Academic literature on the topic 'Separate property (Roman law)'

The article analyses the historical process of dividing the original fideicommissum institution into separate types: family fideicommissum, singular fideicommissum and universal fideicommissum. Family fideicommissum appeared in the inheritance law of Ancient Rome due to the legislator’s desire to limit the freedom of disposition of property that a legatee and other members of his family used to have. The aim of such a limitation was to keep the estate within one Roman family. The author concludes that the legal nature of fideicommissum was based on the transfer of the estate’s assets only (and not liabilities) from an heir to a legatee. This led to the gradual unification of bequests and singular fideicommissa in Roman law. The author bases the analysis of peculiarities of universal fideicommissum on its comparison with legatum partitionis. As a result, it is found that there was a fundamental change in the legal nature of universal fideicommissum. A universal fideicommissum was originally based on the singular succession principle, but the Trebellian senate’s decree (senatusconsultum Trebellianum) permitted the transfer of liabilities, which were a part of estate property, from an heir to a legatee as well as assets, thus permitting universal succession. Due to this, the merger of universal fideicommissa with the bequest became impossible and universal fideicommissum retained its independence in the Roman inheritance law. In course of the research, the author uses translations of fragments from the most important monuments of Roman law — the Justinian Novels, which have not been published in Russian before.

The article is devoted to the analysis of ownership in Ukraine. Features of ownership as a legal category that is inherent in real and compulsory relations are investigated. The legal aspects of ownership used to characterize the acquisition period are clarified. The legal consequences of actual domination of a thing are described. Thus, ownership in civil law is considered as the subjective right of the owner and as a separate real right to own someone else’s property. In civil law, ownership is considered as a subjective right of the owner or other persons, and not as an object of subjective rights. The actual content of a thing without a legal basis should not be identified with the right of ownership in the legal aspect. The stay of the find in fact with a person who has found a thing for six months while the unknown owner of it should not be interpreted as a right of ownership, since in the Civil Code of Ukraine the right of ownership is considered among the types of real rights to someone else’s property. The latter in turn arise on the basis of the will of the owner or the law, and in the case of a dispute — on the basis of a court decision. The positions on the protection of the right of ownership over acquisition time in the judicial procedure are justified. Real ownership is one of the oldest known under Roman law. It covered two aspects: the independent type of property rights and one of the powers that constitute ownership. Since the time of Roman law, attention has been focused on the absolute nature of ownership in the form of domination of things. Dominance can be seen in the factual and legal aspects. The establishment by the courts of the fact of bona fide possession of a thing for a period determined by law can be carried out in a separate proceeding. But it cannot recognize the ownership of a thing in order to consider cases of separate fact-finding proceedings of legal importance. Key words: right of possession, property right, rights, acquisitive prescription.

Roman Elements in Testamentary Regulations of I Lithuanian StatuteS u m m a ryRoman law, alongside Lithuanian, Ruthenian, Polish, German and canon law, was one of the many sources of I Lithuanian Statute of 1529. However, it is still not clear how and within what scope the authors of the Lithuanian codification used Roman law. At some point researchers of the subject held the view that the reception of elements of elaborate Roman law could not have possibly happened before II Statute of 1566, from witch such elements were transferred to III Statute of 1588. It seems, however, that a number of Roman elements were already present in I Statute; later on, in the course of the creation of II and III Statute, Roman elements were considerably multiplied and expanded. An interesting subject for research in this connection is testamentary law in I Lithuanian Statute. For instance, Roman law did not allow for wills to be drawn up by minors, slaves, heretics, sons who remained under the authority of their fathers, and by insane persons. The same regulations are to be found in I Statute. It should be emphasized that the reception of Roman legal institution by the Lithuanian codification went as far as to include even exceptions to the general rules; thus, sons were allowed to make wills with respect to their separate property, and insane persons were allowed to make wills when they were in a sound state of mind. I Statute also adopted the Roman legal principle that allowed a testator to freely change his will at any moment in his life. An impact of the Roman legal system can also be seen in I Statute regulations concerning the capacity to be a witness to will making. Under I Statute, persons lacking will-making capacity and women could not be witnesses to will making. It also appears that disinheritance as a legal sanction for hitting or insulting one of the parents was taken over by I Statute from Roman law, perhaps via Byzantine law.An analysis of the regulations of I Statute leads one to the conclusion that the first codification was already under the influence of Roman law, and that the influence was more significant that previously believed. In view of the above observations, further research on the issue may lead to interesting results.

