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Journal articles on the topic 'Shareholder rights'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Armour, John. "Shareholder rights." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 36, no. 2 (2020): 314–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa005.

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Abstract ‘Shareholder rights’ are the legal entitlements of shareholders vis-à-vis companies in which they invest. A large body of research has sought to investigate how shareholder rights foster accountability of controllers. The concern has been that without accountability, managers and dominant shareholders will use their power to further their own interests at the expense of outside investors. A contrasting concern is that strengthening shareholder rights may come at the expense of other parties, which may also lead to misallocation of corporate resources. A recently-emerging body of resea

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2

Shim, Young. "Title Shareholder and Shareholder’s Rights." Commercial Law Review 36, no. 3 (2017): 9–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.21188/clr.36.3.1.

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3

Fegyveresi, Zsolt. "Shareholders' Right to Information − A Comparative Analysis of Hungarian and Romanian Company Law." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae Legal Studies 9, no. 1 (2020): 39–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.47745/ausleg.2020.9.1.03.

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"This study examines one of the basic rights of shareholders, the right to information in Hungarian and Romanian company law. The right to information is a non-property, organizational right originating from the shareholder’s membership right, which is related to the convening of the general meeting of the company limited by shares and the voting right that can be exercised there. The right to information is the individual right of the shareholder and the individual obligation of the company. The right to information belongs to all shareholders, regardless of the extent of their fi nancial con

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4

Madžarov Matijević, Sara. "PRAVNA NARAV PRAVA NA OBAVIJEŠTENOST U DIONIČKOM DRUŠTVU." Pravni vjesnik 41, no. 1 (2025): 111–27. https://doi.org/10.25234/pv/30792.

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The shareholders’ right to information enables shareholders to ask questions and seek information about the company’s affairs from the management, ensuring active shareholder participation and informed decision-making. This paper aims to examine its legal nature on both theoretical and practical levels. Methodological treatment includes, on the one hand, an analysis of legal sources and case law, and on the other hand, an analysis of the regulatory approach of EU member states’ legislators in regulating this institute, aiming to understand the legal nature of the right to information to better

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5

Houben, Robby. "Shareholder Rights and Responsibilities in the Context of Corporate Social Responsibility." European Business Law Review 27, Issue 5 (2016): 615–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2016028.

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In this article the authors reflect in more detail on shareholder rights and responsibilities, highlighting two recent developments that could give rise to further debate, namely: shareholder’s activist conduct in the general meetings of systemic enterprises and shareholder responsibility as to voting without having an economic interest in the company in which the votes are casted (“empty voting”). Empty voting is problematic in that it allows parties to vote who do not or to a small extent bear the ultimate risk of a company. In doing so, it blurs the traditional ratio along the lines of whic

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6

Goto, Gen. "Legally "Strong" Shareholders of Japan." Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review, no. 3.2 (2014): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.36639/mbelr.3.2.legally.

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Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’ power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections, shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a co

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7

Horáček, Tomáš. "Osoby oprávněné k výkonu práv spojených s akcií a majetková práva akcionářů." AUC IURIDICA 44, no. 2 (2020): 99–113. https://doi.org/10.14712/23366478.2025.261.

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Section 155 (1) of the Commercial Code defines a share as a security with attached shareholder’s rights which he is entitled to exercise in relation to the company. The shareholder is considered not only as the owner of the share – the scripture act incorporating subjective rights – but also as a member of the public limited company. Consequently, the identification of the shareholder is essential for ascertaining who enjoys the rights, or who is subject to obligations, attached to the share. The answer to this question varies according to the nature and the form of the share. In the case of a

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8

Zheng, Xixi, and Hasani Mohd Ali. "The role of dual-class share structures, shareholders’ engagement and corporate governance on unequal voting rights: A comparative study of China, Malaysia, and Germany." Economics and Finance Letters 12, no. 2 (2025): 198–214. https://doi.org/10.18488/29.v12i2.4182.

