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Journal articles on the topic 'Shareholder Concentration'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 26 July 2025

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1

Ekholm, Anders, and Benjamin Maury. "Portfolio Concentration and Firm Performance." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49, no. 4 (2014): 903–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109014000635.

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AbstractThis paper investigates the relation between shareholders’ portfolio concentration and firm performance. Using data on more than 1.3 million unique shareholders, we create an index that measures how concentrated shareholder portfolios are in each firm. We posit that portfolio concentration will affect incentives when shareholders are resource constrained. We find that average shareholder portfolio concentration is positively related to future operational performance and valuation. We also find that portfolio concentration is positively correlated with abnormal stock returns. Our findin

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Li, Weian, and Jianbo Niu. "Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 254–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p1.

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We try to explore the relation among three factors: the private benefits that main shareholders can obtain from the firm, the social benefits derived from a certain ownership structure and the ownership concentration costs. Different corporations have different optimal governance mechanism. Noticing the substitute relation between the level of the management-and-shareholder-conflicts and the different governance mechanism, we take use of the data from China’ stock market and conduct an empirical analysis on the influence both of the different shareholder’s participating in governance and the o

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Antonius Siahaan, Yosman Bustaman, and Indah Larisa Sari. "Ownership Concentration, Corporate Liquidity, and Dividend Payment Policy: Evidence from Indonesian Financial Industries." International Journal of Business and Society 21, no. 3 (2021): 1310–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.33736/ijbs.3351.2020.

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The main objective of this research is to analyze the effect of ownership concentration and corporate liquidity on dividend payment policy in the Indonesian financial industry. Dividend payment is measured using dividend pay-out ratio on measuring dividend payment. Corporate ownership concentration is measured using the number of shares held by legal individual investors and large block shareholders. Ownership concentration is divided into three categories, which are inside shareholders, stable shareholders, and market shareholders. Corporate liquidity is measured by corporate profit, defined

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4

Mélanie, Croquet, Cultrera Loredana, Gahungu Dieudonné, Mbonabuca David, and Niyuhire Prisca. "Capital Concentration and financial performance of listed firms in the East African Community: An Exploratory study." International Journal of Accounting, Finance, Auditing, Management and Economics 2, no. 2 (2021): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4634741.

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The objective of this paper is to investigate the relation between ownership concentration and performance of listed companies in the East African Community (EAC). The EAC is a community of six countries located in the East Africa : Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and South Sudan. Among this Community, all of the countries excepted Burundi and South Sudan own a financial market. These countries decided in 2010 to create the East African Stock Exchanges Association (EASEA). The EASEA has many purposes : the increase of attractiveness and liquidity of its financial markets to encourage

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Cuervo García, Álvaro, and Luisa Reyes-Recio. "The substitution effect between managerial control mechanisms and its effect on the creation of value in reference to firm diversification." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 382–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c4p6.

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This paper aims to investigate the relationships between two governance mechanisms such as active shareholder control and the board of directors, as well as their effect on the creation of value for the shareholder, using firm diversification strategy as the moderating variable. These relationships indicate the existence of a substitution effect between both governance mechanisms, with a more inactive board in firms with large shareholders. On the other hand, the analysis of governance mechanisms and firm diversification strategy indicate the positive effect of shareholder concentration on the

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Edwards, Jeremy S. S., and Alfons J. Weichenrieder. "Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation." German Economic Review 5, no. 2 (2004): 143–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-6485.2004.00100.x.

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Abstract Concentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The results show that, for most types of largest shareholder, the beneficial effects on minority shareholders of increased ownership (greater monitoring of management, and reduced incentives to exploit minority shareholders due to greater cash-flow rights) are at least as large as, and sometimes signific

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Nikolic, Jelena, and Verica Babic. "The implications of ownership concentration for shareholder protection and strategic decision-making." Ekonomski anali 61, no. 211 (2016): 69–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1611069n.

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The purpose of corporate governance mechanisms is to prevent opportunistic behaviour by managers, in order to align the interests of owners and managers. Following from this, our research topic is the analysis of ownership concentration as an internal mechanism to protect the interests of shareholders. In the study of the interdependence between ownership concentration and shareholder protection, particular importance needs to be given to the relationship between ownership structure, the role of the board, and strategic decision-making. Starting from this interdependence, our research aim is t

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8

Abderrahim Chtaoui. "The Influence of Shareholding Mechanisms on Earning Management Practices: The Case of Listed Moroccan Companies." Journal of Information Systems Engineering and Management 10, no. 37s (2025): 205–13. https://doi.org/10.52783/jisem.v10i37s.6395.

