Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Self-defense (International law)'

Cyber has been around for over a decade and yet we are still faces with a situation of a very weak or rather no regulation. This is being heavily influenced by our weak technological development and due to the nature of cyberspace and the Internet. Cyber warfare poses interesting questions for us. It is one of a kind type of warfare, the one we cannot see or feel, but it‘s impacts are instantaneous and potentially devastating. States and scholars agree on that. This thesis attempts to explore possibilities of application of existing international laws to amend this situation and answer the questions if it is adequate or at all possible. While scholars are still arguing about the basics of what cyber warfare and cyberspace actually is, it keeps on evolving. States on the other hand have recognized the potential threat of cyber warfare a long time ago and are attempting to mend the existing legal void, however not successfully. The effects of their efforts are limited only to a small number of States. States who are not willing to give up their cyber capability would also stay clear from such international legislation. International treaties and State practice were analyzed in search of a way to accommodate cyber warfare under the current regime. The findings show that application of existing legal basis to cyber warfare is at best difficult and strained. The reality is that cyber warfare does not fit adequately under any of the legal umbrellas at the moment. Application of... [to full text]
Kibernetinis karas jau egzistuoja daugiau nei dešimtmeti tačiau mes vis dar turime labai silpną šio reiškinio reguliavimą. Tokia situacija yra stipriai įtakota mūsų silpnu techniniu galimybių bei interneto struktūros. Kibernetinis karas yra labai keblus. Tai yra naujoviškas kariavimo būdas kurio mes nematome, bet jo pasekmes gali būti žaibiškos ir niokojančios. Mokslininkai ir pasaulio valstybės tai jau seniai pripažino. Šis darbas bando atskleisti galimybes tarptautines teises reguliavimui kibernetinio karo atžvilgiu, jeigu tai iš viso yra įmanoma. Tačiau mokslininkai vis dar ginčijasi dėl kibernetinio karo ir kibernetines erdvės terminologijos, tuo tarpu kibernetinio karo grėsme tik didėja. Pasaulio valstybes tai suprasdamos bando ištaisyti teisės trukumus, tačiau nesėkmingai. Bet kokie pasiūlymai ir susitarimai galioja tik nedideliam valstybių ratui. O didžiosios valstybės tuo tarpu nenoriai atsisakytu savo kibernetinio pajėgumo. Darbe buvo išanalizuotos tarptautinės sutartys bei valstybių praktika bandant pritaikyti esamus režimus kibernetinio karo reguliacijai. Darytinos išvados, kad esamos tarptautinės teisinės bazės taikymas geriausiu atveju yra sudėtingas ir nenatūralus. Realybė yra tai, kad kibernetiniam karui netinka nei vienas režimas. O toks jo taikymas, deja sukelia daugiau problemų nei buvo prieš tai. Tačiau dar nėra išsemtos visos galimybės ir ateitis gali parodyti teisingą sprendimą. Tuo tarpu valstybes yra pasiruošusios vesti derybas dėl tarptautinės... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007.
Thesis Advisor(s): Moran, Daniel J. "December 2007." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 24, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-55). Also available in print.

After the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001, on American soil, a plethora of norms that enable military forces to shoot-down hijacked civil aircraft have been passed in several countries. Although these laws, decrees and executive orders are grounded on security reasons and they are allegedly aimed to protect people and vital interests on ground, this assertion does not emasculate the main difficulty they face in legal terms, which is the existence of an international provision that forbids the use of force against civilian aircraft. This thesis contains a detailed list of such domestic norms and conducts an analysis of their validity from the perspective of Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention and the right of self-defense granted to states by the Charter of the United Nations.

The thesis examines the international law pertaining to the use of force by states, in general, and to the use of force in self-defence, in particular. The main question addressed is whether the use of force, which was purported to be in self-defence, by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was lawful. The thesis focuses not only on this specific use of force, but also on the changing nature of conflict, the definition of terrorism and on the historical evolution of limitations on the use of force, from antiquity until 2006. In the six chapters which trace the epochs of international law, the progression of five inter-related concepts is followed: limitations on the resort to force generally, the use of force in self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, the use of forcible measures short of war, and the use of force in response to non-state actors. This historical analysis includes a particular emphasis on understanding the meaning of the 'inherent right of self-defence', which was preserved by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter. This analysis is then applied to the use of force against Afghanistan which occurred in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US and the UK notified the United Nations Security Council of their resort to force in self-defence under Article 51. Each element of Article 51 is analysed and the thesis concludes that there are significant doubts as to the lawfulness of that decision to employ force. In addition to the self-defence justification, other possible grounds for intervention are also examined, such as humanitarian intervention, Security Council authorisation and intervention by invitation. This thesis challenges the common assumption that the use of force against Afghanistan was an example of states exercising their inherent right to self-defence. It argues that if this particular use of force is not challenged, it will lead to an expansion of the right of self-defence which will hinder rather than enhance international peace and security. Finally, this thesis draws on recent examples to illustrate the point that the use of force against Afghanistan could become a dangerous precedent for the use of force in self-defence.

