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Journal articles on the topic 'Single transferable voting'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 26 January 2023

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1

Bartholdi, John J., and James B. Orlin. "Single transferable vote resists strategic voting." Social Choice and Welfare 8, no. 4 (1991): 341–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00183045.

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2

Tideman, Nicolaus. "The Single Transferable Vote." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 1 (1995): 27–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.1.27.

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The single transferable vote (STV) is a family of vote-counting procedures that use voters’ rankings of candidates as input and achieve proportional representation. This paper compares STV with other types of voting procedures and discusses the history of STV, issues concerning the rules of STV, limitations of various versions of STV, and a new version of STV based on paired comparisons of sets of candidates. Each refinement of STV overcomes a limitation of previous versions but at some cost in either the difficulty of understanding the procedure, the cost of computing the outcome, or both.

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3

Marsh, Michael. "Voting for government coalitions in Ireland under single transferable vote." Electoral Studies 29, no. 3 (2010): 329–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.004.

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4

Davies, Jessica, Nina Narodytska, and Toby Walsh. "Eliminating the Weakest Link: Making Manipulation Intractable?" Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 26, no. 1 (2021): 1333–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8254.

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Successive elimination of candidates is often a route to making manipulation intractable to compute. We prove that eliminating candidates does not necessarily increase the computational complexity of manipulation. However, for many voting rules used in practice, the computational complexity increases. For example, it is already known that it is NP-hard to compute how a single voter can manipulate the result of single transferable voting (the elimination version of plurality voting). We show here that it is NP-hard to compute how a single voter can manipulate the result of the elimination versi

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5

Khafaga, Doaa S., Hussein Alkattan, and Alhumaima A. Subhi. "Evaluating the Effect of Optimized Voting Using Hybrid Particle Swarm and Grey Wolf Algorithm on the Classification of the Zoo Dataset." Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Metaheuristics 2, no. 1 (2022): 08–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.54216/jaim.020101.

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When there are numerous possible solutions for a given class in a given problem, majority voting or plurality voting is typically employed. One common technique for improving classification accuracy is bagging, which involves training many classifiers on slightly different datasets and then voting on the combined results. In this research, we examine how alternative voting procedures affect the efficiency of two distinct classification algorithms applied to datasets of varying complexity. Despite the increased computing cost associated with determining preference order, the results show that t

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6

Toplak, Jurij. "Preferential Voting: Definition and Classification." Lex localis - Journal of Local Self-Government 15, no. 4 (2017): 737–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.4335/15.4.737-761(2017).

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There is no single definition for ‘preferential voting’ or ‘preference voting’ since the terms are used for a number of different election systems and groups of such systems. They can be synonymous with the single-transferable vote, the alternative vote, open-list proportional representation, or the group of all ranking methods. This article offers an overview of the various definitions and classifications of preferential voting and other terms used in the literature to describe it. It proposes a common understanding of preferential voting. I suggest that preferentiality ought to be one of the

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7

Fournier, Patrick, and Masaru Kohno. "Japan's Multimember SNTV System and Strategic Voting: A Rejoinder." Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 2 (2001): 241–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109901000251.

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Five major claims are made in our paper on strategic voting within the context of Japan's multimember single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system (Fournier and Kohno, 2000). Two claims deal with the reconciliation of Steven Reed's (1990) and Gary Cox's (1997) important work on extending Duverger's law to the Japanese case, and three claims deal with the informational effects of partisan labels on strategic voting.

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8

Felsenthal, Dan S., Zeev Maoz, and Amnon Rapoport. "An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference?" British Journal of Political Science 23, no. 1 (1993): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400006542.

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Six single- or multi-winner voting procedures are compared to one another in terms of the outcomes of thirty-seven real elections conducted in Britain by various trade unions, professional associations and non-profit-making organizations. The six procedures examined are two versions of plurality voting (PV), approval voting (AV), the Borda-count (BR), the alternative and repeated alternative vote (ALV–RAL) and the single transferable vote (STV). These procedures are evaluated in terms of two general and five specific criteria that are common in social-choice theory. In terms of these criteria

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9

Tsai, Chia-Hung. "Policy-Making, Local Factions and Candidate Coordination in Single Non-Transferable Voting." Party Politics 11, no. 1 (2005): 59–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068805048473.

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10

Myerson, Roger B. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems." American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 856–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938819.

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A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank-scor

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11

Elkind, Edith, Piotr Faliszewski, and Arkadii Slinko. "Good Rationalizations of Voting Rules." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 24, no. 1 (2010): 774–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7607.