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Introduction: Shareholding mechanisms, in particular the concentration of capital and the type of shareholder, have a considerable influence on the production of accounting information. More specifically, we seek to verify whether the shareholder category and the degree of capital concentration have an impact on accounting earnings management practices. Objectives: Our objective is to implement an analytical framework that would best explain the best choice of governance mode and enable the process of producing financial information to be steered. Methods: Being interested in the mutual intera

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Kim, Ki-Young, and Young-Hwan Lee. "The Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance on the Relationship between Ownership Concentration and Firm Value." Korean Association Of Computers And Accounting 22, no. 1 (2024): 91–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.32956/kaoca.2024.22.1.91.

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[Purpose] In Korean listed companies, we check whether corporate value decreases as the major shareholder’s equity ratio increases, and whether it can be used as an improvement measure to ultimately increase corporate value by reducing agency costs by improving corporate governance in ESG when the majority shareholder’s equity ratio increases. It is necessary to conduct an empirical analysis. [Methodology] As major independent variables, the major shareholder’s equity ratio and the Korea ESG Standards Institute’s five corporate governance variables (total score, shareholder rights protection,

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Migliardo, Carlo, and Antonio Fabio Forgione. "Ownership structure and bank performance in EU-15 countries." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 18, no. 3 (2018): 509–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-06-2017-0112.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of ownership structure on bank performance in EU-15 countries. Specifically, it examines to what extent shareholder type and the degree of shareholder concentration affect the banks’ profitability, risk and technical efficiency.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a sample of 1,459 banks operating in EU-15 countries from 2011 to 2015. It constructs a set of continuous variables capturing the ownership nature, the concentration and their interactions, and estimates an instrumental variable random effect (IV-RE) model. In additi

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Lskavyan, Vahe, and Mariana Spatareanu. "Shareholder protection, ownership concentration and FDI." Journal of Economics and Business 63, no. 1 (2011): 69–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2010.05.002.

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Basak, Suleyman, Georgy Chabakauri, and M. Deniz Yavuz. "Investor Protection and Asset Prices." Review of Financial Studies 32, no. 12 (2019): 4905–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz038.

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Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that investor protection significantly affects ownership concentration and asset prices. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model to address the empirical regularities and uncover some of the underlying mechanisms at play. Our model features a controlling shareholder that endogenously accumulates control over a firm, and diverts a fraction of its output. Better investor protection decreases stock holdings of controlling shareholders, increases stock mean returns, and increases stock return volatilities when ownership concentration is sufficiently high, cons

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13

Juanda, Juanda. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in Indonesia." Journal of Accounting Research, Organization and Economics 1, no. 2 (2018): 173–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.24815/jaroe.v1i2.11609.

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AbstractObjective – The study aim to investigate the effect of ownership concentration on the financial performance of firms listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012. Design/methodology – Data for the study were collected from the Indonesia Stock Exchange on or prior to 2 January 2008 and remain listed until 31 December 2012. The population is 140 industrial and manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. But, there are only 43 companies meet the sampling criteria. To investigate the influence of ownership concentration on firm performance in Indonesia, mul

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Grimaldi, Francesco, and Anna Lucia Muserra. "The effect of the ownership concentration on earnings management. Empirical evidence from the Italian context." Corporate Ownership and Control 14, no. 3 (2017): 236–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv14i3c1art9.

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The numerous cases of business disruptions, involving opportunism and accounting fraud by shareholder, directors and managers, that have occurred in different countries over the past two decades along with institutional and context phenomena and with the rise of the 2008 financial crisis, have refocused the attention of academia, professionals and world policy makers on the disclosure processes used by companies and on corporate governance mechanisms. This paper, after a systematic description of the investigated issues – ownership structure, ownership concentrations and largest shareholders e

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Zhang, Dengjun, and Yuquan Cang. "Ownership concentration, foreign ownership and auditing: evidence from SMEs in Latin America." Pacific Accounting Review 33, no. 3 (2021): 301–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/par-06-2020-0081.