L’actualité de l’affaire de la Caroline en droit international public.

La doctrine de la légitime défense préventive en procès.

La principale préoccupation au centre de cette recherche a consisté à trancher la controverse qui divise les spécialistes au sujet de la légalité de la doctrine de la légitime défense préventive, spécialement du point de vue du système juridique international institué au lendemain de la deuxième Guerre mondiale. La doctrine en cause préconise clairement qu’un gouvernement d’un Etat, qui éprouverait des craintes ou des soupçons d’une menace d’attaque contre son intégrité territoriale, et dans une certaine mesure, ses intérêts éparpillés à travers le monde, serait autorisé à frapper militairement l’Etat dont le territoire est susceptible de constituer le point de départ de telles menaces :soit, parce qu’un tel Etat détient les armes de destruction massive, notamment l’arme nucléaire et les armes chimiques ;ou soit parce qu’il hébergerait des bandes hostiles, en l’occurrence, les groupes terroristes, à l’origine de ses craintes. Les partisans de cette thèse soutiennent qu’il s’agit là d’une norme de nature coutumière élaborée à l’issue du règlement de l’affaire de la Caroline survenue en 1837, entre la Grande Bretagne et les Etats-Unis d’Amérique.

En effet, un petit navire battant pavillon américain, dénommé la Caroline, avait l’habitude d’effectuer des navettes entre les territoires de Buffalo, aux Etats-Unis, et Navy Island, au Canada. Et dans cet ordre d’idées, il entama comme à l’accoutumée, la traversée du fleuve Niagara en embarquant à son bord des passagers, vers le Canada, en date du 29 décembre 1837. Mais il fut, dans ce contexte, accusé de transporter des rebelles qui étaient sur le point d’envahir le territoire canadien. C’est ainsi qu’à l’issue de ses voyages opérés durant la journée du 29 décembre 1837, alors qu’il se trouvait déjà accosté dans un port situé dans les eaux intérieures américaines, une intervention armée, décidée par le gouvernement anglais, avait eu lieu sur le territoire des Etats-Unis durant cette nuit là. Elle s’est soldée par la destruction de nombreux biens américains, dont le navire en question, qui fut au final coulé dans le fleuve Niagara.

Cet incident va du coup provoquer une grande controverse diplomatique entre les deux Etats précités. La Grande-Bretagne prétendit notamment que ce navire était engagé dans des opérations pirates, et que par ailleurs, sa destruction par ses forces armées relevait de l’exercice du droit d’autoconservation et de légitime défense. Mais au termes de nombreux rebondissements, le Secrétaire d’Etat américain, du nom de Daniel Webster, adressa en date du 24 avril 1841, une note diplomatique à l’Ambassadeur britannique basé à Washington, M. Henry Fox, dans laquelle il contestait l’ensemble de motifs avancés par la Grande-Bretagne, mais en insistant spécialement sur le fait que la destruction de la Caroline, aurait été acceptée comme relevant de la légitime défense, si et seulement si, les forces britanniques ayant agi militairement au cours de cette nuit là étaient en présence « d’une situation de nécessité absolue de légitime défense, pressante, écrasante, ne permettant pas le choix des moyens, et ne laissant pas de temps pour délibérer ». Un consensus de principe se serait donc, semble-t-il, formé autour de ce dictum, mais non de son application aux faits d’espèce.

C’est en prenant en compte les considérations historiques qui précèdent que beaucoup d’auteurs, essentiellement anglo-saxons, se permettent d’affirmer que l’affaire de la Caroline est un précédent fondateur de la légitime défense en droit international public. Et dans cette même optique, considérant par ailleurs que la singularité de cette note consiste dans le fait de subordonner la validité de telles actions armées anticipatives, à l’existence d’une menace imminente d’attaque du territoire canadien par des insurgés, la célèbre formule de Webster précitée aurait également consacré de ce fait même, la doctrine de la légitime défense préventive en droit international coutumier.

