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Spicer, Finn. "Self-knowledge." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.433001.
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Kwon, Hongwoo. "Self-identification and self-knowledge." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62418.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010.<br>"September 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-122).<br>The traditional view has it that self-locating beliefs are distinctive in that they have distinctive contents. Against this, I claim that the distinctive element of self-locating beliefs should be placed outside contents. If someone believes that he himself is hungry, he not only has a propositional belief of a certain particular person that he is hungry, but also identifies himself as that particular person. The latter is not a matter of propositional belief, but a matter of taking a first personal perspective on that person's actions, beliefs and experiences. A subject takes his actions and beliefs to be "up to" himself, and regards his experiences as giving information about where he is located in the world. All these phenomena are shown to be related to the peculiar ways in which we come to know certain facts about ourselves. So self-identification is conceptually connected to self-knowledge. The three chapters discuss some parts or aspects of this reasoning. Chapter 1, "Perry's Problem and Moore's Paradox," claims that Perry's problem of the essential indexical and Moore's paradox are essentially a single problem applied to two different aspects of our rational activities, actions and beliefs, respectively. Chapter 2, "On What the Two Gods Might Not Know," defends what may be called an ability hypothesis about self-locating knowledge, drawing on David Lewis's ability hypothesis about phenomenal knowledge. What the gods might lack is best viewed as the abilities of self-knowledge. Chapter 3, "What Is the First Person Perspective?" asks what it is to take a first person perspective and view oneself as the author of one's own actions. It is a matter of taking a deliberative stance toward one's own actions, which in turn can be best understood as the special ways in which we know them.<br>by Hongwoo Kwon.<br>Ph.D.
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Zamuner, Edoardo. "Knowledge and self-knowledge of emotions." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/2679.
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This thesis addresses two questions. One concerns the metaphysics of emotions and asks what kinds of mental states emotions are. The other asks how the metaphysics of emotions bears on first and third-personal knowledge of emotions. There are two prevailing views on the nature of emotions. They are the perception and cognitive views. The perception view argues that emotions are bodily feelings. The cognitive view, by contrast, contends that emotions are some sorts of evaluative judgments. I show that both views provide inadequate accounts of the nature of emotions. The perception view fails to do justice to the fact that emotions may not involve any bodily feeling. The cognitive view, by contrast, cannot account for the fact that emotions are states that adult humans have in common with infants and animals. On the basis of these criticisms, I put forward an alternative account of emotions. This involves five main arguments. The first is that emotions are enduring non-episodic dispositions that may or may not manifest themselves in experiential episodes such as emotional feelings and behaviour episodes such as expressions. The second argument is that emotional feelings are perceptions of specific bodily changes brought about by emotions. These feelings serve as clues as to what kinds of emotions the subject has. The third argument is that expressions are observable manifestations of emotions in virtue of which emotions can be perceived and subsequently known, directly and non-inferentially, by other people. The fourth argument is that when someone has an emotion without feeling it, she can still come to know it by believing true ascriptions that other people make about the emotion they perceive in her expression. The fifth argument is that full knowledge of emotions requires knowledge of the emotion objects.
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Muzio, Isabella. "Consciousness, self-consciousness, and introspective self-knowledge." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2005. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445604/.
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We are, it seems, able to know a wide range of our own thoughts, beliefs, desires and emotions in a special immediate, authoritative way in which we are not able to know the mental states of others, nor indeed a certain range of our own such states. How is this possible What is this special way we have of knowing a certain class of our own mental states What, in fact, is the class of states of which we are able to have such knowledge, and, what is it about this class that enables us to know them in such a distinctive, authoritative way The broad aim of this thesis is to bring out, in answering these questions, an important point of intersection between issues about world-directed consciousness, self-consciousness and introspective self-knowledge. More specifically, starting from the problem of authoritative self-knowledge, the aim of the thesis is threefold: to motivate, to articulate, and to expand upon a particular Sartrian solution to this problem, based on a view of our world-directed conscious states as being in some sense at the same time states of implicit or 'pre- reflective' self-consciousness. In accordance with this threefold aim, the thesis divides into three parts as follows: Part I begins with the problem of authoritative self-knowledge and the standard solutions on offer in the literature: inferential models, perceptual models, and constitutive accounts. It then suggests how a close examination of the shortcomings of these standard approaches ultimately points towards a solution along the above Sartrian lines, ie. based on an understanding of first-order consciousness as involving already itself an implicit form of self-consciousness. Part II then focuses more narrowly on this notion of implicit self- consciousness, proceeding (a) to distinguish it first from other similar-sounding notions in the literature (ie. notions of 'non-conceptual' self-consciousness, higher- order-thought conceptions of consciousness, and constitutive accounts of self- knowledge), moving on then (b) to show how the notion introduced here, contra these others, can indeed provide the basis for a solution to the initial problem of introspective self-knowledge meeting all the desiderata on a successful such theory. Finally, Part III takes on the more concrete issue of how such a form of implicit self-consciousness might, in practice, be seen to be involved in our two main categories of world-directed states, ie. in our cognitive states on the one hand (thoughts, beliefs, perceptual experiences), and in our emotions on the other (desires, fears, hopes, etc). This section of the thesis goes beyond mere concerns about the relation between an implicit form of self-consciousness and the problem of self- knowledge, drawing on both other parts of the philosophical literature and on various parts of the current psychological literature, to make not only more concrete sense of the view of world-directed consciousness here advocated, but to thereby show it to be also plausible independently from the theoretical considerations about self-knowledge initially driving it in this thesis.