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and foreign ownership on the demand for an external audit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in six Latin American countries. In particular, the authors test whether foreign-owned firms (compared with domestic private-owned firms) and domestic firms with minority foreign shareholders are more likely engaged in audit assurance. Design/methodology/approach The authors applied the logit model to estimate the impact of ownership concentration and owner/shareholder type on audit demand

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Jatiningrum, Citrawati, Fauzi Fauzi, and Bernadhita H. S. Utami. "INVESTIGASI PENGARUH KOMPOSISI DEWAN DAN KONSENTRASI KEPEMILIKAN PADA KUALITAS PENGUNGKAPAN LAPORAN KEUANGAN." AKUNTABILITAS 16, no. 1 (2022): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.29259/ja.v16i1.16146.

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Crucial issues in Asia occur when modern companies are majority owned by large shareholders and effectively control the company. This phenomenon will lead to type II agency conflict, its happens conflict between the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder. This study aims to investigate the effect of the board composition and concentrated ownership on the disclosure quality of financial statement. The samples selected are companies in Indonesia with concentrated ownership. This study uses multiple regression analysis method with the statistical test result reveal that the concentrati

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Brandão, Isac De Freitas, and Vicente Lima Crisóstomo. "Concentração de propriedade e qualidade da governança da empresa brasileira." Brazilian Review of Finance 13, no. 3 (2015): 438. http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/rbfin.v13n3.2015.45739.

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The relationship between ownership concentration and corporate governance quality is analyzed in Brazil. Models are estimated by the system generalized method of moments (GMM) for a balanced panel of 85 companies in the period 2010-2013. The results indicate that the concentration of ownership has an adverse effect on the quality of corporate governance, as measured by an index based on 28 voluntary good governance practices. The negative linear relationship indicates that large shareholders are unfavorable to adoption of best corporate governance practices. Additionally, the negative quadrati

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Yousaf, Imran. "Effect of Corporate Governance Practices on the Earnings Management Practices: A Case of Pakistani Banking Sector." Asia Proceedings of Social Sciences 2, no. 2 (2018): 26–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.31580/apss.v2i2.286.

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Banks are highly focusing on real Corporate Governance practices to provide accurate and unbiased information in their annual financial reports but still managers are encouraged to do earnings managementr to beat expectations. Further, concentrated ownership in banks, give more benefit to majority shareholder as compare to minority shareholders which ultimately resulting in exploitation of the of minority shareholderâ€™s intersts, causing principal-principal(P-P) conflict. This study examines the effect of Corporate Governance practices and P-P conflicts on practices of Earning Management in b

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19

Lakhal, Faten. "Ownership structure and voluntary disclosures: the case of French-listed firms." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 131–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1p11.

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This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and voluntary earnings disclosures under high ownership concentration of French-listed firms. The findings show that French managers are less likely to make voluntary disclosures when they are controlled by a large shareholder or by a family, suggesting that low legal protection leads to expropriation of minority shareholders. The results also show that the proportion of foreign institutional investors in capital is likely to mitigate this relationship since institutional investors signal good minority shareholders’ protectio

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Kostyuk, Alexander, and Olena Kostyuk. "Minority shareholders vs. the state: the case of JSC “UKRNEFT”." Corporate Ownership and Control 2, no. 3 (2005): 106–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv2i3p11.

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The joint-stock company "Ukrneft" is a good example for understanding the role of asymmetry of information in the corporate governance. Corporate ownership structure is characterized by high enough concentration. The state is the largest stockholder, owning 50%+1 company stock, i.e. controlling block. Besides the state, there are some large shareholders in the structure of corporate ownership of the joint stock company "Ukrneft’". They are represented by Pryvatbank, Ukrsybbank and Wotford Groups. The consolidated shareholding of these shareholders is 41 % of voting shares. The remaining 9 % of

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Aluchna, Maria, and Bogumil Kaminski. "Ownership structure and company performance: a panel study from Poland." Baltic Journal of Management 12, no. 4 (2017): 485–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bjm-01-2017-0025.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the links between company ownership structure and financial performance in the context of the largest Central European stock market. Using the framework of agency theory, the authors address the question of the expropriation effect by dominant owners and the effect of collusion between shareholders of different types on company performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors test hypotheses on the relations between ownership concentration and the involvement of different shareholders (state, CEO, industry and financial investors) vs retu

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Priewe, Jan. "Vom Lohnarbeiter zum Shareholder?" PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 31, no. 122 (2001): 103–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v31i122.754.

