Relevant bibliographies by topics / Siege warfare

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Siege warfare'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 31 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Siege warfare"

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Hale, Christopher John. "“TAKE PITY OF YOUR TOWN AND OF YOUR PEOPLE”." Contemporary Challenges: The Global Crime, Justice and Security Journal 3 (September 28, 2022): 82–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2218/ccj.v3.7087.

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It has been argued that the practice of siege warfare is at the very limit of legality under the terms of International Humanitarian Law.[1] The question addressed in this essay might be rephrased: how do the laws of armed conflict permitsieges to become humanitarian disasters? More precisely, can military doctrine regarding the efficacy of siege warfare operations to induce surrender of besieged forces comply in real world terms with the laws of armed conflict? Since February, 2022 it is alleged that Russian armed forces perpetrated a number of crimes against humanity in Ukraine during sieges of cities such as Mariupol. These alleged crimes include indiscriminate targeting of civilian habitation and attacks on evacuation corridors.[2] In the 1990s, siege warfare in the former Yugoslavia provoked international censure and criminal prosecution of perpetrators. Nevertheless, siege operations in Syria and Kashmir today show no sign of respecting the rights of civilian populations despite international censure. The core legal issue regarding sieges is the principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatant civilians and thus decisions regarding targeting and proportionality. The essay will show that distinction is a recent innovation in International Humanitarian Law and uncertainly embodied in military doctrine. The first part reviews evolving IHL norms pertinent to modern sieges. In the second, the essay examines modern jurisprudence regarding the conduct of siege warfare derived from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) prosecution of Major General Stanislav Galić and Major General Dragomir Milosević.[3] [1] Riordan, K., ‘Shelling, Sniping and Starvation: the Law of Armed Conflict and the Lessons of the Siege of Sarajevo’, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 41 (2), p.150; Watts, S., Under Siege: International Humanitarian Law and Security Council Practice Concerning Urban Siege Operations’, Research and Policy Paper, CHE Project, May 2014. [2] https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2022/03/17/armed-conflict-in-ukraine-a-recap-of-basic-ihl-rules/ [3] https://www.icty.org/case/galic
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Murray, William M., and Paul Bently Kern. "Ancient Siege Warfare." Journal of Military History 64, no. 2 (April 2000): 515. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/120251.

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Nijs, Maxime. "Humanizing siege warfare: Applying the principle of proportionality to sieges." International Review of the Red Cross 102, no. 914 (August 2020): 683–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383121000680.

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AbstractSiege warfare and its devastating humanitarian consequences have been one of the defining features of contemporary armed conflicts. While the most apparent restriction of siege warfare appears to be provided by the prohibition against starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare, the prevailing restrictive interpretation of this prohibition has left civilians remaining in a besieged area unprotected from the hardships they endure. This article demonstrates that shifting the focus from the prohibition against starvation to the rules regulating humanitarian relief operations does not seem helpful due to the ambiguities regarding the requirement of consent and the right of control of the besieging party. In remedying this protection gap, this article examines whether and how the principle of proportionality applies in the context of a siege. After analyzing whether the encirclement and isolation aspect of a siege can be considered an attack in the sense of Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I (AP I), to which the proportionality principle applies, the article investigates how this principle operates in the context of a siege. It will be demonstrated that Article 57(2)(b) of AP I requires that the proportionality of a siege must be continuously monitored.
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Wheeler, Everett L. "Ancient Siege Warfare (review)." Technology and Culture 41, no. 4 (2000): 834–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tech.2000.0187.

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Riordan, KJ. "Shelling, Sniping and Starvation: The Law of Armed Conflict and the Lessons of the Siege of Sarajevo." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 41, no. 2 (August 2, 2010): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v41i2.5233.

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This article looks at the siege of Sarajevo conducted from April 1992 to February 1996, which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and great suffering to the civilian population of the city. It also resulted in criminal convictions for Bosnian Serb commanders Stanislav Galić and Dragomir Milosević. Given the fact that sieges have been a common form of warfare from antiquity to the present day, and are likely to remain so, these convictions and the heavy sentences that accompanied them must provide a cautionary tale for commanders who may in future be required to undertake such an operation. This article examines the traditional methods of warfare associated with the successful prosecution of a siege and contrasts them with the detailed and onerous provisions of the law of armed conflict. It ponders the question of what a modern commander must do to conduct a siege which is both lawful and successful.
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Bachrach, Bernard S. "Medieval Siege Warfare: A Reconnaissance." Journal of Military History 58, no. 1 (January 1994): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944182.

