat dels Estats. Ocasionalment, els atacs cibernètics tenen els mateixos efectes destructius que les armes militars. Donada la manca d’acords entre Estats per tal de constituir noves normes sobre el ciberespai, la comunitat internacional ha provat de fer front als atacs cibernètics mitjançant l’aplicació per analogia del Dret Internacional existent. En el primer capítol, el nostre estudi inicia amb una aproximació històrica al principi de la prohibició de l’ús de la força, el qual té com a finalitat estudiar el seu desenvolupament. Més tard, seguim informant-nos sobre els instruments legals i la jurisprudència més rellevants per aclarir dit principi en el Dret Internacional contemporani. En la segona part identifiquem l’abast i significat del principi de la prohibició de l’ús de la força i proporcionem una àmplia visió sobre tal principi examinant les seves característiques més significatives, com ara l’aplicablitat del principi en relacions internacionals i la seva inaplicabilitat en conflictes intraestatals. El segon capítol està relacionat amb el dret de legítima defensa com excepció de la prohibició de l’amenaça o ús de la força. Principalment, en aquest capítol, examinarem les consideracions i característiques generals del principi del dret de legítima defensa. A continuació, estudiarem l’atac armat alhora que els requisits fonamentals i altres requisits significatius (necessitat, proporcionalitat i immediatesa) per a justificar el dret de legítima defensa contra actors estatals i no estatals. En relació amb el requisit d’immediatesa, examinarem algunes controvèrsies legals sobre legítima defensa anticipada, preventiva o fins i tot a posteriori, en en el Dret Internacional contemporani. El tercer capítol is la pedra angular del nostre estudi. Està relacionat amb el dret de legítima defensa contra operacions cibernètiques per part d’actors estatals i no estatals. Inicialment, examinarem el concepte, les característiques i la classificació de les diferents operacions cibernètiques. A continuació, de conformitat amb la quantitat de força emprada, analitzarem les operacions cibernètiques i altres activitats relacionades les quals, directa o indirectament, puguin violar el principi de la prohibició de l’amenaça o ús de la força. A més, estudiarem altres tipus d’operacions cibernètiques que puguin ser inferiors al nivell requerit per dit principi. A la llum de la gravetat, examinar aquelles operacions cibernètiques que puguin constituir un atac armat per a justificar el dret de legítima es tractarà en una altra secció dins d’aquest capítol. A la llum dels atacs cibernètics indirectes duts a terme per actors no estatals, s’estudiaran, també, les dificultats a l’hora d’atribuir l’atac cibernètic als Estats. Finalment, l’última secció està relacionada amb l’adaptació dels altres requisits del dret de legítima defensa (necessitat, proporcionalitat i immediatesa) a l’exercici de tal dret contra els atacs cibernètics, posant atenció especial en la possibilitat legal d’actuar en legítima defensa abans que ocorri l’atac cibernètic.
Nowadays, technological advancement, particularly in the field of cyberspace, has brought serious challenges for the security of States. Occasionally, cyber attacks have the same destructive effects as military weapons. Given the lack of agreement among States to constitute new norms on cyberspace, the international community has always attempted to cope with cyber threats by analogy from current International Law. In the First Chapter, our research begins with a historical approach to the principle of the prohibition of the use of force, which aims at studying its development. Later on, we keep on inquiring the most significant law instruments and international jurisprudence to clarify such principle in contemporary International Law. In the second part, we identify the scope and meaning of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force and provide an extensive view on such principle by examining its most significant features, such as the applicability of the principle in international relations and its inapplicability in intra-State conflicts, etc. Besides, examining the different modalities of the use of force is part of this chapter. Both the scope and meaning of the threat of use of force will be surveyed separately from the scope and meaning of the use of force. Finally, at a glance, we will explain the different exceptions of the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force. The Second Chapter is related to the right of self-defence and the exception of the prohibition of the threat or use of force. Primarily, in this Chapter, we will examine the general considerations and characteristics of the principle of the right of self-defence. After that, we will study the armed attack as well as the primary requirement and other significant requirements (necessity, proportionality and immediacy) to justify the right of self-defence against State and non-State actors. They will take up an important part of our research. In relation to the immediacy requirement, we will examine some legal controversies about the anticipatory, preventive self-defence or even the a posteriori in contemporary international law. The Third Chapter is the cornerstone of our research. It is related to the right of self-defence against cyber operation by States and non-State actors. Initially, we examine the concept, characteristics and classification of cyber operations. Afterwards, in conformity with the amount of force, we examine cyber operations and other related activities which, directly and indirectly, may violate the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force. Moreover, we survey other kind of cyber operations that may be below the level of such principle. In light of the graveness, those cyber operations that may constitute an armed attack to justify the right of self-defence will be examined in another section within this very same chapter. In light of indirect cyber-attacks carried out by non-State actors, difficulties to attribute the cyber attack to the States will be surveyed, too. Last section is related to the adaptation of the other requirements of the right of self-defence (necessity, proportionality and immediacy) to the exercise of such right against cyber-attacks, with especial attention to the legal possibility to act in preventive or anticipatory self-defence before a cyber-attack occurs.