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The paper investigates the impact of some features of the 90s in Germany: shareholder-value orientation and changes in the distribution of share capital, booming asset prices, profit-sharing schemes including option plans, increased capital funded old-age provisions. Two propositions are discussed and, finally, denied: Due to these trends there might emerge a tendency towards a more equal distribution of capital stocks, and a relevant portion of employees might turn out as shareholders with considerable non-wage income. However, despite severe shortcomings in the data base a wave of further we

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Carvalhal da Silva, André Luiz, and Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal. "Ownership, control, valuation and performance of Brazilian corporations." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 1 (2006): 300–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i1c2p6.

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This paper analyzes the ownership and control structure of Brazilian companies and the effect of cash flow and voting rights on firm valuation and performance. Ownership is quite concentrated in Brazil with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that non-voting shares and indirect control structures are largely used to concentrate control with reduced overall investment in the company. Our results support the hypothesis that firm valuation and performance are positively related to cash flow concentration, and negatively related to voting concentration

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Burkart, Mike, and Fausto Panunzi. "Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection." Journal of Financial Intermediation 15, no. 1 (2006): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2004.12.004.

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Lepore, Luigi, Sabrina Pisano, Assunta Di Vaio, and Federico Alvino. "The myth of the “good governance code”: an analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and the comply-or-explain disclosure." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 18, no. 5 (2018): 809–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-08-2017-0197.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to assess the degree of disclosure about compliance with corporate governance code and the explanations provided by Italian firms and second, to analyze the relationships between this disclosure and different variables of ownership structure.Design/methodology/approachThe sample was composed of 75 non-financial companies listed in Italy in 2016. Content analysis of the corporate governance statement and ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression models were used to test the hypotheses.FindingsCompanies tended to comply with the corporat

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Iskandar, Samer. "Shareholder types, their concentration and its effects on demutualized exchanges’ operating and financial results - An empirical study." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 4 (2014): 114–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i4p8.

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Scholars are divided over whether listing the shares of stock exchanges improves their financial performance. Applying simple OLS regressions, I test the hypothesis that exchanges’ post-IPO owners are value maximizers. However, recently demutualized exchanges have a high proportion of shareholders with conflicts of interest. Therefore, I also test whether different types of shareholders have different effects on performance. I find that investment managers behave like true value maximizers. The results also show that a higher fragmentation of share ownership is associated with lower performanc

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Thraya, Mohamed Firas. "Are controlling shareholders extracting private benefits from European public acquisitions?" International Journal of Managerial Finance 11, no. 1 (2015): 80–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-07-2012-0081.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with voting rights structures that are highly concentrated. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder’s concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. The author argues that with higher levels of entrenchment, takeover premiums reflect the private benefits of control which controlling shareholders in

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Jahnke, Patrick. "Ownership concentration and institutional investors’ governance through voice and exit." Business and Politics 21, no. 3 (2019): 327–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bap.2019.2.

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AbstractDrawing on data collected in interviews with investors and corporates in the United States and Europe, this paper sheds light on the motives behind shareholder engagement. It explains why index funds engage in corporate governance, despite their apparent lack of financial incentive to do so. Applying Hirschman's concepts of exit and loyalty to the investment management industry, this paper suggests that for many institutional shareholders today, voice is more feasible than exit. For the largest index investors, the cost of engagement has fallen to a level where it is today negligible.

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Crisóstomo, Vicente Lima, and Isac de Freitas Brandão. "The ultimate controlling owner and corporate governance in Brazil." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 19, no. 1 (2019): 120–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-01-2018-0043.

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Purpose High ownership concentration makes controlling blockholders powerful enough to use private benefits of control and able to shape the corporate governance system to favor their own interests. This paper aims to examine the effect of the nature of the ultimate firm owner on the quality of corporate governance in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach Econometric models are estimated to assess whether the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder affects the quality of the corporate governance system. Models are estimated using panel data methodology with coefficients estimated by the g

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Hossain, Mohammad, Courtney Tiffany, Aline Barth, Aparna Raychaudhuri, and Etienne F. Dumont. "1115. Evaluation of Gepotidacin (GSK2140944) Pharmacokinetics and Food Effect in Japanese Subjects." Open Forum Infectious Diseases 8, Supplement_1 (2021): S650—S651. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofab466.1309.