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The shareholders’ voting rights have been a significant element in ensuring organizational success. This aspect demands greater emphasis from researchers and policymakers. Hence, the primary aim of this study is to examine the impact of dual-class share structures, shareholder engagement, and corporate governance on unequal shareholders’ voting rights in publicly listed companies in China, Malaysia, and Germany with a particular focus on the moderating role of regulatory pressure. The study collected empirical data from shareholders of publicly listed companies through structured questionnaire

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9

Černá, Stanislava. "Ochrana menšinových akcionářů v obchodním zákoníku." AUC IURIDICA 44, no. 2 (2020): 115–30. https://doi.org/10.14712/23366478.2025.262.

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Act No. 142/1996 Coll. amending the Commercial Code strengthened the minority shareholders’ protection. The individual shareholders’ rights can be affected in various ways. These can be a limitation of the shareholder’s capacity to participate in the company control and asserting its will, consequent change of the rights attached to the share, change in the proportion of the individual shareholder’s share to the registered capital of the company or the net commercial capital, a decrease of the share price and a weakened minority shareholders’ position as a result of the acquisition by a certai

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10

Su, Kun, and Peng Li. "The Effects Of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders On Debt Maturity Structure." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 29, no. 2 (2013): 553. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v29i2.7656.

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Using a balanced panel data of 915 Chinese listed firms, this paper studies the effect of ultimate controlling shareholders on debt maturity structure by adopting random effect model. Our results show: the larger the ultimate controlling shareholders cash flow rights, the higher the cost of expropriating outside investors by ultimate controlling shareholder, and can reduce the agency costs of debt financing, so banks are willing to provide more long term debt funds for the firms. Ultimate controlling shareholders cash flow rights are positively related to debt maturity structure. The larger th

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11

Park, In-Ho. "Confirmation of shareholders and exercise of shareholder rights." Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University 41, no. 1 (2021): 161–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2021.41.1.161.

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12

Golden, Joanna. "The Effect of Shareholder Rights and Information Asymmetry on Stock-Option-Related Repurchase Activity." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 21, no. 02 (2018): 1850013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091518500133.

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As stock-option holdings increase, managers alter their firms’ payout composition, choosing stock repurchases rather than dividends to return cash to shareholders. Prior research presents two competing explanations for this behavior: the flexibility hypothesis and the shareholder power hypothesis. In support of the flexibility hypothesis, I document that this executive stock-option incentive to repurchase stock as a substitute for dividends is stronger when firms have weak shareholder rights and when information asymmetry is severe. In addition, I find that option-induced repurchases are assoc

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13

Emanuella, Hamanda Tiara. "Perlindungan Hukum Pemegang Saham Minoritas PT (Persero) dalam Pembentukan Anak Perusahaan BUMN." MLJ Merdeka Law Journal 2, no. 2 (2021): 100–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.26905/mlj.v2i2.7166.

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BUMN (Persero) is regulated in UU 19 of 2003 on BUMN. BUMN hold 50% or more of share as a major controlled, the minority share can be owned by other parties with IPO mechanism. BUMN is including the subject of Law Number 40 of 2007 on Limited Liability Company, which specifically regulates the rights of shareholders. However, the problem is related to when the BUMN carrying out its business activities establishes a subsidiary based on the decision of the GMS, where the majority shareholder who is the largest shareholder is on the side of him, which makes the rights of the minority shareholder

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14

Куйран, Лоу, and Lou Qiuran. "OnThe Essence Of Shareholder’s Right." Advances in Law Studies 3, no. 6 (2015): 307–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/16379.

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The shareholder’s right has been regarded as a special right, which is substantially different from creditor’s right, in China. However, with the development of business reality, the boundaries between these two rights have been blurred already. Although the structure of shareholder’s right has a probable nature, compared to a more stable structure of credit, there are lots of overlaps between these two structures. Thus, an additional standard, whether investor is registered as shareholder, is required to completely distinguish these two rights.

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15

Nuhu, Mohammed, Halilu Bello Rogo, and Mohammed Umar Danladi. "Investigating the Influence of Shareholder Mechanisms on the Perceived Performance of Listed Firms in Nigeria." Review of Economics and Development Studies 4, no. 1 (2018): 79–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.26710/reads.v4i1.283.