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Roth, Jonathan P. "Josh Levithan. Roman Siege Warfare." American Historical Review 119, no. 5 (December 2014): 1756–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ahr/119.5.1756.

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Whitby, Michael. "SIEGE WARFARE AND COUNTER-SIEGE TACTICS IN LATE ANTIQUITY (ca. 250–640)." Late Antique Archaeology 8, no. 2 (January 25, 2013): 433–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134522-90000014a.

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Although there are numerous remains of Late Roman walls and other defensive works, these offer little insight into how individual sieges progressed, and most of our knowledge about siege operations in Late Antiquity comes from literary sources, which, for different reasons, provide a wealth of information. Tactics and techniques were substantially the same as in earlier Roman and Hellenistic times, so that comparative evidence is relevant, and the main issue for debate is the switch from torsion-powered to traction artillery and who was responsible for this development.
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RAPHAEL, KATE. "Mongol Siege Warfare on the Banks of the Euphrates and the Question of Gunpowder (1260–1312)." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 19, no. 3 (July 2009): 355–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1356186309009717.

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AbstractThis article discusses the Mongol approach to warfare, then goes on to consider the Mongols' conversion to the notion that they would have to develop a siege train, since walled cities cannot easily be taken by a cavalry charge. The contribution of Chinese siege engineers is discussed, and there is a survey of Chinese siege techniques as they evolved before the Mongol period. The author considers the evidence for the use of inflammable materials, and then moves to the question of gunpowder. The widespread (not quite universal) consensus that the Chinese used gunpowder is discussed, and then attention moves to Hulegu's expedition to western Asia in the 1250s. It is pointed out that none of the major sources seems to imply the use of anything that might be construed as gunpowder technology during those campaigns. Lastly, the author considers, in some detail, sieges conducted by the Ilkhanid Mongols against Mamluk border strongholds during the succeeding decades, drawing attention to and explaining those sieges' increasing lack of success.
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Burke, James. "The New Model Army and the problems of siege warfare, 1648–51." Irish Historical Studies 27, no. 105 (May 1990): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021121400010282.

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The destruction of the Royalist field armies at Naseby and Langport in 1645 did not end the English Civil War. Althought the king had suffered irreversible military defeats, Parliament was unable to govern effectively while politically important towns and fortresses remained in enemy hands. To ensure political stability Parliament’s army was forced to besiege and reduce a large number of strongholds in England, Ireland and Scotland, a task that was not finally completed until the surrender of Galway in 1652. In particular the war in Ireland was to test the army’s siege-making capacity more severely than any previous campaign. To complete the political conquest of Britain and Ireland the army and its generals were compelled increasingly to practise an aspect of warfare that had been traditionally neglected by English soldiers. In contrast, siege warfare was an area in which their continental counterparts had excelled.In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European wars produced few set-piece battles. Conflicts were more frequently resolved by the assault and defence of fortified cities and towns. Consequently the art of siege warfare evolved rapidly. England’s political and military insularity during this period detached the country from advances in siege technology that had transformed the conduct of European warfare. No major siege had been undertaken by an English army since Henry VIII had invested Boulogne in 1544, and as there had been no siege of English towns or fortresses since medieval times, there had been little innovation in defensive fortifications. What improvements did occur were sporadic and unco-ordinated. In the sixteenth century a great fortress was built at Berwick-on-Tweed to counter Scottish infiltration and a number of coastal towns in the south-east were refortified against the threat of Spanish invasion. However, by the outbreak of civil war in 1642, even these were obsolete by contemporary continental standards.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Siege warfare"

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Morton, Amanda S. "Unconventional Weapons, Siege Warfare, and the Hoplite Ideal." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1313569557.

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Schofield, Aimee Ellen Margaret. "Experimental archaeology and siege warfare : analysing ancient sources through experimentation." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2014. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/experimental-archaeology-and-siege-warfare-analysing-ancient-sources-through-experimentation(f0ea0229-7b24-4b67-92ac-46bdc30d8993).html.