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McHugh, Conor. "Self-knowledge in consciousness." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/3488.
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When you enjoy a conscious mental state or episode, you can knowledgeably self-ascribe that state or episode, and your self-ascription will have a special security and authority (as well as several other distinctive features). This thesis argues for an epistemic but nonintrospectionist account of why such self-ascriptions count as knowledge, and why they have a special status. The first part of the thesis considers what general shape an account of self-knowledge must have. Against a deflationist challenge, I argue that your judgments about your own conscious states and episodes really do constitute knowledge, and that their distinctive features must be explained by the epistemic credentials that make them knowledge. However, the most historically influential non-deflationist account—according to which such self-ascriptive judgments are based on introspective experiences of your conscious states and episodes— misconstrues the unique perspective that you have on your own conscious mind. The second part of the thesis argues that the occurrence in your consciousness of a state or episode of a certain type, with a certain content, can itself suffice for you to have a reason to judge that you are enjoying a state or episode of that type, with that content. Self-ascriptions made for such reasons will count as knowledge. An account along these lines can explain the special status of self-knowledge. In particular, I show that a self-ascription of a content, made for the reason you have in virtue of entertaining that content, will be true and rational, partly because it is an exercise of a general capacity, which I call “grasp of the first-/third-person distinction”, that is fundamental to our cognition about the world. A self-ascription of a particular type of conscious state or episode, made for the appropriate reason, will be true and rational in virtue of features distinctive of states or episodes of that type—features that contribute to determining which judgments are rational for a subject, without themselves being reasons that the subject has. I consider in detail the cases of perceptual experience and of judgment. The thesis concludes by arguing that this kind of account is well placed to explain how selfknowledge fulfills its central role in the reflective rationality that is characteristic of persons.
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Roessler, Johannes. "Self-knowledge and belief." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320685.
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Schmitz, Christoph. "Self-organized collaborative knowledge management." Kassel : Kassel Univ. Press, 2007. http://www.uni-kassel.de/hrz/db4/extern/dbupress/publik/abstract.php?978-3-89958-325-0.
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Abruzzo, Vincent G. "Content and Contrastive Self-Knowledge." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/108.
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It is widely believed that we have immediate, introspective access to the content of our own thoughts. This access is assumed to be privileged in a way that our access to the thought content of others is not. It is also widely believed that, in many cases, thought content is individuated according to properties that are external to the thinker's head. I will refer to these theses as privileged access and content externalism, respectively. Though both are widely held to be true, various arguments have been put forth to the effect that they are incompatible. This charge of incompatibilism has been met with a variety of compatibilist responses, each of which has received its own share of criticism. In this thesis, I will argue that a contrastive account of self-knowledge is a novel compatibilist response that shows significant promise.
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Burton, Sarah. "The development of self-knowledge." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272553.
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Davies, Robert Anthony. "Self-knowledge, deliberation, and memory." Thesis, University of York, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/17965/.
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In this thesis, I argue that the epistemology of memory is a useful but neglected explanatory resource in the philosophical treatment of problems associated with introspection. Not only is a far-reaching convergence in our thinking about introspective failure and memory failure, but by focusing on the epistemology of memory it is possible to explain much of what is thought special about knowledge of our own minds. To demonstrate, I arrange the purportedly distinctive features of self-knowledge into a list of desiderata that can be used to measure the success of a theory. Once the desiderata are clear, it can be shown how the epistemology of memory plays an important role in explaining how a prominent approach of self-knowledge might be successful, and how memory can explain or enhance explanations of some of the main desiderata. To demonstrate the extent to which the memory can be explanatorily useful in this domain, I construct a test theory of self-knowledge around a standard case of recollection and show that it fares well against most if not all desiderata.
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Flockemann, Richard. "Externalism, self-knowledge and explanation." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008060.
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In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible.<br>KMBT_363<br>Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Ren, Huiming. "Self-knowledge and narrow content." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2005. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0010114.
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Still, Carl Nelson. "Aquinas's theory of human self-knowledge." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0018/NQ53911.pdf.
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Sellari, Thomas John. "Knowledge, love, and self in Shakespeare." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.423194.
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Schwengerer, Lukas. "Unified transparency account of self-knowledge." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/33082.