This article deals with the issues of regulation of property relations of spouses in private international law. The article deals with the conflict issues of marriage, as well as the contractual regime of property of spouses. The article reveals the content of the Minsk and Chisinau conventions on property relations between spouses. In particular, the conventions say that the property relations between spouses are determined by the legislation of the Contracting party in whose territory they live together. If the husband lives in one Contracting state and the wife in the other and both have the same nationality, the law of the country of which they are nationals governs their property relations. Attention is paid to bilateral agreements on legal assistance to States in the field of property relations between spouses. For example, such an agreement exists between Russia and Estonia, and it helps to resolve various property issues between spouses. The domestic legislation of different States regulates the issue of determining the regime of matrimonial property in different ways. For example, in the States of the Anglo-Saxon legal system and in most Muslim countries there is only a regime of separate property. On the contrary, in the States of the Romano–German legal system, preference is given to the regime of common property of spouses, and it is possible to establish a different regime of property relations by agreement of the spouses. According to this principle and developing family law in Russia.

It is generally accepted that an abstract system for the transfer of property is applied in South Africa. Characteristic of an abstract system is that the different legal acts which form part of the process, namely the obligatory agreement, delivery of the thing concerned or registration and the real agreement are separated from each other. The real agreement is an agreement between the transferor and the transferee based on a meeting of the minds; it is directed at the transfer of ownership by delivery and should be distinguished from the underlying causa (for example an obligatory agreement). The real agreement merely consists of the transferor’s intention to transfer property and the transferee’s intention to receive property. A second characteristic of the real agreement is that it should meet its own requirements. It is therefore not dependent on the validity of the preceding obligation or any other legal act. This means that ownership will pass from the transferor to the transferee even though the underlying obligatory agreement is invalid. The real agreement is an invention of the German jurist Friedrich Carl von Savigny. The purpose with this article is to ascertain whether or not Roman law at the time of Justinian reflects any of the characteristics of an abstract system and the real agreement (which is generally associated with an abstract system). Can it be said that Savigny based his theory on Roman law? It appears from this paper that a clear distinction was drawn in Roman law between the causa (obligatory agreement) and delivery (traditio). Ownership in movable and immovable property did notpass directly by virtue of the conclusion of the contract of sale or donation (causa) - the thing concerned had to be delivered to the transferee in a legally accepted way as well. Although there is no clarity regarding the question of whether or not a valid causa was a requirement for the transfer of ownership, it can be stated with a fair amount of certainty that the causa had to be valid in those cases where delivery was effected by virtue of sale and donation. If the causa was invalid, ownership did not pass, even though the parties had the intention to pass ownership. In this regard Roman law at the time of Justinian reflects the characteristics of a causal system. However, if the thing was delivered on account of a dos or solutio by virtue of a stipulatio (and maybe also mutuum), there was no prior obligatory agreement and traditio was not affected by the causa at all. Ownership had passed merely by virtue of the intention to transfer and to receive ownership. In other words, Roman law portrays characteristics of an abstract system in these situations. Regarding the question whether or not the reciprocal intention to transfer and to receive ownership had been construed as an independent agreement which should be distinguished from the obligatory agreement, it appears that that was not the case. Because of the dual nature of the contract of sale in Roman law (it created an obligation but it was also iusta causa traditionis), it was accepted that the intention to transfer and to receive ownership was actually contained in the obligatory agreement. It did not exist on its own as a separate agreement (except in cases of a dos, solutio and mutuum). However, it emerges that the intention was emphasised more and more and that it was gradually loosened from the causa. The loosening, however, existed merely in the vision that the intention to pass ownership (as contained in the causa) can continue to exist on its own even though the causa appears to be invalid. The bond between causa and traditio was not yet finally broken, because it was still the intention at the time of the obligatory agreement that effected the passing of ownership. The conclusion is that there was no sign of a real agreement which merely consisted of the reciprocal intention to transfer and receive ownership and which existed independently from the underlying obligatory agreement.