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This thesis seeks to show that by using the principles of experimental archaeology it is possible to reconsider the extent to which the ancient writers understood the use of artillery in the field and under siege conditions. A combination of philological and experimental approaches has been taken to determine not only how catapults could be used by Hellenistic armies, but also why certain actions were taken when artillery was brought into the field. The experimental approach is discussed throughout the thesis, with attention drawn to its merits and disadvantages, and how these can be used to improve the methodologies through which we can further develop our understanding of Hellenistic military history and technology. There are three main sections to the thesis. The first takes a philological approach to considering the ancient artillery treatises by Philon, Heron, and Biton, with reference to Vitruvius' work on catapults. Each treatise is assessed with regard to its level of technicality and the extent to which it can be used for the purpose of constructing catapults. The treatises are then used in the second part of the thesis to construct functional replicas of the Hellenistic stone-thrower and the Hellenistic bolt-shooter. In the third part of the thesis, the catapults are tested against the ancient writers' descriptions of their use in the field. The findings of this thesis show that the ancient writers were broadly accurate in their descriptions of catapult use, but that they appear to be largely unaware of the reasoning behind their deployment. The thesis also highlights problematic parts of the technical treatises which previous scholars have ignored, in particular gaps in the descriptions of some components necessary for the catapults to function. Moreover, solutions are offered to complete the gaps left by the technical writers, especially where none are offered by the commentaries on these works. This thesis also demonstrates that catapults had a specific function in Hellenistic warfare which focused largely on sieges and static engagements. Most importantly, however, this thesis shows that not only can practical experimental methods successfully be applied to otherwise text-based research, but that it produces significant results which can aid in our understanding of military history, ancient technology, and the reliability of the ancient writers.
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Ostwald, Jamel Mindel. "Vauban's siege legacy in the War of The Spanish Succession, 1702-1712." Columbus, OH : Ohio State University, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1039049324.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2002.
Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 389 p.: ill. (some col.). Includes abstract and vita. Advisors: John Rule and John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Dept. of History. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 136-144). Includes bibliographical references (p. 363-389).
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Campbell, Duncan B. "Aspects of Roman siegecraft." Thesis, Connect to e-thesis, 2002. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/776/.

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Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Glasgow, 2002.
Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Department of Archaeology, University of Glasgow, 2002. Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.
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Lovsin, Robert D. "Non-conventional armament linkages : nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the United Kingdom and Iraq." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2011. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7021/.

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This dissertation examines the reasons why states want to acquire nonconventional weapons and analyzes interconnections between decisions on nuclear weapons (NW) on the one hand and chemical/biological weapons (CBW) on the other. Much of the literature on non-conventional weapons has tended to focus either on nuclear weapons or on CBW, with CBW often portrayed as the “poor man's nuclear bomb.” While there is some truth in this, the interconnections between decisions to develop NW and decisions to develop CBW are more numerous, more varied and more nuanced. The dissertation examines non-conventional armament processes in the United Kingdom and Iraq. Using two disparate cases provides the analysis with a comprehensive data set, the lessons from which have formed the basis of the analysis. Having nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons for the purpose of use is not always a state's ultimate goal and factors as wide-ranging as national prestige and the maintenance of international relationships are important in determining why some states decide to pursue NBC weapons. The case study findings have been synthesized into four key areas in which NBC linkages are particularly significant: strategic issues and strategic cultures; political considerations; economics and finances; and future challenges. The key finding is that there are interconnections that show how NW and CBW influence each other. For example, both the UK and Iraq showed that if nuclear weapons were not available, interest in CBW would increase. Conversely, possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily rule out interest in acquiring CBW armament. Non-conventional weapons present a significant challenge to the maintenance of international peace and security. As this dissertation demonstrates, NBC weapons are linked on many levels and it is important to understand how CBW can and do influence policy on nuclear weapons and vice versa.
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McCotter, Stephen Edward John. "The strategy and tactics of siege warfare in the early Byzantine period : from Constantine to Heraclius." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.318794.

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Richoux, Nicolas. "Recherches sur la poliorcétique sous le Haut Empire, d’Auguste à Sévère Alexandre (31 avant J.-C. - 235 après J.-C.)." Thesis, Paris 4, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA040056.