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In this thesis I propose an account of knowledge of one's own mental states. My goal is set on a unified transparency account of self-knowledge. It is unified, because the proposal will account for the generation of beliefs about mental states of all types, regardless of whether they are propositional, non-propositional, experiential or non-experiential. My account will thereby be applicable to knowledge of any mental state, from beliefs and desires to fears, hopes, and sensations such as pain. Moreover, it will be a transparency account because it holds on to Gareth Evans's (1982) observation that self-ascribing mental states is done by attending outwards instead of inwards. There is a sense in which we attend to the world when we find out whether we believe something, and my proposal aims to capture this intuition. The core idea I am exploring is the following: generally, when one produces a first-order mental state, one also forms a corresponding, dispositional second-order belief about that state. Both attitudes share elements of their production, which ensures reliability while retaining fallibility. For instance, when you form a belief 'there is a red car' by perceiving a red car, you also generate the dispositional belief 'I believe that there is a red car,' if everything goes right. I argue that almost all features that make self-knowledge special can be explained with this basic idea. The assumption that the production of a first-order mental state and a second-order belief about the state go hand in hand has surprising explanatory power. Moreover, there are at least no obvious reasons why the assumption should be ruled out. The upshot will be a view that we should take seriously as a contender for an explanation of self-knowledge. I will not be able to conclusively show that it is the best explanation, but I argue that it is one worth thinking about. The thesis is structured in three parts. The first part (chapters 1-3) focuses on the phenomenon of self-knowledge and the transparency idea. These chapters serve as the setup for my later proposed view. Chapter 1 and 2 discuss what exactly we want to explain when we say that we aim to explain self-knowledge. I thereby provide an overview of the conceptual landscape of self-knowledge and argue that we should understand the peculiarity of self-knowledge in terms of features of belief and belief-formation. Moreover, I commit myself to the view that the peculiarity has something to do with our cognitive access to mental states and relate that to the goal of a unified account of self-knowledge. Chapter 3 discusses how we ought to understand the other qualification of my goal: a transparency account of self-knowledge. I provide an overview of transparency accounts in the literature and lay out the path to avoid common problems of transparency accounts. In the second part (chapters 4 and 5) I propose the single process model of self-knowledge as a unified, transparency account of self-knowledge. I provide the core principles of the view and show how it explains the features of self-knowledge I aim to explain. Chapter 4 focuses on attitudes, both propositional and non-propositional. Chapter 5 expands the view to phenomenal states, such as being in pain. The third part (chapters 6 and 7) connects the epistemological discussion of the single process model to research on cognition. Chapter 6 proposes a cognitive story of predictive processing that is compatible with the single process model. I thereby discuss the plausibility of the predictive processing idea and its empirical support. I provide a predictive processing story of self-knowledge that fits with the single process model of self-knowledge. In chapter 7 I discuss extended mental states. Clark & Chalmers (1998) propose that at least some mental states, such as beliefs, can be extended to external devices. Given that my aim is a unified account, I ought to say something about knowledge of these extended beliefs. I argue that they cannot be known by the same processes as non-extended mental states because beliefs about extended beliefs show different features than beliefs about our non-extended states that we formed by introspection. Hence, even if my view cannot account for them this is not a problem, because they are not formed by genuine introspection. Instead, we come to know extended mental states by a distinct process that we might call extended introspection. Finally, chapter 8 provides a brief conclusion of the thesis for and points out some placed that require further development. The account is promising as an explanation of self-belief and self-knowledge, but whether it is correct also depends on future research outside the scope of philosophy.
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Gainey, Ronald Lee. "Self-Monitoring and Partner Knowledge Structures." UNF Digital Commons, 2012. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/344.
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A connection between self-monitoring, which is an individual difference in concern about self-presentation, and partner knowledge structures, which is how people organize thoughts about their current romantic partner, is explored in this study. There were two competing hypotheses. If people structure thoughts about their partner in a way similar to how they structure their social worlds, then low self-monitors would have integrated partner knowledge structures and high self-monitors would have compartmentalized partner knowledge structures. If people structure thoughts about their partner in a way that reflects their relationship motivations and needs then we would find the opposite pattern of results. We used a measure of compartmentalization and integration as well as Snyder’s (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale to explore our hypotheses. Although both low self-monitors and high self-monitors had relatively compartmentalized partner knowledge structures, we found support for the relationship motivations and needs hypothesis. Low self-monitors had more compartmentalized partner knowledge structures than did high self-monitors. In fact, low self-monitors were more likely than high self-monitors to have completely compartmentalized views of their partners. Reasons for these findings, limitations of this study, and future directions are discussed.
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Cates, Darcy Leanne. "Knowledge of Nonsuicidal Self-Injury in Populations That Self-Injure." TopSCHOLAR®, 2010. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/206.
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Archived data was utilized for the present study which examined knowledge about non-suicidal self-injury, or NSSI, in individuals who engage in various degrees of the behavior and those who do not self-injure. Knowledge about NSSI was measured in three groups of respondents: those with no history of self-injurious behavior (no NSSI group), those with more limited experience with NSSI who reported 1-30 incidences of NSSI (limited NSSI group), and those with an extensive history (extensive NSSI group) who reported over 30 incidences of NSSI. To measure knowledge, participants were asked level of agreement with myths and facts about NSSI using Jeffery and Warm’s (2002) knowledge measure. It was hypothesized that the knowledge base would be higher in individuals with more extensive histories of NSSI. Further, individuals with limited histories of NSSI were predicted to have more knowledge than those who have never self-injured. Additionally, this study also hypothesized that the individual item response will vary; depending on extent of NSSI behavior.
Group mean scores on the measure were analyzed for differences using a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) while controlling for the differing group demographic variables of age, sexual orientation, and education level. Results indicated that individuals who have more extensive histories of NSSI evidenced higher mean scores on the measure when controlling for age, sexual orientation and educational level. Individuals with limited histories of NSSI evidenced lower mean scores, and those with no history of NSSI evidenced the lowest scores. In regard to individual item response, items were correlated with seven levels of NSSI (no NSSI, one incident of NSSI, 2-4 incidences, 5-10 incidences, 11-20 incidences, 21-30 incidences and more than 30 incidences). It was found that accuracy was significantly correlated with degree of self-injurious behaviors, with the exception of one item. This item and three additional items also produced weak correlations with other items on the measure. Each item is discussed with regard to group item performance and possible deletions in order to strengthen the measure.
Overall, the results of this investigation supported the reliability and validity of the Jeffery and Warm (2002) knowledge measure for use with individuals who self-injure. Results are discussed in relation to the need for accurate knowledge about NSSI, the importance of refining and strengthen the measure for this use, and additional research directions.
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Newstead, Anne. "Self conscious, self-reference : an approach based on agents's knowledge." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.399412.
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Brown, Laura. "The self and self-knowledge after frontal lobe neurosurgical lesions." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2018. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-self-and-selfknowledge-after-frontal-lobe-neurosurgical-lesions(2fc71590-42c1-4b44-b834-7b3b4d6e7752).html.