Notre hypothèse de travail est simple. En effet, nous partons du point de vue selon lequel, le raisonnement des partisans de la doctrine de la légitime défense préventive, fondée spécialement sur le précédent de la Caroline, soulève de vrais problèmes d’équilibre et de cohérence du système international élaboré après la deuxième Guerre mondiale, dans la mesure où, il aboutit dans ses applications, à cautionner, au sujet de l’interdiction de la force, l’existence d’un ordre juridique ambivalent. Autrement dit, si l’on transpose les enseignements tirés de l’affaire de la Caroline, dans le droit international positif, on aurait immanquablement, d’un côté, un régime conventionnel restrictif de la Charte, qui limite la possibilité de riposter militairement à la seule condition où un Etat a déjà effectivement subi une attaque armée. Tandis que de l’autre côté, on aurait parallèlement un régime coutumier plus permissif, qui laisserait à l’Etat un pouvoir discrétionnaire d’appréciation des circonstances de temps et de lieux, dans lesquelles il peut se permettre de frapper militairement un autre Etat, en invoquant la légitime défense.

Le travail de déconstruction auquel nous avons procédé pendant nos recherches, nous a amené à constater, au bout de cette thèse, que tous les arguments qui sont généralement invoqués par les partisans du précédent de la Caroline présentent des limites et des excès, dans leur prétention à fonder juridiquement, une règle de légitime défense préventive en droit international public, et du coup, ils doivent être relativisés dans leur teneur respective. Pour cette raison, nous soutenons en ce qui nous concerne l’hypothèse selon laquelle, le droit international public en vigueur, ne permet pas encore en son état actuel, l’extension du champ opératoire du concept de légitime défense, tel que stipulé à l’article 51 de la Charte, de manière à justifier l’emploi de la force dans les rapports entre les Etats, en cas d’une simple menace, peu importe son intensité et sa nature, tant qu’il n’y a pas encore eu véritablement une attaque armée de la part de l’Etat envers qui on agit militairement. En conséquence, la tentative doctrinale qui consiste à justifier l’existence d’une règle coutumière, autorisant la légitime défense préventive, en se fondant sur l’autorité de l’affaire de la Caroline, procède en quelque sorte d’un malentendu doublé d’un anachronisme évident.

Bruxelles, le mardi 6 mai 2008

Ivon Mingashang
Doctorat en droit
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Esta tese tem por objetivo criticar a \"Doutrina Bush\", cujos termos foram lançados na Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA de 2002 e têm orientado a política externa da atual Administração daquele país no sentido de uma maior assertividade do poder militar estadunidense contra as ameaças, atuais ou futuras, que ponham em risco a sua posição de dominância no plano internacional, em particular no seu pleito de legalidade da legítima defesa chamada preemptiva. A este respeito, esta tese faz duas afirmações centrais: 1) que, ao contrário do que os termos em que está formulada nos querem fazer crer, não se trata de uma política de ataques preemptivos, mas sim de ataques preventivos, que não podem ser subsumidos ao instituto jurídico da legítima defesa; 2) que qualquer política de ataques preventivos decididos de maneira unilateral é incompatível com a manutenção da ordem no atual sistema em que se estruturam as relações internacionais na atualidade. Para tanto, na primeira parte da tese, é analisada a justificação político-filosófica da legítima defesa, cujo reconhecimento nos sistemas jurídicos positivos se revela uma condição racional de sua legitimidade, bem como, a partir dos limites marcados pelos princípios justificantes - agressão atual e necessidade dos meios empregados na defesa -, é apresentado um conceito ideal de legítima defesa; na segunda parte, expõe-se a regulação do instituto da legítima defesa no direito internacional, especialmente na Carta da ONU, contra a qual é, em seguida, comparada a proposta de \"legítima defesa preemptiva\" feita pela \"Doutrina Bush\". Desta se conclui que, nos termos em que é formulada, não pode ser considerada como legítima defesa, porque dispensa o requisito do ataque atual, em curso ou iminente, revelando-se verdadeira ação preventiva, cuja atribuição somente deve caber a um órgão que represente a comunidade internacional, no caso, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, sob pena de fragilizar a proibição do uso da força nas relações internacionais. Por outro lado, entendida a preempção nos estreitos limites da resposta antecipada a um ataque iminente, defende-se que seja abrangida pela permissão do uso da força em legítima defesa, desde que sujeita a alguma forma de controle posterior.
This thesis intends to refute the so-called \"Bush Doctrine\", whose terms have been laid down in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002, and have since then oriented the present Administration\'s foreign policy towards a greater assertiveness of military power against either present or future threats to its dominant position in international relations, in particular its proposition of a right to preemptive self-defense. In this respect, this thesis advance two central claims: 1) that, contrary to what the actual terms in which this doctrine is formulated might want to suggest, it is not a policy of preemptive strikes that is being proposed, but one of prevention, which is beyond the reach of the legal right of self-defense; 2) that any policy of unilateral preventive strikes is contrary to the maintenance of order in the present international system. In order to support this claims, in the first part of the thesis, the philosophical and political justification of the right to self-defense is examined, the recognition of such a right in actual normative systems emerging as a rational condition of their legitimacy, and an ideal concept of self-defense is advanced that results from the application to the claim to individual self-preservation of the requirements deriving from this justification: an actual aggression and the concrete necessity of the means employed in the defense; in the second part of the thesis, the regulation of self-defense by international law, specially through the Charter of the United Nations, is explained, in the terms of which the legality of the Bush Doctrine\'s claim of preemptive self-defense is verified. Of this claim it is concluded that, at least in the way it is described by the National Security Strategy, it cannot be regarded as self-defense, because it does away with the necessary element of an actual aggression, either in progress or imminent, being in fact a variety of preventive use of force, the recourse to which should be restricted to an organ representing the community, in this case the Security Council of the United Nations, lest the prohibition of the recourse to force in international relations is relaxed. That notwithstanding, it is advanced that, as long as one understands preemption only as an early response to an imminent attack, it can be reconciled with the authorization to use force in self-defense, if subjected to some form of ex post control.