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The current debate on the issues of shareholder rights to firm performance has grown as a topic of research both in the developed and emerging economy. There is serious concern regarding the effectiveness of the board transparency and accountability, company image and the rights of the shareholders in recent times. This paper investigated the influence of shareholders mechanisms on the perceived performance of listed firms in Nigeria. The study is guided byagency theory and supported by the stewardship theory. The questionnaire was used as an instrument for data collection. 247 questionnaires

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16

Bitė, Virginijus, and Žygimantas Narkevičius. "Pre–Emption Right of Shareholders to Purchase Shares for Sale in Private Limited Liability Companies: The Problematic Legal Remedies." Verslas: Teorija ir Praktika 17, no. 2 (2016): 150–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/btp.2016.628.

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This article analyses the problems that can arise when implementing the rights of shareholders in private limited liability companies to purchase the shares of another shareholder being for sale in priority to others and the possible legal remedies for violated rights. According to the practice of the Lithuanian Supreme Court, the rights of the buyer cannot be assigned to a private limited liability company shareholder whose pre-emption right to purchase the shares being for sale has been breached. However, in this article it is being argued that perhaps in certain exceptional cases, in order

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17

Bitė, Virginijus, and Žygimantas Narkevičius. "Pre–Emption Right of Shareholders to Purchase Shares for Sale in Private Limited Liability Companies: The Problematic Legal Remedies." Business: Theory and Practice 17, no. (2) (2016): 150–58. https://doi.org/10.3846/btp.2016.628.

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This article analyses the problems that can arise when implementing the rights of shareholders in private limited liability companies to purchase the shares of another shareholder being for sale in priority to others and the possible legal remedies for violated rights. According to the practice of the Lithuanian Supreme Court, the rights of the buyer cannot be assigned to a private limited liability company shareholder whose pre-emption right to purchase the shares being for sale has been breached. However, in this article it is being argued that perhaps in certain exceptional cases, in order

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18

Djordjevic, Marija. "Corporate management: Ownership, control and shareholders' rights." Privredna izgradnja 48, no. 3-4 (2005): 211–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/priz0504211d.

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In spite of extent of economy development in one country, every corporation faces up with same problems connected with corporate governance. Problems are ownership, shareholders rights and control. The way to acquire ownership is by buying shares of company. Ownership is connected with making essential decisions in corporation like changing statute of firm, allowing new stock market flotation, etc. There are two types of ownership: widespread or dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. Dispersed ownership is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom and United States) wher

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19

Ritika, K. "Pre-emptive Rights of Shareholders: An Indian Perspective." Business Law Review 44, Issue 1 (2023): 44–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula2023002.

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Pre-emptive rights are legal relationships either created by a statute or through a contract. By the exercise of these rights, priority is given to the right holder over and above others as regards the potential acquisition of the relevant subject matter. Only upon refusal by such right holder, is this opportunity given to a third party to negotiate. In India, the statutory pre-emptive rights of a shareholder in a company have been recognized statutorily through the Companies Act, 2013, as well as by the extant security exchange laws. Whereas, in the case of contractual pre-emptive rights, the

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20

Duynstee, D. J. F. F. M., T. Drenth, and A. C. W. Pijls. "Shareholder Activism and ESG: From Locust to Green Knight? A Perspective from the Netherlands." European Company and Financial Law Review 22, no. 1 (2025): 42–69. https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2025-0002.

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42 In this article, we will answer the questions (i) what is the role and what are the rights of activist shareholders under Dutch law, (ii) how these rights relate to ESG developments, and (iii) whether the associated changes in shareholder activism will affect the existing negative image of activist shareholders and their limited rights. We will examine all of this against the backdrop of recent developments – both legislative and practical – around ESG and the broad public support for it. In other words: will the pendulum, that in recent years has placed the power in the company in the hand

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21

Mallin, Chris, and Andrea Melis. "Shareholder rights, shareholder voting, and corporate performance." Journal of Management & Governance 16, no. 2 (2010): 171–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10997-010-9138-1.

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22

Smitiukh, Andrii. "The grounds of the shareholder’s withdrawal from the limited liability companies and legal entities of the similar corporate forms: the comparative legal aspect." Law Review of Kyiv University of Law, no. 1 (April 15, 2020): 188–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.36695/2219-5521.1.2020.38.