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Abstract Background Gepotidacin, a novel, first-in-class triazaacenaphthylene antibiotic, inhibits bacterial replication and has in vitro and in vivo activity against key pathogens, including drug-resistant strains, associated with a range of infections. Gepotidacin is currently in Phase 3 clinical studies for the treatment of uncomplicated urinary tract infections and gonorrhea. This study (NCT02853435) was designed to assess gepotidacin pharmacokinetics (PK) in Japanese subjects (fasted and fed). Methods A tablet formulation of 750 mg gepotidacin free base was used in the study, which was co

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Leal, Ricardo P. C., and Andre Carvalhal da Silva. "Controlling shareholders and corporate valuation in Brazil." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 2 (2006): 137–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p14.

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This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure, valuation and performance of Brazilian companies. The results show that large shareholders keep control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights. The evidence also indicates that non-voting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. There is some evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration, and that foreign-owned firms perform the best while government-owned firms perform the worst.

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Tian, Gloria Y. "Pyramid groups and firm performance: empirical evidence from Canadian corporations." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 3 (2010): 105–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i3p8.

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Using data of Canadian corporations in 1994 and 2003, this study analyzes whether controlling shareholders of corporate pyramid groups, with substantial divergences in ownership and control, negatively or positively impact firm performance. We find some evidence that the combination of ownership concentration and pyramidal structure would lead to inferior firm performance and valuation, but little evidence concerning tunneling within groups. We argue the robust legal environment in Canada that encourages shareholder value maximization could mitigate the negative impact of control enhancing mec

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Pohjola, Matti. "Concentration of Shareholder Voting Power in Finnish Industrial Companies." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 90, no. 2 (1988): 245. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3440102.

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Pourmansouri, Rezvan, Amir Mehdiabadi, Vahid Shahabi, Cristi Spulbar, and Ramona Birau. "An Investigation of the Link between Major Shareholders’ Behavior and Corporate Governance Performance before and after the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Case Study of the Companies Listed on the Iranian Stock Market." Journal of Risk and Financial Management 15, no. 5 (2022): 208. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15050208.

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One of the basic functions of establishing corporate governance (CG) in companies is improving performance and increasing value for shareholders. Expanding the company’s value will ultimately increase the shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, it is natural for shareholders to seek to improve their performance and increase the company’s value. If CG mechanisms cannot perform this function in companies, they do not have the necessary efficiency and effectiveness and, therefore, cannot improve the efficiency of companies. This article investigatedthe connection between the power of major shareholders

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Micheli, Anna Paola, Carmelo Intrisano, and Anna Maria Calce. "Dual Class Model and Shareholder Agreements: An Analysis of Italian Companies." International Business Research 15, no. 1 (2021): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v15n1p121.

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This paper analysed the changes in ownership concentration of the Italian financial market and the recourse to dual class model and shareholder agreements by Italian listed companies in the period 2009-2020. The analysis shows that the control market did not show signs in the period that would lead to presume an increase in the contestability of our companies. The attenuation in ownership concentration, highlighted by the reduction in the value of the Shapley-Shubik index, and the increase in the average market participation did not produce an increase in the contestability of Italian listed c

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Murtaza, Sadia, Ahmad Noor-Ud-Din, Amel Aguir, and Saadia Batool. "The Role of Ownership Concentration and Dividend Policy on Firm Performance." SEISENSE Journal of Management 3, no. 2 (2020): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v3i2.255.

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Purpose- The main aim of this study is to determine the role of ownership concentration and dividend policy on the firm performance of chemical sector firms of Pakistan. Design/Methodology- This research used the secondary data collected from the annual reports of the companies listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). However, inclusion criteria are the 26 listed firms from 2012 to 2017, giving a total of 156 observations. This study used the Generalized Least Squares Model. Findings- The findings reveal that ownership concentration has a significant positive association with fi

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Nielsen, Sabina, Simon Peck, and Winfried Ruigrok. "Substitution effects of internal governance mechanisms: evidence from Switzerland." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 3 (2008): 212–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i3c1p5.