The article is devoted to improving the legal regulation of the replacement of a party to an obligation in the civil legislation of Ukraine, taking into account the needs of civilian turnover and economic practice. The reasonability of the additional settlement of issues of reimbursement of contracts for the assignment of claims and compensation for additional costs associated with such a concession, as well as the introduction of the institution of the assignment of contracts into Ukrainian civil law, is argued. The lack of a direct indication of the law on the remuneration of a claim for assignment of a claim has led to the emergence of a number of interpretations of such a transaction as being non-remunerative. Meanwhile, according to the basic provisions of the Civil Code of Contract - the contract is repayable, unless otherwise stipulated by the contract, law or does not follow from the essence of the contract. In addition, the consequence of concluding a deed of assignment claim is the acquisition by the new creditor of property rights that are property, so the free acquisition of property must be considered as a gift, an indication that is absent in the legislation. Unknown to the contract law of Ukraine and the civil institute of contract withdrawal, which is sufficiently widespread in economic practice and is regulated by European legislation. . The meaning of a contract cancellation is to transfer from one person to another the rights and obligations under the contract with a third party, ie it is a simultaneous combination of the cancellation of claims and the transfer of debt. It is necessary to extend the methods (structures) of transfer of debt through the introduction in Ukrainian civil law of the methods known since Roman times, in particular, the expropriation as a separate construction of the replacement of the debtor in the obligation, which occurs on the initiative of the creditor and on the basis of the agreement concluded between such credit and the new debtor in the absence of the need to obtain such consent from the original debtor; and intercession as a construct, when a new debtor is joined to the obligation (which may be divisible) and each of them must fulfill the obligation in its share.

The history of law should be viewed not only within the context of the study on the birth of law being one of the social regulators, its emergence and evolution of its certain institutions, but also as an instrument of thorough understanding of legal forms recepted from Roman Law. Certain forms of these include usucapio – limitation of action introduced to Russian Imperial legislation by Article 301 of the Legislation Code of 1832.Ukraine can view the doctrine developed by legal scholars of those times as well as court practice on these issues as part of its own history as it used to be a part of the Russian Empire, where (except for Chernihiv and Poltava regions) Russian Imperial legislation was fully in force. Russian Imperial legal scholarship has adopted the approach applied by Roman law, including usucapio and praescriptio. However, the issue of usucapio existence in legislation acts of the Moscow State as a separate institute before 1832 has provided grounds for discussions.Similarly, the legal essence of the usucapio institute has also provided grounds for scholarly discussions on philosophic grounds regarding the impact of limiting legislation on the application of the limitation institute whether limitation should be similarly the ground for losing or acquiring rights, or regarding the conditions when the appropriate limitations may be applied.The analysis of past scholarly concepts provides possibilities to develop a full picture. Nevertheless, this picture is not without homogeneity of thoughts. The author takes the approach that the usucapio institute in Russian Imperial legislation has appeared and developed for assuring the stability of civil relations. Regardless of the division of providing evidence, the existence of the actual possession by the actual possessor of the mortgage after the 10-year term, the new possessor has been recognized and registered the property rights within time limitation if the conditions prescribed in the law are actually fulfilled. The interest in theoretical development in the limitation issue and the amount of the court practice provides evidence that it was claimed by the society.The definition of the Zemska time limitation has been changing gradually, and it can generally be viewed as calm, non-discussional, and continuous possession within the term developed by the law, in terms of “property”. The law of those times did not demand a fair possession conditions for acquiring the rights on limitation grounds, however this approach has been criticized by scholars.Generally, the author has selected the panoramic approach of constructing her research by paying attention to discussional issues, as well as the issues being of interest nowadays. Specific focus is made on actual inaction of titular proprietors of mortgage as the condition for loss of the right on limitation grounds and non-act possession. The actuality of stability of civil relations remains the same nowadays as it was in the past.