The dissertation examines whether Kenya can retaliate in full self-defence against Al-Shabaab on Somali territory. Article 51 UN Charter contains the right to self-defence and is an exception to Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force. The development of the right to self-defence is illustrated with reference to state practice, ICJ decisions and opinions of legal scholars. An enquiry is made into what the required nature of the military attack should be to be classified as an armed attack. This essentially encompasses the question whether an act by a non-state actor is of a sufficient gravity to trigger the right to self-defence. Furthermore, an enquiry is made into whether non-state actors, of whom attacks cannot be attributed to a state, can nevertheless launch armed attacks and trigger the right to self-defence. The current status of the traditional effective control test of attribution is examined as well as the unwilling or unable test which determines whether it is necessary to make use of full-scale self-defence.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
Public Law
LLM
Unrestricted

The United Nations, states and regional organisations have spent invaluable time and resources to maintain international peace and security in a largely anarchical international system, owing to armed conflicts between states and non-state actors (NSAs). This state of affairs is exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorist networks, failed states and a disregard for international norms by powerful states. This is in spite of the normative and policy frameworks that have been established to constrain the use of force by states in the territories of one another. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force by states in their relations, unless they rely on the exceptions in articles 51 and 42 and the customary law doctrine of ?consent?. In addition, it was the requirement of international law that a state may use force against NSAs, only if it attributes the conduct of the NSAs to a state. This thesis examines the extraterritorial use of force by states against terrorist non-state actors, and the focus is to answer the question ?whether the law of self-defence has been transformed?. The investigation has been conducted with particular attention to whether the post 9/11 practice of states, the Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, the use of pre-emptive self-defence by the United States, Israel and a few other states, the disregard for attribution of the conduct of NSAs to states and the overwhelming international support for contemporary incidents of the use of force by states against NSAs, such as Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Al-Shaabab, the Khorasan Group and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, have caused a change in the law of self-defence. Firstly, the study finds that pre-emptive self-defence which does not require imminence has not been accepted as part of international law and it argues that its unlawful use could not cause a change in the law. Secondly, as far as the use of self-defence against non-state actors is concerned, it finds that the actions of the United States against Al Qaeda following resolutions 1368 and 1373 of the Security Council, the lowering of the attribution standard and the toleration by the international community of the use of force against terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, Ecuador, Somalia and Mali without attributing their conduct to states, could be interpreted as amounting to a transformation of the law of self-defence. Accordingly, this study recommends the acceptance of the lowered threshold in the attribution requirement, but it also recommends a corresponding disregard of ?pre-emptive self-defence? as not forming part of the corpus of international law. It is also recommended that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court be enlarged to try transnational terrorism as one of the egregious crimes against mankind.
Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2016.
Centre for Human Rights
LLD
Unrestricted

The purpose of this thesis to to investigate if the complex and ambiguous means of a hybrid warfare strategy in the context of the ‘armed attack’ threshold. The ‘armed attack’ threshold sits within the UN Charter article 51 and it constitutes the legal provision that the right to self-defence, both unilaterally and collectively, is only triggered in the event of an ‘armed attack’. It is therefore important to determine if this threshold can through the ambiguous and complex structure of hybrid warfare be circumvented or obfuscated to prevent, delay or weaken a State’s ability to act in self- defence or by other means. To examine this problem, this thesis approached it by describing the concept of hybrid warfare and the legal framework that constitute the ‘armed attack’ notion in the context of self-defence. And by, to the extent possible analysed if the hybrid warfare means; cyber warfare, information warfare and the use or support of proxy forces could individually amount to an ‘armed attack’ by viewing how these means were used in Ukraine by Russia. This thesis argues, that a hybrid adversary can through the inherently complex and ambiguous nature of hybrid warfare and its means, obfuscate its attribution under certain circumstance to prevent, limit or delay the ability of a State to act in self-defence or by other means.

Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, once said that '... it [will] probably always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it provided its own mortal enemies with the means by which it was destroyed'. Was Goebbels right? Does democracy provide its enemies with the means to destroy it? Is democracy defenceless against anti-democratic ideologies? The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister, the late Yitzchak Rabin, on 4 November 1995 triggered a public debate in Israel about the ability of the state to deal with anti-democratic agents endeavouring to alter a democratic system in the service of an antidemocratic ideology. Almost everyone who took part in the debate assumed that the state has a right to defend itself against such ideologies and those acting in the name of such ideologies. The debate focused on the limitations of this right, offering various boundaries to the permission given to the state to use coercive measures, and more specifically, criminal law. In this thesis I confront Goebbels's proposition and tackle the counter-presumption that the state has a right to defend itself against anti-democratic ideologies. I seek to find a moral source for the state's right to self-defence against internal anti-democratic ideologies.

La légalité est un principe qui apparaît comme une pierre angulaire de la notion d’État de droit. L’expression « principe de légalité » a été longtemps utilisée pour affirmer que l’administration doit respecter les règles de droit. Mais, en cas d’une crise majeure, la légalité peut être atténuée. Il est toléré une légalité de crise. L’État a besoin, de disposer d’autres outils juridiques que ceux ordinaires. Des pouvoirs exceptionnels sont conférés à certaines autorités ou reconnus à certaines personnes par des dispositifs juridiques de nature très différente. Cette théorie des circonstances exceptionnelles vise à assurer la continuité de l’État. Elle repose sur l’adage controversé « nécessité fait loi » en vertu duquel dans les cas extrêmes, certains actes qui seraient illégaux en période normale sont justifiés. L’état de nécessité et la légitime défense de l’État sont les principaux faits justificatifs du recours aux pouvoirs de crise. En droit positif, les régimes de crise sont hétérogènes et redondants. La persistance de la menace terroriste accentue l’accumulation des lois et des mesures antiterroristes. L’hétérogénéité des régimes français de crise pose la question de l’unification des principaux états de crise par la réécriture de leur cadre constitutionnel. Le contrôle de l’état d’exception est tempéré par d’importantes prérogatives reconnues à l’exécutif. Cela peut être un risque pour la garantie de l’exercice des libertés fondamentales surtout lorsque l’exception devient permanente ou lorsque le droit commun est contaminé par le droit dérogatoire
Legality is a principle that appears as a cornerstone of the rule of law. The term "principle of legality" has long been used to assert that the administration must respect the rules of law. But, in the event of a major crisis, legality can be mitigated. It is tolerated a legality of crisis. The state needs other legal tools than ordinary ones. Exceptional powers are conferred on certain authorities or recognized to certain persons by legal devices of a very different nature. This theory of exceptional circumstances aims to ensure the continuity of the state. It is based on the controversial "necessity is law" saying that in extreme cases, certain acts that would be illegal in normal times are justified. State of necessity and self-defense of the state are the main justifications for the use of crisis powers. In positive law, crisis regimes are heterogeneous and redundant. The persistence of the terrorist threat accentuates the accumulation of anti-terrorist laws and measures. The heterogeneity of the French crisis regimes raises the question of the unification of the main states of crisis by rewriting their constitutional framework. The control of the state of emergency is tempered by important prerogatives recognized by the executive. This can be a risk for guaranteeing the exercise of fundamental freedoms, especially when the exception becomes permanent or when common law is contaminated by the derogatory right

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage
The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights

The "unwilling or unable" doctrine and the right of self-defence against non- state actors ABSTRACT For several decades, the fight against international terrorism has been a major challenge for the entire international community. States try to fight these non-state actors in various ways. One of them is trying to neutralize a non-state actor in the territory of the state in which this actor has settled and from which he is preparing and coordinating his attacks. States often invoke the right to self-defense in the case of such actions, stating that the state in whose territory the non-state entity is located is unable or unwilling to deal with it on its own. This paper is devoted to the right to self-defense against non-state actors and the emerging doctrine of "unwilling or unable". The paper is divided into an introduction, four main chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter is devoted generally to the prohibition of the use of force and the threat of force. The second chapter deals with the right to self-defense. First, attention is paid to the right to self-defense in general, where an armed attack is discussed in more detail. Subsequently, a restrictive and extensive approach to the right to self-defense is presented. Attention is then paid more to the preemptive and preventive self-defense and the...