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The article presents the result of comparative legal studies of the grounds of the shareholder’s withdrawal from the limited liability companies as well as legal entities of the similar corporate forms provided by the laws of some countries (namely Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom). It is concluded that in most legal systems the ground of the withdrawal is a set of facts composed of the main element – the declaration of will of the shareholder to terminate the corporate relationship of pa

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23

Zhou, Tingting. "Partial privatization, control rights of large shareholders and privatized shares transfer." Nankai Business Review International 9, no. 4 (2018): 472–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-11-2017-0060.

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Purpose The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also privatized shares transfer. For partially privatized SOEs, the introduction of private sector ownership is not the end of the story because the previously introduced private owners may choose to leave the SOEs by transferring the privatized shares after privatization, a process that is called “privatized shares transfer”. This paper aims to investigate the determinants of privatized shares transfer (PST) from

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24

Shchoka, S. V. "Shareholder rights in Ukraine: some protection mechanisms and corporate relations." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law 2, no. 85 (2024): 68–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2024.85.2.9.

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This article provides a detailed analysis of the establishment and protection of shareholders’ rights in Ukraine, which is an important component of corporate governance and the country’s development. The protection of shareholders’ rights ensures the stability of financial markets and contributes to attracting investments. The legal status of shareholders, their rights, and obligations play a crucial role in the functioning of joint-stock companies. The primary way to acquire shareholder status is by purchasing shares on the stock market, as well as through the transfer of shares via inherita

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25

Liu, Xianzhuang. "Research on the Shareholder Delisting System of Limited Liability Companies." Scientific Journal Of Humanities and Social Sciences 6, no. 7 (2024): 135–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/zhb8xq12.

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Limited liability companies have become an indispensable part of the market economy due to their advantages in combining talent and capital, while continuously attracting more investors to participate. However, there are also some shareholders who intentionally fail to comply with the agreement and are unwilling to fulfill their capital contribution responsibilities. In this case, the shareholder delisting system has emerged. This system refers to the mandatory cancellation of the shareholder status of expelled shareholders in accordance with the company's articles of association or resolution

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26

Zhang, Xinsheng, Jin Liu, Wenhao Zhu, and Haolan Li. "Research on the Legal System of Shareholders’ Rights Exercise for China’s State-owned Enterprises." E3S Web of Conferences 257 (2021): 02073. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202125702073.

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In the context of the new round of reform of China’s state-owned enterprises, the modernization of governance system and governance capabilities has put forward new requirements for Chinese central enterprises to exercise shareholders’ rights, which not only means value reconstruction, business restructuring and process reengineering, but also requires central enterprises to make positive responses in terms of corporate governance, group management and control, and shareholder exercise. This study effectively integrates corporate governance and group management and control, constructs a modern

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27

Lapina, Yuliya, Alexander Kostyuk, Udo Braendle, and Yaroslav Mozghovyi. "Shareholders rights and remedies (comparative law perspective)." Corporate Board role duties and composition 12, no. 3 (2016): 6–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv12i3art1.

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The main aim is to discuss shareholder rights protection in Ukraine and Germany, which have the same Civil law legal system. Our contribution outlines, systemizes and accesses approaches how critical and weak issues in the area of shareholder protection are resolved in both countries using the mechanisms of corporate governance. Using Germany as a benchmark, the paper identifies that the most important and efficient mechanisms of shareholders rights protection, which can be implemented in Ukrainian companies are the following: principle of equal treatment and duty of loyalty which should be fi

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28

Susilowati, Isabella Henny, and IPutu Sugiartha Sanjaya. "PENGARUH KEPEMILIKAN ULTIMAT TERHADAP KEINFORMATIFAN LABA PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BEI." MODUS 27, no. 1 (2016): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.24002/modus.v27i1.565.

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Ultimate ownership is ownership directly and indirectly in public companies to identify the ultimate owners of public Vendor. Ultimate owner has the right greater control of cash fow rights is called the controlling shareholder. This causes problems between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders, which will afect earnings informativeness. Informativeness proft is profit information that could afect stock returns. This study uses the 149 companies listed on the Stock Exchange in 2004-2009. Te data used in this study is proft and equity in the annual fnancial statements, as we

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29

AHERN, Deirdre. "The Mythical Value of Voice and Stewardship in the EU Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement: Rights Do Not an Engaged Shareholder Make." Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 20 (October 25, 2018): 88–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cel.2018.8.