It is generally accepted that an abstract system is applied in South Africa with regard to the transfer of ownership. It is a characteristic of the abstract system that the different legal acts which form part of the process, namely the obligatory agreement, delivery of the thing concerned or registration, and the real agreement are separated from each other and that each has its own requirements. However, there is no certainty about the question as to whether or not this distinction stems from Roman law. The purpose of this article is to ascertain whether the distinction between the different legal acts existed in the vulgar law.It appears that the legal position in the vulgar law differs from South African law in that no distinction between the obligatory agreement and delivery of the thing existed. The conclusion of the sale, payment of the purchase price and the delivery of the merx took place simultaneously. It was considered to be one single act which also transferred ownership from one person to another. It furthermore appears that the intention of the parties to transfer ownership played a very important role. Yet, it was only the intention that existed at the time when the obligatory agreement was entered into, that mattered. Ownership did not pass by virtue of a separate meeting of the minds which could be abstracted from the obligatory agreement.Although certain formal requirements, the purpose of which were to enable the state to collect taxes, had been introduced in the vulgar law, writing and registration had not been regarded as formal requirements for the transfer of ownership in immovable property. Yet, the practice had been to draw written documents relating to the contract of sale, and to register them in municipal registers. This form of registration, however, is not tantamount to registration in the Deeds Registry.The conclusion is that an independent real agreement, which could be abstracted from the obligatory agreement was unknown to the vulgar law. There was no clear-cut distinction between the different legal acts such as that existing in South African law at present.

Modem developments in technology, connnerce and the cultural industries pose problems for intellectual property in Sri Lanka, as everywhere. Case law may be used for judicial guidance but there are comparatively few reported cases from the Sri Lankan courts. By examining Sri Lanka's juridical history and Constitution, together with constitutionally recognised Buddhist principles, it is possible to suggest further sources of guidance for judges. Using the proposed framework, it may be possible for the judges to apply existing law to new situations and avoid the need for constant legislative change in an attempt to keep up with developments and comply with Sri Lanka's international obligations. The extent to which such guidance may be useful is explored by looking at specific issues, which have caused difficulty in other jurisdictions. It is hoped that the proposed techniques could be used to build up a body of Sri Lankan jurisprudence. Ms may prove more stable and effective than incremental legislation. 'Status juris - 'Mis study (unless otherwise stated) based on material available as at 0 1.12.2004 and the law in force on that date.

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O regime patrimonial de bens no casamento e na união estável é o conjunto de regras que regem as relações patrimoniais entre os cônjuges ou companheiros.Com a entrada em vigor do novo Código Civil (lei nº 10.406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002), em 11 de janeiro de 2003, houve a mudança de diversos dispositivos atinentes à matéria. Suprimiu-se o regime dotal, acrescentou-se o regime de participação final nos aqüestos, além do que, se previu a possibilidade de alteração do regime de bens no curso do casamento. A mais importante das alterações referentes ao regime de bens, certamente foi a autorização para que os cônjuges pudessem mudar o regime de bens ainda quando em curso o casamento. Trouxe, como isso, um novo paradigma, revogando o princípio da imutabilidade dos pactos antenupciais. A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar a nova regra a mutabilidade do regime de bens, seus requisitos, forma, efeitos, procedimento, bem como a realidade de outros países. O pedido deve ser submetido ao controle judicial, através de petição conjunta dos cônjuges, no qual farão exposição dos motivos que fundamentam o pedido, devendo comprovar a procedência das razões que invocam. Também há, no texto legal, a ressalva de direitos de terceiros, porventura prejudicados com a alteração do regime de bens, sendo ineficaz em relação a este. Os efeitos da modificação do regime de bens, semelhante ao pacto antenupcial, se condicionam ao registro junto ao Cartório de Registro Imobiliário no domicílio dos cônjuges. O procedimento é de jurisdição voluntária, não cabendo intervenção de quem quer que seja, além dos próprios cônjuges. E o juiz poderá designar audiência de ratificação do pedido ou mesmo de justificação, para comprovação da procedência das razões alegadas pelas partes. A análise da realidade de outros países, também objeto da pesquisa, se constitui um instrumento importante para conduzir o intérprete na aplicação do novo instrumento de garantia da liberdade contratual no âmbito do casamento. Por fim, faz-se uma avaliação positiva em relação à inserção da nova regra no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro.