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La poliorcétique romaine connut apogée et suprématie sous le Haut Empire, dans un monde antique urbanisé où les guerres ne cessèrent jamais. Elle est bien davantage que le simple art de faire le siège d’une ville ou d’une place forte. Elle comprend tous les modes d’action, violents ou non. La guerre de siège et la défense en font également partie. Pragmatique, le général romain cherchait la conquête au moindre coût et n’utilisait la violence qu’en dernier lieu. L’assaut dans la foulée, très pratiqué, était d’une efficacité redoutable. Il évitait les désagréments d’un siège incertain, techniquement complexe, demandant une logistique considérable, dévoreur d’hommes, de temps et d’argent. Pour toutes ces raisons, le siège en règle était finalement assez peu fréquent. Une fois entrepris, il pouvait requérir, mais sans doute moins souvent qu’on ne le pense, des travaux lourds et complexes, exigeant de l’armée une division du travail poussée. Au combat, la complémentarité et l’efficacité du couple légion/auxiliaires n’a pas été assez soulignée, de même que l’importance du combat interarmes, incluant l’utilisation systématique des appuis, artillerie, archers et parfois frondeurs. L’assaut final semble avoir été assez rare et les dénouements alternatifs fréquents. Le traitement des vaincus dépendait de leur opiniâtreté. Sans pitié pour ceux qui leur résistaient, les Romains étaient assez pragmatiques pour les autres, en fonction des buts recherchés. Enfin, la prise d’une ville, était génératrice de richesses. Elle renforçait la légitimité impériale et le butin, matériel et humain, était un complément non négligeable pour le chef et le soldat
Roman siege warfare achieved its upmost efficiency and supremacy under the Early Empire in an antique world in which wars were permanent. Siege warfare is far more than the simple art of besieging cities or fortresses. It includes violent and non-violent courses of action. Siege wars and defense are part of it. Pragmatic, the roman general was eager to capture cities at low cost and use of violence came last. Storming assault was frequently employed and very effective. It avoided dangers of an uncertain siege, characterized by technical complexity, an important logistics, potentially high losses, time consuming and requiring huge financial resources. For all those reasons, methodical siege was not a very usual course of action. It sometimes meant, less frequently than expected, heavy siege works, requiring a demanding division of labor. During the battle, the complementarity and efficiency offered by the couple legion/auxiliaries hasn’t been stressed enough. Such is the importance of combined warfare, which systematically included the use of fire support, artillery, archeries and sometimes slingers. Regarding the capture, final assaults appear to have been rare. Alternative conclusions were most of the time the rule. Pitiless with resistant forces, Romans were rather pragmatic with others, depending on the final desired end state on the ground. When overrun, the city was generally a wealth provider. It concurred to strengthen the imperial legitimacy and, bounty, material and humans as well, was an important financial contribution for the general and the soldier
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Purdie, Margaret Helen. "An account by John Cananus of the siege of Constantinople in 1422." University of Western Australia. School of Humanities, 2009. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2009.0189.

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Wilmart, Julien. "Les deux compagnies de Mousquetaires du roi de France (1622-1815) : corps d’élite, confiance royale et service extraordinaire." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Sorbonne université, 2022. http://www.theses.fr/2022SORUL092.