From 2004 to the present the United States Government has employed drones for cross-border law enforcement purposes in the sovereign territory of Pakistan. Various opinions exist as to whether the US is justified in its intrusion into the territory of another sovereign state. Matters regarding to both the integrity of territorial sovereignty and the use of force by a foreign country within the sovereign domain of another state are confirmed by both customary and treaty law. The United States and Pakistan are both parties to the two treaties that enshrine the principle of sovereignty - the UN Charter and the Chicago Convention of 1944. Drones are being used increasingly by governments and private individuals for a host of reasons, ranging from military aggression to aerial recreation. They fulfil various military and useful other tasks, with the result that they are becoming increasingly indispensable. But, as with all technological innovations, the beneficial aspects of these inventions are counterbalanced by the aggressive and destructive use that can be made of them. Some see the employment of drones for military purposes, such as the elimination of terrorist leaders linked to Al Qaeda in Pakistan, as preferable to whole scale destructive warfare. By the same token though, the argument can be made that the reasoning offered to justify intrusions into the sovereign territory of another state is insubstantial to the point of being dispensable and that the abuse of drones as weapons on these insubstantial grounds thereby becomes a real threat to civilised society and to international peace and security. The purpose - and burden - of this study are to debate the legality and the justifications for the use of drones for law enforcement (seemingly military) purposes by the United States in the sovereign territory of Pakistan. A clear view of the permissibility and legality of this campaign in Pakistan is of considerable consequence to other countries that could find their sovereignty compromised. Two essential ‘tools’ used to establish legal clarity in this matter are the Chicago Convention of 1944 and the UN Charter of 1945. The relevant provisions of these international agreements will therefore be studied in detail. Both these conventions were signed by Pakistan and the United States, and both contain provisions protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states. Reference will additionally be made to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to interpret the provisions of the Chicago Convention which is viewed by some as appropriate to regulate drone warfare. The writer intends to use this Convention to show that the applicability of the Chicago Convention may be open to dispute and that, instead, cross-border drone operations and the protection of aerial sovereignty depend on the purport of article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the customary principle of aerial sovereignty. Therefore, the need to thoroughly examine and understand the concepts of the so-called ‘war on terror’ and the principle of preemptive self-defence is considered critical for the purpose in hand, as the United States uses these elements as justification for their infringement of Pakistani sovereign territory and their cross-border use of force in drone operations. These matters will, therefore, receive appropriate attention by reference to the relevant provisions in the UN Charter as well as the principles set out in international case law dealing with the subject matter.
Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2014.
gm2015
Centre for Human Rights
LLM
Unrestricted

This research examines the legal issues surrounding killing in defence of property in three selected jurisdictions: South Africa, Cameroon and the United States. The comparative analysis illustrates that although the right to protect one’s property is universal, this defence is interpreted differently in the various jurisdictions. Another issue considered in the study is the constitutional right to life in each jurisdiction and whether or not an unlawful attack against one’s property creates a legal entitlement for the attacked party to take the life of another in defence of his or her property. Private defence of property is available when a person uses force to defend an interest in property, for example; to prevent a would-be thief from taking his own, or another’s property, to prevent someone from damaging his own or another’s property, to prevent an intruder from entering his own or another’s property. When an accused pleads private defence, his claim is that his harm-causing conduct was, in the circumstances, lawful. The reasonable use of force (short of deadly force) in the private defence of property is not disputed. However, the use of deadly force in protection of property is controversial, especially in a constitutional state such as South Africa where life should be prized above property. One should however also consider that there is a close link between the private defence of defending life and of protecting property. In many cases, an assault on property also involves a threat on life. However, there are cases of private defence of property where no threat to bodily integrity exists. These situations will be examined in all three jurisdictions and measured against the various constitutional imperatives. Conclusions and recommendations are made as regards the legal framework on the defence of property in the criminal law of the various jurisdictions.
Criminal and Procedural Law
LL. M.