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AbstractThrough the lens of assessing the likely regulatory impact of the 2017 EU Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement and its amendments to the 2007 Directive on Shareholder Rights, this article considers the mythical voice and stewardship role attributed by the EU to shareholders as active corporate governance gatekeepers and drivers of its long-term sustainability agenda. It identifies limitations of the Directive itself and practical challenges concerning the provisions on shareholder identification, executive pay, related party transactions, proxy advisors and shareholder engagem

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30

Romanenko, Volodymyr. "ОБМЕЖЕННЯ ПРАВА НА УЧАСТЬ В УПРАВЛІННІ ГОСПОДАРСЬКИМ ТОВАРИСТВОМ". Visnyk of the Lviv University. Series Law, № 77 (12 грудня 2023): 105–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.30970/vla.2023.77.105.

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The legal concept of «limitation of the right to participate in the management of a company» should be understood as narrowing the scope of such a right, imposing additional rules that impede its realization. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine states that such limitations are allowed in exceptional cases for the purposes of social necessity, solely on the basis of law and in compliance with the principles of justice, proportionality. The examples of legitimate limitation of the right to participate in the management of a company are the following: a joint-stock company’s preferred shareholder

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31

Smitiukh, Andrii. "The exercise of the corporate rights certified by the corporate shares (stocks) encumbered with the usufruct." Law Review of Kyiv University of Law, no. 2 (August 10, 2020): 223–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.36695/2219-5521.2.2020.39.

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The article presents the result of comparative legal studies of the distribution of the exercise of corporate rights certified by corporateshares (stocks) encumbered with the usufruct between a company’s shareholder and a fructuary in the legislations of a numberof civil law legal system countries (namely Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey). It is concludedthat the legislative approach varies significantly in this issue in different countries. The author elaborates an optimal legislativemodel to be introduced into the domestic legislation of Ukraine for th

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32

BEN HAMIDA, Hela, and Chokri MAMOGHLI. "Propriété ultime et performance des entreprises : une investigation empirique dans les contextes des pays développés et émergents." Management international 11, no. 3 (2007): 53–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.59876/a-80sc-xnfj.

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The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of divergence between ultimate shareholder's cash-flow and control rights on firm valuation. In particular, we test incentive effect hypothesis and non monotony of the relationship between separation of control and cash-flow rights and firm valuation. Using data for 713 firms in six emerging and developing countries, we find that pyramiding and cross holding are the main devices to enhance the ultimate shareholder control in emerging countries. The ultimate shareholder is usually associated with family ownership. This result is in line with p

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33

Koutsias, Marios. "Shareholder Supremacy in a Nexus of Contracts: A Nexus of Problems." Business Law Review 38, Issue 4 (2017): 136–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula2017021.

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This article focuses on shareholder supremacy and exclusivity derived from a view of the company as a nexus of contracts. The nexus of contracts theory is the dominant theory within English company law. It defines the company as a contract between private individuals. The shareholders and the company are recognized as the only parties to that contract. While corporate membership is reserved exclusively for shareholders, the rest of the stakeholders are viewed as external to the company. The article will question the theoretical and doctrinal validity of shareholder supremacy and exclusivity wi

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34

Nolan, Richard C. "Shareholder Rights in Britain." European Business Organization Law Review 7, no. 2 (2006): 549–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1566752906005490.

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35

Caton, Gary L., and Jeremy Goh. "Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and Shareholder Rights Plans: Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43, no. 2 (2008): 381–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000003562.

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AbstractWe examine the effect of poison pill adoptions on firm value, controlling for the adopting firm's preexisting corporate governance structure. We find that only companies with the most democratic governance structures, defined as those with the fewest preexisting protective governance provisions, experience significantly positive abnormal stock returns and significantly positive abnormal revisions in five-year earnings growth rate forecasts. Moreover, regression results indicate that abnormal returns and forecast revisions are significantly related to governance structure and not to boa

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36

Sheehy, Benedict. "Shareholders, Unicorns and Stilts: An Analysis of Shareholder Property Rights." Journal of Corporate Law Studies 6, no. 1 (2006): 165–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2006.11419950.

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37

Nowland, John. "Shareholder rights, telecommunications and director attendance around the world." Accounting Research Journal 32, no. 2 (2019): 221–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/arj-03-2018-0047.