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Background: Measurement of awareness plays an important role in adjustment following a brain injury and is noted to impact on engagement with and outcome of rehabilitation. Aim: To systematically review all instruments used to assess intellectual awareness of deficits following TBI and evaluate study design, instrument properties and methods adopted and explore associated factors. Results: Thirty-four studies, all rated as fair to good quality, were identified and within these twenty-three different assessment tools were adopted. The most common method of assessment was patient-proxy discrepancy with the AQ, PCRS and FrSBe instruments being most frequently employed. However, variability was noted regarding the type of assessment method dependent on various sample demographics (e.g. age of sample) and injury characteristics (e.g. time post injury). Exploration of the association between non-cognitive factors and awareness was more common than cognitive factors and awareness. Cognitive functioning appeared to be worse when there was increased unawareness. By comparison greater variation was found in non-cognitive associates. Conclusions: The findings reveal that there still lacks a consensus about the preferred instrument to assess intellectual awareness of deficits after TBI specifically. Recommendations for future research to aid comparability across studies and continued tool development ideas are discussed.
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Wiezbicki-Stevens, Kathryn. "Metacognition developing self-knowledge through guided reflection /." Amherst, Mass. : University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2009. http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/126/.
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Dooley, Patricia Louise. "Conversion through self-knowledge, the desert way." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ55441.pdf.
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Messina, James P. "Kant and the Priority of Self-Knowledge." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2013. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/135.
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In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that “the first command” of all self-regarding duties is to know our “heart.” Kant ostensibly identifies our heart with our moral disposition. Strangely, this appears to be precisely the sort of knowledge that, elsewhere, Kant claims is epistemically inaccessible to us. While the more sophisticated attempts to resolve this difficulty succeed in situating an injunction to know the quality of one’s disposition within a Kantian epistemic framework, no account is wholly successful in explaining why Kant takes self-knowledge to be a necessary condition of virtue. To make sense of the priority Kant assigns to the pursuit of self-knowledge, I argue that it is essential to understand the role of what has been called “generic” self-knowledge in Kant’s moral philosophy. I proceed to defend the place Kant grants moral self-knowledge in his moral philosophy, primarily by developing a Kantian account of such “generic” self-knowledge.
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Schmitz, Christoph [Verfasser]. "Self-organized collaborative knowledge management / Christoph Schmitz." Kassel : Kassel Univ. Press, 2007. http://d-nb.info/993479081/34.
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Flockemann, Richard. "Epistemic norms, a priority, and self-knowledge." Thesis, University of York, 2011. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/1585/.
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This thesis is primarily focussed on developing a novel characterisation of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification. My working hypothesis is that we can make a surprising amount of progress in this field by paying attention to the structure of epistemic norms. I argue that direct a priori beliefs are governed by a structurally different kind of epistemic norm to the one that governs perceptual beliefs. That, I argue, is where the fundamental epistemological difference between the two categories lies. I call this view ‘Seeming-Independence’. Seeming-Independence holds that while a posteriori beliefs depend epistemically on how it perceptually seems to us, there is no corresponding dependence relation between a priori beliefs and how it intellectually seems to us. Intellectual seemings, or intuitions, simply do not play the kind of epistemological role that perceptual experiences play. The central contention of this thesis is that Seeming-Independence is a theoretically fruitful view of the a priori. The arguments I marshal in favour of Seeming-Independence are in this way primarily focussed on the explanatory power and flexibility of the view. In effect, what I suggest is that Seeming-Independence, unlike some of its rivals, is a particularly clear way of dividing the a priori from the a posteriori, and it allows us to neatly bypass some of influential criticisms of a priority.
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Hållén, Elinor. "A Different Kind of Ignorance : Self-Deception as Flight from Self-Knowledge." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-150701.
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In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of self-deception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of “ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of self-deception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of self-deception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of self-knowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.
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Christmas, Simon. "Ideal motives : self-perfection and self-knowledge in the work of Dostoevsky." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1998. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/265428.
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I offer a read ing of Dostoevsky's eth ical philosophy, Jrawing on his fiction and non-fiction work. I argue that coJ1cepts of human oalure and flouri shing are central to Dostoevsky's ethical thought ~d underpin his argum entative strategy in the fiction. ln Part I, l set oul Dostoevsky's ethical philosophy. Dostoevsky rejects the role of reason in ethics and insists that moral action is motivated by spontaneous moral feelin gs . The goal of ethical activity is to develop the se spontaneous feelings and to perfect oneself in the im age of the ideally virtuous agent, Christ. To strive to do so is to flo urish. The i < .lea.l of hum an pe,tect ion is present in un reali sed form in hum an natu re, a.11d self-perfection is n natural process . The process is interrup ted, however. by the desire for autonomy, which undermines one's inner ham10 ny , creating self-des tructive tend encies alongside the natural tendency to self-perfection. This loss of inner harm ony represents t.he opposite of human flourishin g: moral disease. These ideas are apparent in Dostoevsky's views on freedom, res pons ibili y, and the origin of sin. AL the end of Part I, l di scuss Dos toevsky's fict ion al characters in the light of hi s ethi cal thou ght. I sugges t his negative ch :Hacters can be read as experiments des igned to estab lish the conditions Gf hu:11 an fl ourishing. ln Part II , r con si der Dos toevsky's ' cJ011bkd' characters as experiment � . These character ' ar unable Lo es tabli sh the truth abou t their own motivation. a predicament brought abo ut by the ridicule of others . Dosloevsky's ex perim ent assumes that one's confidence in one's account of one's own motivation is affected by Lhe attitudes of others to that account. This as sumption , which is at least pl ausible; is central to Dostoevsky portrayals of interactions between characters. It leads to conclusions that are consonant with his ethical thought - though there are also points of tension.
