Academic literature on the topic 'Single-Leader-Multi-Follower game'

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Journal articles on the topic "Single-Leader-Multi-Follower game"

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Harks, Tobias, Mona Henle, Max Klimm, Jannik Matuschke, and Anja Schedel. "Multi-Leader Congestion Games with an Adversary." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, no. 5 (2022): 5068–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20439.

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We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum loads causing additional costs for the leaders. For the resulting strategic game among the leaders, we show that pure Nash equilibria fail to exist and therefore, we consider approximate equilibria instead. As our first main result, we show that the existence of a K-approximate equilibrium can always be guaranteed, where K (approximately equal to 1.1974) is
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Liang, Chengji, Weiwei Sun, Jian Shi, Kailai Wang, Yue Zhang, and Gino Lim. "Decarbonizing Maritime Transport through Green Fuel-Powered Vessel Retrofitting: A Game-Theoretic Approach." Journal of Marine Science and Engineering 12, no. 7 (2024): 1174. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jmse12071174.

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Addressing the urgent global challenge of man-made greenhouse gas emissions and climate change necessitates collaborative action between shipping lines and government regulatory agencies. Aligning with the International Maritime Organization’s emissions reduction strategy, this paper presents a novel bi-level programming model that unifies these stakeholders. On the upper level of the proposed bi-level model, a number of shipping lines optimize retrofitting plans for their vessels to maximize economic benefits. On the lower level, the regulatory agency responds to the carbon reduction efforts
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Liu, Lu-Ping, and Wen-Sheng Jia. "An Intelligent Algorithm for Solving the Efficient Nash Equilibrium of a Single-Leader Multi-Follower Game." Mathematics 9, no. 5 (2021): 454. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9050454.

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This aim of this paper is to provide the immune particle swarm optimization (IPSO) algorithm for solving the single-leader–multi-follower game (SLMFG). Through cooperating with the particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm and an immune memory mechanism, the IPSO algorithm is designed. Furthermore, we define the efficient Nash equilibrium from the perspective of mathematical economics, which maximizes social welfare and further refines the number of Nash equilibria. In the end, numerical experiments show that the IPSO algorithm has fast convergence speed and high effectiveness.
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Kumar, Akhilesh, Anjana Gupta, and Aparna Mehra. "A bilevel game model for ascertaining competitive target prices for a buyer in negotiation with multiple suppliers." RAIRO - Operations Research 56, no. 1 (2022): 293–330. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2021185.

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In this paper, a decision-support is developed for a strategic problem of identifying target prices for the single buyer to negotiate with multiple suppliers to achieve common goal of maintaining sustained business environment. For this purpose, oligopolistic-competitive equilibrium prices of suppliers are suggested to be considered as target prices. The problem of identifying these prices is modeled as a multi-leader-single-follower bilevel programming problem involving linear constraints and bilinear objective functions. Herein, the multiple suppliers are considered leaders competing in a Na
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Shi, Chenguang, Wei Qiu, Fei Wang, Sana Salous, and Jianjiang Zhou. "Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System." Electronics 8, no. 4 (2019): 397. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics8040397.

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In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader
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Bao, Xiao-Ying, and Lei Zhang. "Green Procurement Relationships Development under Carbon Emissions Regulations: A Bi-Level Programming Approach." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 15, no. 10 (2018): 2183. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15102183.

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A multi-period Stackelberg game is adopted to study a green procurement relationship between manufacturers and suppliers in a supply chain. The manufacturers are considered as leaders, while the suppliers are modelled as followers in this Stackelberg game. Accordingly, a mixed binary linear bi-level programming model is developed to elaborate the game in consideration of carbon tax scheme. The upper level (the leader) aims at selecting a proper number of suitable suppliers to provide heterogeneous raw materials at the lowest operational cost. The objective of the lower level (the follower) is
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Zuo, Juan, WenBo Wang, and XiangMin Hou. "A two-tier game model based scheduling strategy for Virtual Power Plants." Journal of Physics: Conference Series 2378, no. 1 (2022): 012096. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2378/1/012096.

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Abstract Recently, there has been a lot of attention on how to enhance the management capabilities of distributed electricity production and demand aggregation by Virtual Power Plants (VPPs), which poses the challenge of leveraging their ability to participate in electricity markets to maximize operating profits. This paper analyzes the scheduling problem in fully distributed controlled VPP and proposes a two-level game model. In this model, the Stackelberg game is used to describe the interaction between Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and Energy Management System (EMS). On the other hand,
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Ganguly, Baishakhi, Biswajit Sarkar, Mitali Sarkar, Sarla Pareek, and Muhammad Omair. "Influence of controllable lead time, premium price, and unequal shipments under environmental effects in a supply chain management." RAIRO - Operations Research 53, no. 4 (2019): 1427–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2018041.