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Purpose This study aims to document the variation in director attendance rates around the world and investigate the influence of cross-country differences in law and infrastructure on director attendance practices. Design/methodology/approach Director attendance data are hand-collected from company annual reports and are related to differences in shareholder rights, director liability and transportation and telecommunications infrastructure across countries. Findings Using a hand-collected data set of 4,344 directorships from 33 countries, the results indicate that director attendance is signi

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38

Diyan Ibaidah Ayogi, Chusnia Chusnia, and Sumriyah Sumriyah. "Perlindungan Hukum Hak Pemegang Saham Dalam Pembubaran Perusahaan Berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 40 Tahun 2007." Jurnal Hukum dan Sosial Politik 1, no. 3 (2023): 111–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.59581/jhsp-widyakarya.v1i3.547.

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Company dissolution and legal protection of shareholder rights are regulated based on Law Number 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies in Indonesia. The journal discusses the procedure for dissolving a company, the reasons for dissolving, and options for filing a lawsuit against the court for dissolving a company when a dispute arises between shareholders. The author emphasizes the importance of legal protection for shareholders and the need for clear regulations in the Indonesian Limited Liability Company Law. Normative legal research methods (normative legal research). The result

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39

Ouerfelli, Ahmed. "La protection des actionnaires minoritaires En droit tunisien des sociétés." Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online 13, no. 1 (2006): 107–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22112987-91000167.

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Abstract The Law on the Economic Initiative, promulgated on December 27th, 2007, amended several laws at the same time. Among these laws, is the modifi cation of certain provisions of the Commercial Companies Code of November 3rd, 2000. The Law aims at the impulse of the creation and the transmission of fi rms. In the field of company law, it reinforces the rights of shareholders in limited companies, listed or not, and abolishes the minimum capital, required for the constitution of limited liability companies. It also allows the shareholders to have a contribution in services (apport en indus

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40

SHYSHKOVSKYI, Bohdan. "Exit from the company as a means of resolving a deadlock situation in a Limited Liability Company." Economics. Finances. Law 5/2025, no. - (2025): 49–53. https://doi.org/10.37634/efp.2025.5.10.

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This paper explores the exit of a shareholder from a limited liability company as one of the effective mechanisms for resolving deadlock situations. The relevance of the topic stems from the rapid development of contractual business models, particularly the formation of joint ventures with equal shareholdings (50/50), where the absence of adequate mechanisms for resolving corporate conflicts may lead to a complete operational standstill. In such cases, the parties often find themselves unable to make key decisions, posing a direct threat to business continuity and the overall functioning of th

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41

Gleason, Katherine I., and Mark S. Klock. "Is there power behind the dead hand? An empirical investigation of dead hand poison pills." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 1 (2009): 370–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i1c3p4.

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Dead hand poison pills prevent potential hostile acquirers from circumventing a poison pill with a proxy contest whereby newly elected directors could redeem the pill. Dead hand provisions only permit continuing directors to redeem. Shareholder rights advocates and legal scholars have criticized dead hand poison pills as an assault on shareholder governance, but economic theory suggests potential shareholder benefits. We provide the first empirical study of dead hand poison pills. We find that adoption of dead hand poison pills leads to gains for shareholders and losses for bondholders. This s

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Latella, Dario. "The shareholder derivative suits: disfunction and remedies against a "paradoxal" inactivity." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 4 (2010): 297–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i4c2p5.

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The derivative action exerted by shareholders (rectius, by a single shareholder or by a minority of them) falls within the wider topic of the defence of shareholder minorities. Considered as one of the pillars of corporate governance, the above-mentioned subject tends to be a control tool as to the accurate execution of the managerial task. Some empirical studies show that, in spite of corporate fraud by managers, in listed companies there are no such lawsuits. This “physiological paradox” – under which the others’ indifference enables a few organised individuals to control the company – has u

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Radomirovic, Ivana, and Amina Kajevic. "Proxy Voting at the General Meeting of a Public Joint Stock Company – General View and Possibility of Abuse." Pravo i privreda 60, no. 4 (2022): 802–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.55836/pip_22410a.