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar as ações militares lideradas pelos EUA no Afeganistão, em 2001, como resposta aos notórios ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro daquele ano contra o WTC e o pentágono, tendo como o foco confrontar os argumentos jurídico-políticos dos EUA utilizados no sentido de qualificar suas ações militares no referido conflito armado pretensamente sob a égide da legítima defesa, com os argumentos jurídicos trazidos pelas normas, usos e costumes e doutrina do direito internacional. Na primeira parte do trabalho, são relatados, mediante a utilização da doutrina internacional, e de documentos de política externa, os fatos envolvendo o conflito armado no Afeganistão de 2001, expondo os principais acontecimentos, segundo uma ordem cronológica, abordando também as Resoluções da ONU sobre tais eventos. Também será exposta uma breve síntese contendo uma contextualização histórica e geopolítica sobre o Afeganistão. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são destacadas algumas das seqüelas produzidas por tais fatos, quais sejam: a Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA, lançada em 2002, também conhecida como a \'Doutrina Bush\', com a respectiva política de ataques preventivos; e a subseqüente e polêmica invasão militar norte-americana ao Iraque em 2003, que ficou conhecida como a Segunda Guerra do Golfo. Finalmente, na terceira parte do trabalho, faz-se um enfrentamento mais direto dos argumentos utilizados pelos EUA para legitimar, sob o manto da legítima defesa individual ou coletiva, o uso da força contra o Afeganistão, expondo, para tanto, contra-argumentos lastreados no Direito Internacional vigente, contendo, em primeiro lugar, a evolução histórica da regulação do uso da força e do sistema de segurança coletiva, a imperatividade das normas internacionais que autorizam o uso da força, e suas exceções legítimas. Demonstrada a solidez dos arts. 2 (4) e 51 da Carta da ONU, e da Resolução 3314/74 da Assembléia-Geral da ONU, \"Definição de Agressão\", conclui-se pela ausência, no conflito objeto deste estudo, do elemento caracterizador da legítima defesa, o ato de agressão atribuível a um determinado Estado (o Afeganistão); da usurpação das limitações ao seu exercício: a proporcionalidade e provisoriedade da situação criada; bem como alertando-se sobre os riscos inerentes na redução dos requisitos previstos pelo artigo 51 da Carta das Nações Unidas.
This dissertation aims to analyze the actions led by the U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, in 2001, in response to the notorious terrorist attacks occurred on 11 September 2001 against the WTC and the Pentagon, mainly focusing on comparing all legal and political arguments which U.S. claim to qualify their military actions in the aforementioned armed conflict under the aegis of self-defense, with the legal arguments brought by the rules, practices and customs of international law and doctrine. In the first part of the work, by using the international doctrine, and documents of foreign policy, the facts involving the armed conflict in Afghanistan in 2001 are reported outlining the main events, according to a chronological order, and also addressing the UN Resolutions on such events. It will also be exposed on a brief contextualization of Afghanistan\'s history and geopolitical situation. In the second part of work, some of the sequels produced by such facts are highlighted, which are the following: the U.S. National Security Strategy, launched in 2002, also known as the \'Bush Doctrine\', containing its policy of preventive attacks, and also the subsequent and controversy U.S. military invasion of Iraq in 2003, which would became known as the Second Gulf War. Finally, in the third part of the work, there will be a more direct confrontation between the arguments used to legitimize the U. S. actions against Afghanistan, under the mantle of individual or collective self-defense, and therefore the counter-arguments supported by the existing international law, that will inc1ude, firstly, the historical evolution of the regulation of the use of force and the collective security system, the imperative international law that grants the legitimate exceptions for the use of force. Whereas there will be demonstrated the consistency of the artic1es 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter and the Resolution 3314/74 of the UN General Assembly, \"Definition of Aggression\" it is conc1uded that in this specific armed conflict, an essential element of self-defense is not present: an aggression attributable to a specific state (Afghanistan); and also are missing all the limitations required during self-defense exercise: the proportionality and the provisional character of the created situation in Afghanistan; lastly it is underlined the inherent risks of reducing the requirements established by Article 51 of the UN Charter.