Ao longo de seu texto, o Código Civil de 2002 não traz o vocábulo comissório ou quaisquer de suas possíveis flexões gramaticais. Na doutrina e jurisprudência pátrias, entretanto, ele é aplicado exaustivamente quanto à proibição prevista nos artigos 1.428 e 1.365 do mencionado diploma legal. Grosso modo, tem-se em tais dispositivos a impossibilidade de que, após verificado o inadimplemento da obrigação principal, possa o credor insatisfeito conservar para si, na condição de proprietário, a coisa entregue em garantia. Ainda que reproduzida em diversos códigos modernos, especialmente naqueles de tradição romano-germânica, essa vedação ao chamado pacto comissório é um tema pouquíssimo estudado. A necessidade de uma maior reflexão sobre seu conteúdo, no entanto, é cada vez mais evidente. Isso porque, como demonstram pesquisas recentes no âmbito da literatura comparística, há indícios de que a regra tem por base fundamentos que não mais se justificariam. A esse propósito, vale salientar, o estudo do direito romano é fundamental. Afinal, nele a lex commissoria foi criada e por séculos teve aplicação no âmbito dos direitos reais de garantia, até ter sido proibida pelo Imperador Constantino (C. Th. 3, 2, 1; C. 8, 34, 3), no século III. O presente trabalho, portanto, tem por objetivo central a reconstrução e análise do instituto antigo, para que então com mais segurança seja possível delimitar, em que medida, pôde a lex commissoria romana influenciar a proibição do pacto comissório nos atuais ordenamentos jurídicos, em especial, o brasileiro. Para tanto, deve-se notar, em um primeiro momento, que separar a lex commissoria objeto da mencionada decisão da mais consagrada lex comissória no âmbito da compra e venda, recepcionada no livro 18 do Digesto e ainda largamente aceita nos sistemas modernos, não é tarefa das mais fáceis. Tendo a proibição sido anterior à compilação do Corpus Iuris e, igualmente, tendo a própria fiducia cum creditore sido extinta por volta do século II, escassos são os testemunhos nas fontes que chegaram até os nossos dias.
Throughout its text, Brazilian Civil Code of 2002 does not have the word \"comissório\" or any of its possible grammatical inflections. In Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence, however, it is applied thoroughly as the prohibition laid down in Articles 1,428 and 1,365 of that statute. Roughly speaking, we have in such provisions the impossibility that, upon inspection of the default of the principal obligation, unsatisfied creditors could keep for themselves the thing given as a real security (pledge), provided being the owner. Although reproduced in many modern codes, especially those of Roman-Germanic tradition, the prohibition of the so called pacto comissório is a topic rarely researched. The need for further reflection on its contents, however, is increasingly evident. This is because, as recent research into comparative literature shows, there is evidence that this rule is based on essentials that would no longer be justified. In that regard, it is worth mentioning, the study of Roman law is fundamental. After all, in it the lex commissoria was created and for centuries it had been applied under the provision of security until it was banned by Emperor Constantine (C. Th. 3, 2, 1; C. 8, 34, 3) in the 3rd century A.D. The present study, therefore, has as its central objective the reconstruction and the analysis of that ancient institute, so that more safely it will be possible to delimit to what extent could the Roman lex commissoria influence the pacto comissório in current legal systems, in particular the Brazilian one. Therefore, it should be noted at first that to separate the lex commissoria, object of the aforementioned ban, from the established lex commissoria under purchase and sale, as disposed in Book 18 of the Digesta and still widely accepted in modern systems, it is not an easy task. Since the prohibition was prior to the compiling of the Corpus Iuris and also having the fiducia cum creditore been extinct sometime around the 2nd Century, testimonies in sources that have come down to our day are scarce.