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Holmes, Peter F. "Counselor self-reflection /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p9953866.
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Joinson, Adam N. "The relationship between strategies of self-protection and self-improvement in the management of self-knowledge." Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309714.
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Ross, Amber Neta Ram. "Justification internalism, self knowledge, and mental content externalism." Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,186.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006.<br>Title from electronic title page (viewed Oct. 10, 2007). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy." Discipline: Philosophy; Department/School: Philosophy.
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Hassan, Sa'adah. "Self-healing and recovery informed by environment knowledge." Thesis, University of Ulster, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.529567.
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Coates, Vivien Elizabeth. "Beliefs, knowledge, and the self-management of diabetes." Thesis, University of Ulster, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.359523.
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Jopling, David A. "Self-knowledge : a study of Sartre and Hampshire." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:48542a68-69b5-4377-87a4-f68815b0f386.
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This work examines some of the epistemological and ontological conditions of the deep self-knowledge that is demanded by the Delphic motto gnothi seauton (know thyself!). The guiding questions are: what is the 'self' that deep self-knowledge is of? What are we such that we can ask deep and puzzling questions about our life-plans, our self-conceptions and the meaning of our lives? Can we know ourselves as we really are, or only under a certain description which conceals as much as it reveals? What is the nature of the relation between self-knowledge and (personal or inner) reality? The central thesis that is defended is that a person is to a certain extent a self-defining and self-forming being by virtue of his self-knowledge; fundamental changes in how he knows himself, and conceives his way of life, his life-history, emotions, final ends, death etc. particularly in light of fundamental practical questions ('Who am I?' 'What should I do with my life?') necessarily occasion changes in what he is. What he is at any one moment in his life is in part constituted by his self-knowledge. To account for the complex 'inter-relation' between self-knowledge and its object, and the possibility of self-formation, a broadly Kantian theory of constituting activity is developed, as well as a theory of the empirical 'under-determination' of self-knowledge. The peculiarity of self-knowledge is that the knower is the known, and that he is active (meaning-giving, or sinn-gebung) with respect to the object known (himself); the object of knowledge and the knowing subject change and extend their range together. This complicates some of the claims of realism and the correspondence theory of truth: self-knowledge is not a matter of the strict conformity of beliefs or conceptions to an independent, determinate and unchanging reality. In Kantian terms, the object of self-knowledge conforms to the conditions of knowledge. This broadly Kantian approach is brought to the analysis of Hampshire and Sartre's theories, which are studied as illustrations of the general ontological and epistemological conditions of self-knowledge. Hampshire's Spinozist theory of reflexive knowledge, which emphasizes the importance of rationality and the understanding of the causes of one's mental states, is contrasted with Sartre's existentialist theory, which emphasizes the importance of choice, and the non-theoretical understanding of one's way of being. Sartre, who is critical of the foundational status generally given to rationality and knowledge, rejects deliberation, detachment, self-observation, reasoned self-criticism and the other rational activities that Hampshire and Spinoza consider essential for self-knowledge. Other issues that are discussed include the problem of truth conditions in deep self-knowledge, the agent-observer dualism in self-inquiry, the relational model of the self, and Iris Murdoch's critique of Hampshire and Sartre.
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Monday, Tracy L. "Self-esteem knowledge base of counselors-in-training." Online version, 1999. http://www.uwstout.edu/lib/thesis/1999/1999mondayt.pdf.
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Vandergriff, James Harley. "Self-reported sources of literature teachers' practical knowledge." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/279808.
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This dissertation is a study of what selected literature teachers report to be their sources of practical knowledge. The data for the study was collected through open-ended interviews with three practicing public school literature teachers in two school districts in a large southwestern city between 1996 and 1998. The informants were selected more on the basis of convenience of access than any other criteria, though I also considered their length of time in the profession and limited the study to persons who were actually teaching literature at the time of the study. The interviews followed an extended observation. After the interviews were transcribed, I analyzed them by the "constant comparison" method (Merriam, 1988, p. 138), using a set of data codes derived from the interview data, then sorted the data according to the codes. That permitted me to bring together pieces of conversation from various points in the interview in a way that is most useful to me (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, pp. 238--241). While the selection and data collection methods were such that I cannot extrapolate the findings to other literature teachers, the data shows quite clearly that, for these teachers, there is a disjuncture between what the research literature assumes are teachers' primary sources of practical knowledge and what the teachers themselves think it to be. Both their statements about their sources of practical knowledge and the metaphoric language they use to describe themselves argue that, for these three teachers, alternative sources of practical knowledge---self, publisher-generated materials, reading in the professional literature, conversations with colleagues, and professional conferences and staff development workshops---are more important sources of their practices than are the sources upon which the research literature puts its primary focus---the apprenticeship of observation, content courses, and pedagogy courses. This finding suggests to me that a broader, more detailed study of this question is warranted.
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Boeckmann, Emily L. "Self-Injury Knowledge and Peer Perceptions among Members of Internet Self-Injury Groups." TopSCHOLAR®, 2008. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/6.
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Marquine, Maria. "Self-Knowledge and Self-Referential Processing in Memory Disorders: Implications for Neuropsychological Rehabilitation." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/193959.