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Les deux compagnies de Mousquetaires du roi appartenaient aux unités de la garde rapprochée du souverain, qui prit le nom, sous Louis XIV, de Maison militaire du roi. Créée en 1622 par Louis XIII à partir de la compagnie des Carabins de Henri IV, la première compagnie demeura sur pied jusqu’en 1646, époque à laquelle Mazarin la licencia. En 1657, Louis XIV et le cardinal la rétablirent. En 1634, le roi se fit capitaine en titre du corps, déléguant le commandement à un capitaine-lieutenant, témoignant ainsi un insigne honneur et son affection particulière envers ses Mousquetaires. En 1660, Mazarin offrit à Louis XIV sa propre compagnie de Mousquetaires à cheval comme cadeau de mariage. Établies sur le même pied en 1665, ces deux compagnies virent leurs fonctions dépasser leur rôle intrinsèque de garde du roi. Louis XIV fit en effet des troupes de sa Maison des unités d’élite et leur assigna un service de guerre : dès lors, les Mousquetaires participèrent à toutes les guerres, s’y forgèrent leur réputation et décidèrent plus d’une fois du sort de l’engagement. Ils portaient partout la marque de la puissance royale et furent ainsi régulièrement utilisés dans le cadre de missions délicates pour réprimer des soulèvements intérieurs ou arrêter des personnages influents, constituant une police politique royale. Les Mousquetaires apparaissaient donc comme les représentants de l’arbitraire royal. De par leur proximité avec le souverain et leur efficacité militaire, Louis XIV en fit également une école militaire pour la jeune et haute noblesse du royaume, qui était invitée à venir y apprendre les rudiments du métier des armes avant d’espérer obtenir un commandement. Les deux compagnies devinrent ainsi une pépinière d’officiers des armées royales. Malgré le dynamisme de cette école et leur utilité notamment à contenir la guerre des Farines à Paris, les Mousquetaires furent licenciés par Louis XVI en 1775. Éphémèrement rétablis dans l’Armée des Princes en 1791-1792 et sous la Restauration en 1814, Louis XVIII les supprima définitivement en 1815. Ce travail de recherche d’histoire militaire conduit une double approche en étudiant les Mousquetaires comme l’exemple du fonctionnement d’un corps d’élite de l’armée française d’Ancien Régime, sans toutefois négliger l’ensemble des particularités propres à cette troupe qui fondèrent leur renommée
The two companies of the Mousquetaires du roi of France were part of the royal bodyguard units, named Maison militaire during the reign of Louis XIV. The first company was created in 1622 by Luis XIII from the unit of the Carabiniers instituted by his father Henry IV. This company remained active until 1646, when it was disbanded by Mazarin, to be revived by Luis XIV and Cardinal Mazarin in 1657. In 1634, the King transferred the command of the companies to a Captain-Lieutenant. This endorsement highlights the King’s respect and fondness towards the Mousquetaires. In 1660, Mazarin offered his own company of cavalry musketeers to Luis XIV as a wedding gift. Established in 1665, the two companies saw their functions expanded beyond their initial intrinsic role of royal bodyguards. Under Louis XIV, the Royal Household became an elite unit with a vital military role in wars. During his reign, the Mousquetaires participated to each war and forged their reputation as a crucial element to the success of the battles they fought. They became a symbol of the royal power and were employed by the King in delicate missions to shut down riots or silence prominent political figures. The Mousquetaires functioned as the royal political police. In addition to being recognized for their military prowess and benefiting from the King’s endorsement, under Louis XIV the Mousquetaires became a military school for the nobles, who were encouraged to join the company to gain the military experience needed as aspiring commanders. The two companies became indeed a treasure trove of officials for the Royal Army. Despite their dynamism and crucial role in containing the Flour War in Paris, the Mousquetaires were disbanded by Louis XVI in 1775. Only briefly reestablished within the “Armée des Princes” in 1791-1792 and under the Restoration in 1814, the companies were permanently disbanded in 1815 by Louis XVIII. The research on military history presented here focuses not only on the role of the Mousquetaires as an elite corps of the French army during the Old Regime, but also on the peculiarities that contributed to their fame
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Tami, Alan. "L'art de la guerre au temps des croisades (491/1098 - 589/1193) : Du théocentrisme irrationnel aux influences mutuelles et adaptations pragmatiques dans le domaine militaire." Phd thesis, Université Michel de Montaigne - Bordeaux III, 2012. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00735126.

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Jusqu'aux croisades, les rencontres entre l'Orient musulman et l'Occident chrétien avaient été réduites à des échanges commerciaux anecdotiques ainsi qu'à de rares pèlerinages en Terre sainte. Et alors que les musulmans méprisaient souverainement des peuplades septentrionales vouées, selon eux, à l'égarement et à l'ignorance, les Occidentaux avaient fait de la jeune religion orientale et de ses sectateurs l'Antéchrist de leur eschatologie apocalyptique. Tous étaient imprégnés d'un théocentrisme intransigeant ne laissant aucune place à un Autre ignoré ou abhorré, si ce n'est celle de l'Ennemi. Il fallut donc une guerre généralisée entre ces deux ensembles civilisationnels aux antipodes pour qu'enfin ils se rencontrent et se côtoient durablement, jusqu'à estomper en partie des préjugés et des images déformées longtemps entretenus. Paradoxalement, la guerre et ses principales émanations (la stratégie, la tactique, l'armement et l'architecture militaire) allaient être les causes d'une meilleure connaissance mutuelle. En cherchant à répondre au mieux au défi militaire lancé par l'adversaire, chacun fut contraint de scruter les intentions, la mentalité, et surtout l'art de la guerre de l'autre ; ainsi, on n'hésita pas à en copier les concepts et les procédés jugés profitables, de même que les deux camps firent montre, dans ce domaine, d'une adaptabilité multiforme exceptionnelle. En somme, loin de la vision répandue présentant les croisades comme des conflits séculaires purement religieux ayant opposé de manière manichéenne deux conceptions monolithiques et hermétiques du monde et de la guerre, il semblerait en réalité que la Syrie du XIIe siècle fut d'abord un creuset d'échanges dans lequel le maître mot était "pragmatisme".
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Books on the topic "Siege warfare"

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Duffy, Christopher. Siege warfare. London: New York, 1996.