En el Dret Civil de Catalunya es regula el règim econòmic matrimonial de separació de béns com a supletori de primer grau. El legislador, a fi d'evitar les possibles situacions de desigualtat en el moment de la seva extinció, va establir un mecanisme corrector a través de la compensació econòmica per raó de treball. La Llei 25/2010, del Llibre Segon del Codi Civil de Catalunya, adopta una regulació més completa i complexa de d'aquesta institució i intenta donar solucions a qüestions conflictives. No obstant això, la nova configuració de la compensació econòmica porta a distorsionar els principis bàsics que fonamenten el règim de separació de béns. El present estudi recull la recerca sobre el sentit d'aquesta norma correctora i sobre la forma en què el legislador la configura. Així mateix pretén determinar si la nova normativa donarà solució als problemes existents en l'actualitat respecte a la determinació de la procedència i càlcul de la compensació econòmica per part dels tribunals de justícia, ja que aquests, davant l'escassa regulació legal existent, han tingut un gran marge de discrecionalitat, que ha comportat una evident incertesa jurídica. La compensació segueix sent necessària com un mecanisme de protecció al cònjuge feble donat que el treball de la llar continua constituint l'element nuclear de l'estabilitat familiar i perquè, en la mesura que el treball per l'altre cònjuge ja no es configura com a contribució a les despeses del manteniment familiar, repercuteix únicament a favor del patrimoni privatiu del cònjuge beneficiat. Amb la nova regulació es pretén que el cònjuge que més ha incrementat el seu patrimoni pagui fins una quarta part o fins i tot la meitat de la diferència dels guanys a qui ha guanyat menys i s'ha dedicat a la llar o ha treballat per al seu cònjuge. Malgrat que s'observa que el règim de separació s'aproxima al de participació, amb la compensació econòmica no es pretén establir ni un règim de participació, ni un règim de guanys. En realitat, segueix sent un mecanisme propi que es dirigeix a evitar l'excessiu rigor del règim de separació absoluta de béns, sent la nova normativa destinada a aclarir els criteris interpretatius i a dotar de seguretat jurídica determinades situacions. Això no vol dir que desaparegui la discrecionalitat judicial sobre tot en matèria de quantificació de la compensació, ja que aquesta qüestió ha de ser objecte d'interpretació pels tribunals, i caldrà veure si la nova definició de la compensació i el fet que no descansi en la idea de l'enriquiment injust sinó en la dada objectiva que s'hagi produït un increment patrimonial entre un i altre cònjuge com a conseqüència de la convivència, influeixen de manera positiva o no a l'hora de resoldre les dificultats respecte a la determinació de la procedència i càlcul de la compensació.
En el Derecho Civil de Cataluña se regula el régimen económico matrimonial de separación de bienes como supletorio de primer grado. El legislador al objeto de evitar las posibles situaciones de desigualdad en el momento de su extinción estableció un mecanismo corrector del mismo a través de la compensación económica por razón de trabajo. La Ley 25/2010, del Libro Segundo del Código Civil de Cataluña, adopta una regulación más completa y compleja de dicha institución e intenta dar soluciones a cuestiones conflictivas. No obstante, la nueva configuración de la compensación económica lleva a distorsionar los principios básicos que fundamentan el régimen de separación de bienes. El presente estudio recoge la investigación sobre el sentido de esa norma correctora en la actualidad y sobre la forma en que el legislador la configura. Asimismo pretende determinar si la nueva normativa dará solución a los problemas existentes en la actualidad respecto a la determinación de la procedencia y cálculo de la compensación económica por parte de los tribunales de justicia, ya que éstos, ante la parca regulación legal existente, han tenido un gran margen de discrecionalidad, lo que ha conllevado una evidente incertidumbre jurídica. La compensación sigue siendo necesaria como mecanismo de protección al cónyuge débil dado que el trabajo para la casa continua