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Recently, carbon emission becomes a major issue during transportation of products from one player to another player. Due to the increasing number of single-setup-multi-delivery (SSMD) policies by several industries, fixed and variable transportation cost and carbon emission cost are considered. The aim of the model is to reduce the total cost of supply chain for controlling the lead time and to diminish setup cost by a discrete investment. A premium cost is introduced and Stackelberg game policy is employed to obtain the analytical solution. Some numerical examples are given to validate the mo
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Xiao, Yong, Xiaoming Lin, Yiyong Lei, et al. "Blockchain-Assisted Secure Energy Trading in Electricity Markets: A Tiny Deep Reinforcement Learning-Based Stackelberg Game Approach." Electronics 13, no. 18 (2024): 3647. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics13183647.

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Electricity markets are intricate systems that facilitate efficient energy exchange within interconnected grids. With the rise of low-carbon transportation driven by environmental policies and tech advancements, energy trading has become crucial. This trend towards Electric Vehicles (EVs) is bolstered by the pivotal role played by EV charging operators in providing essential charging infrastructure and services for widespread EV adoption. This paper introduces a blockchain-assisted secure electricity trading framework between EV charging operators and the electricity market with renewable ener
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Scopelliti, Domenico. "On a Class of Multistage Stochastic Hierarchical Problems." Mathematics 10, no. 21 (2022): 4044. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math10214044.

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In this paper, following the multistage stochastic approach proposed by Rockafellar and Wets, we analyze a class of multistage stochastic hierarchical problems: the Multistage Stochastic Optimization Problem with Quasi-Variational Inequality Constraints. Such a problem is defined in a suitable functional setting relative to a finite set of possible scenarios and certain information fields. The key of this multistage stochastic hierarchical problem turns out to be the nonanticipativity: some constraints have to be included in the formulation to take into account the partial information progress
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Single-Leader-Multi-Follower game"

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Lasluisa, Daniel. "Contributions to optimization in energy : from bilevel optimization to optimal design of renewable energy plant." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Perpignan, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024PERP0009.

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Dans ce travail de thèse, nous développons et appliquons des techniques d'optimisation dans la conception et la gestion de l'énergie. Tout d'abord, nous nous concentrons sur l'optimisation bi-niveaux et développons une nouvelle analyse théorique pour les jeux à un seul meneur et plusieurs suiveurs avec des contraintes de cardinalité. Cette analyse est ensuite appliquée à la localisation optimale des stations de recharge pour véhicules électriques. La deuxième partie est consacrée à l'optimisation économique, à long terme et à court terme, des centrales solaires à concentration. Une approche in
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Conference papers on the topic "Single-Leader-Multi-Follower game"

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Coniglio, Stefano, Nicola Gatti, and Alberto Marchesi. "Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers." In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/25.

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The problem of computing the strategy to commit to has been widely investigated in the scientific literature for the case where a single-follower is present. In the multi-follower setting though, results are only sporadic. In this paper, we address the multi-follower case for normal-form games, assuming that, after observing the leader’s commitment, the followers play pure strategies and reach a Nash equilibrium. We focus on the pessimistic case where, among many equilibria, one minimizing the leader’s utility is chosen (the opposite case is computationally trivial). We show that the problem i
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Panchal, Jitesh H., Marco Gero Ferna´ndez, Janet K. Allen, Christiaan J. J. Paredis, and Farrokh Mistree. "An Interval-Based Focalization Method for Decision-Making in Decentralized, Multi-Functional Design." In ASME 2005 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. ASMEDC, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2005-85322.

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Multi-functional design problems are characterized by strong coupling between design variables that are controlled by stakeholders from different disciplines. This coupling necessitates efficient modeling of interactions between multiple designers who want to achieve conflicting objectives but share control over design variables. Various game-theoretic protocols such as cooperative, non-cooperative, and leader/follower have been used to model interactions between designers. Non-cooperative game theory protocols are of particular interest for modeling cooperation in multi-functional design prob
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Chen, Yang, Xiao Kou, Mohammed Olama, et al. "Bi-Level Optimization for Electricity Transaction in Smart Community With Modular Pump Hydro Storage." In ASME 2020 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2020-22368.

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Abstract Grid integration of the increasing distributed energy resources could be challenging in terms of new infrastructure investment, power grid stability, etc. To resolve more renewables locally and reduce the need for extensive electricity transmission, a community energy transaction market is assumed with market operator as the leader whose responsibility is to generate local energy prices and clear the energy transaction payment among the prosumers (followers). The leader and multi-followers have competitive objectives of revenue maximization and operational cost minimization. This non-
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