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Damage to the brain can affect the core of the individual, i.e. the self. Results from a small number of studies with amnesic individuals indicate that patients' ability to show preserved knowledge of self may vary. The present study explored self-knowledge in patients with memory impairment as a result of confabulation, mild cognitive impairment, Alzheimer's disease and acquired brain damage. We found that different memory disorders differentially affected patients' self-knowledge. At least some patients showed a preserved sense of self, and were able to acquire information about another person that they had met postmorbidly. Frontal function and stability of cognitive impairments over time appear to be two variables important in determining whether patients can have a consistent and updated sense of self. We also explored the extent to which self-referential and other-referential processing might enhance memory in individuals with memory-impairment. The self-reference effect (SRE) and other-reference effect (ORE) have been consistently found in normal adults. Results indicated that patients showed a normal SRE and ORE. The SRE and ORE appeared to be at least partly dependent on degree of knowledge of the person being referenced, and were also related to general memory and frontal function. Only the SRE, however, was also related to patients' ability to improve memory as a result of emotional processing. These findings may have important implications for caregivers and healthcare professionals working with memory-impaired patients, and may pave the way to novel memory rehabilitation methods.
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Mubiana, Precious Bupe. "Career maturity, career knowledge, and self knowledge among psychology honours students : an exploratory study." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/27277.
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This study explores career maturity, self knowledge and career knowledge and how they influence career decision-making processes among psychology honours students at a South African institution of higher learning. A mixed method approach was used to collect data among (N=62) students who were asked to fill in two career development questionnaires namely, the Career Decision-making Difficulties Questionnaire (CDDQ) and the Career Development Questionnaire (CDQ). 10 scales were measured using the CDDQ. Analysis of the CDDQ revealed moderate difficulties on the General Indecisiveness, Dysfunctional Beliefs and Occupational Information scales. Pertaining to the CDQ, 5 distinct scales which explore the levels of Self information (Self knowledge), Decision making, Career information (Career knowledge), Integration of self information and career information, and Career planning were assessed. Analysis of the CDQ revealed that respondents had adequate levels of career maturity. The results of the content analysis on the qualitative data indicate clinical psychology to be the most popular in relation to other fields of study, followed by research psychology counselling psychology and psychometry.<br>Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2010.<br>Psychology<br>unrestricted
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Clinard, Stacey Edwards. "College Students Who Self-Injure: A Study of Knowledge and Perceptions of Self-Injury." TopSCHOLAR®, 2010. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/170.
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Archived data was utilized for the present study which examined self-injurious behaviors in a college population. College students, who engage in non-suicidal self-injury, or NSSI, were expected to evidence a higher knowledge base for the behavior than those who do not. The demographic variables of gender and sexual orientation were predicted to be over represented in the NSSI group. Further, this study examines the perceived riskiness of the behavior in individuals who self-injure, as well as their perceptions of others who engage in NSSI. The survey consisted of four sections: demographics, knowledge ofNSSI, experience with NSSI, and perceptions ofNSSI. Individuals who engage in or have a history of NSSI evidence a higher mean score or better knowledge of the behavior than those who do not. The NSSI population evidences disproportionate numbers of females and individuals with gay, lesbian, and questioning sexual orientations. Further, when examining the perceived riskiness of self-injury, the NSSI group views the behavior as less risky than the non self-injury group. Results are discussed in relation to the need for accurate knowledge about NSSI and additional research directions.
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McCorkle, Laura Steed. "A study of the relationships of self-efficacy of self-management of asthma and asthma self-management knowledge." Texas A&M University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2583.
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The purposes of this study are to examine the relationship of self-efficacy
regarding self-management of asthma and student self-management knowledge and also
examine the extent to which self-efficacy and self-management knowledge predicts
student outcomes such as reading grades, the number of times a student was absent and
the number of visits a student made to the school nurse. Students were sampled from
one public school district within a suburban city in the southwest portion of the United
States. The sample was comprised of 33 males and 12 females ranging in age from six
to eleven years of age.
Three data collection instruments were developed for this study. Parents of the
participants were asked to fill out a demographic survey to provide descriptive data.
Participants of the study were administered two face-to-face interview surveys: The
Asthma Student Self-Management Knowledge in a School Setting Survey (SMS) and the Asthma Self-Efficacy of Self-Management of Asthma Survey (AMES). Both surveys
were developed based on the six lesson topics of Open Airways.
Two separate data analyses were conducted based on the data collected from
each participant. To better understand the relationship between the AMES and the SMS,
a Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient was used in the regression analysis.
The findings showed that there was a statistically significant positive relationship
between the SMS and the AMES. To determine if the AMES and the SMS could predict
reading grades, the number of times a student was absent and the number of visits a
student made to the school nurse, a multiple linear regression was used. The findings
showed that there is minimal evidence showing that only reading scores maybe predicted
by asthma self-efficacy and asthma self-management knowledge.
Taking into account identified limitations such as not taking into account the
severity of the participant??s asthma, one would be cautious to generalize these findings
to other children with asthma. Based on these results and limitations, recommendations
for future practice and for future research are provided.
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Jones, Joshua K. "Empirically-based self-diagnosis and repair of domain knowledge." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/33931.