constituyendo el elemento nuclear de la estabilidad familiar y porque, en la medida en que el trabajo para el otro cónyuge ya no se configura como contribución a los gastos del mantenimiento familiar, repercute únicamente a favor del patrimonio privativo del cónyuge beneficiado. Con la nueva regulación se pretende que el cónyuge que más ha incrementado su patrimonio pague hasta una cuarta parte o incluso la mitad de la diferencia de las ganancias al que ha ganado menos y se ha dedicado al hogar o ha trabajado para su cónyuge. A pesar de que se observa que el régimen de separación se aproxima al de participación, con la compensación económica no se pretende establecer ni un régimen de participación ni de uno de gananciales. En realidad, sigue siendo un mecanismo propio que se dirige a evitar el excesivo rigor del régimen de separación absoluta de bienes, estando la nueva norma llamada a clarificar criterios interpretativos y a dotar de seguridad jurídica determinadas situaciones. Ello no significa que vaya a desaparecer la discrecionalidad judicial sobre todo en materia de cuantificación de la compensación, ya que dicha cuestión será objeto de interpretación por los tribunales, y habrá que ver si la nueva definición de la compensación y el hecho de que no descanse en la idea del enriquecimiento injusto sino en el dato objetivo de que se haya producido un incremento patrimonial entre uno y otro cónyuge como consecuencia de la convivencia, influyen de forma positiva o no a la hora de resolver las dificultades respecto a la determinación de la procedencia y el cálculo de la compensación.
The separate property marital regime is regulated in the Civil Law of Catalonia as additional of first degree. In order to avoid possible situations of inequality at the time of its extinction the legislator established a corrective mechanism thereof through economic compensation for work reasons. Law 25/2010, of Book Two of the Civil Code of Catalonia, takes a more complete and complex regulation of the institution and try to provide solutions to contentious issues. However, the new configuration of the compensation leads to distort the basic principles that are the base of the separate property marital regime. This study includes research on the meaning of that standard correction today and the way the legislator set up it. It also aims to determine whether the new rules will solve existing problems at present regarding the determination of the origin and calculation of the compensation by the courts, as these, given the sparse existing legal regulation, have a wide margin of discretion, which has led to a clear legal uncertainty. The compensation is still required as a protection mechanism to weaker spouse since housework keeps constituing the core element of family stability and because, to the extent that the work for the other spouse and not configured as a contribution to family maintenance expenses, affects only private assets for the benefit of the spouse. By the new regulation is intended that the spouse that has increased its assets pays to a quarter or even half of the difference in earnings that has earn less and was dedicated to the housework or worked for the spouse. Although it is noticed that the regime of separation approaches that of participation, the compensation is neither to establish a system of participation nor one of property. Indeed, it remains an own mechanism aimed to prevent the excessive rigor of the regime of absolute separation of property, the new standard being called to clarify interpretation criteria and provide legal certainty certain situations. This does not mean that judicial discretion particularly in terms of quantification of compensation will disappear, and that the issue will be subject to interpretation by the courts, and to be seen if the new definition of compensation and the fact that it doesn't rest on the idea of unjust enrichment but on the objective criteria that there has been an increase in assets between each spouse as a result of living data, positively influence or not in resolving the difficulties regarding the determination of the origin and the calculation of compensation.