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This paper analyses proxy voting at the general meeting of a public joint stock company. Proxy voting is an important element in exercising the shareholder’s right to vote, the most important right of the shareholder. This article aims to analyse regulation of proxy voting, and possibility of its abuse through proxy solicitation, using a normative analysis of relevant regulations. Proxy solicitation is an issue that is becoming notable in the member states of the European Union, as it can serve for gaining a controlling influence in the company. Although Shareholders’ Rights Directive does not

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Kwon, Sang-Ro. "A Study on Virtual Shareholders' Meetings under the German COVID-19 Pandemic-related Act." Legal Studies Institute of Chosun University 29, no. 3 (2022): 103–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.18189/isicu.2022.29.3.103.

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With the Act on Measures in Corporate, Cooperative, Association, Foundation, and Home Ownership Law to Combat the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic, virtual shareholders' meetings were temporarily held in Germany. Overall, shareholders' participation in general meetings increased. However, shareholders' right to speak and ask questions was not guaranteed, raising the issue of infringement of shareholders' rights and the risk of resolution cancellation at general shareholders' meetings. Besides, there has been skepticism about continuing to hold virtual shareholders' meetings after the end of th

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Ashraf, Badar Nadeem, and Changjun Zheng. "Shareholder protection, creditor rights and bank dividend policies." China Finance Review International 5, no. 2 (2015): 161–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cfri-08-2014-0057.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of legal protection of bank minority shareholders (noncontrolling shareholders) and bank creditors (e.g. depositors or debt-holders) on bank dividend payout policies using a panel data set of 5,918 banks from 52 countries over the period 1998-2007, after controlling for country-level deposit insurance coverage and bank- and country-level regulatory pressures. Design/methodology/approach – Tobit panel regression models are used to examine the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on bank dividend payout amounts. And

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Yarymovych, Uliana. "Mandatory Redemption of Shares by a Stock Company in Ukraine." osteuropa recht 69, no. 2 (2023): 263–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0030-6444-2023-2-263.

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The study analyzes the peculiarities of realization and protection of the shareholder's right to mandatory redemption of shares by a stock company in Ukraine. The grounds and the procedure for exercising this right, and the specifics of its protection in case of violation, are provided. It is argued that an appeal to the company with a demand for mandatory redemption of shares by it and refusal to fulfil this obligation by the company is the basis for the shareholder to appeal the decision of the general meeting which became the ground for such right to court. At the same time, if the decision

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Madlela, Vela. "The Appointment of a Proxy "At Any Time" in Terms of Section 58 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Richard Du Plessis Barry v Clearwater Estates NPC [2017] ZASCA 11." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 22 (January 31, 2019): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2019/v22i0a4401.

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Section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 gives a shareholder the right to appoint a proxy "at any time" for the purpose of participating in, speaking and voting on behalf of that shareholder at a shareholders′ meeting, or providing or withholding written consent on behalf of the shareholder in terms of section 60. One important issue that arises in regard to the appointment of a proxy relates to the proper interpretation of section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, namely whether this section, as read with section 58(3)(c), constitutes an unalterable provision giving a shareholder an

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Chen, Anlin, Lanfeng Kao, and Yi-Kai Chen. "Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 10, no. 02 (2007): 173–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021909150700101x.

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Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of creditors and minority shareholders. We need legal regulation on controlling shareholders' share collateral to reinforce corporate governance mechanism

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Thraya, Mohamed Firas. "Are controlling shareholders extracting private benefits from European public acquisitions?" International Journal of Managerial Finance 11, no. 1 (2015): 80–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-07-2012-0081.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with voting rights structures that are highly concentrated. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder’s concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. The author argues that with higher levels of entrenchment, takeover premiums reflect the private benefits of control which controlling shareholders in

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Dong, Hening. "Comparative Derivative Litigation Analysis." Law and Economy 2, no. 4 (2023): 23–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.56397/le.2023.04.04.

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Shareholder-derived litigation refers to the litigation system when the legitimate rights and interests of the company are infringed by others, especially by the controlling shareholders, parent company, directors, and managers. As an important system to protect the interests of shareholders shareholder derivative actions have been controversial in practice and do not work well as a remedy. This article will focus on the advantages of relaxing derivative actions while pointing out the problems in current judicial practice and suggesting possible solutions for improving derivative actions in th

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