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In this work, I view incremental experiential learning in intelligent software agents as progressive agent self-adaptation. When an agent produces an incorrect behavior, then it may reflect on, and thus diagnose and repair, the reasoning and knowledge that produced the incorrect behavior. In particular, I focus on the self-diagnosis and self-repair of an agent's domain knowledge. The implementation of systems with the capability to self-diagnose and self-repair involves building both reasoning processes capable of such learning and knowledge representations capable of supporting those reasoning processes. The core issue my dissertation addresses is: what kind of metaknowledge (knowledge about knowledge) may enable the agent to diagnose faults in its domain knowledge? In providing a solution to this issue, the central contribution of this research is a theory of the kind of metaknowledge that enables a system to reason about and adapt its conceptual knowledge. For this purpose, I propose a representation that explicitly encodes metaknowledge in the form of procedures called Empirical Verification Procedures (EVPs). In the proposed knowledge representation, an EVP is associated with each concept within the agent's domain knowledge. Each EVP explicitly semantically grounds the associated concept in the agent's perception, and can thus be used as a test to determine the validity of knowledge of that concept during diagnosis.
I present the formal and empirical evaluation of a system, Augur, that makes use of EVP metaknowledge to adapt its own domain knowledge in the context of a particular subclass of classification problem that I call compositional classification, in which the overall classification task can be broken into a hierarchically organized set of subtasks. I hypothesize that EVP metaknowledge will enable a system to automatically adapt its knowledge in two ways: first, by adjusting the ways that inputs are categorized by a concept, in accordance with semantics fixed by an associated EVP; and second, by adjusting the semantics of concepts themselves when they fail to contribute appropriately to system goals. The latter adaptation is realized by altering the EVP associated with the concept in question. I further hypothesize that the semantic grounding of domain concepts in perception through the use of EVPs will increase the generalization power of a learner that operates over those concepts, and thus make learning more efficient. Beyond the support of these hypotheses, I also present results pertinent to the understanding of learning in compositional classification settings using structured knowledge representations.
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Hasar, Ekim. "The Problem Of Self-knowledge In Kant'." Master's thesis, METU, 2011. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12612765/index.pdf.
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Williston, Byron. "Self-knowledge, moral freedom, and the passions in Descartes." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/nq41049.pdf.
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Swart, Juani. "Self-awareness and collective tacit knowledge : an exploratory approach." Thesis, University of Bath, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.341144.
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Macbeth, Samuel. "Multi-agent based simulation of self-governing knowledge commons." Thesis, Imperial College London, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/25751.
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The potential of user-generated sensor data for participatory sensing has motivated the formation of organisations focused on the exploitation of collected information and associated knowledge. Given the power and value of both the raw data and the derived knowledge, we advocate an open approach to data and intellectual-property rights. By treating user-generated content as well as derived information and knowledge as a common-pool resource, we hypothesise that all participants can be compensated fairly for their input. To test this hypothesis, we undertake an extensive review of experimental, commercial and social participatory-sensing applications, from which we identify that a decentralised, community-oriented governance model is required to support this open approach. We show that the Institutional Analysis and Design framework as introduced by Elinor Ostrom, in conjunction with a framework for self-organising electronic institutions, can be used to give both an architectural and algorithmic base for the necessary governance model, in terms of operational and collective choice rules specified in computational logic. As a basis for understanding the effect of governance on these applications, we develop a testbed which joins our logical formulation of the knowledge commons with a generic model of the participatory-sensing problem. This requires a multi-agent platform for the simulation of autonomous and dynamic agents, and a method of executing the logical calculus in which our electronic institution is specified. To this end, firstly, we develop a general purpose, high performance platform for multi-agent based simulation, Presage2. Secondly, we propose a method for translating event-calculus axioms into rules compatible with business rule engines, and provide an implementation for JBoss Drools along with a suite of modules for electronic institutions. Through our simulations we show that, when building electronic institutions for managing participatory sensing as a knowledge commons, proper enfranchisement of agents (as outlined in Ostrom's work) is key to striking a balance between endurance, fairness and reduction of greedy behaviour. We conclude with a set of guidelines for engineering knowledge commons for the next generation of participatory-sensing applications.
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Bodner, Ronit. "Self-knowledge and the diagnostic value of one's actions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11181.
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Saenz, A. Margarita. "Periodontists' Ability to Self-Assess their Knowledge of Periodontics." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2006. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/389.
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This study examined periodontists' ability to self-assess their knowledge of periodontics. Self-assessment was measured as the difference between actual knowledge and perceived knowledge of two topics of clinical practice of periodontics: periodontal disease therapy and dental implant therapy. Other variables included were learning needs, motivation to learn, and background characteristics (number of years since graduation from a periodontics training program, classification as Diplomate or non- Diplomate, number of years since achieving Diplomate status, classification as private practitioner, academician, or private practitioner with a part-time academic position, and number of credit hours spent in continuing education per year). A questionnaire was e-mailed to 1,800 periodontists practicing in the USA. Two hundred and nineteen subjects participated in the periodontal disease therapy questionnaire and 200 in the dental implant therapy questionnaire. The results showed a significant difference between actual and perceived knowledge for both topics. Correlation coefficients showed no correlation between participants' actual knowledge and perceived knowledge of periodontal disease therapy and a low to moderate correlation between actual and perceived knowledge of dental implant therapy. Also, the results showed that need and motivation are not related to self-assessment ability, but actual knowledge may be related to moderate-high need and motivation; and, that among the background characteristics, Diplomate status is related to a better ability to self-assess, and fewer years since achieving Diplomate status is related to higher actual knowledge and perceived knowledge. In conclusion, periodontists' ability to selfassess their knowledge of periodontics is at best moderate. The concern that practitioners believe that they have higher knowledge in areas in which objectively measured knowledge is significantly lower continues to be valid.
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Sorgiovanni, Ben. "Reconciling content-externalism and self-knowledge : two frameworks considered." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:dde7b307-da02-412a-9022-289fefc7dd6d.