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We explore the relationship between two approaches to rationalizing voting rules: the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) framework originally suggested by Condorcet and recently studied by Conitzer, Rognlie, and Xia, and the distance rationalizability (DR) framework of Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko. The former views voting as an attempt to reconstruct the correct ordering of the candidates given noisy estimates (i.e., votes), while the latter explains voting as search for the nearest consensus outcome. We provide conditions under which an MLE interpretation of a voting rule coincides with i

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12

Santucci, Jack. "Variants of Ranked-Choice Voting from a Strategic Perspective." Politics and Governance 9, no. 2 (2021): 344–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3955.

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Ranked-choice voting has come to mean a range of electoral systems. Broadly, they can facilitate (a) majority winners in single-seat districts, (b) majority rule with minority representation in multi-seat districts, or (c) majority sweeps in multi-seat districts. Further, such systems can combine with rules to encourage/discourage slate voting. This article describes five major versions used, abandoned, and/or proposed for US public elections: alternative vote, single transferable vote, block-preferential voting, the bottoms-up system, and alternative vote with numbered posts. It then consider

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13

Blom, Michelle, Andrew Conway, Peter J. Stuckey, and Vanessa J. Teague. "Did That Lost Ballot Box Cost Me a Seat? Computing Manipulations of STV Elections." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 08 (2020): 13235–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i08.7029.

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Mistakes made by humans, or machines, commonly arise when managing ballots cast in an election. In the 2013 Australian Federal Election, for example, 1,370 West Australian Senate ballots were lost, eventually leading to a costly re-run of the election. Other mistakes include ballots that are misrecorded by electronic voting systems, voters that cast invalid ballots, or vote multiple times at different polling locations. We present a method for assessing whether such problems could have made a difference to the outcome of a Single Transferable Vote (STV) election – a complex system of preferent

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14

Urbańczyk, Michał. "Alternatywne ordynacje wyborcze. Przykład Australii i Irlandii." Opolskie Studia Administracyjno-Prawne 14, no. 3 (2016): 193–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.25167/osap.1483.

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The essence of democracy is the rule of the sovereign, that is the nation, today understood as all of the state’s citizens. At present, the most common type of governance is representative democracy, exercised by representatives elected from the citizens themselves. Therefore, for the proper functioning of liberal democracy it is difficult to find a more important issue than the procedure for the election of those who govern us. The article presents two alternative electoral systems: an alternative voting system (AV) and the system of Single Transferable Vote (STV).

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15

Johnson, Thomas H., and Ronald J. Barnhart. "An Examination of Afghanistan’s 2018 Wolesi Jirga Elections: Chaos, Confusion and Fraud." Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 7, no. 1 (2020): 57–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2347797020906635.

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This article’s primarily focus concerns Afghanistan’s ‘democratic’ electoral processes and procedures. Fraud and other critical aspects of the 2018 election for the Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament, are systematically assessed and official election data and results are examined in depth. As witnessed in earlier Wolesi Jirga elections, this legislative election was duplicitous and unrepresentative. By definition, a democratic legislature serves as the voice of a country’s population. Assessing the voting results in Kabul, the largest and most important province, can summari

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16

Butler, Andrew S. "JM Kelly's The Irish Constitution." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 26, no. 3 (1996): 615. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v26i3.6160.

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This article is a book review of G Hogan and G Whyte JM Kelly's The Irish Constitution (3rd ed, Buttersworths, Dublin, 1994) 1222 + cxxii pages (including index). A noticeable feature of the commentary and jurisprudence on modern New Zealand public law has been the willingness to draw on comparative material. Butler notes that Ireland is one such jurisdiction from which New Zealand draws inspiration, including Ireland's single transferable vote system (New Zealand's voting system at the time), as well as Ireland's status as a republic (given New Zealand's continued debate over republicanism).

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17

Hix, Simon. "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament." World Politics 56, no. 2 (2004): 194–223. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0012.

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Despite a sophisticated understanding of the impact of electoral institutions on macrolevel political behavior, little is known about the relationship between these institutions and microlevel legislative behavior. This article reviews existing claims about this relationship and develops a model for predicting how electoral institutions affect the relationship between parliamentarians and their party principals in the context of the European Parliament. The European Parliament is an ideal laboratory for investigating these effects, because in each European Union member state, different institu

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18

Packaral, Mathew, Phil Harris, and Chris Rudd. "Election Forecasting: Development of the Constant Sum Scale to be used in Telephone Surveys." International Journal of Market Research 51, no. 6 (2009): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/147078530905100606.