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Kern, Paul Bentley. Ancient siege warfare. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

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Kern, Paul Bentley. Ancient siege warfare. London: Souvenir Press, 1999.

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Durman, Laura. Siege. Mankato, Minn: Arcturus Pub., 2013.

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Donnelly, Mark P. Siege: Castles at war. Dallas, Tex: Taylor Pub. Co., 1998.

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Amersfoort, H. Belaagd en belegerd. Amsterdam: Balans, 2011.

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Mitták, Ferenc. Várostromok a magyar történelemből. Debrecen: TKK, 2005.

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Turner, Alexander. Messines 1917: The zenith of siege warfare. Oxford: Osprey, 2010.

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1950-, Dennis Peter, ed. Messines 1917: The zenith of siege warfare. Oxford: Osprey, 2010.

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Dargie, Richard. Castle under siege. Austin, Tex: Raintree Steck-Vaughn, 1999.

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Book chapters on the topic "Siege warfare"

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Roy, Kaushik. "Siege War Before the Gunpowder Age." In A Global History of Warfare and Technology, 75–96. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3478-0_6.

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van den Boogaard, Jeroen C., and Arjen Vermeer. "Precautions in Attack and Urban and Siege Warfare." In Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 163–98. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-264-4_5.

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Sullivan, Denis. "Technical aspects of siege warfare in the eleventh century." In War in Eleventh-Century Byzantium, 315–31. London; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2021. | Series: Routledge research in Byzantium studies: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429201356-19.

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Hall, Joshua R. "As They Were Ripped from the Altars: Civilians, Sacrilege and Classical Greek Siege Warfare." In Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy, 185–206. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58532-5_9.

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Robson, Fergus. "Siege Warfare in Comparative Early Modern Contexts: Norms, Nuances, Myth and Massacre During the Revolutionary Wars." In Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy, 83–105. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58532-5_5.

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Schofield, Aimee. "Keeping It Together: Aeneas Tacticus and Unit Cohesion in Ancient Greek Siege Warfare." In Unit Cohesion and Warfare in the Ancient World, 45–61. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315171753-4.

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Dosquet, Emilie. "Between Positional Warfare and Small War: Soldiers and Civilians During the ‘Desolation of the Palatinate’ (1688–89)." In Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy, 107–36. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58532-5_6.

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Dowdall, Alex. "‘Like Troy, Though About as Much Larger … as the Encyclopaedia Britannica is Larger than the Iliad’: Civilians and Siege Warfare During the First World War." In Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy, 61–81. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58532-5_4.

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"Siege Warfare,." In Pyrrhic Victory, 105–52. Harvard University Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt13x0fkn.8.

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Rawlings, Louis. "Siege warfare." In The Ancient Greeks at War, 128–42. Manchester University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719056574.003.0008.

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Conference papers on the topic "Siege warfare"

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Coppola, Giovanni. "Assedi e macchine da guerra nel Mezzogiorno normanno, XI e XII secolo." In FORTMED2024 - Defensive Architecture of the Mediterranean. Valencia: Universitat Politàcnica de València, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/fortmed2024.2024.18071.

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Abstract:
The establishment of Norman authority in southern Italy and Sicily was the result of an unprecedented effort that would substantially alter the future political order of the Mediterranean. The most effective military action adopted by Norman commanders was siege warfare, carried out against the main fortifications and major urban centers. This technique, very much related to Byzantine military traditions, consisted in surrounding with the army the place to be conquered with one or more small "counter-castles", preventing supplies from the outside, and at the same time engineering some powerful war machines, built for the occasion by the doctissimi artifices, which hammered the walls with intensity forcing it to surrender. The sophisticated lignorum machinae presented different types: mobile towers equipped with battering-rams, petrary, ballistae in addition to the well-known trebuchets with rope or counterweight devices.Starting from the written sources of the period, the essay aims to describe the salient phases of the main sieges conducted by the Normans between the 11th and 12th centuries, in which they experimented with singular warfare tools and strategies to get the better of the Lombard, Byzantine and Muslim armies.
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Yanez Pacios, Roberto T. "MODERN FORTIFICATION AND WARFARE: GRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE SIEGE OF FUENTERRABIA (1638)." In SGEM 2014 Scientific SubConference on ARTS, PERFORMING ARTS, ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN. Stef92 Technology, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2014/b41/s15.099.

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