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In this thesis, I assess the prospects for reconciling content-externalism and crucial guiding intuitions about self-knowledge within two different frameworks, respectively. The first framework belongs to the prominent contemporary externalist, Tyler Burge. The second framework is built from central strands of thought in Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work. I argue that a tension between the basic externalist intuition and crucial guiding intuitions about self-knowledge arises within a Burgean framework which does not arise within a Wittgensteinian framework. I show that given Burge's views about the individuation of mental content, switching a subject slowly between two relevantly dissimilar contexts can undermine knowledgeability of her epistemic reasons. I argue that this is a troubling result, given Burge's views about the sorts of things that epistemic reasons are. On Burge's view, epistemic reasons are rational relations between mental states. If slow-switching can undermine knowledgeability of one's epistemic reasons, then it can undermine knowledgeability of the rational relations between mental states. But the thought that the knowledgeability of the rational relations between mental states might be sensitive to changes in one's context in this way seems at odds with our intuitive picture of self-knowledge. I argue that this tension does not arise within a Wittgensteinian framework because there is evidence that Wittgenstein rejects certain of the claims about the individuation of mental content which generate the tension in Burge's case. The thesis examines the substantive similarities and differences between the Burgean and Wittgensteinian frameworks more generally. In doing so, it maps two contrasting ways in which the basic content-externalist intuition might be elaborated.
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Otto, Andrew J. (Andrew James) Carleton University Dissertation Political Science. ""Read thyself": science and self-knowledge in Hobbes' Leviathan." Ottawa, 1995.
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Paul, Ryan Singh. "The Unknowing Self: Knowledge, Ignorance, and Early Modern Subjects." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194293.
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This dissertation explores the role of ignorance in the process of early modern self-fashioning. Renaissance historiography has, by and large, been based on a Cartesian-cum-Hegelian understanding of the subject as a subject of knowledge. An individual's recognition of her self-motivated agency, her power to act as an independent self, has been read as the product of the generation of knowledge and epistemologies that assert human ability to pursue and master knowledge. Critical theories of subjectivity have challenged the humanist subject and its epistemological foundations, but ignorance and the unknown have rarely been theorized as anything more than empty spaces to be invaded and filled by knowledge. Building on recent philosophical and cultural materialist investigations into knowledge, ignorance, and the subject, my work studies how ignorance can operate as a positive force in the production of the self and how, paradoxically, knowledge can erode the epistemological foundations of subjectivity. Primarily focused on the literature of early modern Europe, this dissertation advances the study of early modern subjectivity as well as the relationship between epistemology and the self as perceived in contemporary theory by tracing the hitherto ignored operations of ignorance and complicating the assumption of a teleological connection between knowledge and subjectivity. In particular, the major areas of study are: how hegemonic discourses produce not only knowledge but also ignorance in order to stabilize the existence and authority of social hierarchies and empowered subject; how the creation and pursuit of knowledge outside of these demarcations can erode the foundations of social identity and individual subjectivity by revealing the fiction of cultural "truths"; how cultural spaces of ignorance can provide disempowered individuals opportunities for resistance and self-fashioning against socially prescribed norms; and how submission to or acknowledgment of one's own ignorance can become internalized as an essential part of a subjectivity that does not rely on knowledge as a form of power.
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Gonzalez-Angiulo, Hilda 1960. "Las Senoras: From funds of knowledge to self-discovery." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288787.
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Literacy as a critical tool for understanding the relationship among text, self, and world (Freire, 1987, p. 30) is vital in order for students to relate their own reality with that of the characters'; for students to read their world while they read the word, as Freire and Macedo (1987) would put it. For over three years, I have met with a group of women (Las Senoras1 to explore their views of themselves and how they relate to the school and society around them. Las Senoras are all Spanish-Speakers, some of them Spanish/English Bilinguals. The vehicle for our discussions was El Club de Literatura (the Literature Club) wherein we read such novels as Hasta no Verte Jesus Mio, Arrancame la Vida, Me Llamo Rigoberta Menchu, y asi me Nacio la Conciencia and short stories, for example, Detras de la Reja, Out of the Mirrored Garden) to explore our own lives as women, within our families, communities, and society at large. A goal of this phenomenological orientation is the rediscovery of self-knowledge through literature discussions infused with personal experience, through extensive dialogical conversations, interviews, letters, journals, and observations, facilitated by a researcher as "friend" role. These are among the methodological tools used to provide a panoramic of women's lives. This work analyzes the process of Las Senoras' personal transformation through the rediscovery of their own knowledge in El Club de Literatura. Why this focus on Las Senoras? Because as an educator of working-class, language minority students, I am aware of how mothers are generally the ones most intimately involved in the education of their children and how they serve as the primary connection to the schools, yet at the same time they are held at bay with respect to their rights as women, mothers and wives. Further, an important finding of this work has had to do with my own evolution from teacher to pedagogue. This evolution has encompassed my breaking from my earlier training as a teacher which strictly dictated the curriculum and prescribed my role as a teacher, to the joint creation of curriculum with my students and their families. The process has led me from reflecting upon my practice to understanding the implications of my actions in communion with my students. A communion where I am not always the teacher, but a lifelong learner. For those who ask, "Can I do this work?" The answer is, "If you are willing to learn and change, then you can be the teacher." Further, as commented by Patricia, one of Las Senoras, "It depends on what you are going to teach us." (1)Las Senoras: in Spanish one refers to a woman as a Senora as a gesture of respect, be it out of age, experiences, or legal status. In this study, Las Senoras, are women who are treated respectfully by me and others who know them through me. Age and legal status are not important in our group, life experiences are what give them the status of Senoras.