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The Constant Sum Scale has been successfully tested to forecast election results in face-to-face surveys. As political polls are carried out using telephone surveys, there was a need to test the scale for use in telephone surveys. In this study the Constant Sum Scale was tested for implementation in a telephone survey. The study was carried out during an election that used the single transferable voting system, and the Constant Sum Scale was utilised to forecast the election outcome. The validation against the election results showed that the Constant Sum Scale was successful in ranking the ca

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19

Joo Ha, Lee. "Politics of Social Policy-Making in South Korea an Japan." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 22, no. 2 (2008): 109–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps22205.

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Until recently, welfare politics in Korea and Japan tended to be dominated by conservative forces "from above." This paper investigates the formation and domination of such forces from above, with a focus on the interaction between institutional arrangements and strategic maneuvering by political actors which, I argue, constitutes the politics of (social) policy-making. The notion of the politics of social policy-making aims to provide a more politically and institutionally sensitive framework than the pluralist analysis of policy-making. Korea and Japan share some crucial institutional legaci

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20

Gallagher, Michael, and A. R. Unwin. "Electoral Distortion under STV Random Sampling Procedures." British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 2 (1986): 243–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400003902.

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This Note will discuss the impact of random sampling at elections conducted under the single transferable vote (STV) electoral system in multi-member constituencies in the Republic of Ireland. STV, partly because of its popularity among electoral reformers, has received considerable theoretical scrutiny. It has been given an ‘intermediate’ rating in recent assessment of a number of electoral systems, and dismissed as a ‘perverse social choice function’ because it is subject to non-monotonicity. This shortcoming is also mainly responsible for the low degree of acceptance accorded to it by Brams

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21

Jang, Jinhyeok, and Nick C. N. Lin. "Personal votes, electoral competitiveness of parties, and legislative representation in Taiwan under SNTV." Japanese Journal of Political Science 20, no. 1 (2018): 21–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109918000397.

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AbstractWe advance the literature on electoral institutions and legislative representation by investigating legislators’ position taking strategies in Taiwan under the single non-transferable voting period. Existing research largely assumes that representatives elected from the same electoral rule behave similarly. We challenge this conventional understanding by arguing that legislators in multi-member districts (MMDs) tend to move toward the extreme direction from the party line if they come from districts where their party is less competitive. This pattern of legislative representation allow

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22

Maushagen, Cynthia, Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe, and Ann-Kathrin Selker. "Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules." Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, August 9, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-022-09802-5.

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AbstractIn iterative voting systems, candidates are eliminated in consecutive rounds until either a fixed number of rounds is reached or the set of remaining candidates does not change anymore. We focus on iterative voting systems based on the positional scoring rules plurality, veto, and Borda and study their resistance against shift bribery attacks introduced by Elkind et al. [1] and Kaczmarczyk and Faliszewski [2]. In constructive shift bribery (Elkind et al. [1]), an attacker seeks to make a designated candidate win the election by bribing voters to shift this candidate in their preference

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23

Freeman, Rupert, Markus Brill, and Vincent Conitzer. "On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 28, no. 1 (2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8827.

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Runoff voting rules such as single transferable vote (STV) and Baldwin's rule are of particular interest in computational social choice due to their recursive nature and hardness of manipulation, as well as in (human) practice because they are relatively easy to understand. However, they are not known for their compliance with desirable axiomatic properties, which we attempt to rectify here. We characterize runoff rules that are based on scoring rules using two axioms: a weakening of local independence of irrelevant alternatives and a variant of population-consistency. We then show, as our mai

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24

Skowron, Piotr, and Edith Elkind. "Social Choice Under Metric Preferences: Scoring Rules and STV." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 31, no. 1 (2017). http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10591.

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We consider voting under metric preferences: both voters and candidates are associated with points in a metric space, and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to her to ones that are further away. In this setting, it is often desirable to select a candidate that minimizes the sum of distances to the voters. However, common voting rules operate on voters' preference rankings and therefore may be unable to identify the best candidate. A relevant measure of the quality of a voting rule is then its distortion, defined as the worst-case ratio between the performance of a candidate selected

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25

Kao, Kristen. "Electoral Institutions and Identity Based Clientelism in Jordan." Political Research Quarterly, October 4, 2022, 106591292211287. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10659129221128752.

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In contexts where social cleavages are universally salient, how can political alliances across social identity groups be forged? A wealth of research examines the effects of either electoral rules or social identity on electoral behavior, but the interplay between these two factors is understudied. This article leverages original datasets of tribal voting coalitions, parliamentarian constituent casework logs, and a national survey in Jordan to demonstrate how institutions interact with social identity to shape distributive politics. Within single non-transferable vote districts (SNTV), represe

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