L’analyse de la situation internationale actuelle montre l’existence de nombreux obstacles et limites à la lutte effective contre le terrorisme international. Dans cette thèse, il n’est pas question d’étudier le terrorisme en général, un sujet controversé et bien étudié en doctrine juridique et en science politique. Il n’est pas question non plus de s’attarder sur la lutte contre le terrorisme elle-même. Il s’agit de réfléchir, d’étudier et d’analyser les nombreuses limites juridiques à cette lutte antiterroriste, tant au niveau de l’élaboration des règles antiterroristes qu’au niveau de leur mise en œuvre
The analysis of the current international situation shows the existence of numerous obstacles and limits to the effective fight against international terrorism. In this thesis, there is no question of studying terrorism in general, a controversial subject well studied in legal doctrine and political science. Nor is it a question of dwelling on the fight against terrorism itself. It is a question of reflecting, studying and analyzing the numerous legal limits to this fight against terrorism, both in terms of the elaboration of anti-terrorist rules and their implementation

La criminalisation de l'agression et l'établissement de la compétence de la Cour pénale internationale sur ce crime obligent à donner une définition de ce crime, de même qu'à déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles la Cour exercera sa compétence sur ce crime. Cette tâche n'est cependant pas aisée en raison de la " nature particulière " du crime d'agression. Le problème majeur qui se pose est celui de la difficulté à définir et à encadrer le crime d'agression tout en respectant les règles cardinales du droit international pénal d'un côté et les exigences du droit de la Charte ou du droit international du maintien de la paix de l'autre côté.En raison de la nature juridique de l'agression et plus précisément du positionnement atypique qui caractérise le crime d'agression, crime à la croisée du droit international du maintien de la paix et du droit international pénal, sans oublier le fait que ce crime vise exclusivement les personnes " effectivement en mesure de contrôler ou de diriger l'action politique ou militaire d'un État ", le régime juridique du crime d'agression va être assez particulier, ceci en comparaison de celui des autres crimes internationaux contenus dans le Statut de Rome.

Le droit international contemporain est placé face à un défi majeur : assurer la sécurité et laliberté des espaces maritimes alors que l’on y observe une recrudescence des activités illicitesou dangereuses. L’étude s’inscrit dans le cadre de ce défi et tente de cerner la problématiquede l’emploi de la force en mer afin de lutter contre ces activités. Elle se place alors dans lasphère du développement et de la mise en oeuvre de pouvoirs de police dans les zonesmaritimes et tente de montrer l’ambivalence de la police internationale relative à la mer. Elleest caractérisée par une double juxtaposition entre l’objet de l’emploi de la force en mer(activités illicites de personnes privées ou actes illicites des Etats) et entre les acteurs chargésde lutter contre l’illicite en mer. Elle se traduit par deux dialectiques distinctes maisétroitement imbriquées. La première, police internationale en mer et police internationale desmers, repose sur les acteurs de l’illicite et déterminera le corps de règles applicable. Laseconde, emploi de la force décentralisé et emploi de la force centralisé, met en scène lesacteurs de la police relative à la mer et permet de mettre en lumière le besoin croissant d’unegestion commune centralisée des atteintes à l’ordre des mers
Contemporary international law is facing a great challenge: ensuring both the security and theliberty of the oceans while unlawful or hazardous activities at sea are constantly increasing.The study takes its place within this challenge and tries to shed light on the issue of the use offorce at sea in order to combat these activities. It lies within the framework of thedevelopment and the enforcement of police powers on the maritime zones and attempts to putforward the ambivalence of the international police relating to the sea. The ambivalence ischaracterized by a couple of juxtapositions, both between the object of the use of force at sea(private unlawful activities or States’ unlawful acts) and between the actors in charge of thestruggle for the safety of the oceans. It results in two distinct but closely linked dialectics. Thefirst, international police at sea and international police of the sea, relies on the actors of theunlawful acts and determines the relevant body of rules. The second, decentralized andcentralized use of force, emphasizes the increasing need for a global and shared managementof the breaches of the legal order of the sea