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This paper explores the substitution effects among three governance mechanisms, board monitoring potential, incentives and ownership structure, in a sample of 176 publicly listed companies in Switzerland, a country characterised by bank-centred governance system and high degree of ownership concentration. Our results suggest that whereas ownership concentration per se does not substitute for monitoring by the board, shareholdings held by board and top management and presence of a shareholder on the board act as substitutes for board independence. Moreover, we found that substitution effects di

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Delios, Andrew, Zhi Jian Wu, and Nan Zhou. "A New Perspective on Ownership Identities in China's Listed Companies." Management and Organization Review 2, no. 3 (2006): 319–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2006.00048.x.

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We introduce a new perspective on the conceptualization and measurement of ownership identities of China's listed companies. Previous work analyzing the strategy and performance implications of the ownership structure in Chinese firms has used the official categorization provided by state bodies in China. In this categorization, state shareholding, legal person shareholding and A-shares dominate. This official categorization, however, obscures the ultimate identity of a shareholder; this can confound conceptual and empirical work on die strategy and performance implications of ownership identi

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Djebali, Raoudha, and Amel Belanes. "On The Impact Of Family Versus Institutional Blockholders On Dividend Policy." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 31, no. 4 (2015): 1329. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v31i4.9320.

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This paper investigates the effect of not only the controlling shareholders but also their identity on dividend policy. For a large panel of French firms during the period 2006-2010, we find that the dividend payout ratio increases with the ownership concentration. However, this result changes with the identity of the largest shareholder. Family-controlled firms are more tempted to distribute lower dividends while firms dominated by institutional investors likely distribute higher dividends. Empirical results also reveal that firms with more independent directors are associated with higher div

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Deng, Hua, Fariborz Moshirian, Peter Kien Pham, and Jason Zein. "Creating Value by Changing the Old Guard: The Impact of Controlling Shareholder Heterogeneity on Firm Performance and Corporate Policies." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, no. 6 (2013): 1781–811. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109014000039.

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AbstractTheory suggests that controlling shareholders can influence firm value through both shared benefits creation and private benefits consumption. Using negotiated control-block transfers from 31 countries, we look beyond ownership concentration and investigate how controlling shareholder heterogeneity influences the relative importance of these two effects. We document that a control transfer precipitates positive firm outcomes particularly when the vendor has maintained control over an extended period and the acquirer displays a strong incentive to engage in restructuring. In such cases,

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Nogueira, Nasaré Vieira, and Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro. "Effects of ownership structure on the mergers and acquisitions decisions in Brazilian firms." RAUSP Management Journal 55, no. 2 (2019): 227–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/rausp-11-2018-0124.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of ownership structure on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions of Brazilian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach This paper is an applied and explanatory research based on secondary data. The sample is comprises non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa between 1998 and 2007. Considering that the dependent variable is binary, the authors estimate panel data logistic regression models. Considering the existence of conflicts of interest among those who have the decision-making power and the supplier of capital

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Deudon, Jean-Charles, Ana C. Marques, and Gerrit Sarens. "Ownership concentration of three large Belgian banks during the crisis." Corporate Governance 15, no. 5 (2015): 663–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-09-2014-0104.

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Purpose – In this paper, two different ownership structures in Belgian banks are studied to see whether this had an impact on how these banks went through the financial crisis of 2007-2008. On the one hand, there is the concentrated ownership structure with a number of major shareholders, while on the other hand, the ownership can be really dispersed with no shareholder having a significantly large stake and ability to influence management’s decisions. Design/methodology/approach – The authors study three large Belgians banks. Dexia and KBC followed the first model (concentrated ownership), wh

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Kuhlmann, Sebastian, and Joachim Rojahn. "The impact of ownership concentration and shareholder identity on dividend payout probabilities: New evidence from the German stock market." Corporate Ownership and Control 15, no. 1 (2017): 18–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv15i1art2.

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Numerous studies analyse the impact of ownership concentration and shareholder identity on dividend payout probabilities. In this paper, we seek to provide additional information about the importance different ownership proxies have for dividend payments. Because the importance of those proxies varies with the classification techniques applied, we use both traditional and machine learning techniques. We examine the dividend payout behaviour of German issuers, which is considered rather flexible in terms of its distribution frequencies and dividend yields compared to international practice. Our

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Tsui, Chiahao, Lisa S. Cunden, Nicole Billings, et al. "152. rapid Ultra-high Enrichment of Bacterial Pathogens at Low Concentration from Blood for Species ID and AMR Prediction Using Nanopore Sequencing." Open Forum Infectious Diseases 7, Supplement_1 (2020): S206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofaa439.462.