This study looks at the role of women in the economic environment of Roman Egypt in the light of the papyri. By examining marriage and inheritance documents from the first three centuries, the study shows that marital and inheritance laws and customs in Roman Egypt were made to protect women’s interests when it came to ownership and possession of property, which is one of the main reasons why women played such a prominent role in Egypt’s economic environment.

During the long eighteenth century, married women in England were subject to the rules of coverture, which denied them a legal identity independent of their husbands and severely curtailed their acquisition, possession and disposition of property. There is a consensus among historians that married women circumvented the restrictions of coverture both in their daily lives and by use of the legal mechanism of the separate estate. This study reviews contemporary legal and social attitudes towards women’s property rights in marriage to examine the extent to which married women had economic agency under coverture. Through a review of reported cases, treatises on the law of property, and a contemporary fictional representation of pin-money, I assess the foundations justifying the law of coverture, and the challenges presented to coverture by the separate estate. I argue that there is a distinction between the theory and practice of the separate estate; the separate estate must be understood as a type of property set aside for a special purpose rather than a type of property separated from a husband’s control. More precisely, the existence of the separate estate generally, and pin-money in particular, did little to advance married women’s economic agency.
Graduate

The South African concept of freedom of testation is one of the most absolute concepts of freedom of testation in westernised legal systems. It is suggested that the South African concept of freedom of testation is a memento of capitalist patriarchy. As the South African legal system practices a nearly absolute concept of freedom of testation, capitalist patriarchy has maintained masculine control of property in South Africa and perpetuated the systems of male dominance prevalent in South Africa. Freedom of testation allows for wealth to pass from one male to another. It also allows entrenched gender roles to continue by excluding women from inheriting. Thus the South African law of testate succession and its central concept of freedom of testation allows for discrimination on the ground of gender.
Jurisprudence
LL.M

This chapter deals primarily with the various interests that could be acquired in property, particularly ownership, rights to servitudes, and possession. The Roman law of property is one of the lasting and important legacies of their legal order and has had a profound impact upon modern legal systems across the world. This chapter begins by considering the Roman classification of property. This was the intellectual starting point in the teaching manuals preserved from the classical period of Roman law. The purpose of this exercise in classification was to demonstrate that certain objects fell outside the sphere of private ownership. Apart from issues of classification, this chapter deals primarily with the various interests that could be acquired in property, particularly ownership, limited real rights over the property of others, such as rights to servitudes, and possession. It deals with the legal rules governing these institutions and their interrelationships. In theory, the interests in property may be divided into two broad categories, namely legal interests (ownership and limited real rights) and factual interests (possession). While such a division is useful, it should not be seen as absolute, since possession, though largely a question of fact, could also have certain legal consequences. But first the Roman classification of property must be considered.

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter examines the protection of privacy, personality, and publicity interests. It considers: the law of privacy and the extent to which individuals can control the use or disclosure of their personal and private information; character and personality merchandising and the ways in which the law of registered and unregistered trade marks protects these interests; and the controversial question of whether individuals can and should be able to prevent the commercial exploitation of their personality and image through a separate publicity right.

In the post-global economic and financial crisis, Europe is suffering from significantly low levels of investment. This applies both to national level in the individual Member States and to those with a supranational scope. For this reason, the EC tried to stimulate the development of any investment initiative through the Juncker Plan, which is based on three pillars: the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Advisory Center and the European Investment Projects Portal, and third, improving the business environment by removing regulatory barriers to investment at national and European level. Policies in this direction will continue and build on over the period 2021-2027 through the InvestEU program, which aims to continue to support increased investment, innovation and job creation in Europe. The process of implementation of each such initiative directly affects the individual legal and natural persons as investors who enter different bond relations, which have both national and international dimension. The development of new investment products and instruments would be unthinkable without the Bank’s involvement as a major creditor in the implementation of investment projects. This fact shows that it is necessary to examine the legal guarantees for the protection of creditors in these relationships in case of possible threat the debtor to damage the creditor in case of unfavourable development of the respective investment initiative. This paper will justify the significance and the peculiarities of Paul’s claim as a means of protecting creditors in the context of a developing EU investment environment and its legal framework. This method of preventing the decline of the asset and / or the increase of the liability of the debtor’s property is characterized by extreme persistence over time as a legal institution that originated in the Roman era and has survived to the present without losing its significance.