À la suite d'attaques terroristes massives est apparue une motivation féroce qui risque d'être manipulée pour justifier des excès de force. Voulant prévenir des attaques armées contre leurs intérêts, certains États ont adopté des politiques de « tuerie ciblée » pour éliminer de façon permanente des terroristes en sol étranger qui menacent leur sécurité. II est pourtant illégal de tuer des individus en l'absence de conflits armes sans égard au droit à la vie. La présente recherche tient à déterminer si, en vertu du droit international, des États peuvent neutraliser par force des individus dangereux ou bien venir au secours d' otages en sol etranger. En étudiant l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, un certain nombre de conclusions sont apparues, notamment que des opérations pour « arrêter ou neutraliser » ne peuvent avoir lieu que dans des États qui supportent des terroristes ou qui restent indifférents face à leur présence, et que I'expression « guerre contre Ie terrorisme » ne peut permettre des «tueries ciblées » sans avoir à considérer les droits à la vie et à la légitime défense. Puisque toute division entre les membres de la communauté internationale peut venir limiter la prévention d'attaques, le fait que la coopération entre les États ayant abolis la peine de mort et ceux ayant recours aux « tueries ciblées » puissent en souffiir fait l'objet de cet ouvrage. Ladite recherche conclue que l'utilisation de « tueries ciblées » en dehors du contexte de conflits armés ne peut être permis qu'en dernière mesure lorsque réellement nécessaire pour prévenir des attaques armées et protéger la vie.
From the ashes of devastating acts of terrorism has arIsen a resolve so powerful that measures of counterterrorism risk being manipulated by states to justify excess. In an attempt to prevent armed attacks against their interests, a number of states have adopted policies of targeted killing to permanently incapacitate terrorists on foreign soil. The intentional killing of suspected offenders, however, cannot be lawfully carried-out by states in the absence of armed conflict without regard for the right to life. The following research attempts to determine whether it is permissible for nations to use force on foreign soil to . incapacitate dangerous individuals or rescue hostages under international law. By studying article 51 selfdefense of the United Nations charter, a number of conclusions are asserted, namely that operations to "arrest or neutralise" can only be carried-out in states that support terrorists or are complacent to their presence, and that declaring "war on terrorism" cannot allow governments to kill suspected terrorists in countries where there is no war, except in a manner that is reconcilable with the rights to life and selfdefense. Since division among members of the international community may ultimately diminish their ability to collectively suppress international terrorism, the potential for hindered cooperation between abolitionist states and those that carry-out targeted killings is also addressed. The current research concludes that targeted killings can only be justified outside the context of armed conflict when they are truly necessary as a last resort to prevent armed attacks and save lives.
"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

In this thesis I seek to demonstrate that the legal and customary norms defining the permissible use of lethal force by police are more restrictive than those defining the permissible use of lethal force by military personnel. I argue that in many cases this asymmetry can rest on a foundation provided by the moral norms of individual self- defense, but that the strength of this foundation is contingent on the context in which lethal force is used. Provided that three contextual asymmetries between police and military operations hold, we can morally justify the asymmetric legal and customary permissions granted to these two institutions on the basis of threat, liability, necessity, and proportionality. However, there are limits to the moral grounds these norms can provide. In cases where the three contextual asymmetries begin to break down, the moral foundation offered by the moral norms of individual self-defense weakens. In cases of contextual equivalence, we are forced to adopt one of two conclusions. Either we accept that our legal and customary norms are without moral foundation in such cases, or we must find alternative moral reasons to morally justify the asymmetry. In the final section I briefly draw out the strengths and weaknesses of both positions and offer some discussion of what other moral reasons we might use to shore-up the moral foundation for the asymmetry in the legal and customary norms regulating the permissible use by military and police institutions.