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Abstract Background Each year in the United States there are over 1.7 million cases of sepsis that account for a third of hospital deaths. A key to reducing morbidity and mortality rates is early, appropriate antibiotic therapy. Most new diagnostic approaches still suffer from insufficient sensitivity to low bacterial loads in blood and limited sets of detection targets for bacterial species identification (ID) and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) determination. As such, blood culture remains the gold standard for diagnosing bacteremia despite limitations such as &gt; 2-day turnaround time (

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Silva, Francisca, Nicolás Majluf, and Ricardo D. Paredes. "Ownership structure and performance: Empirical evidence from Chilean firms." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 4 (2006): 175–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i4c1p3.

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This paper analyses the effect of ownership structure (represented by the concentration of the economic rights of the majority shareholder, and the affiliation to a business group) on performance. From a crosssection of publicly traded Chilean firms in the year 2000, we find evidence that the effects on performance depend on ownership concentration in a non-linear way, showing the changing balance of two opposing economic forces: value creation and value expropriation by the controlling shareholder. For the entire sample, the mere fact that a firm is owned by a business group does not affect p

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Javid, Attiya Y., and Robina Iqbal. "Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from Pakistan." Pakistan Development Review 47, no. 4II (2008): 643–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v47i4iipp.643-659.

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The nature of relation between the ownership structure and corporate governance structure has been the core issue in the corporate governance literature. From a firms’ perspective, ownership structure determines the firms’ profitability, enjoyed by different stake-holders. In particular, ownership structure is an incentive device for reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and management, which can be used to protect property rights of the firm [Barbosa and Louri (2002)]. With the development of corporate governance, many corporations owned by disperse shareholder

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Nguyen, Thi Tuyet Mai, Elaine Evans, and Meiting Lu. "Independent directors, ownership concentration and firm performance in listed companies." Pacific Accounting Review 29, no. 2 (2017): 204–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/par-07-2016-0070.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of independent directors on firm performance in Vietnam and identify how different types of ownership structure and the presence of controlling shareholders influence the relationship. Design/methodology/approach For a sample of 217 non-financial Vietnam-listed companies during the period from 2010 to 2014, this study uses the ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the relationship between independent directors and firm performance. Two econometric techniques – the fixed effects estimation and the difference in difference e

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Ricardo Kuronuma, Cleiton, Rodrigo Takashi Okimura, and George Andre Willrich Sale. "Agency Conflicts Between Controlling and Minority Shareholders in the Distribution of Dividends in Brazilian Companies." RGC - Revista de Governança Corporativa 9 (June 15, 2021): e076. http://dx.doi.org/10.21434/iberoamericanjcg.v9i.76.

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Objective: This paper aims to investigate whether the dividend policy is influenced by the shareholding concentration of publicly traded companies in Brazil. Methodology: This research was elaborated through panel regression analysis empirical tests, considering the period from 2013 to 2016. Originality/ Relevance: In Brazil, shareholding is usually concentrated in a small number of shareholders. In this scenario, controlling shareholders often end up having a great influence on management. As a result, agency conflicts may arise (Dalmácio & Corrar, 2007), mainly because controlling shareh

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Nogueira, Nasaré Vieira, and Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro. "Effects of ownership structure on the mergers and acquisitions decisions in Brazilian firms." RAUSP Management Journal 55, no. 2 (2020): 227–45. https://doi.org/10.1108/RAUSP-11-2018-0124.

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<strong>Abstract</strong> <strong>Purpose</strong> – The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of ownership structure on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions of Brazilian listed companies. <strong>Design/methodology/approach</strong> – This paper is an applied and explanatory research based on secondary data. The sample is comprises non-financial companies listed on the BM&FBovespa between 1998 and 2007. Considering that the dependent variable is binary, the authors estimate panel data logistic regression models. Considering the existence of

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Hamza, Taher. "Controlling shareholders, performance and risk taking of Tunisian listed firms." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 1 (2009): 222–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i1c1p6.

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We investigate the effects of ownership structure, as an internal control mechanism of agency problem, on corporate governance. We focused specially on the impact of the size, number and type of blockholders on the performance and the risk-taking of the Tunisian listed companies during the period 2001-2004. The descriptive analysis highlights, absence of ownership-control discrepancy, high ownership concentration, low management stock-ownership and the presence of two or three large blockholders with significant difference of the block share size between the first and the other controlling sha

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